of his claim (fr. 7, para. 2) that the poor benefit from civic concord, in so far as it promotes trust and intercourse between rich and poor (p. 155).

The volume is marred by a number of presentational defects. Misspellings of Greek, including errors in breathings and accentuation, are so pervasive as to suggest a fault in the software used to generate Greek type (the pieces by Hoffmann, who cites more Greek than his collaborators, are worst affected); all the same, it is surprising to find δίκϵ (p. 12) and μῆτρον (p. 15, twice) in the text of a scholarly publication. Transliterated Greek is not immune; in the piece on Protagoras' myth *aidos* appears mostly, though not invariably, as *eidos*. There are a few Germanisms in the English summaries prefixed to the papers, though none significant enough to obscure the meaning. Since the contributors give full bibliographical references in footnotes, the absence of a general bibliography is only a minor defect. On the other hand, the absence of any form of index is a major one. The volume identifies a modern writer hitherto unknown to scholarship, 'Jonathan Routledge Barnes' (p. 75 n. 83).

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REWRITING THE PAST IN FOURTH-CENTURY GREECE

F. POWNALL: *Lessons from the Past. The Moral Use of History in Fourth-Century Prose.* Pp. x + 204. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004. Cased, US$60, £37.50. ISBN: 0-472-11327-5.

There are two interesting arguments in this book. The main one is that Xenophon, Ephorus, and Theopompus deliberately distorted the record of the past in the interests of promoting moral lessons in their historical writing. A secondary argument is that they represent the politics of dissent—filling the space left for historians in Ober's survey of types of literary opposition to democracy in his *Politics of Dissent* (Princeton, 1998).

The author sees the promotion of the moral lesson as a reaction to the philosophic questioning of values and moral disintegration caused by the Peloponnesian War—their impact on morals is not questioned. Her survey of prose-writers from Herodotus to Isocrates does describe a trend toward the listing and defining of virtues, though some more refinement is possible: the virtues in Xenophon's *Agesilaus* 7–9 cannot be passed over as 'nonmoral' since he regularly attaches them to his paradigms of leadership (being *philopolis*, *eucharis*, opposed to *alazoneia*), and the remark that courage is 'conspicuous by its absence' from his characterization of Cyrus in *Cyropaedia* is true of the section the author refers to about his imperial administration, but not of other sections where Cyrus is presented as a military leader (pp. 34–5).

The main arguments begin with a reading of Plato's *Menexenus* as a subversion of the Athenian democratic rhetoric found in the *epitaphios*. This represents the politics of dissent, and is juxtaposed with Plato's own distortions of the past to reach the conclusion that Plato thought that such distortion was justified if it gave moral instruction, but not when, as in the *epitaphios*, it merely flattered the masses.

The arguments are then developed in chapters on the historians, with Plato as the model. Xenophon in his *Hellenica* is also 'more interested in the moral lessons to be gained from historical events than in preserving an accurate record of the past'

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(p. 110). This could suggest that he tells deliberate lies, but the chapter does not go beyond attributing his well-known selectivity to his love of a moral lesson. Thus, passages of moral instruction are found filling the gaps left by *Hellenica*'s notorious omissions (pp. 75–6: the argument presumes that he could make nothing instructive of the omitted material), and what he calls 'worthy of report' are moral lessons, on leadership in particular, as we know, and involve the narration of insignificant events (p. 82). His digressions, speeches and other narrative features show the same priority.

Xenophon's lessons are then made more briefly to serve the politics of dissent. The morals he promotes are called undemocratic because they are oligarchic, military, and hierarchical—Spartan in a word (pp. 110–11)—and his lessons on leadership are said to endorse the traditional aristocratic military career against the contemporary preference for demagogy. One could say in response that courage in the face of death and loyalty in misfortune, qualities to which the chapter has made specific reference, are certainly not restricted to military life; that it is not unlikely that the democracy itself valued such leadership qualities in their fighting forces; and that in other works Xenophon requires the same qualities of political leaders and of members of the private associations of family and friends.

The chapter on Ephorus also concludes (p. 141) that his 'primary purpose in writing his *Histories* seems to have been the moral instruction of his readers, to show how the collective moral behavior of a society leads to its remaining strong and free, which he achieved through the use of praise and blame, negative example, prefaces, digressions, aphorisms, speeches'—even though, as the author has indicated, very little remains of his prefaces or speeches. A special proof of his interest in moral lessons is found in passages where he is prepared to break his own rule about not dealing with the mythical past. The foundation of the Delphic oracle by Apollo is one instance, and the author continues to pursue the distortion of the 'accurate' record in the interests of moral lessons (p. 119), arguing here and elsewhere that Ephorus does not even try to obtain the accurate version (pp. 121, 128). E.'s view that the freedom of the Aetolians came from their simple and hard life probably has as much truth in it as the similar view in the concluding story in Herodotus about the Persians.

The two main arguments are pursued with the same degree of conviction in the chapter on Theopompus, an easier case, since he made such an issue of praise and blame in his work.

It is useful to have our attention drawn again to the importance of the evaluation of virtue and vice in the fourth-century historians, but whether they deliberately distorted events in order to promote such evaluation is unproven. That they represent the politics of dissent is plausible, but Xenophon at least is a much more complicated case than is allowed here.

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THE NEW OCT DEMOSTHENES

M. R. Dilts (ed.): *Demosthenis* Orationes *I.* Pp. xxxiii + 318. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Cased. ISBN: 0-19-872168-4.

This volume represents the first of a planned four-volume edition of Demosthenes' speeches, replacing the Oxford text of S. H. Butcher and W. Rennie (1903–31). It is a

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