to duplicate the cube and 'save the phainomena'. I am not quite convinced by Z.'s argument that Sosigenes rather than Eudemus was the first to posit Plato's doing the latter simply because Simplicius, our source, does not specifically credit Eudemus with this belief as well, but here, as throughout, Z.'s laying out of the ancient evidence and his admirable knowledge of modern scholarship grants the reader the opportunity to disagree without further research. Similarly conservative, he argues that mathematics was not taught at the Academy for an impressive number of reasons, all of which are negative in nature; e.g. no early Academic was considered a mathematician. This may be, however, because mathematics was regarded as simply the propaedeutic it was in the *Republic*, not something that exercised the Academy's professional interest. Later, however, in his important chapter on Eudemus, he is more willing to accept many uncredited statements about early Greek mathematics as Eudemean in origin. Eudemus, in fact, more so than even Theophrastus, is seen as the culmination of the Peripatetic project of describing the history of Greek science (ἐπιστῆμαι). Overall, Z. has succeeded in his history of the history of science. Moreover, since it is impossible to do this without discussing the science itself, Z.'s book may also be recommended as a source of much up-to-date information on almost all the questions that vexed Greek scientists, including the Presocratics. (Since I am thanked in Z.'s preface, let me say that this was only for having commented on some very few pages.)

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PENNER (T.) and ROWE (C.) **Plato's *Lysis***. Cambridge UP, 2005. Pp. xiv + 366. £55. 0521791308.

In their book Penner and Rowe argue that this apparently impish dialogue is a work of serious philosophy, and a resounding philosophical success to boot. On their view, the *Lysis* contains a sophisticated and credible theory of friendship and love, based on a more general Socratic theory of human desire and action. The nature of these theories will not surprise those familiar with Penner's previous work: human desire is for the *real* (rather than the apparent) good, just as when I talk about an object I intend to refer to that object as it really is ('the principle of real reference', 210). Knowledge alone is always good, as it alone is always a means to happiness, and so knowledge is our ultimate good and the dialogue's mysterious 'first friend'. Human desire is thus desire for the knowledge that will guarantee our happiness. But while all our desires have this 'basic structure' (269), the different *means* to the good allow us to distinguish love and friendship from our other desires. If Lysis loves Menexenus, it is because he recognizes that Menexenus' good is a major means to his (Lysis') own good. And as this 'good' is knowledge, friendship is a deeply philosophical business, the pursuit of wisdom through conversation and companionship.

The book falls into two parts: first a very faithful translation, interspersed with a lengthy commentary, and then an unbroken account of the dialogue's theory. (The translation is then reproduced without interruptions.) In the second part the authors return to the claims made during the course of the commentary, but now offer more precision and more comparisons with other Platonic dialogues. This division allows them to claim both that a theory of desire can be quarried from arguments and hints in the *Lysis* alone (as witnessed by their commentary), and that this theory can be further understood in the light of Socrates' claims elsewhere.

The authors develop a powerful case for their interpretation, with attention to both argument and dramatic detail, and their final chapter mounts a powerful defence of the dialogue's theory, giving special weight to countering Vlastos' protest that our love for others should have no regard for our own good. Indeed, Vlastos has a particularly strong presence in a book that rarely engages with alternative views of the *Lysis*; P. and R. oppose directly both Vlastos' account of love and the conception of the 'Socratic elenchus' he helped to pioneer (195-205). (On these topics, as elsewhere, the authors' arguments are of wide application and interest.) There is also, perhaps, an offshoot of Vlastos' understanding of Socratic irony in the book's claim that Socrates argues on different levels; on Vlastos' view, Socratic irony may baffle an interlocutor but it also sets him a riddle to solve, and this view has something of a progeny in these authors' notion that Socratic argument leads the interlocutor into difficulties but *hints* at a solution.

Here I have misgivings. It is one thing to say that Plato hints at and implicitly recommends a theory of desire capable of solving the problems of the *Lysis*, quite another to say that *Socrates* hints in such a way. P. and R. want to say both (37-8, 39-40, 167, 171, 184, 275). But attributing these strategic intimations to Socrates is of course difficult to square with Socrates' claims to be bewildered (216c) and unexpectedly hesitant (218c). And, perhaps more importantly, it has unwelcome consequences for our view of Socratic dialectic. Elsewhere Socrates states that in dialectic between 'friends' one should refer to items which one's interlocutor claims to understand, and then checks that his interlocutor understands various items in the way *he* (Socrates) understands them (*Meno* 75d-76a). If P. and R. are to be believed, however, some of Socrates' most earnest arguments work on a different level from that of his interlocutors' understanding. Regardless of any dialectic between 'positions' (108 n.27), it would be unfortunate if Socrates proved to ignore his own prescriptions for dialectic between 'friends' – and in the *Lysis* of all places.

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