psychology to launch her own 'take' upon the problem of Classical portraits. Rather, in her study of *Ancient Greek Portrait Sculpture*,[5] she proposes abandoning the traditional quest of scholars confronted by Greek portraits – portraits by and large with Roman provenance – which has been to make a classification by names. This is a radical shift of direction, and seems at first sight to subvert the very *raison d'etre* of a portrait. If we cannot recognize some bearded worthy as Homer or Demosthenes or suchlike, what value has the portrait; who wants a portrait of 'Anonymous'? But of course this is more of a problem for modern scholars than it was for ancient patrons. When Martin Robertson salutes the block-headed bust of Themistokles (from Ostia) as 'the first true portrait of an individual European', the identification of a pugnacious block-head with the historical Athenian is secured only by an accompanying inscription; yet, if we had no such 'label' of identity, the physiognomic individuality would be there all the same. So, by focusing on a series of 'unknown' Classical personages, Dillon is able to explore the nuances of appearance for their own sake. The result is a necessary (and overdue) exercise in recognizing the range of sculptural techniques devised by the fourth century BC in order to achieve the rightful end of all portraits – commemoration by an 'increase of being'.

doi:S0017383508000752 NIGEL SPIVEY

[5] *Ancient Greek Portrait Sculpture. Contexts, Subjects, and Styles*. By Sheila Dillon. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. xx + 217. 171 figures. Hardback £64, ISBN: 978-0-521-85498-6.

Philosophy

David Sedley this year edits his last *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*[1] – a fine volume, which, among other treats, includes a bravura discussion – with pictures! – of a passage of *Metaphysics Θ*.6 by Myles Burnyeat. Sedley has also published his 2004 Sather Lectures, *Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity*,[2] from which it emerges that there were more creationists in antiquity than we generally suppose. The Presocratics in particular, according to Sedley, were not the mechanists that Plato and Aristotle have encouraged us to think of them as: they differed more in their ideas about how than about whether teleology was part of the story. Anaxagoras' Intellect turns out to have brought about and nurtured the world on the model of a farmer for human benefit; Love and Strife set clear teleological boundaries to the operation of chance in Empedocles; Socrates emerges as 'a fundamentally anti-scientific creationist' (and originator of the 'argument from design'). Critics emerge only in chapter 5 with the atomists, and chapter 6 on Aristotle (whose achievement in thinking of teleology without a controlling intelligence clearly attracts Sedley's admiration). Chapters on Plato and the Stoics set out more traditional versions of creationism. As always with Sedley's work, this is a highly readable and fresh account of individuals – and a subject – of central importance. Sedley champions what Patricia Curd, in

[1] *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*. Edited by David Sedley. Vol. XXXIV, Summer 2008. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. 423. Hardback £45, ISBN: 9780199544875; paperback £25, ISBN: 9780199544899.

[2] *Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity*. By David Sedley. Sather Classical Lectures 66. Berkeley, CA, Los Angeles, CA, and London, University of California Press, 2007. Pp. xvii + 269. Hardback £17.95, ISBN: 9780520253643.

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Anaxagoras of Clazomenae,[3] characterizes as the 'austere' view of Anaxagoras: that is, the view that the fundamental stuffs of the universe are only the opposites – hot and cold, wet and dry, and so on (26–30). In a series of acute and lucid essays, complementing a presentation and translation of the fragments of Anaxagoras, Curd argues instead for what she describes as the 'moderate' view, that substances such as flesh and gold play a part at this level too – though not such things as bread or dog, as an 'expansive' wing of Anaxagorean scholarship has argued. The question comes down in large part to the role one accords to the 'seeds'. If natural kinds are already in the mix, it is obvious where they come from; Sedley has 'seeds' as a kind of intermediate stage, nurtured in their turn by *Nous*. Curd's view is that seeds are 'somehow the mechanism through which *Nous* is projected into living things and by which structure is imposed' (226). Her 'moderate' view of substance is thus bought at the cost of a more expansive view of the divine mind.

Presocratic views of the *human* mind are the subject of several new studies. *The Enduring Significance of Parmenides*[4] by Raymond Tallis sees Parmenides' claim that we can only think *what is* as a seminal moment in human intellectual history. Parmenides was wrong, as it happens: Tallis' view is that human understanding works by positing an observer-independent reality underlying the objects of empirical experience to which it cannot have direct access. 'What is' turns out to be precisely what we *cannot think*. In confusing the limit of knowledge with its proper object, however, Parmenides is taken to have confronted knowledge with the conditions of its own possibility and thus represents a thunderbolt moment in a grand Hegelian narrative of the 'awakening of human consciousness to itself' (53). The attraction to philosophical hagiography of this sort eludes me (as does the dismissive caricaturing of other players that often accompanies it: Ionian philosophy is compared to 'gossip' at 13, for example). But Parmenides is a bit of a peg for Tallis anyway – he does not stray far from frr. 2–3 – and his discussions of consciousness and epistemology have a lot of their own interest.

Ugo Zilioli's *Protagoras and the Challenge of Relativism*[5] is more successful as a sophisticated study in 'pure' epistemology – relativism in this case – that also commands historical credibility. Key to Zilioli's reconstruction is the claim that Protagoras' epistemological relativism ('what seems to me true is so') is allied with a thesis of *ontological* relativism ('nothing is anything in its own right'). Zilioli gets around the threat of solipsism by describing the state that Protagoras finds himself in as one of private worlds which are (in terms derived from Kuhn, via Feyerabend) *incommensurable* but nonetheless *comparable*. This allows inter-personal relationships of every kind – linguistic, didactic, emotional – on the basis of which we can forge political communities. Relativism was a serious challenge to Plato, Zilioli argues, for reasons that ought to make us take it seriously too: Protagoras offers a model of communication between different cultural outlooks that is peculiarly suited to the complexity

[3] *Anaxagoras of Clazomenae. Fragments and Testimonia*. A text and translation with notes and essays by Patricia Curd. Phoenix Presocratics Volume 6. Toronto, Buffalo, NY, and London, University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pp. xiv + 279. Hardback £42, ISBN: 9780802093257.

[4] *The Enduring Significance of Parmenides. Unthinkable Thought*. By Raymond Tallis. Continuum Studies in Philosophy. London and New York, Continuum, 2007. Pp. xvi + 240. Hardback £65, ISBN: 9780826499523.

[5] *Protagoras and the Challenge of Relativism. Plato's Subtlest Enemy*. By Ugo Zilioli. Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Philosophy. Aldershot and Burlington, VT, Ashgate, 2007. Pp. x + 160. Hardback £50, ISBN: 9780754660781.

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of our own world (145). Robert Zaborowski's *Sur le sentiment chez les Présocratiques*,[6] takes us from epistemology to phenomenology, showing that the Presocratics tended to employ the Homeric vocabulary of *thumos*, *phrên*, and *noos* for 'feeling', rather than the fourth-century standards *aisthêsis* and *pathos*, with a growing role for *logos* as the essential element of the human soul. The conclusion – that Presocratic psychological models were not the dichotomies of reason and emotion with which we are familiar from Plato onwards – is not all that surprising; but the careful analysis of the evidence makes the book no less useful for that. And the point is well taken that there was more interest in anthropology among the Presocratics than we are often inclined to give them credit for. The Presocratics are given a role in another story that typically excludes them by Fritz-Gregor Herrmann's *Words and Ideas*,[7] a book that also shares with Zaborowski an interest in lexical analysis. Taking some of the central theoretical terms of Plato's *Phaedo* (ten in all, including *eidos*, *idea*, *metechein*), Herrmann traces their philological, literary, and philosophical roots, with the aim of establishing how they would have sounded in context to Plato's early readers. His conclusion is that all this vocabulary comes to Plato from pre-existing philosophical contexts and that, in reshaping it to his own new models of explanation, Plato can be seen to be in dialogue with, especially, Democritus (*idea*), Anaxagoras (*metechein*), and Philolaus (*eidos*). The etymological and linguistic analysis gets a little out of proportion at times; but the work to which it is finally put, and particularly the suggestion that Plato's 'forms' have relevant antecedents, is exciting stuff and matter (I hope) for future development. Barbara Anceschi seems to be committed to the idea that Plato himself traced the theory of forms back to the earliest men – those who established the names for things. In *Die Götternamen in Platons Kratylos*,[8] she develops a reading of the *Cratylus* through a commentary on the discussion of divine names at 400d–408d. This passage, Anceschi argues, amounts to an 'allegorical' reading of the Greek theological tradition, whose method can be usefully compared to that of the 'Derveni' author, with Socrates' etymologies giving a subtextual account of Platonic metaphysics – programmatically signalled by the double etymology of Hestia as both *ousia* ('Parmenidean' being) and *ôsia* (a 'Heraclitean' 'shoving about' of matter). It is also a sort of *mise-en-abîme* of the *Cratylus* as a whole, whose message is that *all* language is perforce, as allegory is by choice, 'riddling' and imprecise in its depiction of reality – not the cut-and-dried matter of naturalism or conventionalism variously championed by Socrates' interlocutors. This is obviously a highly suggestive and ingenious approach to the work, but it is not without its problems too. One is precisely the ascription of a *Platonist* metaphysics to the name-givers: Socrates consistently characterizes them as Heracliteans (e.g., 402b, 411b–c, 439c). Francis Grabowski's *Plato, Metaphysics and the Forms*[9] rehearses

[6] *Sur le sentiment chez les Présocratiques. Contribution psychologique à la philosophie des sentiments*. By Robert Zaborowski. Warsaw, Stakroos, 2008. Pp. 256. Paperback £20, ISBN: 9788386700233.

[7] *Words and Ideas. The Roots of Plato's Philosophy*. By Fritz-Gregor Herrmann. Swansea, The Classical Press of Wales, 2007. Pp. xv + 368. Hardback £50, ISBN: 9781905125203.

[8] *Die Götternamen in Platons Kratylos. Ein Vergleich mit dem Papyrus von Derveni*. By Barbara Anceschi. Studien zur klassischen Philologie 158. Frankfurt-am-Main, Peter Lang, 2007. Pp. 225. Paperback £25.80, ISBN: 9783631565292.

[9] *Plato, Metaphysics and the Forms*. By Francis A. Grabowski. Continuum Studies in Ancient Philosophy. London and New York, Continuum, 2008. Pp. xi + 163. Hardback £65, ISBN: 9780826497802.

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the evidence that Plato thought of forms as concrete individuals in the misapprehension that this might 'turn the conventional Platonic scholarship on its head' (107). It is true that not everyone ends up talking of the forms in these terms: but Grabowski underestimates his opponents if he thinks that they are ignorant of the considerations he adduces. He will be lucky if this book causes anyone so much as to turn in their sleep. Proclus' commentary on Plato's *Parmenides* is a rather different study of Platonic metaphysics, which may be mentioned as appropriately here as anywhere. The second part of Carlos Steel's three-volume OCT of Proclus' text[10] covers books 4 and 5, and includes a short but useful preface that starts a dialogue of sorts between Steel's text and that of the new Budé edition – the first part of which appeared shortly after his own first volume (noted last year: *G&R* 55 [2008], 150). A final book devoted to a single Platonic dialogue: G. R. F. Ferrari's *Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic*.[11] This is a fine collection of original studies, well conceived, well executed, and, for all the variety of topics and approaches, remarkably coherent. Or, rather, not remarkably: a lot of care and effort clearly went in to making it so (there was even conference behind it: xxv). Among the themes that struck me and helped give the volume its sense of collegiality was a recurring interest in the figures of Glaucon and Adeimantus as Socrates' immediate audience, and in the 'city of pigs' – the 'real' utopia trounced in the end by Callipolis. Several books this year develop full-scale strategies for reading Plato as a whole. In some ways, the most straightforward (the most student-friendly, anyway) is Gerald Press's *Plato. A Guide for the Perplexed*.[12] This presents itself as a kind of toolkit for reading Plato, with a wealth of information about Plato's life, work, and intellectual context, which includes (just for example) lists of the principal sophists and their dates (32), a table of the dialogues with theme, setting, and interlocutors (72–3), and brief summaries of the more commonly studied dialogues (209–20). In the central chapters, Press surveys some of the principal structural features of the dialogues (argument, myths, irony, playfulness, paradox, etc.). Finally, he introduces a practical strategy for reading one of them: analyse the arguments; assess the dramatic setting; integrate those first two stages into a single reading; repeat. If this all sounds a bit dry, it is too brisk for that: 'workmanlike' is probably the word, and an excellent remedy for the sort of perplexity that Plato in particular arouses. Yet Press has a theoretical agenda in all this as well, which is to attack readings that look for Platonic 'mouthpieces' in the dialogues. Philosophically speaking, he thinks, the dialogues are more *tao* than 'tell' (e.g., 123, 172). A concern one might have with this sort of approach is that all substantive content drains away through the open-endedness on which it relies – though Press tries to address this worry with an interesting position on Platonic thought as something 'transcending' the vulgar antinomies of his interlocutors to give 'a particular way of understanding the world as having a lower or outer level as well as an inner and higher level' (170). David Wolfsdorf agrees with Press in his

[10] *Procli in Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria. Tomus II libros IV–V continens*. Edited by Carlos Steel. Oxford Classical Texts. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. xv + 331. Hardback £45, ISBN: 9780199291717.

[11] *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic*. Edited by G. R. F. Ferrari. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. xxvi + 533. Hardback £48, ISBN: 9780521839631; paperback £16.99, ISBN: 9780521548427.

[12] *Plato. A Guide for the Perplexed*. By Gerald A. Press. London and New York, Continuum, 2007. Pp. viii + 240. Hardback £50, ISBN: 9780826491770; paperback £12.99, ISBN: 9780826491763.

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opposition to the 'mouthpiece' reading of Plato but, in *Trials of Reason*,[13] attempts to keep a more direct grip on the idea of Platonic doctrine. Wolfsdorf's method relies on spotting contradictions within and between the dialogues: internal contradictions, which come about because the dialogues follow a trajectory that takes conventional assumptions and language and gradually bends them to distinctively Platonic thought; and contradictions between dialogues that arise as a consequence of the fact that each starts afresh from conventional assumptions. Once we have identified them all, we can assume that a thesis is distinctively Platonic only when it is (a) argued for, (b) against conventional wisdom, while (c) not being contradicted elsewhere in the corpus. A dense series of close readings illustrates the method (notable is that of the *Charmides* in the final chapter). Inter alia, we learn that Plato is committed to the view that human excellence resides in knowledge, and that definition is foundational for knowledge – with the result that the project as a whole effectively stumbles on 'Meno's Paradox'. This leaves philosophy rather open-ended again (Wolfsdorf prefers to say 'work in progress': 197) but valuable still, apparently, to help people realize their excellence against the forces of 'antiphilosophy'. Both Press and Wolfsdorf think of the dialogues as more or less self-contained works; and, although Wolfsdorf's method involves looking for consistencies between them, he is no more interested than Press in their *engagement* with each other as a matter of method. This is something that Christopher Rowe, by contrast, puts in the foreground of his manifesto for the study of Plato – *Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing*.[14] Like Wolfsdorf and Press, Rowe insists on balancing the analytical and the literary, and, like Wolfsdorf at least, Rowe explains differences between dialogues in terms of the different ways in which Plato's readers (represented by Socrates' interlocutors) are led into the system. Unlike either, however, Rowe insists that there is a fully unified system there. This system is consistently Socratic (Rowe is a committed mouthpiece-arian, then: see especially 15) in asserting first that the individual is, ideally at least, a unified rational agent and only desires the good; and second, that this drives the quest for knowledge (including self-knowledge), which is attainable only through philosophical dialectic. Much of the book is devoted to the obvious problems that such a picture raises: what of the forms? of recollection? of the divided soul? The answers are found in the dialectical context of their particular discussions. That will inevitably sound glib in summary, but is very subtle in execution and often ends up in exegesis that confronts head on things that niggle most commentators. Why does recollection in the *Meno* seem to presuppose a lengthy succession of incarnations, for example? (Answer at 115.) Plato does well for intelligent introductions this year, then. Others are not so lucky. Take Nicholas Smith's *Ancient Philosophy*,[15] a selection of texts in translation, intended for a survey course in ancient philosophy. The selection, from the Presocratics to Plotinus, is suitably conventional, and is

[13] *Trials of Reason. Plato and the Crafting of Philosophy*. By David Wolfsdorf. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. x + 285. Hardback £41, ISBN: 9780195327328.

[14] *Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing*. By Christopher Rowe. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. ix + 290. Hardback £55, ISBN: 9780521859325.

[15] *Ancient Philosophy. Essential Readings with Commentary*. Edited by Nicholas Smith with Fritz Allhoff and Anand Jayprakash Vaidya. Blackwell Readings in the History of Philosophy. Malden, MA, Oxford, and Victoria, Blackwell, 2008. Pp. xix + 445. 3 maps. Paperback £19.99, ISBN: 9781405135634.

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elegantly supported by chronology, maps, and 'further reading' suggestions. However, the 'commentary' (which, luckily, amounts to little more than brief introductory remarks to the various sections) is more than venially flawed. Perhaps one could mount an argument that people before Thales believed that nature was chaotic (as Smith confidently asserts: 4, cf. 13 – though how did they manage to farm in that case?); but it is just untrue that medieval Islamic scholars preserved Plato for the West (66: they did a lot for us, but not that); Aristotle's final cause is misleadingly equated with 'natural functioning' (6); Pyrrhonists *denied* that they were committed to the impossibility of knowledge (*pace* Smith at 10, 367); and I can think of no reason to suppose that Academic Sceptics (not represented in the selections, but touched on in a garbled paragraph at 368) thought knowledge was possible for disembodied souls. There is little to distinguish John Vella's *Aristotle. A Guide for the Perplexed*[16] from other introductions to Aristotle where it is sound, but it too is far from reliably sound. Taking his cue from the ontology of the *Categories* (discussed here at some length), Vella never gets round to clarifying the status of Aristotelian 'form', which the reader is allowed to assume must be one of the 'secondary substances' of that work – an error reinforced by the (false) information that there is a 'form' for each pile of dirt (56) and every rock (79). The very alert student might raise an eyebrow at discovering that souls (which are forms) are 'prior' to the entities whose souls they are (92): secondary substances are not like that; but this hint will probably come as too little too late. There are elements of serious misinformation as well: Aristotle would surely not think that Socrates, being snub-nosed, was potentially thin-nosed in the same way that, being pale, he is potentially dark (71: having a nose-job is not the same as getting tanned); nor could he think that *the ends for which human hands are employed* are a matter of nature (83); nor would he agree that Dr Frankenstein's monster was 'potentially alive' and somehow ensouled when the switch was thrown (92). All of these cases suggest that Vella is unable to tell the difference between art and nature, which is (see *Physics*, 193a3–9) enough to perplex Aristotle himself. In the same series, Andrew Holowchak's *The Stoics. A Guide for the Perplexed*[17] has the advantage over Vella of being a poor guide only where it does not care to be otherwise. This is not, for example, the book to use if you want to find out about Stoic epistemology (casually assimilated to Descartes and Aristotle in quick succession, and dismissed as a piece of turf-marking anyway: 22–3) or Stoic fate (at 46, Holowchak inexplicably concludes, from a Chrysippean discussion of moral culpability, that 'one cannot avoid one's end, though there are many paths one can take to arrive at one's end'). But Holowchak is only, and avowedly, interested in what he can save of the Stoics for the modern world, and for him that means their ethics. As far as this is concerned, Holowchak's account, which is steeped in Seneca, is lively, compelling, and attractive. But then so, one might reflect, is Seneca himself – and Seneca does not come with the limitations. By coincidence, Ronna Burger characterizes her exhilarating study of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Aristotle's Dialogue with*

[16] *Aristotle. A Guide for the Perplexed*. By John A. Vella. London and New York, Continuum, 2008. Pp. x + 166. Hardback £50, ISBN: 9780826497079; paperback £12.99, ISBN: 9780826497086.

[17] *The Stoics. A Guide for the Perplexed*. By M. Andrew Holowchak. London and New York, Continuum, 2008. Pp. x + 237. Hardback £60, ISBN: 9781847060440; paperback £14.99, ISBN: 9781847060457.

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Socrates,[18] as yet another 'guide to the perplexed' (4) – but with Burger we find ourselves on firmer (albeit less familiar) ground. In style, the work is rather like the contemporary mode of Platonic commentary: a close reading of the text, which is sensitive to its literary as well as its philosophical character. And Burger takes the literary integrity of the *Ethics* very seriously. Nothing here is dismissed as the result of editorial shuffling of Aristotelian lecture notes: if topics recur and are revisited, it is because that is what Aristotle wanted. The resulting narrative, oddly enough, felt less compelling to me than a simpler, more traditional analysis of the work; and, in some cases of detail, the philosophical results were less satisfying, and less clear, than standard analyses too. I was not convinced by the treatment of *akrasia*, for example (can our vulnerability to it really be the effect of an over-emphasis on ethical habituation [152]?). Nevertheless, some highly original and stimulating discussion emerges as well: as of the rehabilitation of pleasure in Books 7 and 10, for example; or of love and friendship in Book 9. And along the way a wealth of engagement with Platonic works is brought to the surface (and the study is worth it for that alone). So why a dialogue with *Socrates*, then? Burger suggests that Aristotle is engaged with Socrates *as distinct from Plato* – though she ends up admitting herself that 'Socrates' here is specifically *Plato's* Socrates in any case (215). I do not have the expertise to comment on the reliability of Michael Bowler's *Heidegger and Aristotle*[19] as a study of Heidegger, but it will disappoint anyone who wants to learn about Aristotle, or even the reception of Aristotle, who gets rather little mention. One unnerving feature of the book from an ancient philosophy perspective is that some of the bizarre interpretations (as they seem to me) of Aristotle appear to be Bowler's own reading, not his report of Heidegger. According to Bowler, for example, Aristotle argued 'that all motion, including that of life, is an interplay of spontaneity and affectivity' (100). Tellingly, the claim comes without a reference. Stephen Brown's *Moral Virtue and Nature*[20] takes Aristotle (and especially the 'function' argument of *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7) as the starting point for a study in contemporary virtue ethics. Central to Brown's argument is his claim that a teleology adequate to underpin a prescriptive notion of 'function' is available within a framework of evolutionary biology. There is, he argues, still a 'human nature' from which prescriptions for human action can be derived. What I missed from the discussion was an attempt to explain why these prescriptions amount to anything other than *generalizations* of a certain sort. For, if that is all they are, it is difficult to see why they can have normative applicability to individuals – and, unless they have that, Brown's 'teleology' may turn out not to be of the relevant sort after all. A lot of recent work on Stoic ethics has been directed at the attempt to 'humanize', or otherwise justify, their account of the emotions. To many people, the Stoic claim that emotions are (a) voluntary and (b) vicious seems (a) untrue and (b) unpleasant. Margaret Graver's *Stoicism and Emotion*[21] takes a fresh

[18] *Aristotle's Dialogue with Socrates. On the Nicomachean Ethics*. By Ronna Burger. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 2008. Pp. viii + 309. Hardback £18, ISBN: 9780226080505.

[19] *Heidegger and Aristotle. Philosophy as Praxis*. By Michael Bowler. London and New York, Continuum, 2008. Pp. 171. Hardback £65, ISBN: 9780826498465.

[20] *Moral Virtue and Nature. A Defense of Ethical Naturalism*. By Stephen R. Brown. Continuum Studies in Philosophy. London and New York, Continuum, 2008. Pp. viii + 151. Hardback £65, ISBN: 9780826498717.

[21] *Stoicism and Emotion*. By Margaret R. Graver. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 2007. Pp. x + 289. Hardback £22, ISBN: 9780226305578.

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look at the evidence, with striking results. The Stoics, she suggests, are concerned rather about feelings being directed *appropriately* than about their elimination as such. What is more, their definition of 'emotion' is quite specific. As she puts it: 'one has not had an emotion until one accepts that the way the emotion presents its object is really true' (108). This leaves a lot of room for the sage to experience and exhibit feelings, even strong feelings. For a start, there are the *eupatheiai* (virtuous correlates of passion), which are 'corrected versions of human feelings, not diminished versions' (52); and then there are *propatheiai*, explained as the feelings one has before making the intellectual commitment that is such an important part of the emotion. Graver also deals with questions normally sidestepped by commentators: for example, how the Stoics account for *individual* moral characters, given the principal and (as she puts it) 'non-scalar' division of the world into the good and the bad (chapters 6 and 7). This is, then, a really excellent and lucid account (and highly readable, too). Unusually, it does nothing to strain the evidence to 'modernize' the Stoics. I end with a more uncomfortable encounter between world-views: Niketas Siniossoglou's *Plato and Theodoret*.[22] This is a fascinating and nuanced study of a period when Christianity was in the political ascendancy but had not yet achieved cultural domination. Siniossoglou argues that Theodoret challenged those on the Hellenic side of the divide by his demonstrably violent and dishonest appropriations of Plato, who is made to speak for conceptions of monotheism, asceticism, cosmology, eschatology, and law that he could scarcely even have entertained. Siniossoglou is a bit evasive about what Theodoret hopes to achieve by doing this: he argues both that Theodoret's works are meant for the old-school Greeks they purport to address (47) and yet that those same Greeks would not stand a chance of being taken in by any of it. He may be on stronger ground when he suggests (as he seems to do in the final chapter) that Theodoret's works are intended to effect a sort of *colonization* of Greek culture. In any case, this is an eye-opening account of a fascinating period of our intellectual history.

doi:S0017383508000764 GEORGE BOYS-STONES

[22] *Plato and Theodoret. The Christian Appropriation of Platonic Philosophy and the Hellenic Intellectual Resistance*. By Niketas Siniossoglou. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pp. xi + 267. Hardback £50, ISBN: 9780521880732.

General

Thomas Hobbes is best known as the author of one of the most important of all works of political philosophy – the *Leviathan* (1651); less well known is his work as a translator of both Thucydides and Homer. Eric Nelson has now produced the first modern edition of Hobbes's translations of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, undertaken when the philosopher was already in his eighties and in the grips of a severe 'shaking palsy' (probably Parkinson's disease).[1] This is a welcome publication for all those interested in the reception of Homer and in translation studies more broadly. In a general

[1] Thomas Hobbes, *Translations of Homer. 1. The Iliad. Volume XXIV*. Edited by Eric Nelson. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2008. Pp. lxxxi + 406. Hardback £125, ISBN: 9780199541003. Thomas Hobbes. *Translations of Homer. 2. The Odyssey. Volume XXV*. Edited by Eric Nelson. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2008. Pp. 327. Hardback £125, ISBN: 9780199541010.

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