face, "in consequence, *apparently*, of branches which they give off to be connected with cells in their course." In the outer gray layer they form a close network, with which the nuclei and cells are in connection. Some of them, however, pass through the layer, and, in company with processes from some of the cells, traverse the next outer and white layer, in which part of them turn round the circumference of the convolution—part run longitudinally—others *appear* to form loops—while the rest continue their vertical course and, reaching the surface, become continuous with the thin stratum of fibres which forms the first layer of the convolution.

Another system of fibres, springing from each side of the base of the stem-*curve inward* and form a beautiful arch over its summit, where they decussate, and partly constitute the *innermost* layer. Mr. Clarke names these the *arciform* fibre; they run in different planes, transversely, obliquely, and longitudinally; and "they are always interspersed with numerous cells, with processes of which they are continuous." They "establish an infinite number of communications in all directions between different parts of each convolution, between different convolutions, and between these and the central white substance."

Mr. Clarke has found some modifications in the structure of different convolutions. Thus those at the end of the posterior lobe are not only marked by the greater distinctness of their laminæ, but they contain a great number of cells of a *much larger* kind—peculiar pyramidal cells with quadrangular bases, which give off four or more processes, some of which become continuous with the fibres radiating from the central stem while others are continuous with the *arciform* fibres. The opposite end of the cell tapers into a straight process "which runs directly towards the surface of the convolution, and may be traced to a surprising distance, giving off minute branches in its course, and becoming lost in the surrounding network."

"The cells of the convolutions in man certainly differ in some respects from those of the larger mammalia—from those, for instance, of the ox, sheep, and cat."

Remarks on Criminal Responsibility in relation to Insanity. By John A. Symonds, M.D., F.R.C.P.

(Read before the Bath and Bristol Branch of the British Medical Association, held at Clifton, on February 18th, 1864; and reprinted from the 'British Medical Journal,' February 27th, 1864.)

It is almost needless to say that Dr. Symond's essay is worthy of perusal. Any contribution to practical medicine bearing his honoured name would necessarily command our attention.

Dr. Symond's paper was written, he says, just after the trial and conviction of Townley and before the various discussions had appeared in journals and newspapers.

Dr. Symonds observes that among medical writers and medical witnesses in courts of law, there have been great differences of opinion as to what constitutes a man irresponsible for a criminal act, and he arranges these differences under three heads:

1. There are those who think it must be proved, that the person under consideration was the subject of a delusion, aninsane belief, the result of a morbidly erroneous action of the comparing faculty, and that this delusion originated the act for which the person is brought to trial.

2. There are those who would not limit irresponsibility to so narrow an

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issue. They say, that there may be no evidence of any particular delusion; but that the man before he committed the act manifested so much disorder in his feelings, disposition, character, and general conduct that he ought to be held irresponsible.

3. A third class hold that, if a man were one of whom it might be said that he was in any way insane, whether in judgment, or in feeling, or in propensities, no matter whether or not there be any evidence of connection between the act and the special form of mental derangement, still the mere proof of diseased mind ought to excuse the person from the legal consequences of his act, even though there might be evidence of an adequate motive for the act; the theory in this view being that, when it is once admitted that a man's mind is in any way unsound, no one can deny that this unsoundness may have extended to the feelings, motives, judgment, power of self-control, etc., so as to put the act out of the category of crime. In other words, the holders of this view do not require that, in order to exempt from responsibility, the delusion, or the known morbid state of the emotions and moral sentiments, should have been mixed up with the crime.

Dr. Symonds raises the following question as affecting the responsibility of the partially insane.

"Let us ask another question. *Why was the criminal at large? Why was he in the enjoyment of the privileges of society, if he were not answerable to the law which protects those privileges?* This question points out to our minds a test that may be a help to us as medical witnesses, whatever may be the value of it to the public, or to the deliberations of a court. If we are considering whether a prisoner is responsible or not for his act, let us ask ourselves whether the facts testifying to his unsoundness of mind were such as would have justified us in certifying him as a person fit to be confined. And if we can satisfy ourselves that we should not have judged him to be a person who could be entrusted with his liberty, we may safely pronounce him irresponsible for his actions. But if we must have left him at large, then he must be treated as a free agent, and one who was not disabled by mental disorder from knowing that his act was wrong.

"I think my fellow-members will give due consideration to this suggestion. And were it brought before the attention of the public as likely to be carried into practice, it might probably have an indirectly beneficial operation on those unfortunate persons about whom is the question. Were the partially insane to know that so long as they have liberty they are answerable to the law, I believe that this knowledge would lead them to that self-restraint which is the object of deterrent penalties. And as to the public, they would take more heed of those individuals who, by reason of their unsoundness of mind, are dangerous possessors of liberty. The test would not only diminish the odium or obloquy which at present is so often attached to those who place such persons under control, but it would impel the friends of such persons to the performance of a duty from which it is often natural to shrink. But here comes a difficulty which must be familiar to all who have had to deal with these debateable cases. There is no friend or relation willing to incur the responsibility and the expense of consigning the case to an asylum. What is to be done? This difficulty points to a great public want, which will, I trust, be some day supplied. I mean the appointment of public medico-legal functionaries, whose business it shall be to investigate and take the responsibility of determining upon, and providing for, the seclusion of the cases alluded to. I think it would eventually appear that it is better, nay, that it is fiscally and economically preferable to deposit a brain-sick man in a hospital for the insane, where he may be *cured* as well as kept out of the way of harm to himself or others, than to allow him to remain at large till he has committed some crime

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which will cause him in one case to be maintained at the public expense as a convict or prisoner for life, or in another to be executed as a doubtful criminal."

Dr. Symonds thus concludes his Essay:—

"In conclusion, and to gather up the more important practical points of this paper. It will be our duty to inquire in any case: 1. As to delusions, whether they were of so gross a nature as in themselves to argue a diseased state of the understanding; or whether, though of an insulated nature, and not involving the whole mind, they had a direct bearing on the crime; or whether they were mixed up with morbid emotions and sentiments. 2. As to cases without manifest delusions, whether the state of the emotions and moral feelings was so perverted, either with reference to the ordinary standard, or with reference to what was the patients's former temper and character, as to indicate a morbid condition, that condition telling in particular on the power of self-control. In distinguishing such cases, it will be a help to view the inordinate emotion in relation to the object which excited it—as in the common cases of revenge, hate, jealousy, and cupidity; and to consider the proportion between the passion and its provocation. 3. As to the impulsive forms of mania, these ought not to be admitted but on the strongest evidence. But luckily, in such cases, the evidence is usually very convincing; or, if not so to the merely legal mind, it is conclusive to those who have any practical acquaintance with the great variety of the forms which mental disorder can assume."

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