is inclined to represent Lord Elgin as a 'saviour' of marbles that would otherwise have gone to ruin *in situ*, we are left in little doubt that if Elgin had fulfilled his original intent, the sculptures of the Parthenon would now be scattered throughout transatlantic museums. Scott concludes with praise for the British Museum in rescuing some portion of these private souvenirs as coherent ensembles. The praise is due: though curiously, I find, it adds to pressure on the custodians to go the extra mile in Elgin's case – and for the sake of coherence, deliver the marbles back to Athens.

NIGEL SPIVEY

Philosophy

What is Ancient Philosophy?[1] Beware if you assume from the title of Pierre Hadot's book that this is a reflection on our *study* of ancient philosophy: it actually means to ask what the philosophy we study 'is'. An unusual question, which was clearly written to Hadot's idiosyncratic answer which, as I understand it, is this: that before the unhappy days when philosophy became enslaved to the service of Christian theology, philosophy was not a tool crafted for any purpose, but a form of self-expression. 'It was the philosopher's choice of a way of life which conditioned and determined the fundamental tendencies of his philosophical discourse' (272–3) not, as one might have thought (and as ancient philosophers themselves claimed) *vice versa*. All of this makes for a study in which the evidence for ancient philosophy is treated in a way which will seem rather topsy-turvy to its conventional practitioners: ancient biographical reports (as e.g., at 111, Diogenes Laertius' satirical caricature of Pyrrho of Elis) are accepted with perfect seriousness, while the specifics of doctrine and argument (which by implication have secondary importance) are covered with a rather airy insouciance. I think I understand what Hadot means when, for example, he says that Stoicism involved becoming 'sharply aware of the tragic situation of human beings' (127), but it creates a somewhat misleading impression. If Hadot were right, one of the surprising things would be how similar the interests of ancient and modern philosophers turn out to be. The 'atmosphere of sublimated love' that is supposed by Hadot to have prevailed in the Academy (60) nurtured a metaphysics every bit as precise, pedantic, abstract, and yet engrossing as any that has come from the colder academies of the post-Christian era. Verity Harte's exploration of *Plato on Parts and Wholes*[2] is an excellent case study of this. Her question is beguilingly simple: What it is to be something which has parts? In a sophisticated and illuminating discussion of, in particular, the *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Philebus*, and *Timaeus*, Harte shows how Plato demonstrates that a whole is not (just) the sum of its parts. Rather, a 'whole' is to be understood as a structure of a certain kind. The easy thing at this point might have been to cry 'Form' and have done with; but one thing (among many) that makes this such an interesting study is Harte's deliberate policy of avoiding any systematic attempt to link her discussion to the theory of forms (6). The strain of this self-imposed discipline shows at times: she has to note the 'nascent theory of forms' at a crucial point in the *Parmenides* (cf. 51 with n. 9), and her

[1] *What is Ancient Philosophy?* By Pierre Hadot. Translated into English by Michael Chase. Harvard UP, 2002. Pp. xii + 362. Hardback £19.95.

[2] *Plato on Parts and Wholes*. The Metaphysics of Structure. By Verity Harte. Oxford UP, 2002. Pp. x + 311. Hardback £35.

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discussion of creation in the *Timaeus* does start to develop a link between forms and (in this case geometrical) structure (cf. 261–4). But it is worth it in the end for showing that the theory of forms is not the be all and end all of Plato's capacity for sophisticated metaphysical analysis. A characteristic theme of early modern philosophy is the role and nature of self-awareness; ancient philosophers rather focussed their attention on the (separate) issue of self-intellection, and this is the subject of Crystal's *Self-Intellection and its Epistemological Origins in Ancient Greek Thought*.[3] It is not always an easy read, partly because of its subject-matter, and partly because, while it is strong on historical background (Parmenides and Plato, in the pre-history of the subject, take up more than half the book), Crystal does not make a great deal of effort to locate his topic in its wider intellectual context. His study is, nevertheless, useful and illuminating. Starting from Parmenides and working through Plato, Crystal traces the background of the idea that the intellect somehow *becomes* the object of its own thought to Aristotle's concern that the intellect might vanish from sight when it tries to catch sight of itself. Aristotle (who made the question 'part of the epistemological geography': 152) answered this problem by saying that the intellect perceives itself only incidentally, insofar as it perceives (other) intelligible objects. It was left to Plotinus (Crystal argues) to argue the possibility of full self-intellection. Through criticisms especially of the Stoics' attempts in the field, Plotinus argued that the *activity* required by the intellect to sustain its contents, the activity of intellection, is the mark that distinguishes the intellect as the subject of its thought even when it thinks about itself. There are two important contributions to ancient literary theory to note. The briefer of these comes in a new edition of Fortenbaugh's classic study of *Aristotle on Emotion*.[4] In an epilogue to the original 1975 text, Fortenbaugh revisits some of his original topics, including the subject of laughter, where he significantly expands on his original (and, he now thinks, simplistic) assertion that laughter for Aristotle as for Hobbes was confined to the thought of one's own superiority to others. The more substantial is Andrew Ford's *The Origins of Criticism*,[5] which attempts to correct an anachronistic tendency to view Platonic and (especially) Aristotelian literary theory as the culmination of earlier approaches to poetry. He does this by locating earlier critical reaction in its social context, which in practice means the context of poetic performance, since Ford argues that in the sixth and fifth centuries evaluation was rather of performance than of text (of 'song' rather than 'poem'-as-artefact). He makes a convincing case for saying that such criticism was moral or political rather than technical in tendency, so that Plato's concern for the political suitability of poetry turns out to be old-fashioned rather than critically irrelevant. This is a detailed, clearly written, and valuable book; and although it (confessedly) has little analysis of later philosophical theories of literature, they inevitably benefit enormously from the light shed by his work on their historical background. The cause of historical background in the reading of Plato has been done an immeasurable service by Debra Nails' *The People of Plato*,[6] a painstaking prosopographical study of

[3] *Self-Intellection and its Epistemological Origins in Ancient Greek Thought*. By Ian M. Crystal. Ashgate, 2002. Pp. x + 220. Hardback £45.

[4] *Aristotle on Emotion*. A Contribution to Philosophical Psychology, Rhetoric, Poetics, Politics and Ethics. By W. W. Fortenbaugh. 2nd edn. Duckworth, 2002. Pp. 142. Paperback £12.99.

[5] *The Origins of Criticism*. Literary Culture and Poetic Theory in Classical Greece. By Andrew Ford. Princeton UP, 2002. Pp. xiv + 356. Hardback £29.95.

[6] *The People of Plato*. A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics. By Debra Nails. Hackett, 2002. Pp. xlviii + 414. Hardback £49.

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every historical personage in the dialogues of Plato and of other Socratics (including Phaedo, I notice, though on p. 1 Nails admits only to Antisthenes, Aeschines, and Xenophon). Nails has had to make some decisions about who counts as historical and who does not (Er is out; Diotima is in, for example); and it would be a miracle if such a monumental synthesis of material were altogether free of mistakes (though the only really questionable claim I have found is Nails' identification of Alcibiades' tutor with the eponymous physiognomist of Phaedo's *Zopyrus*: the latter is supposed to have been a stranger in Athens when Alcibiades was old enough to be in Socrates' company). I blush to stress the fact, and do so only because the work is *so* obviously well done and *so* obviously useful that there is a danger that those of us who use it will come to neglect the primary sources, when its purpose should be to make us more familiar with them. (I take it that this sort of concern is in Nails' own mind when she disarmingly says on p. l that 'I have not written a perfect book. There are errors.') But everyone, of course, should own a copy of this book. I myself have two. Some works to note briefly on the way to the exit: an excellent new OCT text of Plato's *Republic*[7] by Simon Slings, which claims to be the first 'based on an exhaustive examination of all the textual evidence', and fully deserves its place as the successor to Burnet; a reissue of Skemp's classic translation of and commentary on Plato's *Politicus*;[8] and an Italian translation of the Emperor Julian's epistle *To the Cynic Heraclius*,[9] which an unenlightening introduction and pedestrian notes do nothing to make a less interesting text. The Summer issue of *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*[10] is a mixed bag. There are outstanding contributions on Plato's *Protagoras* by Denis O'Brien and on Sextus Empiricus by Gail Fine; a series of interesting discussions of Aristotelian metaphysics by Marc Pavlopoulos, Devin Henry, and Stephen Makin; worthy contributions on Empedocles' cosmic cycle (Simon Trépanier), Stoic logic (John Bowin), Stoic physics (Ricardo Salles), and 'Cosmological Ethics in the *Timaeus* and Early Stoicism' (Gábor Betegh). This leaves an interesting and thoughtful paper by Rachel Barney identifying a 'Puzzle in Stoic Ethics'. I am not entirely convinced that Barney is right to suppose that the Stoics said (or meant to say) that 'preferred indifferents' were preferred *absolutely*. It might be that the Stoics thought that health, for example, is 'preferred' only *ceteris paribus*, i.e. only on the understanding that my selection of health will normally be beneficial to the cosmos as a whole. If, on a particular occasion, it is not, then it isn't 'preferable' for me on that occasion either (since I identify my own best interests with those of cosmos). But if I am mistaken about this, then Barney is right to see a puzzle in how we are supposed to reconcile the claim that virtue is a matter of selecting preferred indifferents with the claim that there are times when the right thing to do might be detrimental to (for example) my health. But as I began with Hadot's view of the character of philosophy in antiquity, I end with Andrea Cozzo's view of why we should care.

[7] *Platonis Respublica*. Edited by S. R. Slings. Oxford UP, 2003. Pp. xxiii + 428. Hardback £25.

[8] *Plato: the Statesman*. A translation of the *Politicus* of Plato with introductory essay and commentary. By J. B. Skemp. Revised edition. Bristol Classical Press, 1987. (Reissued 2002.) Pp. 246. Paperback £12.99.

[9] *Giuliano Imperatore: Al Cinico Eraclio*. Edited with translation and commentary by Rosanna Guido. Mario Congedo, 2000. Pp. xxxviii + 206.

[10] *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*. Edited by David Sedley. Vol. XXIV, Summer 2003: Oxford UP, 2003. Pp. 400. Hardback £35; paperback £19.99.

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Sapere e potere[11] is a polemic against any answer founded on positivist assumptions (e.g. that the study of ancient philosophy helps us take the 'long view'), both because he disagrees, on theoretical grounds, with historical positivism, and because in any case he has a Marxist distaste for the self-serving power-structures of the academy and what he sees as its refusal to engage with the wider contemporary world. It is, in other words, both theoretically and politically legitimate to talk about antiquity only insofar as we are really talking about ourselves. The theoretical point established, Cozzo uses a suggestive study of the transmission of wisdom in antiquity to make his political point, contrasting an essentially autocratic model of conventional pedagogy with the more democratic possibility embodied (he says) by Socrates. What this means, exactly, I remain unsure, particularly because Cozzo's image of the ideal pedagogue as the pilot of a ship whose company it is that decides where to go (55) is rather like the image used by Plato to explain why it is inevitable that a Democracy would murder a Socrates (*Republic* 488a ff.). In any case, Cozzo is perhaps too optimistic in thinking that his book will be received as 'un piccolo atto di disobedienza civile' (15); and too pessimistic about the power of the institutionalized academy. Most students who pass through it, after all, do not become part of it; and the capacity for civil disobedience might be one of the transferable skills we have to offer. (Now where did I put my copy of the Benchmark Statement?)

GEORGE BOYS-STONES

[11] *Sapere e potere presso i moderni e presso i Greci antichi*. Una ricera per lo studio come se servisse a qualcosa. By Andrea Cozzo. Carocci, 2002. Pp. 304. Paperback €24.50.

General

'World' must now be one of the most commonly employed words in scholarly literature – we examine the 'world' of this or that author, various aspects of the Graeco-Roman 'world', 'worlds' of philosophical and political thought, and so on. There will be no shortage of such worlds turning up in this set of reviews. It is, however, a pleasure at least to start off with a set of volumes which deals in considerable detail with a significant and relatively neglected part of the 'real world', the kind of world which geographers talk about and study; the credentials of these volumes in that direction are neatly reinforced by the presence of a map on the front cover – a Ptolemaic map which includes the southern tip of Iberia, the Pillars of Hercules, the Oceanus Occidentalis to the far left, and the detailed depiction of Mauretania Tinganica as the main focus. This map, then, is the visual representation of the theme of the three volumes, an extraordinarily thorough, varied, and valuable collection of essays on the theme of *L'Africa Romana,*[1] stemming from a conference held in Sassari in December 2000. The range and number of the contributions, well over 150 of them, presented in a variety of languages, and covering literary, archaeological, historical, and artistic material, preclude any individual assessment here. One can merely note it as a scholarly treasure-trove, and marvel at the stamina, passion, and dedication of the participants. The conference timetable, provided at the start of the first volume, sets a terrifying standard for devotion to our subject,

[1] *L'Africa Romana*. Lo spazio maritimmo del Mediteranneo occidentale: geografia storica ed economia. Edited by Mustapha Khanoussi, Paola Ruggeri, and Cinza Vismara. Carocci, Rome, 2002. Three volumes. Pp. 2580, with black and white plates and illustrations. Paperback €103.29.

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