DE CORONA

H. YUNIS (ed.): *Demosthenes:* On the Crown. Pp. xii + 314, map. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Paper, £16.95. ISBN: 0-521-62930-6 (0-521-62092-9 hbk).

For most of the twentieth century Demosthenes was a rather neglected author. But the oration *On the Crown* is an exception, and after Hermann Wankel's massive commentary in German (1976) and Stephen Usher's edition for English-speaking students in the Aris & Phillips series (1993), one might wonder whether another commentary is needed so soon on this particular text: are there not many other Demosthenic speeches whose need is more urgent? Yet there is no denying the importance of this oration from both historical and literary points of view; and in fact there was a gap between Usher's elementary presentation and Wankel's exhaustive erudition, which Harvey Yunis has rightly perceived and admirably filled.

The introduction is short but good. It includes a concise account of the political and military events leading up to the trial. Y. says less than Usher about Demosthenes' career as an orator, but he gives a good survey of his rhetorical art. There are, however, two important problems which are not adequately considered. First, although Y. remarks that 'the trial was postponed' (p. 10), he does not discuss how this was done: who had legal authority to decide that a prosecution initiated in 336 should come to trial in 330 and not before? Secondly, there is the problem of the relationship between the text which we have and the speech as spoken. Y. thinks that 'the written text closely resembled the version delivered in court', and that 'it is the right length and complexity for the kind of trial that took place' (p. 26). He does not explain how he knows that it is the right length. In my opinion the text as we have it is too long to have been delivered in the time likely to have been available; it is in any case much longer than the surviving text of Aiskhines' speech for the prosecution—though both speeches ought to have been of the same length, measured by the water-clock. So probably our text is an expanded version of the speech delivered in court, and was written out by Demosthenes for circulation afterwards. But different opinions about this matter are possible, and it needs more consideration than Y. has given it. (I have discussed it further in P. Flensted-Jensen, T. H. Nielsen, and L. Rubinstein [edd.], *Polis and Politics* [Copenhagen, 2000], pp. 563–8.)

For the Greek text Y. has not collated the manuscripts himself but relies on earlier editions, together with advance information about M. R. Dilts's forthcoming Oxford text. His *apparatus criticus* is very selective, omitting most variations of orthography. He omits from the text all the decrees and other documents which are included in the manuscripts but which, in the case of this oration, are generally agreed to be spurious.

The commentary, which is nearly twice the length of Usher's, is of high quality. It has a perceptible American bias: for grammatical points Y. regularly refers to Cooper's *Attic Greek Prose Syntax*, which is not widely used in Britain. As a rule, Y. gives only brief explanations of historical and prosopographical matters. He is also not greatly interested in legal problems: at one point he dismisses modern scholars' concern with such problems as 'anachronistic' (p. 174). On linguistic points, some students will want more assistance with Demosthenic usage than Y. gives them; for instance, he does not explain the use of *νὴ Δία* to mark what an opponent is supposed to say. In this respect, Usher's edition is more helpful because it includes a complete translation; however, a translation by Y. will, I believe, be published separately, in the Texas series of translations of the orators.

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The outstanding feature of his commentary is the analyses of the arguments and rhetorical skill of the oration, including some bold attempts to assess the use made of rhythm. For example, on the famous *Ἑσπέρα μὲν γὰρ ἦν, ἦκε δ' ἀγγέλλων τις* (section 169) he tells us that 'the abrupt switch from the balanced opening clause (– ⏑ – – ⏑ –) to the jarring pace that follows (– ⏑ – – – ⏑) . . . reflects the way in which the tranquil evening is shattered by the messenger's sudden arrival' (p. 204). Such analyses are inevitably subjective, and some readers may disagree with them, but all will find them worth serious consideration.

University of Glasgow DOUGLAS M. MacDOWELL

STUDIES IN ORATORY

C. W. WOOTEN (ed.): *The Orator in Action and Theory in Greece and Rome. Essays in Honor of G. A. Kennedy*. Pp. xvii + 172. Leiden, Boston, and Cologne: Brill, 2001. Cased, €59. ISBN: 90-04-12213-3.

This is a short and attractive Festschrift for George Kennedy, containing nine essays of a generally high quality. Different essays will appeal to scholars in different areas; all except three (Carawan, Papillon, Russell) are also suitable for students. Kennedy, who has done so much for ancient rhetoric (and whose publications—nine pages of them, including fifteen books—are listed in this volume), is appropriately honoured. I will comment briefly on each essay in order.

(1) Ø. Andersen begins the volume with one of the best contributions, 'How Good Should an Orator Be?' ('good' meaning 'proficient' not 'virtuous'). He explores, with reference to Greek oratory, the paradox whereby it was in an orator's interest, in all three types of oratory, both to deny and to display his oratorical skill. The essay therefore expands upon Ober's observation (quoted on p. 6) that a 'deep distrust of rhetoric . . . coexisted with the aesthetic appreciation the jurors felt for a well-composed oration'. Audiences, then, were not logical and consistent; they could hold contrary views simultaneously, and orators implicitly recognize this in their speeches. So, in answer to the question: an orator should be very good, but deny it. Andersen's conclusion is supported by a point made later by Russell (p. 162): Longinus argues that the way to avoid being suspected of trickery is to let grandeur and emotion dazzle the audience.

(2) E. Carawan traces the concepts of *παραγραφή* and *μετάληψις* from Athenian legal practice and Hermagoras to Cicero and Quintilian, and to later Greek rhetoricians. He finds that *παραγραφή* was originally a rule of estoppel, a bar to lawsuits that violated prior decisions, covenants, and binding agreements (pp. 27–8). After Hermagoras, however, it takes on a life of its own among rhetoricians more used to the Roman legal system, to which *παραγραφή* was barely relevant.

(3) S. Murnaghan explores the effects of (i) speeches and debate and (ii) silence, with or without visual aids and metaphors, in Herodotus, and reveals Herodotus' apparent suspicion of rhetoric: in his *Histories*, actions speak louder than words, and points are often more tellingly made by visual metaphors than by oratory. This contrasts with Thucydides' presentation, in which important matters are decided by debate.

(4) T. L. Papillon's contribution seems to me the only weak one. He asks why Isocrates chooses to write an epideictic speech (or 'hypodeictic', as Papillon prefers) praising Busiris, when Busiris is portrayed negatively in other accounts and on vases. Rejecting the obvious answer, that in an epideictic exercise one's skill can be better

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