PART II.—REVIEWS.

*Berkeley.** By J. H. Balfour Browne, Esq.

A man's meaning in life? What he is worth to us? What he is here for? These are questions which force themselves upon us in connection with a proper name. We are constantly employed in working sums in addition to find out a man's worth. We are constantly dropping questions—which are like plummets—to ascertain his depth. We are all capable of dealing with trivialities. The matters of the detail of this life few of us are incapable of understanding. Those who are thus incapable we call fools and madmen. But the question as to the significance of a man is not quite a matter of detail. Many men have very little meaning here—some, each has. The tooth on a cog-wheel is not the wheel nor the force which drives it. It is only a tooth, but without it the wheel would be useless. So it is even with little men. But a great man is something more to the machinery of this world. And the questions as to what he is? and what he is worth? are not easy of answer. Two circumstances make the answer difficult. These are the facts of attraction and repulsion. A great man is great in that he makes friends and enemies. He is great because he is not insignificant. His thought is a menstruum; it dissolves men. Other men become him. He is like a planet which collects floating ærolites. The huge stones which fall upon the earth become a part of its body. Men who fall into the great man's way of thinking become a part of his soul.

That is the phenomenon of attraction; but there is its *other*, which is also a fact. A great man is not accepted by all. He is great because of his negative quality as well as his positive quality. He creates antagonism as well as friendship. All greatness brings "a sword" upon earth.

* The works of George Berkeley, D.D., formerly Bishop of Cloyne. Including many of his Writings hitherto unpublished. With Prefaces, Annotations, his Life and Letters, and an Account of his Philosophy. By Alexander Campbell Fraser, M.A., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. In four vols. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. London: Macmillan and Co.

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Even the "Lamb of Peace" did that. Now it is from the position necessitated by one of those tendencies that a man must judge of his great neighbour. Those that are not with him are against him. This makes the problem difficult, and yet its difficulty does not deter. Worshippers laud their great man—there is a sort of self-satisfaction in such praise; and detractors pluck at his garment and spit upon him—there is a sort of self-assertion in this. A man's greatness is a question which is not answered without dispute, sometimes not without blows. There is a good deal of right on each side.

There is an absolute desire in each one of us to find a great man. Our ideas of greatness differ, but we all desire to see some one nobler and better than ourselves; to behold and handle an incarnated principle which is too remote from our worldly hearts. We all like to bring our senses to bear upon questions. If we see, we believe. The presence of a king makes his subjects loyal; and so far the presence of a great man is certainly an excellent thing. An absenteeism of greatness from the world is deleterious.

Men are flattered by the existence of greatness in the flesh. They feel that the greatness of another is theirs. You see men proud because Scott was a Scotchman; and so we feel proud of *our* greatness. This is not without its meaning. There is a oneness in the race. The differences are not so great as the similarities. We all desire to have great men. But how will we have them? That is the peculiarity of genuine greatness; we can't have it as we desire. Indeed, it invariably shows itself as an influence antagonistic to our dearest wishes. The dearest wishes of the mob are generally fleshly. It was under the tyranny of Pharo, it was against the fleshpots of Egypt, that Moses protested, and said "Let us go that we may serve and worship God, and not that stupid bird." It was when men were content to purchase pardons that Luther came to say that the transaction was a cheat. Great men are outrages in the world of opinion. They are always, in a sense, protestants. They come and purge the world; and it is well. Strong in faith, pure in heart, simple in manners. But such qualities are invincible. God beats Mammon even at money getting. Believers get rich, and it becomes lucrative to believe, and thus Mammon has the best of it. This is the systole and diastole of human life.

Great men always come at the right time. There are always those who say that the need at the present of heroes is exceeding great. Every "present" has had those who thought

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thus. But it seems as if the times produced the great men it required. We are very material in our own time. But to set against that fact we have the revival of German philosophy; we have the existence of such a man as Carlyle. Some facts have an enormous bulk! The existence of some men has a tremendous significance. So in the century which went before our own. There were many who thought that faith had come to an end; that the ungodly triumphed; that scepticism was rampant; that free thinking had gone to its furthest limits. And those times produced George Berkeley.

There is one quality of a great man which we have noticed, and that is his philanthropy. It need not be direct, it seldom is, but it always is excellent. All great thought tends to do good. Truth is the soul's panacea, and it is not found yet. There is a saying that "murder will out." But it is truth, absolute truth, which will out. When a man knows a truth he cannot keep it. It torments him until it is uttered. It may be uttered in acts or in words. Now this is indirect philanthropy. All great men are philanthropists in this sense. All great men have their great uses. Berkeley saw this. He saw that truth, and not prosperity, was to save a country. He saw that thought, and not money, was the constituent of wealth. He imagined that a true philosophy would save England. He was eminently practical. His philosophy was not a toy but an instrument. He regarded his system as no cobweb woven by philosophers, but as a net which was to catch and hold men's souls. He proposed to accomplish a definite end. He desired to disprove materialism, to show the fallacy of free thinking, to prove the existence of a God. Surely that would be practical philanthropy. It was an end like this that Kant hoped to attain. All great men are practical. A great man's words *are acts*, a small man's are only words. This is the very thought-kernel of Berkeley's heart. His life is an externalization of this idea.

From the time when Proclus observed that there were two kinds of philosophers—one looking upon body as a cause of mind, and the other looking upon all corporeal things as dependent upon soul or mind,* these two kinds of philosophers have existed. This question is the moot point of all time. It is associated in many minds with the great moral question of obedience to a man's higher or lower nature. It is inevitably connected with the struggle between the god and the animal, which has the heart for its arena. To some

* In Platonis Theologiam, lib. i., c. 3.

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men the universe has seemed to be thought, while to others thought has commended itself as only a part of the universe. But the question as to Berkeley's intellectual position with regard to this matter must be looked at in its historical connection.

When Berkeley began to put the question to himself, as to the meaning and stuff of the universe, Locke had gone so far as to suggest that matter was the cause of mind. The question of a *cause* is the most important of all questions, and Berkeley, who had become acquainted with the efforts of Des Cartes, Malebranche, and Locke to prove the existence of this same matter, thought that the difficulty of the proof of its existence might arise from its non-existence.

To many individuals it seems that philosophers quarrel about words. To them it seems waste of time. The common people think words unreal in comparison with things; and in one sense they are. But some words are the representatives of ideas, which are the threads of the canvas of the universe, and all real things are like wools sewn into these. So it is not a struggle about nothing, but about the value of all things that philosophers engage in. Now the words that Berkeley wished to attach a definite connotation to were "existence," "reality," "externality," and "cause." To do this thoroughly would be the work of a life time, but to do it thoroughly would have been philanthropy enough for a century. So far Berkeley was right. So far he was on the way to find out, not only the reason of that prejudice about the existence of matter, but the very meaning and stuff of thought itself. But his philosophy is not thoroughly searching; it is not, in the deepest sense, analytic. He is, at his best, an experimental sensationalist and not an idealist, in the truest meaning of the word. As he answers great moral questions more by reference to utilitarian reasons than by a reference to principles, so he answers the great metaphysical questions which he had proposed by a reference to concrete experiences rather than by a reference to the very foundation principles of thought itself. He constructed a phenomenalism, or a philosophy of sensation perceptions, out of a synthesis of facts rather than by a critical analysis of opinion.

But Berkeley had in this way "changed the question," as Professor Fraser puts it; and in this there was great merit. The man who puts a question is almost as great as he who answers it. He probably had a presentiment of the truth.

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And Berkeley, by thus changing the question which it was thought necessary that a satisfactory philosophy should answer, founded the new school of modern philosophy. The men who went before him are dead to us. He and many of those who came after him are alive.

The ideas of to-day have a genealogy. There are families of ideas; question and answer, affirmation and negation continue the race. A man whose influence has been negative is of use positively through those who contradict him. We find this in considering Berkeley's historical position. He raised the question as to the real meaning of the words "matter," "reality," and "causality." Owing partly to the method of his research, partly to the way in which he accounted for the "association of ideas," in explanation of his theory of the invisibility of distance, and to the way in which the question of the immediacy of our perceptions was connected with the main question of his sensationalism, his answer to the question which he raised was not complete. He proved the non-existence of matter, and he accounted for the apparent causality of the universe by the existence of spirits; he accounted for externality by the existence of the relations between what is seen and what is felt; and those relations depended upon a belief in the voluntary providential activity of God. Where he ended, Hume began. Hume carried Berkeley's principles further than Berkeley had done. He denied that mind any more than matter had free activity; he reduced association to unintelligible custom; he makes experience the foundation of all reasonings concerning the relation of cause and effect, and attempts to show that there is no discoverable foundation for the conclusions derived from this experience. Hume's thought necessitated a thorough examination of the meaning of reality and causality, and Kant undertook this critical analysis. All men seem to make up one man. The work that one begins to-day is completed by another to-morrow. The sentence that one begins is ended by another. Men seem the same being. The same soul is in them all. They enter into each other's thoughts: that is into each other's lives. The man who believes what I say has become a parasite upon me. He lives on the sap of my life as the mistletoe does on that of the oak. The modern philosophy of Germany is, as it were, the work of one man. It is complete in itself. It is a working out of a thorough idealism. It is the making explicit of the universal concrete. Kant produced a system of transcendental idealism. He was followed by Fichte and

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Schelling, whose philosophy was thoroughly subjective; and by Hegel, who produced a system of absolute idealism.

These are the generations of modern idealism. And this history will enable those who desire it, to know Berkeley's position with regard to modern philosophical thought. But Berkeley occupies a position with regard to modern thought which has scarcely been noticed. Much of the thought which is in Carlyle and Emerson seems to have been either directly or indirectly received from Berkeley. The philosophy of neither is a system. In each we find the philosophy as we would books upon it in a library which is being removed from one house to another—as gold lies in the sand of a river's bed. But when we do find it, it is idealism; and idealism of the constructive kind which we find in Berkeley. Much of the reforming spirit of these men resembles the desire that Berkeley had to see simple manners, love of truth, moral excellence. The hatred of materialism is in Carlyle as it was in Berkeley. We find much in "Signs of the Times" which reminds us of passages in "Alciphron;" and "An Essay towards Preventing the Ruin of Great Britain" is curiously like "Shooting Niagara and After." One other point may be mentioned with regard to Berkeley's historical place in philosophy. Professor Fraser has pointed out that Berkeley, in so far as he believed in immediate perception, is anticipatory of the Scotch philosophy. Reid, Hamilton, and Mansel have argued for the non-representative character of the phenomena presented in sense, and it was absolutely necessary to Berkeley's theory of sense symbolism that he should deny the possibility of a double object in sense perception. To Berkeley there was only a single object, and that was the sensation. To Reid there is only a single object, and that is the thing. Professor Fraser is right in attributing immediacy to both of those perceptions. But when this is done, nothing is done. No one can say that the immediate perception of Reid in any way resembled the immediate perception of Berkeley. It would be as reasonable to assert the similarity of the views of two men, who took exactly opposite sides of an argument, because they agreed as to the definite meaning of the words "yes" and "no." The very thing that the Scotch philosophers asserted to be present in sense, Berkeley denied existence to. Is there then any resemblance between these two theories? True they both deny a medium of representative ideas; but that is all they have in common. They are both non-representative, but not in the same way. The mere denial of a medium does not

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prove them to agree in any point save in that denial. And to say that they are the same theories in so far as the immediacy of the presentations are concerned, is to play with the word immediacy.

So much for Berkeley's position in regard to the philosophy of the last hundred years.

Berkeley's Philosophy.—We see things we call sun and moon, river and mountain. Many men are content with this. It is enough if the sun warms, if the moon makes beautiful, if the river makes a moving road for ships, and the mountain pours down a silver largess to the green plain. These things make a man happy. That is enough. Many men live in the senses; but there is something more than the senses, and men early began to enquire what that something was. All they saw and felt must have some meaning. What was it? How did they see and feel?

There is something behind the eye, for the eye may be open and not see. Yet what could be behind the eye but another eye, for men do not see with their ears; and what could be behind the ear but another ear, for men do not hear with their eyes. The sensations then were various, and they required to be unified. Their absolute diversity was meaningless. Unity may be explanation. This question easily found an answer. What was common to seeing and hearing was that the individual *knew* that he saw and felt. Why should not seeing and hearing, then, be different phases of knowing? Thus the philosophy of idealism commenced. But still there was that crass nature to be explained. We saw and felt *it*, men said. Men saw the river, and felt the warmth. These were facts of that crystal nature which has five sides. But nature was, in this respect, infinitely various, and therefore meaningless. Separated facts are unproductive. You must take the corn to the field or it will not grow. Mere sensations, dependent upon external facts which had no connection the one with the other, were without significance. But when facts were connected it was by mind. There could be no physical connection. If I see two men together it is my seeing them together that brings them together for me. Nay, not only the connection between things, but the things themselves must needs be dependent upon mind for their very relation to mind, and that relation is the evidence of their existence. Thus nature, which was infinitely various, seemed to be melted down into thought, and only what thought would melt down was nature. The inconceivable is not

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natural. It was as if nature had been shaped in a hundred ways, and thought had been the gastric juice of the brain, which enabled it to digest and assimilate the universe. This is the history of idealism in the rough. We shape a block before we dress it.

Now Berkeley had a thought of this kind. He found men believing that there was such a thing as matter, and that mind became aware of this thing by means of representative ideas, and he regarded this belief as untrue, and in that it was untrue it was baneful. Berkeley did not then and there deny the existence of a *sensible world*, but he laid the emphasis on the "sensible," and not on the world. An emphasis will make the difference between two systems of philosophy. A spark will consume a city. He said we have senses, and we have no touchstone of the senses. We cannot tell whether they are accurate or inaccurate, but as we cannot discover their perfidy we must believe in their truth. Look at it how you like, these senses tell us nothing about this thing you call "matter." You yourself admit that it is unperceived, and you endeavour to prove its existence. You can't. Its non-existence is demonstrated. This is Berkeley's earliest attitude, and with this there was an intense feeling that all this belief in matter produced that blight, scepticism. There was an intense desire to rise through this proof of the free activity of the spirit, through this proof of the impossibility of causative matter (which revolted his feelings), to the improvement of the condition of mankind, to the proof of the existence of a Deity and the truth of Christianity. This is Berkeley's earliest aspiration. If we knew a man's aspirations we would know *him*. His acts are unreal things, in so far as his spirit is concerned, when compared with his hopes. We have already said that the way he set about this work was by changing the question. We have seen that he desired to arrive at a conclusion with regard to the meaning of that externality of which we have been speaking, and of causality as it existed in the external world, and he sought to do this by examining the phenomena of sensation. In this he was wrong. Those who had gone before him had the same problem to solve, and they began the examination with matter. Berkeley commenced his examination with experienced sensations, while the Germans sought for the basal principles in thought itself. Beginning at the wrong end or in the middle makes a great deal of difference in the end.

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However, having set about an analysis of sensation, he proceeded until he found that he could not get further than sensation. There was nothing behind sensation on the material side, and the fault of Berkeley's philosophy is that there is so little on the mental side of it. He found that large and small, soft and hard, white or blue, was all that he knew of things outside of him. The material world was a world of sensations. Anything of which these phenomena were modes was an impossibility, as it was unperceived, and what is unperceived is not. True there is a certain relation between perceived sensations, but that is dependent on the mind; it is not real, except in so far as it is perceived. He fought strenuously against abstract ideas, and the belief in matter was one of them. He admitted the possibility of forming abstract ideas in his Principles of Human Knowledge,* but denied the possibility of forming abstract general ideas, and he did this upon the authority of experience.

So far, then, we have got only to the proof that externality is sensation. But perception implies a person perceiving as well as an object being perceived. If the sensible external world is only in sensation, and I perceive it, then it is in me, and a part of me; and yet I am conscious that it is distinct from me. I drag identity through a hundred changes. I have my own face under a million changing masks. My soul is the same in a million attitudes. I alone am permanent. The world is a chameleon; it is changing constantly. There is nothing permanent but my identity. In this way sensations differ from the percipient. They are his, and they are not his. He has *them*, but to a certain extent they have *him*. They are in me, and yet not of me. This attitude, with regard to sensations, raised the question of causality. I have a consciousness of some activity; I can will—but my will is not effective against sensations. I cannot will to see or not see. Therefore my will is not the cause of my sensations. So far the world is only actual sensation, which I perceive to be mine and not mine. But Berkeley had to deal with the unperceived qualities of objects as well as the perceived. When we shut our eyes, does the visible world go out of existence, or only exists because we remember it to have been visible, and imagine it to exist?

Phenomena change. The world is a procession, it passes us. We see days and nights, and they go. Our lives are spent in looking at the processions of events. But what I see

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I do not handle; what I handle I do not hear. The bell I see is not the bell that rings, and not the bell that is cold and hard to my finger. This is evident from the very statement of Berkeley's theory in so far as it relates to sensation. But there is a relation between sensations, and these relations are believed to be universal. One group of relations, which is actual, is therefore a sign of other groups which are not actual through the relation of these to time past and time to come. This is the meaning of substantiality and causality when they are attributed to the dependent phenomena of sense, according to Professor Fraser; for Berkeley does not develope his theory into this completeness. Professor Fraser adds to a theory of a constant succession of actually perceived sensations which are dependent on, and yet independent of the mind that perceives them, the idea of a possibility of actual sensations and so arrives at a co-existence among phenomena, which, he asserts, is the only conceivable substantiality; and at an idea of permanence and invariableness in the succession of sensations, which he regards as the only conceivable causality among phenomena. This might be satisfactory if the meaning of "co-existence" and "succession" were not to be determined in the same way that the meaning of substantiality and causality are, that is, by mind.

May it not be said with as much truth that for us the only conceivable co-existence and succession of sensations is dependent upon the interpretation of those very signs which we are using them to explain. If we cannot see distance, we cannot perceive time; and as distance is to be inferred, according to Berkeley, from certain syllables in the visible language of the sensible world, so surely would we argue that time is to be inferred from certain syllables in the same articulation of sensations. If time or succession is upon a par, in so far as its source is concerned with the actual sensations it is supposed to explain, the explanation must necessarily be useless. If distance cannot prove substantiality, how can time? If time rests upon what rests upon it, the equilibrium of the argument founded upon it is not likely to be stable.

But we return to Berkeley. The non-existence of the unperceived seemed to follow necessarily from his theory, and he had recourse to the supposition that imagination continued the actual existence of the unperceived objects when we thought of them as unperceived, in which case we would lose all guarantee of objectivity. If imagination is the con-

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dition of existence, his philosophy would be a subjective sensationalism. The way that constructive idealists answer the question which arises in this contest, is by regarding the permanent possibilities of sensation as giving some guarantee of objectivity. It is certain that all this discrepancy has arisen from Berkeley's defective method. He was not thorough, he was not deep. He began with sensation, and he ended there. He was not earnest to find in thought the reason of all things, and to ascertain the very nature of thought itself. He never sought the deepest. He only considers, and that in a somewhat unsatisfactory way, the possibility of uncreated conditions of thought and being.* Had he bestowed more attention upon this subject the whole question of externality and causality might have been the better understood in connection with his system. And he might have come to imagine that sensation itself was, to a certain extent, external. But, as it is, the "changed question" received only a tentative answer.

If Berkeley's conception of a visual language is not the very best philosophy, it is excellent poetry. That we should "live and move and have our being" literally "in God;" that the material universe should be, as it were, the simple consciousness of God, and that we should live interpreting it as we interpret man's thoughts from his language, is a wonderful conception. Let them laugh who will. The idle are those who find fault with the laborious. The flippant may grin at such a theory; but all the grinning in the world is as nothing to the truth. It sinks in from the flesh into the spirit, and makes an ugly soul more hideous. This theory of vision is beautiful. Philosophers are poets, for all great truth is poetry. The peculiar character of the thought of the latter is that feeling makes it Protean. It changes its form. It is an eclecticism of the beautiful, an in-gathering of the lovely in the universe into the true of thought. In the truest sense this theory is a poem.

The argument for the existence of this visible language is exceedingly lucid. Berkeley says: "Distance is a line turned endwise to the eye, and a line in that position, however long, is to the eye that sees it a single point." The eye then cannot perceive distance immediately, and therefore perceives it mediately or through something else. Distance, then, is perceived through or by means of the changes of appearance which are perceived by the eye in connection with an object when it is near and when it is further off. Thus littleness,

* See Siris, sect., 311—318; 351—362.

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faintness, or confusion are signs of distance. But they could not be signs of anything unless the individual had experience of what these things were the signs. Distance then is, according to this theory, known through experience of the visible phenomena variously situated. But words are connected with things in the same way that these signs are connected with the things signified.

An argument that a man may know distance through a perception of the angles made by the optic axis where they meet in the visible object, is disposed of by Berkeley, by an assertion that, in that case the mind would discover distance by means of geometry, and that it would be necessary under such circumstances, that a man who perccived distance from angles, must first perceive the angles, or that he could not otherwise infer anything from them. And, further, that if you asked any seeing man about these angles, he could tell you nothing about them. He then argues that a blind man made to see would not see things at a distance from him, but in his eye, or in his mind, and also that the objects of sight are not at a distance from the eye. This he proves by showing that a thing seen at a distance differs from the same thing when seen near at hand. A man at a distance may seem a post. Can we be said to have seen the man? The things, therefore, which we see are not those which we suppose to exist at a distance.

He then proceeds to show that the proper objects of sight are lights, and colours, and their shades; "and these do form a language wonderfully adapted to suggest and exhibit to us the distances, figures, situations, dimensions, and various qualities of tangible objects—not by similitude, nor yet by inference of necessary connection, but by the arbitrary imposition of Providence, just as words suggest the things signified by them."

All this is expounded with the utmost grace, and illustrated with adequate ingenuity. No one ever wrote upon metaphysics more admirably than Bishop Berkeley. But the grace seems sometimes to draw away one's attention from the weakness of the argument. The nimbleness and ingenuity of style often conceals a want of force in the logic. In this argument it is evident that there is no reason assigned why this language of the universe—of which this theory is the grammar—should appeal only to one sense; why the other senses should not in the same way be *en rapport* with Deity through their own peculiar sensations.

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Again, precisely the same arguments that Berkeley produces in support of the proposition that men cannot become acquainted with distance through the acuteness or obtuseness of the angles formed by the optic axis, apply with as much force to the proposition that men must learn to swallow, or to that other, that the bees must reason as to the building of their cells.

The above analysis of his argument will show in what way he was wont to reason, and it will also indicate the process by which this wonderful poem was elaborated—this conception, which makes the whole universe a wall, dark as that which loomed over Belshazzar's feast, on which God writes his thoughts to men by means of fire.

But the main object of Berkeley's "Essay towards a Theory of Vision," was to inquire how it came to pass "that we apprehend by the ideas of sight certain other ideas, which neither resemble them, nor cause them, nor are caused by them, nor have any necessary connection with them." And the explanation, as Professor Fraser has pointed out, is a moral presumption of a divinely established association between visible and tangible phenomena.

It must become evident to all who reflect upon the subject, that much that we call perception is a reasoned belief, and that this induction is founded upon the universal association. To whatever cause that association is due, will be obvious to those who read carefully the "Essay towards a Theory of Vision." That we do not touch and see the same things in Berkeley's sense of the word is certain. The qualities which are perceived by sight are not those which are perceived by touch, and yet in the sensible world we find that tangible things are signified by visible things, and visible things are signified by tangible things, and this association is founded on a belief in the providential activity of God. In this way Berkeley comes to conclude that the construction and existence of the world of which we are cognizant by sense, is voluntary and arbitrary; and in this context he seems to deny the uncreated necessities of thought and existence, which in his later years he seemed more willing to acknowledge. But this principle of association, although Professor Fraser has clearly distinguished it from the ordinary subjective association of ideas, even explained as connected with the presupposition of faith in the present and constant rationality, which as it were, pervades things, is a defective link in Berkeley's philosophical chain. Surely the rationality of the

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universe and the conception thereof, must to some extent depend upon any theory of vision which would explain seeing the distant or outward; and a belief in such a supposition cannot be made to support a theory of our perceptions. From Berkeley's own method, we have a right to expect an explanation of the objective association of sensations from his theory of vision, and not an explanation of his theory of vision founded on a belief (which is exceedingly like a prejudice) in the constant rationality of the phenomena of which we become conscious by means of sense. If B is deduced from A, it is evident A cannot be deduced from B.

But upon what does this pre-supposition rest? Thoughts are builded one upon the other. The lower explains the position of the higher. The lowest must explain all the rest. The story of the elephant and the tortoise was an effort to find out the true meaning of stability. It was crude, but it was an admission of the principle. The way it was carried out was in conformity with the known laws of human thought. As the more remote must, through the near, explain the near—and we have in this process both induction and deduction—as there is a necessary endeavour to rise through the particular to the ultimate conception, which will make all those particulars reasonable and intelligible, so it is, men often imagine that by getting into an unintelligible remoteness, they have got at an explanation of their immediate environment. So it was that the difficulties of the question of stability were removed from the world to the tortoise, and there the question was left. Now, the question of the ground of Berkeley's pre-supposition has not been sufficiently enquired into; and it seems certain that Berkeley must, in an ultimate analysis, have derived this pre-supposition from subjective association: otherwise, the faith in the interpretability of the universe could have no meaning for us, and the objective association of ideas can, in Berkeley's use of the words, have no meaning.

Berkeley's Life.—Notwithstanding these defects in Berkeley's philosophy of sensation-perceptions, or sensuous idealism, as a whole, his system is the best that Britain has produced. A philosophy is, to a man's ordinary thoughts and conceptions, what a cathedral is to an ordinary house. The building of it is worship. If Berkeley's house—not builded with hands—is less huge and massive than that of Kant or Hegel: if there are cracks where the wind of scepticism may whistle through, while their system has a gigantic completeness,

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still, it is infinitely beautiful. If theirs is like St. Peter's, his is like Cologne, unfinished, yet so exquisite. All men have two lives. They live in facts, and in ideas. They become metaphysical upon occasion. They live in the dust of circumstances for six days, and on the seventh, matter has a rest, and man lives above the world. The soul has a day to itself. No man can help thinking philosophically at times. Each, now and then, transfigures nature; thinks the impossible, which turns out to be the true; sees those iron facts melt like wax, and feels the soul within him as lasting as brass. These things are so in the life of each. The poet abolishes matter. He thinks together things which the fate of their existence have separated, but which the overpowering fate of his joins. The painter looks at nature through ideas, and it yields up its hidden meaning under such a microscope. All the truth in life is the ideal. But most men indulge in this spurious idealism. They admit the thought into their lives, but it does not, as it ought to do, become their lives—absorb their lives. Sometimes lightning is flashed through a cloud; the flame is not seen, but the cloud is illumined. In every part of its bulk it shines. So it should be with the light of truth in a soul. Souls are like clouds, and the light of truth should fill them in every part; but too frequently there is only a spark, as there is in dying embers.

Berkeley's life was thoroughly interpenetrated by his philosophical thought. In his writings, we find a gradual advance from the thought of a youth who thinks for a purpose, to the thought of a man whose purpose is thinking. We find an apartness, in some of his earlier works, of his thoughts from his actual life. His practical life was separated to some extent from his ideal life. But in his later years we find that his philosophical life is his practical existence.

If his works are a poem (an epic of God), his life is a poem —an idyl of man. His life is beautiful. He does good in the little hand to hand way, as well as the great mind to mind way. We find passages in some of his letters to Tom Prior, requesting him to pay sums of money to his (Berkeley's) brothers. We know of his work at Cloyne, of his experiments with tar water, of the efforts he made to attain his great object, the grant for the University at Bermuda; and we feel that Pope, when he ascribed to Berkeley—

"Every virtue under heaven,"

was in the right.

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But those who care to know the few facts of Bishop Berkeley's life, which are preserved to us, must go to Professor Fraser's admirable biography. Care is the characteristic of this biography, as it is of all Professor Fraser's works. He has not attempted to extract the essence out of Berkeley's life, and give it to us in a few words. Few men have this wonderful power, and of those who have, many make better pictures than portraits. But Professor Fraser has given us a life which is in every respect admirable, and one which is as worthy of Berkeley as it is of his biographer. Professor Fraser's prefaces to the various works of Berkeley are not less admirable than the life, and many of the notes are most valuable. This was necessarily the case.

It is a somewhat difficult task to learn to know a man. Some people might live for years with another, and never know anything about him, or only know him by sight. To get into a man's inmost thoughts, to appreciate his life in its entirety, and not in its little particular trivialities; to get through the facts to their meaning, through the acts to the soul; that is the work which a conscientious biographer and interpreter has to do.

Now one thing is certain, Professor Fraser thoroughly understands Berkeley. He appreciates, perhaps, better than any one the full meaning of Berkeley's philosophy. He enters into every part of his thought, and he endorses almost all his opinions. Only one thing can be said which derogates from this very high estimate, and, to use a Hibernianism, perhaps that does not. Professor Fraser almost knows too much of Berkeley. In some connections he sees results which Berkeley hardly contemplated, and he traces necessary consequences of Berkeley's thought, which, in some instances at least, we feel that Berkeley had not anticipated, Withal, however, Professor Fraser is most careful to interpret, and not to interpolate, and such an interpretation as that which Professor Fraser has given us is just what was required. We have pointed out Berkeley's influence upon purely philosophical thought, and upon thought at the present day, which is not purely philosophical. We need not trace the indirect influence of that thought—as it appears in the writings of Carlyle and Emerson—upon the whole of the current speculation of our time. We see traces of Carlyle in most of our great men; and so inoculation from the old stock of ideas goes on. That being so, it is surely most important that Berkeley's own works should be studied by those who have, as it were,

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adopted his opinions at second hand, especially as his writings, although profoundly philosophical, are more likely to address themselves to the minds of ordinary readers, than the pseudo-philosophical writings of our two great men. In this way Professor Fraser has done well in giving to the public his valuable edition of Berkeley. There are other reasons which make the publication of this book an important matter in so far as philosophy is concerned. English constructive idealism, as represented by Mr. Mill, is not prosperous. Mr. Mill has sighed and given up the cause of ghosts or spirits. He has come to what he considers as an inexplicable fact, and founds his system of philosophy upon it. It is time to go back if we cannot go forward, and there is no one to whom it is better to go back than Berkeley. To all philosophical readers, Professor Fraser's work will be most acceptable. He has done a real service to philosophy in this country.

Subject and Object as Connected with our Double Brain, and a New Theory of Causation. By R. VERITY. London: Longmans and Co.

There are several good points in this book. The style in its clearness, felicity, and flow reminds one of that of Coleridge. The author has also a considerable intimacy with the subjects which he handles. He fully recognizes the necessity, in determining the truths pertaining to the world of mind, of profoundly studying the physiology of the brain and nervous system. On the whole he is not one-sided, but attaches equal importance to the various aspects of a many-sided question. In some respects, however, this book reminds us of a work we once read, entitled the "Exact Philosophy." We regret to have to say that there is in it too much dogmatism and rash assertion; and the author, though he covers considerable surface, does not always attain to more than ordinary depth. Yet his style and *nonchalant* manner of putting things is apt to impose on one who is not a specialist on certain of the subjects of which this book treats. "The author himself," we quote from the preface, "belongs to those who rest in truth and not in doubt." We have not the least doubt of it. It were well if the author did rest a great deal more in doubt than he does, and not present to his readers, in the garb of established truths, so many

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