order by their Greek or Latin title, either their inherited title or, in the absence of such, one newly devised.

The format and nature of the individual entries can be exemplified by the treatment given to the initial entry, although many fables receive considerably briefer treatment. First, the tale is thoroughly identified: the heading (H. 1) indicates that the narrative is the initial fable in Hausrath's edition; additional references and cross-references relate the fable to A.'s medieval inventory (M. 33), to other critical editions of anonymous Greek fables (Chambry 3, Perry 1), and to pertinent motifs in Stith Thompson's *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature*; and the title of the fable is given in Greek (*Aetos kai Alôpêks*) and in English. After this basic information, the Greek and Latin sources for the tale of the Eagle and the Fox are given, leading to a summary of the fable's contents and observations on variations in content by different authors. Next, A. offers a brief description of the structure, characters, and themes of the fable, along with observations on its history and development, culminating in a stemma that traces the fable's literary history, as the author reconstructs it, from Archilochos to Romulus. Finally, A. prints possible traces of Hellenistic verse in the Greek prose versions, in support of his conviction that this fable is one of many that derive from a lost book of fables in Greek verse. Frequent references are made throughout to earlier discussions of different aspects of the Eagle and the Fox in Volumes I and II. The entry on this fable concludes with two separate sets of supplementary references, new to the English edition, one by A. and the other by van Dijk.

The fable inventory is the fruit of an enormous amount of meticulous scholarship, and it will be a welcome resource for all scholars pursuing work on individual Greek and Latin fables and fable-like narratives. Nevertheless, some of the evidence and results will be of little interest to researchers who do not share A.'s conclusions concerning the transmission of the ancient Greek fables, which, for one thing, is seen as an almost entirely literary process. The reader will find a summary of the author's views at the end of the preceding volume (II.711–26).

The four-part fable inventory is followed by an impressive series of indices, over 100 pages of them, prepared by van Dijk. These include correlations of the enumeration of the fables in the present work to those in the standard critical editions as well as to Antti Aarne's and Stith Thompson's *The Types of the Folktale* and to Thompson's *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature*, an index of the languages of the fables cited, an index of the fables by character, and an index of fable passages cited. No subject index for the work as a whole is provided, nor is there a bibliography of scholarly works cited.

Indiana University, Bloomington WILLIAM HANSEN
doi:10.1093/clrevj/bni097

EMOTIONS

J. SIHVOLA, T. ENGBERG-PEDERSEN (edd.): *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy*. (The New Synthese Historical Library 46.) Pp. xi + 380. Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998. Cased, US$184. ISBN: 0-7923-5318-8.

This set of essays results from a selection of papers read at a conference held in Helsinki in 1994, but with the addition of further specially requested contributions.

The Classical Review vol. 55 no. 1 © The Classical Association 2005; all rights reserved

https://doi.org/10.1093/clrevj/bni098 Published online by Cambridge University Press

This care in avoiding a simple reprint of raw conference papers shows in the careful cross-referencing of contributions and the gradual build up of a fairly consistent picture, which though inevitably not seamless does demonstrate that the contributors have noted each others views. The last twenty or so years has seen a resurgence of interest in Hellenistic philosophy and a deepening sophistication in its evaluation. Above all, the Stoics had been underestimated by other philosophers in antiquity and, more recently, many of their ideas have been rejected as naive and crude. Although this adverse judgement has been largely dissipated, the Stoic view of the emotions still proves a stumbling block. The apparently feeling-less Stoic sage remains the laughing-stock he was even in antiquity. This volume goes far in remedying this injustice to Stoic views. The opening five essays provide the basic arguments for this reassessment in which Chrysippus emerges as not so different after all from Plato and Aristotle, whilst Posidonius' Stoic credentials are reinstated. The Platonic and Aristotelian material is introduced by Simo Knuuttila and Juha Sihvola, who point out the variety of emphasis in Plato's treatment of the *pathe*, or what we might call the emotions, which are sometimes seen in an entirely negative light (e.g. *Phaedo*) and elsewhere have a positive rôle (e.g. the two horses of the *Phaedrus*), an idea which Aristotle develops. Here is noted the Stoic distinction of primary and secondary passions, a basic distinction which plays a vital rôle in the following discussions, for it allows the possibility of 'emotions', as primary passions, in the sage. Tad Brennan next outlines the agreed interpretation of the early Stoic philosophy of the emotions. An essential distinction is found between the primary feelings we may have and our judgement of them, i.e. whether we assent to them or not. What the Stoics are opposed to is not the externally caused experiences, of pain, joy, etc., but our false assent to them. Emotion, then, is a judgement.

Probably the most familiar topic of Stoic psychology is Posidonius' apparent criticism of Chrysippus' rejection of the emotions as a force independent of human reason. The received interpretation is that Posidonius had recourse to the Platonic tripartite soul in order to explain the internal conflict of emotions and reason. The discussion of this issue and its source in Galen figures prominently in the next three papers. John Cooper argues cogently that Galen has misinterpreted Posidonius, who, more subtly, attempts to attribute a certain subjective, even rational, factor to the primary emotions which he calls 'effective movements', whilst reserving assent to the reason. Chrisopher Gill largely agrees with Cooper's analysis, but goes one step further in noting that the location of psychic powers in soul parts is only one and not necessarily the most definitive of Plato's analyses of the internal dialogue of the soul. Even in the *Republic* a more subtle analysis regards the different aspects of soul as activities operating within a unity and thus comes close to Chrysippus. It is Galen who over-stresses the notion of location. In this respect, one might add, it is interesting that Plotinus, clearly following a Middle-Platonic emphasis, attacks the Stoics for locating the inner and empirical self in the same rather than separate entitities (*Enneads* I.4.13.). Richard Sorabji approaches the same problem by making use of Seneca's distinction of three chronologically distinct moments in the emotional involvement of soul: an involuntary preparatory reaction, a moment of judgement, and finally the failure to follow good judgement.

The Epicurean treatment of anger is outlined by John Procopé. He shows that for the Epicureans anger may be 'natural' or 'empty', the latter when it does not lead to freedom from care and pain. Philodemus, who is equally combative against what he would regard as unorthodox Epicureans as against Stoics, takes the middle ground between the positive Aristotelian view of moderated anger as good and the opposite

https://doi.org/10.1093/clrevj/bni098 Published online by Cambridge University Press

view of the Epicurean Nicasicrates, who, in rejecting all anger as bad, leans more towards the Stoic position. Most distinctive of the Epicureans' approach is their therapeutic method of dealing with anger which advocates distracting the mind from the cause of anger to more pleasant thoughts, as opposed to Chrysippus' advice to learn how to foresee and then live with the evils caused by the primary movement of passion. Richard Bett next evaluates the rather slim evidence for the sceptics' attitude to the emotions.

But is the Stoic sage inhuman in his response to his own and others' passions? Terry Irwin argues against the charge by noting in particular that the Stoics only deny that the sage assents to a false belief in the value of an appearance and not that he is not presented with such appearances. Another important distinction is the one made between objectives and ends. The sage does all in his power to achieve preferred indifferents as objectives, and in this differs little from the Aristotelian wise man. Despite, or rather because of, his omission of broader elements of Stoic theory, I.'s discussion brings some clarity to an important issue. But to compensate for this, Amelie Rorty enlarges upon the cosmic context of the Stoic sage in order to make sense of the apparent absurdity of his behaviour. The sage does not so much control wayward impulses as think them through in the context of the universal order of which he is a part. R. also illuminates the issues with a discussion of the use made by Rousseau and Freud of Stoic ideas. Martha Nussbaum traces the double meaning of *eros* in Greek culture, as beneficial and divine or as violent. The two are reconciled in Plato's *Phaedrus*, where a special kind of beneficial madness is identified as a component of love. The Stoics, however, reduce this element in their attempt to reconcile the two types of love, whilst still admitting sexual desire. The comparison with Plato is both historically justifiable and casts light on the Stoic attempt to give meaning to the sage's emotions.

The topic of the emotions is pursued beyond the strict chronological confines of the title in the last two papers, which deal respectively with Marcus Aurelius and Plotinus. Troels Engberg-Pedersen shows that beneath the apparent informality of Marcus Aurelius' text there is a coherent argument which helps to bridge the polar extremes of many of his statements about human involvement in the world. His solution, like that noted by Rorty in earlier Stoic thinkers, is based on our relationship to nature as a whole. A rational consideration of our rôle in the whole provides the key to an informed involvement in the particular situations of our lives and the exercise of enlightened emotions. Finally Eyjolfur Emilsson introduces Plotinus, whose interest in the emotions is not direct but comes primarily from a concern to maintain the impassibility of the soul and so is, in a way, dealing with the same sort of problem about human involvement in the world as Marcus Aurelius. Plotinus' approach, however, is different. Change is located in the body, whilst the soul's involvement is seen as active rather than passive. An interesting corollary is that for Plotinus it is possible to be unaware of an affection or pain, for it is the living body which experiences pain whilst the soul may or may not be aware of the experience of the body. But other affections, such as anger, may begin from the soul, although the soul in these cases is an active agent or cause of the anger. The inclusion of these last two thinkers forms a fitting conclusion to an excellent sequence of discussions because they clearly demonstrate the continuum of engagement with the same basic issues and at the same time a freshness and novelty of approach.

University College Dublin ANDREW SMITH
doi:10.1093/clrevj/bni098

https://doi.org/10.1093/clrevj/bni098 Published online by Cambridge University Press