doi:10.1017/hgl.2015.15 *Hegel Bulletin*, 36/2, 135–158
© The Hegel Society of Great Britain, 2015

W.T. Harris, Peirce, and the Charge of Nominalism

David W. Agler and Marco Stango

Abstract

While a number of classical pragmatists crafted their philosophies in conjunction with a careful study of Hegel's works, others saw their philosophies emerge in antagonism with proponents of Hegel. In this paper, we offer an instance of the latter case. Namely, we show that the impetus for Charles S. Peirce's early articulation and avowal of realism (the claim that some generals are real) was William Torrey Harris's claim that the formal laws of logic lacked universal validity. According to Harris, the leading representative of Hegelism in the United States, the universal validity of the laws of logic rested on a nominalistic metaphysics that a Hegelian-realism showed to be false. In response to this charge, we articulate how Peirce's attempt to prove the universal validity of the laws of logic resulted in avowing a realism that differed from both nominalism and Harris's Hegelian-realism.

Introduction

Charles S. Peirce's relationship with Hegel is complicated to say the least.[1] On the one hand, Peirce never seemed to tire of leveling criticisms at Hegel.[2] Peirce referred to Hegel's whole method as 'flummery', his phenomenology bereft of mathematics as a 'pitiful club-footed affair',[3] and went so far as to write that 'my whole *method* will be found in profound contrast with that of Hegel; I reject his philosophy *in toto*.'[4] On the other hand, Peirce was also strikingly cognizant of how similar their philosophies were.[5] Such similarities led Peirce to say that his own doctrine was 'a variety of Hegelianism',[6] that his 'philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume',[7] and that 'in some respects [Hegel was] the greatest philosopher that ever lived.'[8]

The aim of this issue is to investigate what connections exist between (neo-)pragmatists and Hegel. While several pragmatists developed their own philosophy through a direct reading of Hegel's texts, others saw their philosophical views mature under antagonism with self-proclaimed disciples of Hegel.

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

In this paper, we offer an instance of the latter case. Namely, we shall argue that Peirce's early articulation of *realism* (the claim that some generals are real) developed under pressure from an early proponent of Hegel's philosophy in the United States: William Torrey Harris (1835–1909). The claim that Peirce was, early on, a realist is not without controversy as a number of Peirce scholars have argued that Peirce's early statements about the nominalism-realist debate reflect a commitment to nominalism. In addition, the fact that early in their correspondence Peirce never denied Harris's characterization of him as an *extreme nominalist* seems to further support this view. We, however, argue that the characterization of Peirce as a nominalist is mistaken. Peirce's reluctance to avow realism in the context of his quarrel with Harris was partly due to the fact that Peirce's realism stood in stark contrast to Harris's Hegelian-inspired realism.

I. Peirce and Harris in 1867

The first issue of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* (JSP) appeared in January of 1867. After a four issue run, W. T. Harris,[9] the Hegelian founder of the JSP,[10] wrapped up the volume with a preface that responded to criticisms of the journal's content. The two primary criticisms of the journal were (i) that too much of the journal's contents consisted of translations[11] rather than original philosophical content and (ii) that the journal was 'un-American' since it focused upon the work of European, rather than American, authors. The first volume was, no doubt, choked-full of translations, but Harris stressed that the translations were important for American philosophy. For example, the translation of Leibniz's *Monadology* was the first time it appeared in English. In response to the charge that the JSP was 'un-American', Harris argued that if 'American Thought' was coextensive with those philosophers that Americans read, then the term referred to the philosophy of John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Comte, Hamilton, and Cousin. 'It is said,' Harris wrote, 'that of Herbert Spencer's works nearly twenty thousand have been sold in this country, while in England scarcely the first edition has been bought.'[12] And so, if the JSP was 'Un-American' because it did not reproduce 'American thought', then the JSP was un-American as the JSP was anti-Spencerian since its inception.[13] Nevertheless, Harris retorted that 'American philosophy' should not be understood as reflective of what Americans thought, but where American thought was going. As Harris put it, the JSP did *not* publish the works of philosophers who were representative of 'American thought' as it *was*, but who could facilitate the production of new 'American *thinkers*'.[14] For Harris, the only way a truly distinctive group of American thinkers would materialize was through a 'study of the greatest thinkers of all ages and all times': the likes of Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, and Schelling.[15]

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Harris saw the importance of publishing translations for only when their works were fully digested would a 'phalanx of American thinkers' emerge.[16]

In the same year (1867) that the JSP was born, Peirce was elected a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (30 Jan) where he delivered five papers (12 March, 9 April, 14 May, 10 Sept., 13 Nov.). By November 1867 Peirce had obtained offprints of the first three papers, bundled them together with the title 'Three Papers on Logic', and sent a copy to Harris and others.[17] Harris's interest was piqued concerning the third of these essays, 'On a New List of Categories' and he wrote to Peirce in a 10 Dec 1867 letter 'if I find time [I] will see whether I can review it properly in the next number of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*.' Quite surprisingly, Harris understood part of what Peirce was driving at in his epically dense 'New List' and referred him to his own search for categories, a series of articles that Harris published in the JSP with the running title 'Introduction to Philosophy'.[18] Accompanying his reply, Harris also sent Peirce the first three issues of the JSP. Upon receipt of the items, Peirce wrote to Harris on 1 January 1868, and noted that he was already subscribing to the JSP through a bookseller and that he had 'read your "Introduction" as far as published and think it very good. Yet [I] totally disagree, since I act wholly in the interest of the understanding and do not beleive [sic] in the "reason" of your school, at all. I admit there is music in the logic of Hegel, but that is all I discover there.' Peirce remarked further that he had drafted Harris a long letter on Hegel — most likely concerning Harris's discussion of Hegelian philosophy in issues 1 and 2 — but decided against sending it.[19]

By 24 January 1868, Peirce had read the fourth issue of the JSP, which included Harris's ongoing *Introduction* and Harris's critical review of Paul Janet's *Hegel*. In the 24 January letter, Peirce congratulated Harris on the first volume of the JSP and directed a number of criticisms toward the intelligibility and plausibility of Hegel's philosophy.[20] Treating Harris as the defender of Hegel's philosophy, Peirce addressed five questions that focused on the following three key issues: (i) the meaning of abstraction, (ii) the identity of Being and Nothingness, and (iii) whether the burden of proof falls on those who affirm or deny the universal validity of the laws of logic. While Peirce wrote that his questions about Hegel's philosophy were not to be thought of as criticisms 'but only as inquiries', his style of raising these 'inquiries' could only be read as antagonistic as many were expressed in the form of a reductio ad absurdum.

Peirce's 'inquiries' could not have been read in good spirit for its addressee was not a detached interpreter of Hegel's work but was, instead, a strident defender of Hegel's philosophy. Harris, who had been studying Hegel since 1858, was fully convinced of both the truth and practical importance of Hegel's philosophy, and his St. Louis Movement had poured over Hegel's *Logik* under the guidance of Henry Conrad Brockmeyer with unparalleled devotion. For the

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

members of the St. Louis movement, Hegel's philosophy was not merely the step beyond both Kant and New England transcendentalism, but it contained the keys to *salvation itself*.[21] St. Louis Movement member and biographer Denton Snider (1920: 119) recalls that his study of Hegel was totally absorbing: 'I not only thought Hegel, but lived Hegel, was Hegel. All that I had ever known or done I Hegelized with a sort of desperation.' Pochmann (1948: 12) writes that Harris and Brockmeyer had decided that 'the future salvation of the nation lay in translating Hegel's *Logic,* for only Hegel could save the nation from itself.' McCluskey (1958: 116) even goes so far as to write that for Harris, Hegel's philosophy had a personal religious dimension to it: 'Harris had every intention of remaining a Christian, even though the Christianity he professed had more Hegel in it than Christ.'

Here then was Peirce informing Harris that the logic of Hegel was mere music, that his school lacked reason, and that he simply had five 'inquiries' concerning Hegel's philosophy for which he'd appreciate answers. So when Peirce concluded his 24 January letter by saying that he wouldn't mind if his questions were published provided he could remain *incognito*, Harris snatched the opportunity to defend Hegel from Peirce's so-called 'inquiries'. Harris would do so by publishing Peirce's questions, along with Harris's critical replies, in the JSP as 'Nominalism *versus* Realism'.[22]

II. Nominalism vs. Realism and the Metaphysical Basis of the Laws of Logic

'Nominalism *versus* Realism' set the stage for two paths of debate between Peirce and Harris.[23] The first concerned Hegel's philosophical vocabulary. The second, and the path we follow in this paper, was whether the universal validity of the laws of logic entailed a commitment to *nominalism*. Did the laws of logic have universal validity? Harris thought they did not, Peirce thought they did, and so the opening stage of their quarrel centered on deciding who bore the burden of proof. In 'Nominalism *versus* Realism', Peirce argued that since there is a *prima facie* presumption in favour of the common sense view that accepts the universal validity of the laws of logic, it is 'more probable that subtle fallacies lurk in the Hegelian reasoning than that such fallacies lurk in all other reasoning whatsoever.'[24] Thus, Peirce argued that the onus lies on the Hegelians to show that the laws of logic lack universal validity rather than on a proponent of formal logic to show that they are, in fact, universal.

Harris responded by arguing that that the common-sense acceptance of the universality validity of the laws of logic (e.g., the principles of non-contradiction, identity, and excluded middle) entailed a nominalistic metaphysics, but

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

nominalism was false. Thus, the laws of logic are not universally valid and so the onus falls on Peirce to show that they have such universality.

Harris's argument, however, requires some unpacking. First, for Harris, *nominalism* was a metaphysical theory that asserted that the individual, the immediate, and the independent were exhaustive of the real. In contrast to the realist, the nominalist took that which was general and universal as fictive. As a corollary, general terms purporting to refer to general objects and abstract terms purporting to refer to abstract objects were simply '*flatus vocis*' (mere names) and did not refer to real generals or abstract things.[25]

Second, Harris argued that nominalism was a false doctrine. If the nominalist takes all things to be individual and independent of everything else, nominalism must posit a thing's *immediate* and *isolated* being (what a thing is at a given time independent of its relation to everything else) as identical to its *total* being. For Harris, this equivalence showed the falsity of nominalism insofar as the nominalist cannot account for *dynamic* features of objects (e.g., motion, change, death, becoming, identity through change and, in general, development). For example, the nominalist cannot account for *motion* insofar as a body cannot move to *where it already is* as *it is already there*, nor can it move where it is not as this is to deny the nominalist thesis that a thing's immediate being is identical to its total being. Thus, the nominalist is either false or implausible (as the nominalist could bite the bullet and assert that bodies do not move).[26]

With nominalism clarified and the falsity of the nominalist position argued for, the final step was to show that a proponent of the universal validity of the laws of logic (Peirce) was committed to nominalism. Harris was, no doubt, explicitly committed to this entailment as he wrote 'to pre-suppose such a doctrine as formal logic presupposes, is to set up the doctrine of immediateness [nominalism] as the only true.'[27] And, Harris, the founder of a journal on 'speculative' philosophy,[28] argued that Peirce's zeal for logic expressed 'the most profound and compendious statement of the *anti-speculative* standpoint as related to the Science of Pure Thought (*Prima Philosophia*), that we have seen.'[29] The entailment in question was forged by showing that the laws of logic can only be thought valid when an object is understood nominalistically. That is, on Harris's account, logical laws like the principle of contradiction are valid *only* when we assume the nominalist viewpoint since propositions of the form 'Not (P and not-P)' or 'it is not the case that water is both liquid and not liquid' are true *only* if things are treated as though they were in a fixed state. In contrast, the laws of logic lack validity when objects are understood as having the dynamic features which the nominalist, in privileging the immediacy and independence of things, is committed to denying. To see why the laws of logic breakdown when objects are understood dynamically, consider that if the identity of an object is *partly* determined by what it is at a given moment and *partly* determined by what it

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

will be in future moments, then the state of an object can change from one state to another. For example, while water *is*, at a current moment, *liquid*, it is also *not-liquid* insofar as it can change to a *vapour* or a *solid* (not a liquid) when it is heated or cooled.[30] Thus, Harris asserted that the principle of non-contradiction 'not (Pa and not Pa)' is not universally true as 'water is liquid and water is not liquid' is a true statement.[31]

So, in response to Peirce's claim that since the laws of logic are recommended by common sense and the onus is on the Hegelian to show that such laws are not universally true, Harris argued that common sense gets things wrong. While there may be *prima facie* reasons for thinking the laws of logic are true, speculative philosophy shows, upon closer inspection, the metaphysical basis of this commitment is flawed.[32] A commitment to formal logic entails nominalism and since nominalism is a false doctrine, the commitment to the universal validity of such laws is misplaced.

In Harris's mind, Peirce's appeal for an argument that makes Hegel's attack on the laws of logic had been clarified and so speculative (Hegelian) philosophers had met their burden of proof. In addition, Harris had polarized the debate between Peirce and himself. Where Peirce was formalistic, Harris (and his JSP) accepted Hegel's context-infused dialectic. Where Peirce accepted the dictates of common sense, Harris thought reality could only be revealed through a speculative insight. Where Peirce was a *nominalist* of an extreme stripe, taking isolated individuals as exhausting reality, Harris was a *realist* who took a commitment to these so-called individuals to entail a denial of all dynamism in the world. The onus was now on Peirce to show how the laws of logic could have universal validity on nominalistic grounds. Peirce was up for the challenge for he wrote Harris saying that 'I have already devoted some attention to that subject. I cannot say what I think in less than three articles of the Journal'.[33] Harris was sufficiently interested and Peirce set to work in writing the 'three articles' for the 1868 and 1869 issues of the JSP.[34]

III. Peirce's Realism and His 'Proof' of the Universal Validity of the Laws of Logic

Peirce took up Harris's challenge to defend the universal validity of the laws of logic in three essays published in the JSP: 'Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man' (QCCF), 'Some Consequences of Four Incapacities' (SCFI), and 'Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences of Four Incapacities' (GVLL). Peirce argued for a number of philosophical theses in these texts and several fine exegetical and critical overviews of the JSP series do them justice.[35] The focus of this section concerns, instead, how, at least in

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

outline, Peirce responded to Harris's charge that he could not prove the universal validity of the laws of logic. What we find striking about Peirce's response, as we will sketch here and explore in further sections, is that Peirce appears to concede the point that the laws of logic cannot be explained on nominalist grounds. That is, under pressure from Harris, he appears to abandon nominalism for realism.

While the JSP essays proceed with an attack on several non-inferential faculties claimed to belong to human beings, we begin our sketch of Peirce's argument with the second JSP essay: SCFI. There Peirce begins the essay by summarizing four key results (denials) from QCCF:

> Denial #1: that we have an intuitive (or introspective) power to distinguish intuitive cognitions from cognitions that are the result of inference,
> Denial #2: that we can think without signs,
> Denial #3: that we can have a conception of the incognizable, and
> Denial #4: that we can have a conception of some cognition not determined by previous cognitions.

From these four denials, Peirce, in SCFI, detailed a number of consequences, but only two consequences are particularly relevant here. First, Peirce claimed that one consequence of the first three denials is that we have no conception or actual perception of an *image* (something that is absolutely determinate in all respects). That is, images or singulars are incognizable. Second, Peirce argued that given that we have no conception of the absolutely incognizable, we should adopt the hypothesis that all of our conceptions correspond to something that is cognizable to some degree.[36]

Given the four denials and the two consequences noted above, Peirce concluded SCFI with an argument for *realism*. He argued that since there is a meaningful conception of reality and there is no meaningful conception of that which is incognizable, reality must be potentially cognizable to some degree. Second, insofar as 'the real' is cognizable, it cannot be singular since, as the two consequences above noted, we have no conception of that which is singular or determinate in every respect. Thus, if reality is potentially cognizable and that which is singular is not cognizable, Peirce concluded that *reality* itself must be general to some degree. Thus, only the *realist* can sustain a meaningful conception of reality.

In the third and final essay of Peirce's JSP series (GVLL), Peirce attempted to make good on his promise to Harris by proving how the laws of logic have universal validity.[37] His argument proceeded as follows. First, the *forms* of the logical laws of deductive reasoning cannot be genuinely doubted. If what is asserted by 'Every M is P' is that anything for which we can predicate 'M', we can

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

also predicate 'P', then if 'S is M', no one can genuinely doubt 'S is P'. Second, the scope of the logical laws is not limited to abstract (formal) objects but applicable to *real* things. Since, as the argument above noted, generals are real — i.e., some instance of 'Every M is P' signifies something real —, the validity of the laws of logic extends beyond the merely formal sphere to reality itself. That is, the validity of these laws is applicable to the things which the general statements signify. Third, and finally, Peirce argued that various objections directed at the validity of deductive reasoning are unconvincing.[38]

What we find striking in Peirce's argument for the universal validity of the laws of logic is not the persuasiveness of his proof but how the outline of his argument *seems* to reflect a shift in his thinking about the underlying metaphysical commitments required by the logician. That is, Peirce's argument seems to switch the initial terms of the debate as Peirce does not show that the universal validity of the laws of logic rest on *nominalistic* grounds. Instead, he appears to abandon nominalism for realism, and this abandonment seems to be the result of pressure put on him from Harris's Hegelian-based attacks.

There has been a long-standing debate about the status of Peirce's early metaphysical commitments, specifically over whether Peirce was a realist prior to 1868. There are two central views.[39] First, there is the *Nominalist-to-Realist* view held by Max Fisch (1967: 159; cf. W2: xxvi) and Frederick Michael (1988). This position contends that Peirce was a nominalist early in his career as he denied the reality of universals outside of the mind (*Ontological Claim*) and that although the late Peirce was committed to an extreme scholastic realism, the early Peirce shifted from a nominalist ontology to a realist ontology in 1868 (Fisch) or in 1881 (Michael) (the *Developmental Claim*). Evidence cited in support of Peirce's early nominalism includes a variety of pre-1868 passages (including the drafts of the JSP series) where Peirce utters pro-nominalist remarks, including at least two where Peirce explicitly denied the reality of universals by calling *qualities* 'fictions' framed for the purposes of philosophizing (1967: 163; W2: 175, 180, 181; cf. W1: 287, 307, 312, 360). In addition, around this same time period, Peirce expressed his allegiance to a number of nominalistic doctrines, e.g., the frequency theory of probability (Fisch 1967: 160-161; cf. W2: 98-99; Burks 1964).[40]

If the reconstruction of the Peirce-Harris exchange given above is correct, one piece of evidence that would further support the Nominalist-to-Realist view is that *if* Peirce was a realist prior to 1868 then one would expect him to deny Harris's characterization of him as an extreme nominalist. That is, since Peirce doesn't deny this charge in correspondence with Harris, one can only conclude that Peirce shifted his position from nominalism to realism under pressure from Harris.

In contrast to the Nominalist-to-Realist view, there is what we call the 'Standard View' held by the likes of Boler (1980), Roberts (1970), Goudge

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

(1950:95-103), Skagestad (1981:67-69), Lane (2004), and others. This view contends that Peirce was a realist early in his career as he accepted the *reality* of universals, but denied that they exist in the same sense as concrete particulars (the *Ontological Claim*). In addition, this view takes the early Peirce to be a scholastic realist that developed into a more extreme form of realism as Peirce's career progressed (the *Developmental Claim*). The most straightforward evidence for both the ontological and developmental claims of the Standard View comes from Peirce's own account of his philosophical development. Peirce attests that despite his many revisions to his realism, he has 'never been able to think differently on that question of nominalism and realism' (CP1.20, 1903) and that 'never, during the thirty years [1863-1893] in which I have been writing on philosophical questions, have I failed in my allegiance to realistic opinions and to certain Scotistic ideas.'[41]

The central difficulty for the Standard View has been how to explain away the passages where Peirce directly avows nominalism. Proponents of the Standard View reply in two stages. First, they argue that Peirce did not have a clear understanding of the different types of realism available. Early on, Peirce understood the 'realistic' position as falsely asserting that universals have the same kind of reality as that of concrete particulars, i.e. universals were real but were in no way relative to the mind.[42] John Boler (1963:25) vividly puts this point when he writes that Peirce did not think 'that you can find generals in the sense that an archeologist finds vases.' Next, proponents of the Standard View argue that it was only when Peirce began reading Duns Scotus more intently and scholastic philosophy more broadly that he came to distinguish his own brand of *realism* from the *realism* that takes universals to be existent entities.[43] As such, the purported shift from nominalism to realism by Peirce does not amount to a change in ontological commitments; rather, it is simply a reclassification of himself as a realist given a clearer understanding of the landscape of theories.

IV. Harris' Extreme Realism and the Nominalist Badge

Why didn't Peirce shirk the nominalist badge that Harris pinned to him? If we follow the Standard View on Peirce's early realism, we ought to contend that at the time of the debate with Harris, Peirce understood 'realism' to refer to the position that universals are real in the same way that concrete things are real, viz., as concrete things. Since Peirce was not a realist in this sense, it makes sense for him not to accept this position. We think, however, more can be said on this issue. In particular, we think better sense can be made of why Peirce didn't explicitly deny 'nominalism' when Harris's Hegelian-inspired realism is considered.

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

In contrast to nominalism, Harris subscribed to a Hegelian-inspired realism that asserted that *only* universals are actual.[44] Universals were not, on Harris's account, Platonic (abstract) entities existing *outside* of space and time qua ideal forms but rather that which exists *through* space and time. That is, real universals are diachronic structures of objects that 'preserve [a thing's] identity, amid the changing and variable' (1868b:177) and should be understood as '[t]hat which abides in the process of origination and decay' (W2:149). With this understanding of the universal, Harris argued that where nominalism denigrates that which is universal for the individual, a full-blown realism denigrates the individual for that which is universal. 'The Universal or Generic', Harris wrote, 'may be said to be the only true existence.'[45] And, where the nominalist devalued the status of general objects as merely figments of the mind, Harris took particulars as that which lacked reality as they were merely instantiations of a more complex, dynamic being. That is, it was particulars that lacked reality as they could not be conceived as being independent from the larger complex, more dynamic and diachronic being. This lack of independency was, in part, partly due to the fact that no understanding of the whole could be gained through an aggregation of particulars but also due to the fact that the fleeting nature of particulars exemplified their non-reality: '[t]he self-determining is what we believe in, and it alone exists, while the fleeting show whose reality rests on contradiction is (and this not Hegelian merely, but older than Plato) a mingling of Being and non-Being'.[46] Finally, where the nominalist devalued general terms as simply useful devices for referring to individuals, Harris understood individual terms as abstractions involving a *selective* (limited) attention to some aspect of the universal. All abstractions of this variety were, according to Harris, false.[47]

So if Harris took the goal of speculative philosophy in general to advocate realism (the view that only generals exist) and undermine nominalism (the view that only individuals exist)[48] and he took Peirce to be the most anti-speculative (and thereby nominalist) philosopher to date, then *if* the early Peirce was *not* a nominalist as the Standard View contends, why didn't he shirk the nominalist badge pinned to him by Harris? The short answer is because Peirce was neither a realist nor a nominalist in the way that Harris defined the terms. On the one hand, Harris's Hegelian-inspired realism went too far in denying reality (in a certain sense) to particulars. On the other, the nominalist position went too far in denying any kind of reality to generals.

For Peirce, the nominalism-realism debate was over 'whether *laws* or general *types* are figments of the mind or real', whether 'laws and types are objective or subjective',[49] and whether all abstraction is merely of a logical (subjective) nature or whether certain abstractions could be grounded in reality. While the realist and nominalist agreed that our thinking involves general ideas, Peirce saw their dispute as boiling down to whether the *object* of thought involved any real

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

generality.[50] To answer this question, it was necessary, for Peirce, to clarify what might be meant by 'reality' or 'real objects'. If 'real objects' refers to the unintelligible external *cause* of cognition—i.e., those objects located entirely outside of the mind—then, according to Peirce, *only individuals are real* and 'the nominalistic answer must be given to the question concerning universals.'[51] But, Peirce claimed, 'reality' can be understood in a different (more idealistic) way.[52] Rather than understanding 'real object' as referring exclusively to the efficient cause of cognition, Peirce claimed that it also referred to the object represented by the final opinion of an indefinitely extended inquiry. Insofar as all thought is general, the *real object* of this final opinion was general. Such a position, Peirce argued, was *realistic* as could ward off a number of nominalistic objections. For instance, if, according to the nominalist, this object of this final opinion was deemed 'illusory', then, per the assumption that reality is cognizable to some degree, some further inquiry should be able to uncover this illusion. But, per the hypothesis that the object is that of the *final* opinion, no further correction is forthcoming. Thus, the object of the final opinion is *real* and insofar as it is a representation of thought, it is general. If, according to the nominalist, the object of this opinion was 'subjective', then there should be variation of opinion between different subjects. But, per the hypothesis that the object is the *final* opinion of the *community* of inquirers, the object of the final opinion is not relative to any particular subject even though it is relative to a multitude of different minds.[53]

For Peirce then, insofar as we have a meaningful, cognizable notion of reality, the realistic answer should be given. But this realistic answer did not, like Harris's Hegelian-inspired realism, carry with it a complete denial of all aspects of nominalism. In contrast to Harris who argued for the non-reality of particulars as their *being* depended upon the reality of universals, the early Peirce accepted the nominalistic-sounding insight that there could be no generals without particulars: '[t]he great argument for nominalism is that there is no man unless there is some particular man.'[54] In short, Peirce accepted the nominalist claim that true abstractions were grounded in particular things. While true abstract and general propositions provide evidence, in Peirce's view, for a realistic interpretation of generals, it is at the same time true that the symbolizing and abstracting activity of the intellect always operates upon individual things that instantiate those generals.[55] From these two insights into the nature of knowledge, Peirce could neither avoid 'realism' (= generals have some type of reality) nor totally reject 'nominalism' (= individuals are real existents). But, apart from Peirce's understanding of these labels, his overall position amounted to a refined form of traditional realism rather than a version of nominalism.

So it is now clear why Peirce did not flatly deny the charge of nominalism. If 'realism' meant Harris's *Hegelian realism*—a position that denies both the existence

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

of particulars and the reality of abstractions—then Peirce was not a realist in this sense.[56] Peirce was sensitive to the nominalist claim that there were *no generals without particulars* and he never denied that singulars exist, *even though they were incognizable*.[57] This conclusion, we think, supports the Standard View on Peirce's early realism in a way not previously recognized. Namely, where proponents of the Standard View explain Peirce's reluctance to embrace realism insofar as he took the position to entail that universals were concrete existent things, we additionally contend that this reluctance was due to Harris's striking rejection of particulars altogether. The early Peirce's realization that he was a realist required at least two clarifications on his part. The first was how a realist could be committed to the reality of generals without taking generals to be concrete things like chairs, tables, and vases. The second was how a realist could nevertheless be committed to the reality of generals while not rejecting any mode of existence to particular (or singular) things.

Conclusion

Harris's defense of Hegel had a lasting influence on Peirce's thought. First, as we have shown, it is thanks to his correspondence with Harris about the nature of Hegel's realism and rejection of the universal validity of the laws of logic that Peirce came to see himself as falling into the realist camp. That is, part of what can be said to have propelled Peirce into a deeper self-awareness of his tacit realism was W. T. Harris's charge that a commitment to the universal validity of the laws of logic required a corresponding commitment to nominalism.[58] Denying this entailment required Peirce to make sense of the kind of realist he was, and this project of articulating what sort of realism the logician ought to be committed to ultimately became a lifelong project for Peirce. Shortly after writing the JSP essays, Peirce wrote a slew of book reviews and papers that address the nominalism-realism debate[59] and Peirce explicitly acknowledged that much of his own philosophical development could be characterized as an increasingly extreme commitment to realism.[60]

Nominalism-Realism aside, Harris can be said to have aided Peirce's philosophical development in another way. Not only can we assert that Harris provoked Peirce to more fully articulate his realism, but Peirce's entanglement with Harris also incited him to reexamine his *wholly* negative evaluation of Hegel's philosophy.[61] In circa 1898, Peirce noted that his knowledge of Hegel in the early-mid 1860s was informed primarily by Augusto Vera's *Introduction à la philosophie de Hegel* (Paris, 1855). At the time, Peirce confessed he could find little good in Hegel's work, remarking that what he knew of Hegel at that time 'repelled me'.[62] Elsewhere he writes that his attitude toward Hegel in these early years was 'one of contempt'[63] and an 'antipathy' that blinded him to seeing their

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

respective similarities.[64] This same negative attitude toward Hegel is no doubt evident in Peirce's earliest correspondence with Harris. But, by 13 May 1868, Peirce's attitude is slightly warmer. In a letter to Harris, Peirce qualifies his initially negative remarks about Hegel's philosophy:

> You generally speak of my side as other than yours. Perhaps you divide thinkers into Hegelians & non-Hegelians. But as I should draw the line (if required to make 2 sides) I should come on the same side as Hegel, because I am idealistic. I do not feel very much opposed to Hegel, though I think his main points (in his own estimate of importance) are wrong.

As Peirce matured, so did his estimation of Hegel. As noted in our introduction, Peirce's assessment of Hegel's philosophy was never fully positive for he remained a strident opponent to what he thought was Hegel's unscientific way of philosophizing and his disdain toward him on this point never seemed to temper. What did temper, however, was his negative assessment of the content of Hegel's philosophy, and this is, at least partly, due to contemporaries like Harris who forced Peirce to take Hegel's philosophy seriously.

David W. Agler
The Pennsylvania State University, USA
dwa132@psu.edu

Marco Stango
Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan
marcostango123@gmail.com

Notes

[1] Abbreviations of references to Peirce's work follow these conventions: CP#.# = (Peirce 1960); EP2:# = (Peirce 1998); HL:# = (Peirce 1997); W#.# = (Peirce 1982-2010); R#:# & L#:# = (Peirce 1963-1970); RLT:## = (Peirce 1992). An 'x' is placed after all rejected manuscript page numbers, e.g. R343:32x. Peirce-Harris Correspondence (L183; Nethery 1962). Letters from William James (James 1992-2004). Letters from A. Bronson Alcott (Alcott 1969).

[2] For example, Peirce criticizes Hegel's seminarian method in inquiry (CP1.40; cf. CP1.1), for his deficiency in mathematics and the 'very elementary character of his reasoning' (CP1.368; cf. CP6.31), for a lack of critical severity and ignoring facts (CP1.524), for attempting to destroy philosophical terminology (CP2.223), for failing to distinguish between existence and essence

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

(CP5.37), for the nominalistic character of his philosophy (CP5.37, CP5.61; CP8.208; CP8.258), for 'overlooking the weakness of individual man' when practicing the dialectical method (R1002, CP1.368; CP4.385; R596), for using dilemmas as his primary mode of reasoning (CP1.491), for taking the rationality of the universe to imply necessitarianism (CP6.218), for beginning his *Logik* with pure Being (CP8.112; Stern 2013b:68; cf. Houlgate 2005; Houlgate 2006), for regarding *presentness* or *immediacy* as an abstraction (HL:140; CP5.38, CP5.44; see also R893, R943, R944, and for ignoring the 'Outward Clash' in experience. Peirce calls this final criticism Hegel's 'capital error' (W5:225, CP8.41). In a letter to James, Peirce expands on this 'capital error', this time writing that 'to my mind the one fatal disease of his [Hegel's] philosophy is that, seeing that the Begriff in a sense implies Secondness and Firstness, he failed to see that nevertheless they are elements of the phenomenon not to be *aufgehoben*, but as real and able to stand their ground as the Begriff itself' (CP8.268; cf. CP3.368; CP1.524; CP5.532; CP2.157; CP4.318; CP5.79; CP8.272). For more on this criticism, see Tiercelin 1992: 72.

[3] CP2.35; cf. CP5.40.

[4] CP1.368, my emphasis; cf. CP1.453.

[5] For example, both Peirce and Hegel insisted that reality is intelligible, that there are three elementary categories (HL120; CP3.422), that 'the philosophy of continuity [i.e., his own pragmatism] leads to an objective logic, similar to that of Hegel' ((RLT 13; cf. CP1.40-1, CP6.31), that it was the business of phenomenology to 'bring out and make clear the Categories' (CP5.38; cf. Jensen 2004:278; Parker 1998:104, 232n1) and that philosophy ought to begin by starting from everyday experience rather than the method of doubt. Concerning the final similarity, Peirce (CP8.112) asserted that Hegel was committed to such a view because he 'began his greater masterpiece by considering a man sitting under a tree in a garden in the afternoon.' Elsewhere (HL:140), Peirce notes that Hegel begins the *Phenomenology* by supposing that 'he and the reader are out of doors' but Peirce criticizes him, writing '[b]ut somehow his theory that the abstract is more primitive than the concrete blinded his eyes to what stood before them. It was more dazzling than sunlight to him.' Anne Freadman (2004: 55-56) has remarked that Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* does not have such a homely start. Instead, Hegel's work is chocked full with a host of abstract ideas like 'mediated simplicity' and 'pure being'. While Stern contends that Peirce 'says nothing' concerning Hegel's epistemology, he does note the similarities between Peirce's phenomenology and the Introduction to Hegel's *Phenomenology*. According to Stern (2013b: 65-66), Hegel stresses that we ought not begin philosophy by subjecting our own cognitive capacities to the severe criticism that the Cartesian philosopher demands. For a point by point comparison of many of Peirce's differences and similarities to Hegel, see Shapiro 1981; Stern 2013a, 2013b.

[6] CP5.38.

[7] CP1.42.

[8] CP1.524.

[9] For works that deal with the life and thought of W. T. Harris, see McCluskey 1958; Ames 1909; Leidecker 1946. For more on the St. Louis Movement, see Pochmann 1948; Goetzmann 1973; Dowling 1972; Easton 1966; Harmon 1943.

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

[10] Harris edited the JSP from 1867 to 1893. The JSP is distinctive for being the first periodical in the United States devoted to philosophy; it rivaled the newly minted *Mind* in the 1870s, and it is remembered for having published some early works of some of the best minds in classical American philosophy: Peirce, James, Dewey, Hall, Royce, and Morris. It is even credited for coaxing John Dewey — then a shy high school teacher — into becoming a philosopher (cf. Westbrook 1991).

[11] Harris (1867f) noted that there was 'some disappointment expressed at the lack of original articles.' Several years later, William James became rather incensed at this continued editorial practice of Harris. On 6 December of 1877, James sent Harris his anti-Spencerian 'Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence,' his first signed publication (see James 1878b). James followed this article by submitting his 'The Spatial Quale', but Harris informed him that the article would not fit in the upcoming April 1878 issue. James wrote Harris on the matter: 'Don't you think that original matter should always take precedence of translations? I hear regrets expressed here at your publishing so much aesthetic translation, and I confess that where it crowds out new american writing I rather share the regret. I fancy you could get more original contributions, if the journal aimed at a more modern cachet. There are five or six people here who I should think would send you then at least an article a year,—Howison, Everett (C.C.) Cabot, Bowne, possibly Bowen, a man named Dunbar, Fennollosa, Hall, and perchance others. Many of these are non-hegelian however, and I am not sure whether you wd. consider so much infidel matter to be again' (James to W. T. Harris, 22 Sept. 1878). James was even more perturbed than he let on. On 26 November 1878, James inquired whether Harris would be interested in publishing his 'The Sentiment of Rationality'. Originally, James had conceived of it appearing in four parts in the JSP, but informed Harris that he wished it to appear quickly. James quickly retracted his offer and informed Harris not to reserve a place for the work in the July number for he planned to turn it into a larger work and use portions of it for a review for *Mind*, the JSP's competitor (see James's letter to W. T. Harris 13 Dec. 1878). Reflecting on such interactions with Harris, in a 16 Feb. 1879 letter to Josiah Royce, James refers to Harris as the 'most villainous of editors', stating that he would 'give no more for his judgment than for that of a Digger Indian' and in a 3 Feb 1880 letter, stating that he would 'never write again for Harris's journal. He refused an article of mine a year ago 'for lack of room,' and has postponed the printing of 2 admirable original articles by T. Davidson and Eliot Cabot for the last 10 months, or more, in order to accomodate [sic] Mr [Ellery] Channing's verses and Miss ——?s [Gertrude Garrigues's] drivel about the school of Athens etc etc. It is too loathesome.' Even St. Louis member Thomas Davidson, who published several translations in the JSP, thought Harris lacked judiciousness in this area. Davidson wrote Harris a letter (5 June 1878) that 'Your last Journal [April 1878], with its numerous translations, was not so good as the previous one. I am coming quite round to the view of Cabot and James that the original articles are always the best' (qtd. in Fisch 1986:154).

[12] Harris 1867f.

[13] The anti-Spencerian component of the JSP likely began when Harris had submitted an essay on Spencer to the *North American Review* that was rejected. The editor of the *Review*, Charles

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Eliot Norton, wrote to Harris declaring the essay 'unfathomable, unreadable and especially unliterary.' Harris gathered some of the members of the St. Louis Philosophical Society together and read the letter aloud, peppering his reading with his own sarcastic comments. Snider (1910:326) recalls that while reading the letter, Harris 'jumped up, clenched his fist and brought it down defiantly upon the empty air, saying 'Now I am going to start a Journal myself'.' C.H. Ames (1909: 703) also recalls that for Harris 'spiritual life was being suffocated under the deadening negations of Herbert Spencer.' The very first issue of the JSP contained Harris's rejected refutation of Spencer (1867a). In addition, Snider (1920: 118) recalls a strong hostility of the St. Louis movement toward Spencer's fame, noting that Harris had read him a refutation of Spencer's philosophy and that '[i]t may be said that Spencer gave the primal impact which pushed into print the St. Louis Journal of Speculative Philosophy by way of opposition.' For examples of the anti-Spencerian component of the JSP, see James 1878a; Wasson 1869; Watson 1878, 1877; Harris 1867a; cf. DeArmey and Good 2001:xvi.

[14] Harris 1867f.

[15] Harris 1867f.

[16] Harris 1867f.

[17] See L183; L54; W2:xxv.

[18] See L183; see Harris 1867d: 116-117; Harris 1867e: 188; cf. Harris 1867b.

[19] That same day Peirce also made a catalogue of books on medieval logic that were available in Cambridge (see R1549).

[20] See W2:143.

[21] Snider 1910: 390-391; cf. McCluskey 1958: 108-110.

[22] W2:143-144, 144-154; see Peirce and Harris 1868. Peirce's 1 Jan 1868 letter can thus be said to have set off a debate between Peirce and Harris over several topics, e.g. the proper use of philosophical terminology, Hegelian philosophy, and the metaphysical assumptions underlying the validity of the laws of logic. According to C. F. Delaney and others (1984: xxxvii; e.g., Ochs 1998: 51-52), Peirce's JSP was initiated when Peirce read Harris's review article 'Paul Janet and Hegel' and sent Harris a set of criticisms. This led Harris to challenge Peirce on whether he could prove the universal validity of the logical laws on nominalist grounds, and Peirce's attempt to do this resulted in the JSP series. The percolation of the JSP is slightly more complex. First, as of 1 January 1868, it does not appear that Peirce had received issue 4 from his bookseller (or from Harris directly) and so had neither read Harris's 'Preface' addressing the 'Un-American' character of the journal nor the piece on Janet's *Hegel*. This would make sense since in the 1 Jan letter, Peirce himself criticized the JSP, writing that while he wishes the best for it, but he did 'not think it represents the country at all, nor do I suppose it is intended to; but it must represent your St. Louis Society very well.' Second, in the 1 January letter, Peirce notes that he had drafted a long letter that contained several criticisms of Hegel's philosophy (and this was before he had read Harris's piece on Janet's Hegel). In other words, the setup for Peirce's JSP series not only involved Harris's review piece on Janet's *Hegel*, but also Peirce's reading of Harris's *Introduction*, Harris's attempt to connect the 'New List' to his *Introduction*, and some criticisms that Peirce had formulated toward Hegelian philosophy but was not quite ready to unleash.

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

[23] 'Nominalism *versus* Realism' went to print before Harris received the proof sheets from Peirce as Peirce's errata went uncorrected (compare Peirce's 16 March 1868 letter with (Peirce and Harris 1868: 59, 60)).

[24] W2:153.

[25] See W2:149, 153. Harris wasn't the only one to take Peirce's inquiries to reflect a nominalistic disposition. After reading the issue that contained 'Nominalism *versus* Realism', A. Bronson Alcott wrote to Harris (2 April 1868): 'What you say abo[ut] Rosencrantz and Peirce is good. I take Peirce to be the son of the Cambridge mathematics professor, and perhaps defending as he best can the Professor's metaphysics, if not of the College' (Alcott 1938: 299; cf. 501).

[26] Harris 1868a: 54.

[27] W2:149. Elsewhere, Harris writes that accepting the principle of non-contradiction as holding universally true carries with it the treatment of things in their 'isolated independence' and to look 'upon all truths as dead results, and never as living processes' (Harris 1868a: 53).

[28] For what Harris means by 'speculative philosophy', see Harris 1867g, 1868a: 51; cf. Colapietro 2000; Hausman, Johnstone Jr., and Vaught 1987; Stuhr 2003.

[29] W2:144, 1868, my emphasis.

[30] See Harris 1867c:239.

[31] After 'Nominalism *versus* Realism', it is likely the case that Harris pressed this argument even further with Peirce in two letters he wrote between March 16th and April 9th of 1868 (not extant).

[32] W2:153.

[33] W2: 159, 9 April 1868.

[34] For the original essays, see Peirce 1868a, 1868b, 1869.

[35] For analyses of Peirce's JSP series, see Buchler 1939: 3-19; Feibleman 1946: 69-77; Gallie 1966: 59-83; Prendergast 1977; Skagestad 1981: 20-30; Hookway 1985: 15-40; Murphey 1993: 106-122; Hausman 1993: 60-67; Smyth 1997: 1-182; Cooke 2006: 7-20; Short 2007: 32-36). That Peirce regarded this series as important is, no doubt, beyond question for he writes 'If I have ever done any work of any value in Noölogy, it was in the years 1862-1868; and its results, including the view of Reality and the outlines of most of the opinions in the present paper, are given in three articles in Vol. II of Dr. William T. Harris's *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*' (R641, 5 Nov. 1909).

[36] W2:239.

[37] Peirce was not satisfied with GVLL. In a 20 December 1868 letter, Peirce wrote that he had 'very little time for it, it is not very well written.' In addition to proving the universal validity of the laws of logic, GVLL also aimed to show how said laws came to be true and how the principles of said laws were explicable on an anti-Cartesian and scholastic-realist platform.

[38] See W2:247-263.

[39] There is a third strand of literature that we do not address here that it is improper to take Peirce as coming down on either the realist or nominalist side during the late 1860s for, as T. L. Short (2007: 42) contends, from 1859 to 1877, Peirce 'tossed on the horns of this

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

[the realism-nominalism] dilemma' and during this time, he was 'trying make contradictories agree.' Less charitably, Edward Moore (1952: 406; cf. Bastian 1953) characterized Peirce as having 'suffered from a kind of philosophical schizophrenia.'

[40] With respect to the developmental claim, Fisch (1967: 159; cf. W2:xxvi) contends that Peirce takes his first step toward the realist position in SCFI (1868), where Peirce explicitly states that since no cognition can be absolutely determinate, 'generals must have a real existence' (W2:239). In some contrast, Michael (1988: 335-336) claims that Peirce's apparent early conversion to realism was only a change in labels; a change in ontological commitment did not occur until the early 1880s when he abandoned the so-called 'subject-predicate logic' for predicate logic. On Michael's account, Peirce so-called 'early realism' is actually a kind of nominalism as it did not involve a commitment to the reality of universals outside the mind. No doubt, if the later Peirce were called a 'nominalist' like it was by Carus in the early 1890s, Peirce would have vehemently objected.

[41] CP6.605, 1893.

[42] Peirce often referred to the view that universals exist as 'Nominalistic Platonism', a position he attributed to French philosopher Roscellinus, Berkeley, Abélard, and John of Salisbury (see W2:480-481, CP1.19, CP5.503, CP5.470, CP5.503, CP8.10).

[43] Tiercelin (1992: 55) notes this feature of Peirce's philosophy when she writes that when Peirce 'claims universals are real, he does not mean that they exist and that they are to be discovered like crabs under rocks.'

[44] These positions are articulated by Harris in 'Nominalism *versus* Realism' and two chapters of his *Introduction to Philosophy* (chapter VIII and X).

[45] Harris 1868b: 176.

[46] W2:158n4.

[47] Harris 1867e: 190.

[48] The 'central point of speculative philosophy', Harris (1867d: 120) writes, is to show that 'every really existing, separate entity is self-determined'. By this he means that the goal of speculative philosophy is to show the reality of universals and non-reality of particulars.

[49] CP1.16.

[50] CP1.27.

[51] W2:468.

[52] W2:238.

[53] Cf. W2:239.

[54] W2:240. That Peirce's acceptance of the reality of generals does not carry with it an explicit denial of the existence of individuals, see (W2:181, c.1868; CP3.613, CP5.70, CP5.152 CP6.340, c.1909).

[55] W2:175, 181-182.

[56] Peirce would later write 'Hegel, whose neglect of Secondness was due chiefly to his not recognizing any other mode of being than existence' (CP1.532).

[57] Peirce was sensitive to the nominalistic aspect of his realism when he wrote in a draft of the JSP series that '[i]f this [realism] seems a monstrous doctrine, remember that my nominalism saves me from all absurdity' (W2:181, 1868).

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

[58] No doubt, several other factors played important roles in Peirce's avowal of realism, most notably being that at roughly the same time in which Peirce began to engage Harris, he also began a systematic study of medieval logic, particularly Scotus (see R1549). While his reading of Scotus may have given him the *means* to see himself as a realist, we contend that this does not take away from Harris and the JSP being the *impetus*.

[59] For instance, in 1869 his reviews of Noah Porter's *The Human Intellect* (W2:276-8, 1869) and James Mill's *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind* (W2:303-4, 1869) were published. In the former review, Peirce distinguished between Scotus's realism from the Thomistic view, while in the latter review (a review of the 2nd edition, although Peirce read 1st edition in college), Peirce leveled a variety of criticisms at the underlying nominalism of Mill's account of knowledge (see R1606). In the same year, Peirce was appointed by Charles Eliot (president of Harvard University) to deliver a series of lectures on philosophy. Peirce delivered fifteen lectures from 14 Dec 1869 to 15 Jan 1870 on the history of British logic (see W2:xxiv, 309-345). While the entirety of the lectures is not extant, and so it is not clear the specific topics that Peirce addressed, Peirce's first lecture was titled 'Lecture I. Early nominalism and realism' and he read and analyzed large chunks of text from both Scotus and Ockham. Further, Harris's influence can be seen in this lecture series in that Peirce remarks that the 'chief value of the study of historical philosophy is that it disciplines the mind to regard philosophy in a cold and scientific eye and not with passion as though philosophers were contestants' (W2:310, Nov-Dec. 1869). Peirce's remark about philosophical 'contestant' is reminiscent of his debate with Harris (recall 'Nominalism *versus* Realism', 'What is Meant by Determined', Peirce's remark on Hegelians versus Non-Hegelians in his 13 May 1868 letter). Finally, Peirce's early treatment of the issue culminates in his 1871 review of Fraser's *The Works of George Berkeley*, a review where the discussion of nominalism and realism addresses a litany of figures in the history of philosophy.

[60] For an account of the philosophical-mathematical issues that led Peirce to accept the reality of possibility, see Lane 2007. For several accounts of Peirce's understanding of the nominalism-realism debate, see Moore 1952, 1964; Bastian 1953; Goodwin 1961; Boler 1963, 1980; Fisch 1967; Roberts 1970; Almeder 1973, 1989; Haack 1992; Margolis 1993; de Waal 1996, 2010; Lane 2004; Forster 2011.

[61] Peirce was no doubt influenced by several others, including Royce, Augusto Vera, J. H. Sterling, and F. E. Abbot.

[62] CP4.2.

[63] CP5.38.

[64] CP8.329.

Bibliography

Alcott, A. B. (1938), *The Journals of Bronson Alcott*, ed. O. Shepard. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Alcott, A. B. (1969), *The Letters of A. Bronson Alcott*, ed. R. L. Herrnstadt. Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State University Press.
Almeder, R. (1973), 'Peirce's Pragmatism and Scotistic Realism', *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 9(1), 3-23.
Almeder, R. (1989), 'Peircean Scientific Realism', *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 6(4), 357-364.
Ames, C. H. (1909), 'William Torrey Harris', *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 6(26), 701-709.
Bastian, R. J. (1953), 'The "Scholastic" Realism of C. S. Peirce', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 14(2), 246-249.
Boler, J. (1963), *Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism: A Study of Peirce's Relation to John Duns Scotus*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Boler, J. (1980), 'Peirce, Ockham and Scholastic Realism', *The Monist* 63(3), 290-303.
Buchler, J. (1939), *Charles Peirce's Empiricism*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.
Burks, A. W. (1964), 'Peirce's Two Theories of Probability', in E. C. Moore and R. S. Robin (eds.), *Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, Second Series*. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 141-150.
Colapietro, V. (2000), 'The Speculative Reconsidered', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 14(1), 7-16.
Cooke, E. F. (2006), *Peirce's Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry: Fallibilism and Indeterminacy*. New York: Continuum.
de Waal, C. (1996), 'The Real Issue between Nominalism and Realism, Peirce and Berkeley Reconsidered', *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 32(3), 425-442.
de Waal, C. (2010), 'The History of Philosophy Conceived as a Struggle between Nominalism and Realism', *Semiotica* 179(1/4), 295-313.
DeArmey, M. H. and Good, J. A. (eds.) (2001), *The St. Louis Hegelians: Origins, the Dialectic, and the Critique of Materialism*. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
Delaney, C. F. (1984), 'The Journal of Speculative Philosophy Papers', in E. C. Moore (ed.), *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, xxxvi-xlii.
Dowling, M. F. (1972), The St. Louis Movement: Reconstruction of the Individual and the Nation Through Speculative Philosophy. Ph.D. dissertation, St. Louis University.
Easton, L. D. (1966), *Hegel's First American Followers*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.
Feibleman, J. K. (1946), *An Introduction to Peirce's Philosophy: Interpreted as a System*. New York and London: Harper & Brothers Publishers.
Fisch, M. H. (1967), 'Peirce's Progress from Nominalism toward Realism', *The Monist* 51(2), 159-178.

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Fisch, M. H. (1986), 'Philosophical Clubs in Cambridge and Boston: From Peirce's Metaphysical Club to Harris's Hegel Club', in K. L. Ketner and C. J. W. Kloesel (eds.), *Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 137-170.
Forster, P. (2011), *Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Freadman, A. (2004), *The Machinery of Talk: Chares Peirce and the Sign Hypothesis*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Gallie, W. B. (1966), *Peirce and Pragmatism*. New York: Dover Publications, Inc.
Goetzmann, W. H. (1973), *The American Hegelians: An Intellectual Episode in the History of Western America*. New York: Knopf.
Goodwin, R. (1961), 'Charles Saunders Peirce: A Modern Scotist?', *New Scholasticism* 35: 478-509.
Goudge, T. A. (1950), *The Thought of C.S. Peirce*. Dover edition. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Haack, S. (1992), ' "Extreme Scholastic Realism:" Its Relevance to Philosophy of Science Today', *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 28(1), 19-50.
Harmon, F. (1943), *The Social Philosophy of the St. Louis Hegelians*. New York: Columbia.
Harris, W. T. (1867a), 'Herbert Spencer', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 1(1), 6-22.
Harris, W. T. (1867b), 'Introduction to Philosophy', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 1(1), 57-60.
Harris, W. T. (1867c), 'Introduction to Philosophy', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 1(4), 236-240.
Harris, W. T. (1867d), 'Introduction to Philosophy', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 1(2), 114-120.
Harris, W. T. (1867e), 'Introduction to Philosophy', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 1(3), 187-190.
Harris, W. T. (1867f), 'Preface', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 1(1).
Harris, W. T. (1867g), 'The Speculative', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 1(1), 2-6.
Harris, W. T. (1868a), 'Introduction to Philosophy', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 2(1), 51-55.
Harris, W. T. (1868b), 'Introduction to Philosophy', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 2(3), 176-181.
Hausman, C. (1993), *Charles S. Peirce's Evolutionary Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hausman, C. R., Johnstone, H. W. Jr. and Vaught, C. G. (1987), 'To The Reader', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 1(1), 1-5.
Hookway, C. (1985), *Peirce*. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Houlgate, S. (2005), *An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Houlgate, S. (2006), *The Opening of Hegel's 'Logic'*. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

James, W. (1878a), 'Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence', *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 12(1), 1-18.
James, W. (1878b), 'Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 12(1), 1-18.
James, W. (1992-2004), *The Correspondence of William James*, ed. I. K. Skrupskelis, E. M. Berkeley, B. Grohskopf and W. Bradbeer. 12 vols. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
Jensen, K. E. (2004), 'Peirce as Educator: On Some Hegelisms', *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 40(2), 271-288.
Lane, R. (2004), 'On Peirce's Early Realism', *Transactions of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society* 40(4), 575-605.
Lane, R. (2007), 'Peirce's Modal Shift', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 45(4).
Leidecker, K. F. (1946), *Yankee Teacher: The Life of William Torrey Harris*. New York: The Philosophical Library.
Margolis, J. (1993), 'The Passing of Peirce's Realism', *Transactions of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society* 29(3),293-3330.
McCluskey, N. G. (1958), *Public Schools and Moral Education: The Influence of Horace Mann, William Torrey Harris, and John Dewey*. Westport: Greenwood Press, Publishers.
Michael, F. (1988), 'Two Forms of Scholastic Realism in Peirce's Philosophy', *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 24(3), 317-348.
Moore, E. C. (1952), 'The Scholastic Realism of C. S. Peirce', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 12(3), 406-417.
Moore, E. C. (1964), 'The Influence of Duns Scotus on Peirce', in E. C. Moore and R. S. Robin (eds.), *Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, Second Series*. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 401-413.
Murphey, M. G. (1993), *The Development of Peirce's Philosophy*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Original edition, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961.
Nethery, W. R. (1962), 'C. S. Peirce to W. T. Harris', *The Personalist* 43(1), 35-45.
Ochs, P. (1998), *Peirce, Pragmatism and the Logic of Scripture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Parker, K. A. (1998), *The Continuity of Peirce's Thought*. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press.
Peirce, C. S. (1868a), 'Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 2(2), 103-114.
Peirce, C. S. (1868b), 'Some Consequences of Four Incapacities', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 2(3), 140-157.
Peirce, C. S. (1869), 'Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences of Four Incapacities', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 2(4), 193-208.
Peirce, C. S. (1960), *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (vols. 1-6) and A. Burks (vols. 7-8). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Peirce, C. S. (1963-1970), *The Charles S. Peirce Papers*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Library, Microreproduction Service. Microfilm Reels 1-30: Papers; Microfilm Reels 31-32: Supplement to the microfilm edition of the Charles S. Peirce Papers.
Peirce, C. S. (1982-2010), *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition*, ed. The Peirce Edition Project 1-6:8. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Peirce, C. S. (1992), *Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898*, ed. K. L. Ketner. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Peirce, C. S. (1997), *Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, ed. P. A. Turrisi. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Peirce, C. S. (1998), *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings*, ed. The Peirce Edition Project. Vol. 2. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Peirce, C. S. and Harris, W. T. (1868), 'Nominalism versus Realism', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 2(1), 57-61.
Pochmann, H. A. (1948), *New England Transcendentalism and St. Louis Hegelianism*. Philadelphia: Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation.
Prendergast, T. L. (1977), 'The Structure of the Argument in Peirce's "Questions Concerning Faculties Claimed for Man', *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 13(4), 288-305.
Roberts, D. D. (1970), 'On Peirce's Realism', *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 6(2), 67-83.
Shapiro, G. (1981), 'Peirce's Critique of Hegel's Phenomenology and Dialectic', *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 17(3), 269-275.
Short, T. L. (2007), *Peirce's Theory of Signs*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skagestad, P. (1981), *The Road of Inquiry: Charles Peirce's Pragmatic Realism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Smyth, R. A. (1997), *Reading Peirce Reading*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Snider, D. J. (1910), *A Writer of Books: In His Genesis*. St. Louis: Sigma Publishing Co.
Snider, D. J. (1920), *The St. Louis Movement in Philosophy, Literature, Education, Psychology*. St. Louis: Sigma Publishing Co.
Stern, R. (2013a), 'An Hegelian in Strange Costume? On Peirce's Relation to Hegel I', *Philosophy Compass* 8(1), 53-62.
Stern, R. (2013b), 'An Hegelian in Strange Costume? On Peirce's Relation to Hegel II', *Philosophy Compass* 8(1), 63-72.
Stuhr, J. J. (2003), 'The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 1867-1893 (review)', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, New Series* 17(3), 237-240.
Tiercelin, C. (1992), 'Vagueness and the unity of Peirce's realism', *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* (XXVIII) 1: 51-82.

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Wasson, D. A. (1869), 'Being and Nothing: In What Sense They Are Identical', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 2(4), 245-247.
Watson, J. (1877), 'The Relativity of Knowledge', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy: An Examination of the Doctrine as held by Mr. Herbert Spencer* 11(1), 19-48.
Watson, J. (1878), 'The World as Force', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 12(2), 113-137.
Westbrook, R. (1991), *John Dewey and American Democracy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2015.15 Published online by Cambridge University Press