PORPHYRY'S RHETORIC

In paying tribute to Porphyry as polymath,[1] Eunapius expresses uncertainty whether his most significant contribution was to rhetoric, literary studies, arithmetic, geometry, music, or the various branches of philosophy (*Lives of the Sophists* 4.2.2–3 = 9.11–19 Giangrande). The *aporia* is a rhetorical figure (it is no coincidence that philosophy holds the final, climactic place), but we should not discount the initial claim that Porphyry was a major contributor to rhetoric, although that is not a perspective on Porphyry that will occur readily to modern scholars. Smith's survey of recent work registers no interest at all in Porphyry as a rhetorician, and his Teubner edition of the fragments omits the majority of the rhetorical fragments, and all of the most substantial ones.[2] The present paper aims to provide an introduction to this aspect of Porphyry's work (Sections I–IV), together with a catalogue of the available evidence and a commentary on it (Section V). This will, I hope, assist towards a better understanding of the history of rhetoric in the third century, and its place in the intellectual culture of the time.[3]

I. CONTEXT

According to Eunapius, Porphyry had already made rapid progress in the standard educational curriculum (ἡ προσήκουσα παιδεία) before he came to Athens. This will, of course, have included rhetoric, but we know nothing of his early teachers. In Athens he studied both *grammatikê* and rhetoric with Longinus, and continued to distinguish himself (Eunapius 4.1.1–2 = 6.11–13; cf. Porphyry, *Life of Plotinus* 17.4–15). Evidence for Longinus' rhetorical teaching is provided by an *Art of Rhetoric*, of which we have a substantial fragment and an epitome (F48, F49);[4] this work presents itself as a concise reminder (ὑπόμνημα) for those who had attended his lectures regularly (F48.313–23 Patillon = 192.19–193.1 Spengel–Hammer). Some other fragments contain technical matter on rhetoric, and parallels between a collection of excerpts under the heading ἐκ τῶν Λογγίνου (F50) and Photius' essays on the ten orators make it likely that the material in Photius which is not derived from pseudo-Plutarch or Libanius was drawn, perhaps indirectly, from Longinus.[5] I have not observed any striking parallel between Longinus' and Porphyry's rhetorical fragments, but the evidence on both sides is so patchy as to make this unsurprising.

Longinus was admired above all as a critic; the testimonia are full of praise for his achievements as a literary scholar (κριτικός, φιλόλογος), but he is not referred to as a

[1] See R. J. Penella, *Greek Philosophers and Sophists in the Fourth Century A.D.* (Leeds 1990), 42–3.

[2] A. Smith, 'Porphyrian studies since 1913', *ANRW* II.36.2 (1987), 717–73; *Porphyrius. Fragmenta* (Leipzig 1993).

[3] This project will be developed further in a book on Menander Rhetor currently in preparation; for an interim report, see M. Heath, 'Rhetoric in mid-antiquity', in T. P. Wiseman (ed.), *Classics in Progress* (Oxford, 2002), 419–39. I gratefully acknowledge the support of a British Academy Research Readership towards the project's completion.

[4] Longinus' fragments are cited from M. Patillon and L. Brisson, *Longin. Fragments. Art Rhétorique. Rufus. Art Rhétorique* (Paris, 2001); some additional evidence is adduced in my review, *CR* 52 (2002), forthcoming.

[5] M. Heath, 'Caecilius, Longinus and Photius', *GRBS* 39 (1998), 271–92.

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sophist. Philostratus sometimes distinguishes the teachers with whom his sophists studied criticism, theory, and composition,[6] so it is likely that in Athens Porphyry would also have studied with experts in other aspects of rhetoric. He would certainly have come into contact with many of them. A fragment preserved by Eusebius (*Praep. Evang.* 10.3 = Porphyry 408F Smith, Longinus F10) enables us to identify two sophists of his acquaintance. The fragment presents what purports to be an account of the conversation at a dinner given in honour of Plato's birthday by Longinus. In addition to Longinus himself, two of the guests (the grammarian Apollonius and the geometer Demetrius) appear to have been among Porphyry's teachers.[7] It may therefore be worth looking more closely at the two sophists present, Maior and Nicagoras.

Maior is recorded in the *Suda* as an Arabian, contemporary with Apsines and Nicagoras under Philip (A.D. 244–9) and earlier. He wrote a work *On Issues* in thirteen books—that is, one book for each of the thirteen issues in the system that had become standard by the end of the second century A.D. The scale of this work suggests a much more elaborate and detailed discussion than is found in a short textbook like Hermogenes' *On Issues*. A small group of fragments dealing with technical points in the handling of cases of conjecture is preserved by later commentators on Hermogenes.[8]

Nicagoras, acknowledged as a friend by Philostratus, was sacred herald of the Eleusinian mysteries and held an official chair of rhetoric in Athens; he had a family connection to Plutarch and his nephew, the Stoic philosopher Sextus of Chaeroneia. The *Suda*, which identifies his father as a rhetor named Mnesaus, gives him a *floruit* under Philip, to whom he addressed a *presbeutikos*; other works, including biographies, are also mentioned, but they do not include technical works on rhetoric. Nicagoras' birth was placed *c.* 175–180 by Schissel; Clinton accordingly infers that 'his lifetime . . . probably did not extend much beyond 250, if at all'. But this chronology may be a little too early: Philostratus names him alongside his nephew, Philostratus of Lemnos, born 190/1, and Apsines, whose birth is generally placed *c.* 190. So we cannot exclude the possibility that Nicagoras taught Porphyry in the 250s.[9]

[6] Herodes had different teachers for rhetoric and οἱ κριτικοὶ τῶν λόγων (*Lives of the Sophists* 564); Pollux gained expertise in κριτικοὶ λόγοι from his father, but studied σοφιστικοὶ λόγοι with Hadrian (592); Antipater studied with Hadrian and Pollux, and also learned theory (τὸ περὶ τὴν τέχνην ἀκριβές) with Zeno (607). That it was worth commenting on the fact that Lollianus gave classes in theory as well as declamation (συνουσίας οὐ μελετηρὰς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διδασκαλικάς 527) suggests that a stricter division of labour was normal at the highest level of the profession.

[7] M. Heath 'Longinus *On Sublimity*', *PCPS* 45 (1999), 43–74, at 48–9; on this fragment, see also I. Männlein-Robert, *Longin. Philologe und Philosoph* (Munich and Leipzig, 2001), 251–92.

[8] *RG* 4.324.13–325.4, 352.5–354.11; Syrianus 2.67.1–6; Georgius fol. 10^{v}, 12^{v}, 29^{v} (L. Schilling, 'Quaestiones rhetoricae selectae', *Jahrbuch für classische Philologie* Suppl. 28 [1903], 663–778, at 710, n. 1, n. 3, 744). For the attribution of *RG* 4.352.5–354.11 to Maior, see H. Rabe, 'Aus Rhetoren Handschriften: 11. Der Dreimänner Kommentar WIV', *RM* 64 (1909), 578–89, at 588. Rabe's corrections to Walz's attributions, based on his collation of Par. 2923 (Py), will be cited repeatedly in the following notes (see also G. Kowalski, 'De commentarii in Hermogenis Status e tribus interpretibus confectis [Rh. Gr. IV Walz] in codice Par. Gr. 2923 obvia', *Eos* 41 [1940–6], 46–80 and 42 [1947], 122–41, at 60, 62). Unfortunately, the manuscript attributions in the composite commentary of *RG* 4 remain unreliable even when Walz's errors are removed, as comparison of the two recensions of Syrianus shows.

[9] Nicagoras: the evidence is summarized in M. Heath, 'The family of Minucianus?', *ZPE* 113 (1996), 66–70, at 67 (to the bibliography add now *FGrH* 1076); for the unrevised chronology, see O. Schissel, 'Die Familie des Minukianos', *Klio* 21 (1926/7), 361–73, at 367; K. Clinton, *The Sacred Officials of the Eleusinian Mysteries* (Philadelphia, 1974), 80. Philostratus: I. Avotins, 'The

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Nicagoras' son Minucianus (epigraphic evidence reveals his full name as M. Junius Minucianus) was also a sophist, and may be the author of the treatise on epicheiremes transmitted under his name (an alternative attribution to Nicagoras is attested). The later chronology proposed for Nicagoras is consistent with Frantz's conclusions about the dating of Minucianus, placing his career *c.* 255–95 and the birth of his son (also named Nicagoras) *c.* 265–85.[10] It has been conjectured that Porphyry was a pupil of Minucianus. This suggestion is based on the fact that he wrote a commentary on the *Art of Rhetoric* by an older Minucianus, who some speculatively identify as the younger one's great-grandfather (Mnesaeus' father).[11] But there is nothing to support this theory, and I have argued elsewhere that the older Minucianus is more likely to have been an epigraphically attested Claudius Minucianus, and thus not a direct ancestor of Junius Minucianus in the male line, although some less direct family relationship is probable.[12]

Two other names may be mentioned briefly. Eunapius refers to 'Paul and Andromachus from Syria' as leading teachers of rhetoric in Athens in Porphyry's time (4.3 = 10.11–13). If these names derive from Porphyry himself, they are likely to reflect his acquaintance with the rhetorical scene in Athens before he left the city in 263. Andromachus is probably Andromachus of Neapolis; according to the *Suda* he taught in Nicomedia, and it is possible that he was invited to move from Athens to Nicomedia when Diocletian (A.D. 284–305) established his capital there. This would imply that he was already distinguished in Athens, so his career could have overlapped with Porphyry's Athenian period. Paul is most likely to be Paul of Germe, an expert on Lysias mentioned in the *Suda*, and probably identical with the Paul of Mysia cited by Photius in connection with the authenticity of Lysias' speeches (cod. 262, 489a14–35). Although we have no firm date for him, the likelihood that Photius derived this information from Longinus makes Paul of Mysia a chronologically plausible candidate for identification with Porphyry's Paul.[13]

II. PORPHYRY'S RHETORICAL WRITINGS

The following technical works on rhetoric are attested:

1. A number of sources credit Porphyry with an *Art* (*τέχνη*: Sopater, *Division of Questions* 382.2 = F14), or—more specifically—an *Art* concerned with issues (*ἡ περὶ τῶν στάσεων τέχνη* = P61 Smith: see Syrianus 2.14.4–5 = F4 below; Anon. *RG* 7.921.2–3 = F6).
2. The *Suda*'s bibliography of Porphyry includes a commentary on Minucianus' *Art*, a treatise that was itself concerned primarily with the theory of issues (*εἰς τὴν Μινουκιανοῦ τέχνην* = P60 Smith).

year of birth of the Lemnian Philostratus', *AC* 47 (1978), 538–9 argues for 187 as an alternative possibility, but see S. Rothe, *Kommentar zu ausgewahlten Sophistenviten des Philostratos* (Heidelberg 1988), 262, n. 1; L. de Lannoy, 'Le problème de Philostrate (État de la question)', *ANRW* II.34.3 (1997), 2362–449, at 2369–72 agrees on 190/1. Apsines: M. Heath 'Apsines and pseudo-Apsines', *AJP* 119 (1998), 89–111, at 90–1 (with further bibliography).

[10] For Minucianus and the younger Nicagoras, see Heath (n. 9), 67. Chronology: A. Frantz, *Late Antiquity: A.D. 267–700* (*Athenian Agora* 24, Princeton, 1988), 9–10, followed by E. Sironen, 'Life and administration of late Roman Attica in the light of public inscriptions', in P. Castrén (ed.) *Post-Herulian Athens* (Helsinki, 1994), 15–62, at 20.

[11] J. Bidez, *Vie de Porphyre* (Gent, 1913), 30; cf. Schissel (n. 9), 368.

[12] Heath (n. 9), 69–70.

[13] The argument of this paragraph is presented in more detail in Heath (n. 5), 280–1.

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The *Suda* attributes to Metrophanes of Eucarpia (another third-century rhetorician, described as a Platonist by Syrianus) a work *On Issues* as well as a commentary on Hermogenes' *Art*—that is, *On Issues* (see Section IV). So the possibility that Porphyry wrote both an *Art* and a commentary on Minucianus' *Art* cannot be excluded. In this case, we should envisage the *Art* as a brief handbook, similar in scope to that of Hermogenes, written perhaps for teaching purposes; the commentary would have given a more extensive and detailed exposition, with greater scope for original contributions, the link to an existing standard teaching text rather than to his own treatise being intended perhaps to ensure a wider audience. However, a more economical hypothesis is that Porphyry's *Art* is identical with the commentary on Minucianus, his exposition of issue-theory taking the form of a commentary on an existing handbook. The usage may be compared to Simplicius' citation of Porphyry 'in the *Philebus*', meaning a commentary on Plato's *Philebus* (*In Phys*. 435.30–1 = 174F Smith).[14]

3. A scholion on Hermogenes published by Rabe (F5 below) refers to a *Collection of Rhetorical Questions* (ἡ συναγωγὴ τῶν ῥητορικῶν ζητημάτων = P62 Smith). The title suggests a collection of declamation themes. The obvious extant parallels are Sopater's *Division of Questions* and the anonymous collection in *RG* 8.402–13; but the *Suda* also attests to Aelius Theon's *Rhetorical Subjects* (ῥητορικαὶ ὑποθέσεις) in the first century, and in the second to Sabinus' *Introduction and Subjects for Declamation* (εἰσαγωγὴ καὶ ὑποθέσεις μελετικῆς ὕλης) in four books and Pausanias of Caesarea's single book of *Problems*. The one identifiable fragment of Porphyry's work (F5) suggests that it included a discussion at least of the general structure of issue-theory; we may infer an introduction, as in Sabinus, and the themes may have been organized by issue, as in Sopater. It seems likely that Porphyry included analyses of the themes, as Sopater does, but the anonymous collection in *RG* 8 shows that this was not inevitable.

Two other works listed in the *Suda* may be mentioned in passing:

4. On the six books *In Reply to Aristides* (πρὸς Ἀριστείδην ζ' = P59 Smith) Smith in his apparatus comments 'Aristides Quintilianus?' It is true that musical theory was among Porphyry's interests, but Behr has shown that the work was probably a reply to Aristides' criticisms of Plato on rhetoric, traces of which may be discernible in Olympiodorus' commentary on the *Gorgias*.[15] This work was concerned with rhetoric, therefore, but was not of a technical nature.
5. The work *On Thucydides' Proem* (εἰς τὸ Θουκυδίδου προοίμιον = P58 Smith) could have been rhetorical, since Thucydides was studied in rhetorical schools. But there are other possibilities (one might envisage, for example, a discussion of Thucydides' outline of ancient history).

[14] Smith (n. 2), xii. Cf. ἐν ταῖς πρώταις Νεφέλαις (sch. Ar. *Clouds* 1115a), referring to a commentary on the first *Clouds*. If this is right, it is also possible that the *Suda*'s reference to Metrophanes' *Art* is a doublet created by citations of the same work under both styles.

[15] C. A. Behr, 'Citations of Porphyry's *Against Aristides* preserved in Olympiodorus', *AJP* 89 (1968), 186–99. R. Jackson, K. Lycos, and H. Tarrant, *Olympiodorus. Commentary on Plato's Gorgias* (Leiden, 1998), 22, 240 are more inclined to concede first-hand knowledge of Aristides to Olympiodorus.

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III. EVIDENCE FOR PORPHYRY'S COMMENTARY

The primary body of evidence for Porphyry as a rhetorical theorist is constituted by the testimonia and fragments (for convenience, I shall use 'fragments' in a broad sense to cover both) discussed in Section V. Only a few of these fragments can be assigned to Porphyry's commentary on Minucianus with certainty (F1, F2) or by strong inference (F7, F15). Many of the citations have no specified source, and some are referred instead to Porphyry's *Art* (F4, F6, F14, and so presumptively F9). But even if this was a separate work from the commentary, neither it nor the *Collection of Rhetorical Questions* (F5) has left sufficient identifiable evidence on which we might attempt to reconstruct them independently of the commentary; and we have no grounds for assuming that the *Art* (if it had a separate existence) or the *Collection* took positions other than those in the commentary. My working assumption, therefore, will be that all the fragments except F17 are potentially relevant evidence for the commentary on Minucianus, and my primary concern will be with what can be reconstructed of that commentary.

An additional advantage in concentrating on the commentary is that it allows us to draw on our knowledge of Minucianus' *Art* itself as evidence. This work was comparable to Hermogenes' *On Issues* and to the (probably slightly earlier) treatise by Zeno of which Sulpicius Victor is, in part, an epitome. Minucianus equipped his treatise with more elaborate prolegomena than Hermogenes, and the two rhetoricians took a different view on many technical details; the scholia to Hermogenes identify Minucianus as the target of several polemical passages in *On Issues*. There is no comprehensive collection and analysis of Minucianus' fragments, and caution is needed in handling the evidence: there are inconsistencies which suggest that his work ceased to circulate fairly soon after it had been displaced by that of Hermogenes, so that it was not directly accessible to later rhetoricians, whose reports may therefore be misleading.[16] It should also be emphasized that evidence for Minucianus will not tell us what positions Porphyry affirmed. It is clear from the extant scholia to Hermogenes that writing a commentary on a rhetorical handbook did not imply a commitment to that text as an unquestioned authority. Hermogenes' commentators are often highly critical of him, sometimes preferring positions advocated by Minucianus in the face of Hermogenes' objections. However, evidence for Minucianus will give some indication of the range of topics that Porphyry is likely to have discussed and of the overall structure of the commentary.

It is, thirdly, possible that we may be able to learn about Porphyry's commentary indirectly, by tracing its influence on later works beyond passages where he is explicitly cited. One fragment (F2) owes its inclusion in Section V to a well-established inference of this kind. In trying to go further in tracing Porphyry's influence I have in particular attempted to identify patterns in later commentators' citations of earlier rhetoricians that may help to throw light on the structure of the tradition: who was responsible for the transmission of whose fragments? Such inferences are inevitably uncertain; the

[16] On Minucianus, see Heath (n. 9). S. Gloeckner, *Quaestiones Rhetoricae* (*Breslauer Philologische Abhandlungen* 8.2, 1901), 22–50 provides helpful overview of the evidence for Minucianus' theories, but is out of date; W. Stegemann, 'Minukianos (1)', *RE* XV.2 (1932), 1975–87 is not consistently reliable. Some of the material is discussed in my commentary on Hermogenes (M. Heath, *Hermogenes on Issues. Strategies of Argument in Later Greek Rhetoric* [Oxford, 1995]). On Zeno, and the grounds for thinking that his work antedates that of Minucianus, see M. Heath, 'Zeno the rhetor and the thirteen *staseis*', *Eranos* 92 (1994), 17–22; references are by page and line in Sulpicius Victor (*RLM* 313–352 Halm).

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suggestions I make are accordingly very tentative, and should be treated with due caution. But the attempt seems worth making, since it is clear that Porphyry's impact on the commentary tradition was substantial—not least because he apparently created it.

IV. PORPHYRY AND THE COMMENTARY TRADITION

Longinus' colleague Maior (Section I) cast his detailed exposition of issue-theory in the form of a series of monographs; Porphyry, by contrast, wrote a commentary on Minucianus. The contrast is significant, for this is the earliest attested commentary on a work of rhetorical technography, although the commentary on Hephaestion by Porphyry's teacher Longinus (F42) provides a precedent for a commentary on a recent technical handbook; we will observe (F1, F2) similarities in approach with Longinus, and with Porphyry's own commentary on Ptolemy's *Harmonics*. The monograph format did not die out completely; in (probably) the fourth century Tyrannus (*Suda* *T*1189) wrote one book *On Issues*, which may have functioned as an introduction to his ten books *On Division* (presumably treating the four counter-positions in a single book). But Porphyry's use of the commentary format set a trend. In the third century we know of another commentary on Minucianus by the sophist Pancratius, probably the father of Prohaeresius (*Suda* *Π*12), and of commentaries on Hermogenes by Metrophanes (*Suda* M1009, cf. Section II.2), whom Syrianus describes as a Platonist, and the sophist Menander of Laodicea, who also wrote a commentary on Minucianus' *Progymnasmata* (*Suda* *M*590). It is likely that Porphyry and Metrophanes wrote earlier than Pancratius and Menander;[17] if so, it would seem that this use of the commentary format originated in philosophical circles, but spread quickly. More commentaries were written in the fourth century and later, by which time Hermogenes' treatise had established itself as standard.[18] The fact that Minucianus and Hermogenes both attracted commentaries by a philosopher and a sophist shows that their rivalry should not be interpreted in terms of an ideological opposition between the two theorists.[19] The evidence suggests that Hermogenes' text was preferred because of its greater clarity;[20] this, presumably, made it more serviceable as a teaching text.

As noted above (Section III), commentators on rhetorical handbooks did not treat the base-text as an unquestioned authority. Hermogenes' commentators often disagree with him, and Porphyry was apparently willing to depart from Minucianus in formulation (F5) and in substance (F11). The commentated text provided a common point of reference to which rhetoricians could anchor an ongoing discussion of theoretical problems, but in that discussion they felt free to modify the text's teaching and went far beyond it in the level of detail addressed. Thus they exploited the commentary as a

[17] Prohaeresius' father must have been younger than Porphyry; Menander's fragments include criticisms of Metrophanes.

[18] From the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries we have evidence of commentaries on Hermogenes by Aphthonius (if a comma is placed after *τέχνην* in *Suda* *A*4630), Athanasius, Eustathius, Georgius, John of Caesarea, 'John(?)' *ὁ σημειογράφος*, Marcellinus, Phoebammon, Photius, Sopater, and Syrianus. H. Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner* (*Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaften* XII.5, Munich, 1978), 77–88 provides a useful way into the literature.

[19] As assumed by Schissel (n. 9): *contra* Heath (n. 9), 68–9; G. A. Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors* (Princeton, 1983), 76.

[20] Sopater, *RG* 5.14.19–28, 4.140.10–11; anon. *RG* 7.139.4–5; *PS* 60.16, 294.17–22, 317.12 app., 317.19–320.3.

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vehicle for original contributions to the subject's development—and (needless to say) for the prosecution of sometimes highly polemical exchanges with predecessors and contemporary rivals.

One consequence is that Porphyry's commentary was inevitably superseded, not only because Minucianus was displaced by Hermogenes as a standard text, but also because later rhetoricians developed the subject further. There is nevertheless evidence to show that he exercised an influence on later rhetoricians, directly or indirectly. Thus, for example, elements from his prolegomena entered the tradition (F1, F2). There is reason to believe that this material was mediated to later commentators on Hermogenes by some predecessor. If so, the most probable intermediary is Metrophanes, whose commentary on Hermogenes is (unlike that of Menander) frequently referred to in the scholia.[21] In F13, where their views coincide, Porphyry and Metrophanes are cited together, which may imply Porphyry's mediation by Metrophanes.[22] The heading to F15 refers to Porphyry, Metrophanes, and Athanasius, the last of these being one of the recipients of Porphyry's defence of Minucianus (F1). Co-citations of Hermagoras and Metrophanes elsewhere offer further support, if it is accepted that fragments of Hermagoras and Lollianus on issue-theory were transmitted by Porphyry (see under F2).[23]

Metrophanes' role as a vector of information about earlier theorists may also be discernible in the case of the Harpocration, who is cited several times in the scholia to Hermogenes for technical points in issue-theory.[24] We do not need here to resolve the prosopographical perplexities associated with this name. Briefly, there is no positive reason to identify the issue-theorist with the Harpocration whose *Art* is cited by the Anonymus Seguerianus, and no way to secure an identification of either with any of the three rhetoricians named Harpocration recorded in the *Suda* and/or with the philosopher and rhetor of that name recorded in a third-century Athenian funerary inscription.[25] However, while the identity of the issue-theorist in question must remain uncertain, some indications suggest that his fragments were transmitted by Metrophanes.[26] *RG* 7.349.24–351.1 records Harpocration's critique of Hermogenes' position in the controversy over incomplete double conjectures, along with Metrophanes' reply; and in Georgius (fols. 179^{v}–180^{r})[27] a position adopted by Harpocration is immediately

[21] M. Heath, 'Hermagoras: transmission and attribution', *Philologus* 146 (2002), has more detail and further references.

[22] Schilling (n. 8), 751, n. 4.

[23] Georgius fol. 207^{r} (Schilling [n. 8], 711–12); *RG* 7.595.6 (~ 5.337.23–338.6).

[24] *RG* 4.519.27–520.5, 7.254.17–28 (~ 5.270.16–25), 349.24–351.1, 432.20–433.9, 547.31–549.13, 563.20–7 (~ 5.328.3–7); Syrianus 2.60.14–19; Georgius fols. 116^{r}, 179^{v}–180^{r} (Schilling [n. 8], 743); Christophorus fol. 132^{r} (H. Rabe, 'De Christophori commentario in Hermogenis librum', *RM* 50 [1895], 241–9, at 248).

[25] The *Suda* gives us Gaius, Aelius, and Valerius Harpocration (*A*4012–4014). For the philosopher and rhetor, see *IG* II^{2} 10826 (= Peek 558, Kaibel 106): compare the third-century philosopher and sophist Tiberius (*Suda* *T*550). We should probably eliminate Valerius, the Alexandrian lexicographer, on whom see J. J. Keaney, *Harpocration. Lexeis of the Ten Orators* (Amsterdam, 1991), ix–x. Aelius' works included an *Art of Rhetoric* and *On Types of Style* (*περὶ ἰδεῶν*); a work on idea-theory implies a date in the late second or third century. It may seem tempting to identify his *Art* with that cited by the Anonymus, especially since the citations display a marked interest in style; but they contain nothing distinctive to idea-theory. No positive conclusion is warranted.

[26] The speculative possibility that the philosopher Metrophanes studied with Harpocration the philosopher and rhetor, and that his reports of Harpocration derive from oral instruction rather than a written text, complicates the question still further.

[27] Schilling (n. 8) 743, 749.

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followed by Metrophanes' contrary view. Syrianus mentions Harpocration alongside Minucianus, Zeno, Hermogenes, and Metrophanes (2.60.14–19).

That last passage is concerned with the reason why conjecture is placed first among the issues; *RG* 4.202.19–203.9 also juxtaposes the contrary views of Minucianus and Metrophanes on this point, and their opposed positions on the part of the speech to which 'quality' belongs (is it a head of argument or part of the epilogue?) are likewise directly juxtaposed in our sources (see on F15). Such co-citations suggest that later commentators were drawing on Metrophanes' explicit critical engagement with Minucianus. Significantly, in opposing Harpocration on incomplete simple conjecture Metrophanes was siding with Hermogenes in one of his fiercest attacks on Minucianus, and in doing so was adopting what seems at this time to have been a highly controversial position.[28] On the other hand, Metrophanes did sometimes agree with Porphyry against Hermogenes (F12), so he too was not a slavish adherent of his base-text.

In this light, the absence of any evidence in later sources of Porphyry having criticized Hermogenes or defended Minucianus from his attacks must be significant. There is no reason why Hermogenes' *On Issues* should not have been available to Porphyry, and its criticisms of Minucianus' teaching were potentially relevant to Porphyry's task as commentator. However, if Metrophanes was willing to cite Harpocration's critique of Hermogenes and reply to it, it is difficult to see why he should have failed to cite and engage with criticisms of Hermogenes in Porphyry had they existed. In this instance, therefore, the argument from silence has some force, and we may conclude that Porphyry did not engage with Hermogenes.[29]

V. COMMENTARY

Minucianus' *Art of Rhetoric* was primarily concerned with the theory of issues. In the form of issue-theory that was developed by second-century rhetoricians, forensic and deliberative themes were classified under thirteen distinct issues, according to the nature of the dispute; the division of each issue into a series of heads of argument provides the prospective speaker with a default strategy for conducting the argument in a given case. Some of Porphyry's fragments deal with introductory topics relating to the theory or Minucianus' treatment of it; others concentrate on technical points at various levels of detail: the overall structure of the system of thirteen issues, the definition and differentiation of the individual issues, the division of each issue into heads, minute analysis of techniques for developing particular heads, and the resources available for this purpose.

Limitations of space unfortunately make it impossible to include the sometimes extensive text of the testimonia and fragments in this paper. I have therefore presented the texts themselves, with a translation, in a separate publication,[30] while trying here to provide a summary sufficient to convey their contents, at least in broad terms. The commentary gives a brief explanation of the theoretical points with which each fragment engages; readers interested in pursuing the technicalities in more depth will find supporting material in my commentary on Hermogenes' *On Issues*.

[28] Heath (n. 16), 92–4.

[29] Gloeckner (n. 16), 76 conjectured that Porphyry replied to Hermogenes' criticisms of Minucianus; *contra* H. Rabe, *Prolegomenon Sylloge* (Leipzig, 1931), xiii.

[30] M. Heath, 'Porphyry's rhetoric: texts and translation', *Leeds International Classical Studies* 1.5 (2002), 1–38 (at http://www.leeds.ac.uk/classics/lics/).

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F1 (415F Smith): Sopater *RG* 5.9.14–22[31] (with the discussion in 9.22–14.17); ?Marcellinus *PS* 293.14–26 (= *RG* 4.35.20–32); Athanasius *PS* 181.13–15.

Minucianus began his *Art* by stating that 'the rhetor will speak on every political question' (*ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐρεῖ πᾶν ζήτημα πολιτικόν*), but offered no definition of rhetoric, rhetor or political question (cf. Sopater *RG* 5.26.24–9, 4.67.4–6; Marcellinus *RG* 4.69.10–12). Our sources tell us that Porphyry explained the failure to define rhetoric by pointing out that Minucianus' primary concern was with issue-theory, which applies only to judicial and deliberative oratory (in panegyric there is no disputed question, and therefore no issue); since Minucianus' treatise was not concerned with rhetoric as a whole, a general definition of rhetoric was not needed.

The restriction of the scope of Minucianus' treatise means that its title, *Art of Rhetoric*, was broader than its actual content. Hermogenes' polemical allusion to 'those who have, under the title of the art of rhetoric, written on the part concerned with division' (74.16–17) made a related point.[32] Thus Porphyry's justification of Minucianus' failure to define rhetoric is bound up with a clarification of the treatise's potentially misleading title. The significance of the title was a normal topic for the introduction to a commentary.[33] We may compare the prolegomena to Longinus' commentary on Hephaestion's metrical *Handbook*, in which Longinus explains why there was no need for Hephaestion to define metre and elucidates the book's title (86.1–13 Consbruch).

By contrast with Minucianus, Zeno did begin his work on issues by defining rhetoric. The definition initially cited is a broad one, *bene dicendi scientia* (313.8), which is then narrowed down to *in quaestione civili* (313.13–15); the restriction of the scope of his treatise to judicial and deliberative rhetoric is presupposed (cf. 316.4 *iudiciale vel deliberativum*) rather than explicitly stated. A definition of *civilis quaestio* (313.16–314.4) follows the definition of rhetoric in which that phrase appears. Hermogenes also specifies his subject as the division of political questions into heads (28.11–12) and provides a definition of political questions (28.15–29.6), but he does not explicitly define rhetoric. Some commentators on Hermogenes therefore borrowed Porphyry's defence of Minucianus. However, not everyone accepted its relevance in his case: of the sources cited above Athanasius and Marcellinus reject it, arguing *inter alia* that Hermogenes did define rhetoric by implication, while Sopater reaches a positive conclusion after stating both sides of the dispute. Since the relevance of Porphyry's

[31] Text: at 5.9.20 for *περὶ ταύτης* read *περὶ πάσης*; cf. 26–7 (*περὶ πάσης τέχνης διαλαμβάνεται*), *PS* 293.25.

[32] Georgius fol. 198[r] (Schilling [n. 8], 756) cites this comment in support of his contention that copyists had given Hermogenes' treatise the title *Art of Rhetoric* in error; cf. ?Marcellinus, *PS* 292.13–293.8. Anon. *PS* 245.20–249.1 surveys the discussion of why Hermogenes had given his work this title before deducing from this passage that he did not.

[33] On prolegomena to commentaries, see J. Mansfeld, *Prolegomena. Questions To Be Settled before the Study of an Author or a Text* (Leiden, 1994); *Prolegomena Mathematica. From Apollonius of Perga to Late Neoplatonism* (Leiden, 1998); M. Plezia, *De commentariis isagogicis* (Polska Akademia Umiejetnosci, Archiwum filologiczne 23, Kraków, 1949); R. E. Heine, 'The introduction to Origen's *Commentary on John* compared with the introductions to the ancient philosophical commentaries on Aristotle', in G. Dorival and A. le Boulluec (edd.), *Origeniana Sexta* (Leuven, 1995), 3–12. Kennedy (n. 19), 78 suggests that it may have been Porphyry 'who began the custom of writing prolegomena to the study of rhetoric which fit the discipline into a philosophical scheme and deal with the delicate question of why rhetoric should be taken seriously, given Plato's objections to it in the *Gorgias*'. However, the fragments contain no evidence for such general prolegomena to rhetoric, as distinct from prolegomena to the particular text in question, nor of anything as elaborately systematized as the later prolegomena.

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defence of Minucianus to Hermogenes was already a matter of debate before Sopater and Athanasius, we may conclude that Porphyry's defence had been adopted and adapted by some earlier commentator on Hermogenes; this is likely to have been Metrophanes (Section IV).

F2 Sopater *RG* 5.5.28–8.30; cf. Anon. *PS* 59.21–60.17 (= *RG* 2.683.13–684.4).

Sopater's prolegomena to Hermogenes' *On Issues* contain an outline history of rhetoric. According to this account, rhetoric existed among the gods, and flourished in the time of the heroes (Plato's etymology of 'hero' at *Cratylus* 398d,e is cited); the libertarian impulses of rhetoric meant that its fortunes declined under the tyrants, but a renaissance began in Sicily and spread (with Gorgias' assistance) to Athens, reaching a peak in the fourth century; suppression under the Macedonian hegemony ended with the restoration of good political order (*σώφρων πολιτεία*) under Rome, especially under Hadrian and Antoninus. Interwoven with this narrative is a history of rhetorical technography: in the early period, from Tisias to Isocrates, there is no evidence that written treatises handled issue-theory, although the consistency with which the classical orators apply its principles show that the teaching was transmitted orally (*παραδόσει*); Cicero provides evidence that the art of rhetoric was preserved in the intervening years, but the earliest technical writers currently in circulation (*τῶν νῦν φερομένων τεχνικῶν*) are Hermagoras and Lollianus, who identified seven and five issues respectively;[34] it was Minucianus who first established the canonical system of thirteen issues.

The parallel in the anonymous prolegomena contains a much briefer summary of what is recognizably the same history. Both sources speak of a renaissance of rhetorical theory in the Roman era, in which issue-theory was developed by Hermagoras, Lollianus, and Minucianus—Minucianus being the first to fix the number of issues at thirteen (*RG* 5.8.21–3 ~ *PS* 60.11–15); both add Hermogenes on to the end of the sequence, though in somewhat different terms. Rabe pointed out that Minucianus must originally have marked the culmination and conclusion of this history; it derives, therefore, from a commentary on Minucianus, and was subsequently borrowed and adapted by commentators on Hermogenes, like the defence of Minucianus in F1. Here, too, Porphyry is a likely source, and the influence of an intermediary commentator on Hermogenes may be inferred.[35]

If this reconstruction is correct, the prolegomena to Porphyry's commentary contained a history of rhetoric slanted towards the development of issue-theory; this was used to elucidate the historical significance of Minucianus' work, thus explaining why it was chosen as the basis for a commentary. Again, Longinus provides a parallel in his prolegomena to Hephaestion: the first words of the surviving portion imply that he has just summarized a dispute about the history of metrical theory, with reference

[34] The reference is not to Hermagoras of Temnos, in the second century B.C., but to a homonym dating (like Lollianus) to the early second century A.D.; on the transmission and attribution of fragments of rhetoricians named Hermagoras, see Heath (n. 21). The fragments of Lollianus are collected in O. Schissel, 'Lollianus aus Ephesos', *Philologus* 82 (1926/7), 181–201. According to the transmitted text at 5.8.19–20, it was Lollianus who held that there were seven issues, and Hermagoras 'after him' five, but comparison with *RG* 5.79.10–15 and *PS* 60.13–15 shows that the two names have been accidentally transposed: Gloeckner (n. 16), 52–3.

[35] Rabe (n. 29), xi–xiv. Cf. K. Schöpsdau, 'Das Nachleben des *Technon synagoge* bei Cicero, Quintilian und in der griechischen Prolegomena zur Rhetorik', in W. W. Fortenbaugh and D. C. Mirhady (edd.), *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle*, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 6 (New Brunswick, 1994), 192–216, at 215, n. 63.

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to its possibly divine origin (83.4–11). He then proceeds to explain briefly his choice of Hephaestion over other metrical theorists (83.12–16; the explanation continues in 86.14–19). Porphyry's commentary on Ptolemy's *Harmonics* likewise opens with an overview of the many schools of musical theory and an explanation of the choice of Ptolemy's text for exegesis (3.1–4.21 Düring).

It may be helpful to pause at this point to examine Porphyry's possible role in transmitting information about earlier theorists.

(a) Hermagoras and Lollianus

In Porphyry's history the modern period begins with the younger Hermagoras and Lollianus (5.8.18–20). These two rhetoricians are cited in close proximity in other passages of Sopater (*RG* 5.15.16–18 with 5.17.17–26; *RG* 5.79.10–15; *RG* 5.173.23–174.28 ~ 4.647.18–648.11), and there is a further co-citation at *RG* 4.63.9–18. It seems likely that Porphyry is the source in these passages as well. It is significant that the co-citation in *RG* 5.173.23–174.28 is preceded by a reference to Minucianus, and that Hermagoras again keeps company with Minucianus in a later Hermogenean commentator (Nilus fol. 155^{r}).[36] Moreover, there is a reference to 'the Hermagoreans' in a lengthy extract explicitly attributed to Porphyry (*RG* 4.397.15 = F7 below), which should also be referred to the younger Hermagoras.[37]

If the inference is correct that Porphyry's commentary on Minucianus was the vector of fragments of the younger Hermagoras and Lollianus on issues, then a review of those fragments will provide more evidence for the topics which it covered:

(i) Sopater *RG* 5.15.16–18 and 5.17.17–26 frame a survey of definitions of rhetoric, suggesting that Porphyry made good the omission which he had defended in F1.
(ii) Marcellinus[38] *RG* 4.63.9–18 compares Lollianus and Hermagoras in their treatment of the division of rhetoric into species and genus, whole and part. See further F3.
(iii) Anon. *PS* 330.6–331.3 records that Lollianus regarded issue as an accidental property of rhetorical discourse, arguing this position from an analysis of the relationship between a question, its key argument (*sunekhon*) and its issue. As a philosopher, Porphyry might well have addressed himself to such topics in what I have elsewhere called the 'substructure' of issue-theory, especially since Minucianus made use of the triad *aition–sunekhon–krinomenon* which plays a role in Lollianus' argument; indeed, Minucianus is cited in this very passage (330.10–14).[39] Cornutus is also cited alongside Lollianus, as sharing his opinion: I return to Cornutus in (b) below.
(iv) Sopater *RG* 5.79.10–15 is more specific about which issues were recognized by Hermagoras, his 'successors' (μεταγενέστεροι) and Lollianus. This elaborates on the statement in the history of rhetoric about the number of issues the two theorists recognized, and presumably prefaced Porphyry's own exposition of the thirteen-issue system. *RG* 4.223.4–7, recording that Hermagoras treated quality

[36] Gloeckner (n. 16), 33.
[37] The argument of this paragraph is presented in more detail in Heath (n. 21).
[38] For this attribution of the section starting at 63.6 (τὸ πολύυλον), see Rabe (n. 8), 587.
[39] M. Heath, 'The substructure of *stasis*-theory from Hermagoras to Hermogenes', *CQ* 44 (1994), 114–29, discussing Lollianus at 123–5 (I do not accept Rabe's supplement οὐδαμῶς at 330.27), Minucianus at 125–6.

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as single issue and the logical issues as its classes (εἴδη), would fit in the same context. See further F5.

(v) Nilus fol. 155^{r} [40] is concerned with the relationship between the issues of counterplea (ἀντίληψις) and objection (μετάληψις) in Minucianus and Hermagoras. See further F5c(iii), F10.

(vi) Sopater *RG* 5.173.23–174.28 is concerned with the order of the counterpositions in Hermagoras, and records that Lollianus did not distinguish them (~ *RG* 4.648.9–11). See further F5c(v).

(vii) Georgius fol. 207^{r} [41] and *RG* 7.595.6 (for the text see *RG* 5.337, n. 21 and 337.23–338.8) indicate that Hermagoras divided the practical issue into more than the two classes recognized by Hermogenes, without going to the lengths of Metrophanes, who identified no less than twenty-five classes.

(b) Cornutus

In F2a(iii) Cornutus appears with Lollianus in what may be information transmitted by Porphyry; in F3 he is cited alongside Porphyry himself. The supposition that it was Porphyry who transmitted this information presents no difficulty, since he cites Cornutus' *Art of Rhetoric* elsewhere (*In Cat*. 86.20–4).

The Cornutus whose *Art* Porphyry cited is certainly the first-century Stoic, since his reply to Athenodorus is mentioned at the same time.[42] However, the attribution of other rhetorical fragments tranmsitted under the name Cornutus is potentially complicated by Graeven's conjecture that the Anonymus Seguerianus was a third-century rhetorician named Cornutus.[43] This suggestion, which has not met with general acceptance, has a very weak evidential foundation. The argument is based mainly on the fact that a survey of definitions of *kolon* by the fifth-century sophist Lachares quoted in scholia to Hermogenes (*RG* 7.931.6–7) attributes to Cornutus a definition of *kolon* identical to that given by the Anonymus (242). Since the Anonymus draws heavily on older sources, this is not decisive in itself, and Graeven's argument requires the further assumption that Lachares' survey, which mentions Cornutus after Lollianus and Basilicus and before Apsines, is in chronological order; in fact, the position of Cornutus and Apsines is determined by the greater clarity of their definitions of *kolon* and *komma* respectively (σαφέστερον 931.1, 15). Cornutus is also mentioned by Syrianus (2.60.19–23; cf. 2.201.8–14) in a doxography that covers Minucianus, Zeno, Hermogenes and Metrophanes, Harpocration, Cornutus, and Evagoras and Aquila. Here too Graeven argues for a broadly chronological order, but closer inspection again reveals that the order is rhetorically determined—two unsatisfactory arguments for the standard precedence of conjecture are followed by two non-standard theories (Harpocration placing documentary exception first, Cornutus ambiguity),[44] before Syrianus' preferred authorities (see 2.56.18–25) are called on to vindicate the standard order by providing a better grounding for it.

(c) Minucianus, Zeno, and Antipater

According to the history of rhetoric which we have attributed to Porphyry, Minu-

[40] Gloeckner (n. 16), 33. [41] Schilling (n. 8), 711–12.
[42] A. D. Nock, 'Kornutos', *RE* Suppl. 5 (1931), 995–1005.
[43] J. Graeven, *Cornuti artis rhetoricae epitome* (Berlin, 1891).
[44] Graeven (ibid.), xxxi–xxxiii tries to link the precedence of ambiguity to Anon. Seg. 188: *contra* F. Marx, *BPW* 12 (1892), 776–82, at 780.

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cianus was the first exponent of the system of thirteen issues. But this is unlikely to be true: the version of the system found in Zeno is likely to be earlier than that attested for Minucianus.[45] This implies that Porphyry was unaware of the chronological sequence, or else that he did not know Zeno's treatise. That Zeno's treatise may no longer have been readily available in Porphyry's day is perfectly plausible: it could have been driven out of circulation quickly when superseded by Minucianus, as Minucianus was in due course displaced by Hermogenes.[46] It is consistent with this that we have only one citation of Zeno's work on issues (by contrast with the more frequent references to his commentary on Demosthenes, which was still of interest to Menander in the latter part of the third century). It is not even certain that this citation is correct: there is no indication in Sulpicius Victor that Zeno had any explanation of the order in which the issues were treated, let alone the one reported by Syrianus (although it is possible that the explanation has been eliminated by epitomization at 325.16–17).

How, then, did this information (or misinformation) reach Syrianus? What follows is wildly speculative. The scholia to Hermogenes contain two references (*RG* 7.235.12, 244.20) to an Antipater, probably Antipater of Hierapolis, who studied theory with Zeno. In the former passage, he appears in close proximity to a citation of Porphyry (F10), and is criticized (though the doctrine being rejected is not specified). In the latter, Minucianus and Antipater are mentioned together, as sharing the view that the issue of objection can arise on the part of the defendant. (To judge from 339.6–25, Zeno would not have accepted this.) Thus Antipater's two appearances are in close connection with Minucianus and Minucianus' commentator, Porphyry. One possibility is that Metrophanes cited Porphyry and Minucianus, adding the references to Antipater independently; Antipater could then have been the source for his *indirect* knowledge of Antipater's teacher Zeno.

F3 Nicolaus *Progymnasmata* 55.18–20 Felten

In the course of a lengthy discussion (54.11–57.8) of the division of rhetoric into classes (εἴδη), Nicolaus argues that although the range of different kinds of discourse is indefinite, all can be brought under the traditional threefold classification—judicial, deliberative, and panegyric. Cornutus and Porphyry are named as adherents to this view. We have already seen that the threefold classification appeared in Porphyry's defence of Minucianus (F1).

We noted in F2a(ii) the likelihood that Porphyry transmitted the information in Marcellinus *RG* 4.623.9–18 about the views of Hermagoras and Lollianus on the division of rhetoric into species and genus, whole and part. This is a topic that Hermogenes mentions only to distinguish it from the division of an issue into its constituent heads of argument, with which his treatise is concerned (28.8–14). The polemical relationship to Minucianus of much in Hermogenes makes it plausible that in setting aside questions of species and genus, whole and part, he is dismissing as irrelevant a

[45] See n. 16 above.

[46] If so, Sulpicius Victor probably made his Latin epitome (and thus, to our remarkable good fortune, ensured the preservation of evidence about Zeno in a parallel tradition) in the second century, and there is no obstacle to taking Sulpicius as a direct pupil of Zeno—a reading of 313.2–4 that Heath (n. 16, 1994), 17 appears to regard as questionable. The consequences for the date of Marcomannus do not seem problematic.

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topic which Minucianus had discussed, although the direct evidence that he did so is open to some doubt.[47]

In my commentary I mistakenly followed Syrianus (2.12.5–13, cf. Athanasius *PS* 179.9–17, *RG* 7.111.4–9) in referring Hermogenes' references to whole and part to the theory of the constituent parts of a speech. Marcellinus and Sopater (*RG* 5.24.13–25.11, where, however, the terms εἶδος and ὅλον are reversed) show that the concern was more probably with a hierarchical division of rhetoric into judicial, deliberative, and panegyric, and of these in turn into prosecution and defence, protreptic and apotreptic, encomium and invective. Hermagoras placed 'logical science' at the top of the hierarchy, with rhetoric as one of its species, so that prosecution, defence, and the rest appear as 'parts' of judicial, deliberative, and panegyric oratory; Lollianus placed rhetoric at the top of the hierarchy, so that the 'parts' were the constituent heads of prosecution, defence, and the rest. Porphyry (and presumably Minucianus, if he discussed this topic) appears to have favoured the latter scheme.

F4 (416F Smith): Syrianus 2.14.9–14; Syrianus 1.93.9–13; anon. *RG* 7.1086.12–1087.1. Cf. ?Marcellinus *PS* 291.12–18; Marcellinus *RG* 4.185.7–10.

These sources record Porphyry's influential comparison of invention to the soul of a speech and expression to its body.[48] Syrianus attributes it to Porphyry's *Art*, and the prolegomena would provide a plausible context: comparison with the soul implies that invention is the most important part of rhetoric, and since issue-theory is a crucial component of invention, the comparison serves to emphasize the importance of the subject (on which Hermogenes also insists, 28.7–8). If Porphyry's *Art* is identical with the commentary on Minucianus, emphasis on the importance of the subject of the base-text is equally appropriate: the usefulness (χρήσιμον) of the text under discussion is a standard topic in the prolegomena to commentaries (e.g. *PS* 286.16–24).

F5 (417F Smith): anon. Par. 3032 fol. 137^{r}.[49]

This fragment is cited from the *Collection of Rhetorical Questions*, but it seems likely that a similar approach to the overall structure of issue-theory was taken in the commentary on Minucianus.

Porphyry identifies the three most general questions: does it exist? what is it? of what kind is it? These questions correspond respectively to conjecture, definition, and 'the others'—that is, the eleven issues grouped under quality. The organization of issue-theory round these three questions is traditional (e.g. Cicero, *Orator* 45, *De Or.* 2.104–13; Quintilian 3.6.44, 56).

Although defining conjecture in terms of the question 'does it exist?' is traditional, Minucianus is known to have followed a different tradition in defining conjecture as a complete denial of the charge (ἄρνησις παντελὴς τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐγκλήματος:

[47] In sch. min. *RG* 4.63, n. 20 (cf. the extract from John Doxapatres in S. Gloeckner, *Über den Kommentar des Johannes Doxopatres zu den Staseis des Hermogenes* I, Wissenschaftliche Beilage zum Jahresbericht des Königlichen Gymnasiums zu Bunzlau 244 [Kirchhain, 1908], 31) the doctrine attributed to Minucianus is the same as that attributed to Lollianus in *RG* 4.63.9–18; the possibility must therefore be recognized that *Μινουκιανός* is a mistake for the less familiar *Λολλιανός*. But if, as suggested below, Porphyry and Minucianus accepted Lollianus' scheme, the information might be authentic.

[48] The image was extensively developed by later writers; for references see Rabe's annotation to *PS* 205.1–4, and M. Heath, *Unity in Greek Poetics* (Oxford, 1989), 134–6.

[49] H. Rabe, 'Aus Rhetoren Handschriften: 3. Die Quellen des Doxapatres in den Homilien zu Aphthonios', *RM* 62 (1907), 559–86, at 561, n. 2.

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'Sopater and Marcellinus' *RG* 4.202.20–5; Marcellinus *RG* 4.214.16–17; 'Syrianus and Sopater' *RG* 4.298.13–15; 5.150.11–12; Syrianus 2.61.8–10; *RG* 7.180.17–181.4; cf. Cic. *De Or*. 2.105; Quintilian 3.6.15, 32). Zeno used the same formulation (*status ex negatione natus* 325.19). Porphyry is in this respect closer to Hermogenes (36.9–12, 42.7–8).

Objection (μετάληψις) is treated as separate from the three general questions by Zeno (325.6–7) and Hermogenes (42.5–11), followed by Sopater and Marcellinus (*RG* 4.276.17–20, 278.10–17). Porphyry's use of the three most general questions as an organizing principle implies that Porphyry (and perhaps Minucianus before him) subsumed objection under quality; this is the view favoured by Syrianus (2.152.3–10).

We are now in a position to summarize the evidence for the prolegomena to Porphyry's commentary.

(a) Porphyry's prolegomena

Although the order in which the topics were treated can only be guessed at,[50] the range of topics covered in the prolegomena appears to have included:

(i) a defence of Minucianus' failure to define rhetoric, related to a clarification of the title of the base-text: F1;
(ii) a discussion of the definition of rhetoric: F2a(i);
(iii) a discussion of the division of rhetoric into classes, and of the related problem of genus and species, whole and part: F2a(ii), F3;
(iv) an outline history of rhetoric, and of rhetorical technography, with special attention to issue-theory, leading to an explanation of the choice of Minucianus as base-text: F2;
(v) a discussion of the nature of issue (presumably including a definition, and perhaps—after Minucianus—discussion of the etymology of the term),[51] and of its relationship to the concepts of question and key argument (*sunekhon*): F2a(iii);
(vi) an assertion of the importance of issue-theory: F4;
(vii) a review of ways in which issue-theory had been organized by theorists before Minucianus, and an outline of the thirteen-issue system: F2a(iv), F5.

(b) Minucianus' prolegomena

As noted in Section III, Minucianus included more extensive prolegomena in his treatise than did Hermogenes; so it is not easy to draw a boundary between the prolegomena to Porphyry's commentary and his commentary on Minucianus' prolegomena. It may therefore also be worth asking whether the evidence for these prolegomena allows us to make further inferences about the topics that would have come within Porphyry's scope.

(i) The tasks of the orator: Zeno introduces the *officia oratoris* after his discussion of *civilis quaestio* (315.5–10, with 320.9–14). The only direct evidence for Minu-

[50] It may be relevant that Porphyry's commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* begins (56.14–57.18) with the title and subject-matter of the base-text. Cf. Dexippus, *In Cat*. 5.25–6.26, covering purpose (σκοπός), usefulness, and title.

[51] On Minucianus' definition of issue, see Heath (n. 39), 125–6. Etymology: Sopater, *RG* 5.77.12–22 ~ 4.199.4–13; anon. *RG* 7.170.11–13; cf. Syrianus 2.47.13–20. Hermogenes 35.17–19 dismisses the topic.

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cianus is provided by George Plethon, *RG* 6.585.2–586.6: the source does not inspire confidence, and there is evidence of contamination from Hermogenes' *On Types of Style*, but with some emendation (in particular, the supplement <*νόησιν*> before *εὕρεσιν*) the list is credible, the closest parallel being *PS* 210.5–14. Zeno's list is similar, except that it has a hierarchical structure (subsuming natural and artificial order—*τάξις* and *οἰκονομία*—and expression under *διάθεσις*) and omits memory (cf. e.g. Athanasius *PS* 175.16–177.7; others omitted delivery as well as memory: Quint. 3.3.4–5, *PS* 202.5–8, 236.19–20).

(ii) Preliminary analysis (*νόησις*): Zeno's discussion is very elaborate (315.15–319.35), but later texts such as Athanasius (*PS* 175.17–21; cf. *PS* 61.2–4, 200.1–201.7, 235.21–6, 346.1–3) focus on four questions: is the problem a political question? does it have issue? what is its class? what is its issue? We know (F1) that Minucianus took the concept of political question as a given. We also know that Minucianus concerned himself with the classification of themes lacking issue, and that Hermogenes' polemic on class and mode was directed against Minucianus;[52] the issues themselves were of course the main theme of the treatise.

(iii) Classification of person and act: Minucianus' classification is attested by the commentators on Hermogenes.[53] Zeno does not (so far as we can judge from Sulpicius Victor's epitome) provide such a classification, although person and act do appear in his discussion of the analysis of a theme (315.29, 316.23–317.2). The categories of person and act played a key role in Minucianus' probably innovative treatment of incomplete conjecture.

(c) Ordering of the issues

We noted above that F5 implies the inclusion of objection within quality. There are other pieces of evidence for the order of Minucianus' exposition of the issues:

(i) Minucianus placed conjecture first (*RG* 4.202.20–5, Syrianus 2.60.8–10).

(ii) Minucianus' differentiation of definition from conjecture (*RG* 5.149.30–150.16), and of counterplea from conjecture (*RG* 5.94.24–95.7 ~ 4.235.16–25) and definition (*RG* 5.96.11–97.3 ~ 4.236.28–237.10, Christophorus fol. 83^{r} [54]), looks like a cumulative procedure.

(iii) Minucianus placed objection next after counterplea: Nilus fol. 155^{r} [55], which includes a reference to the younger Hermagoras' view that the two issues do not differ: see F2a(v).

(iv) The counterpositions were probably treated next, although the issues between definition and the legal issues appear in such various orders in different theorists as to make certainty impossible.[56]

(v) The order in which the counterpositions were treated in systematic presentations of issue theory varied considerably (see e.g. Cic. *Inv.* 1.5; *Rhet. ad Her.* 1.24; Quint. 7.4.7–15; Fortunatianus 93.3–94.6 Halm; Julius Victor 381.8–382.2,

[52] Heath (n. 16), on Hermogenes 31.19–34.15, with 36.7–9 (themes lacking issue); 34.16–35.14 (class and mode).

[53] Ibid., 63–6, on Hermogenes 29.7–31.18.

[54] Rabe (n. 24), 246–7.

[55] Gloeckner (n. 16), 33.

[56] For example, Zeno: objection, practical, counterplea, counterposition; Hermogenes: counterplea, counterposition, practical, objection; Sopater, *Division of Questions* (and *τῶν παλαιῶν τεχνογράφων οἱ πλείονες* according to Syrianus 2.151.22–3): counterplea, counterposition, objection, practical.

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391.1–392.10 Halm). Zeno and Hermogenes agree on the order: counterstatement, counteraccusation, transference, mitigation. Minucianus discussed them (individually, as in Zeno, and not together as in Hermogenes) in the order: counterstatement, transference, counteraccusation, mitigation (Sopater *RG* 5.173.23–174.8; 'Syrianus' *RG* 4.647.17–648.3).[57] Porphyry followed Minucianus' order (*RG* 4.397.17–30: see F7 below). See F2a(vi).

(vi) It is likely that the practical issue was treated after the counterpositions, and the legal issues last (as is generally the case).

F6 Anon. *RG* 7.921.2–4 (cf. Maximus Planudes *RG* 5.466.18–19).

Rhetoricians generally recognized six 'elements of circumstance' (*περιστατικά*): person, act, time, place, manner, cause (e.g. Hermogenes 42.22–43.3). In his *Art*, Porphyry included a seventh, matter (*ὕλη*; see also F9 below).

The inclusion of matter among the elements of circumstance is attested in other sources (Quint. 5.10.33; Fortunatianus 104.28–9 Halm; *PS* 207.2–11). Nicolaus lists the standard six and adds that 'some' also distinguish matter (13.14–14.3 Felten); Troilus rejects the addition (*PS* 51.24–52.2); according to pseudo-Hermogenes (*Inv.* 140.15–141.3) it is philosophical, not rhetorical. Among Hermogenes' commentators Athanasius (cf. *RG* 7.921.10), Marcellinus (*RG* 4.165.19f.),[58] and Syrianus (2.39.17–20) recognize the standard six; Sopater presents more of a problem, and merits separate discussion.

Sopater generally lists five circumstances (*RG* 5.123.10–28; 4.355.5–357.17; 5.136.29–137.15 ~ 4.389.30–390.13;[59] 4.595.9–12;[60] 5.195.20–196.9 ~ 4.794.13–795.2). This formula (preferred also by Troilus) takes act separately from its five concomitants, and is therefore equivalent in effect to the standard six; so there is no particular grounds for surprise when six are listed at *RG* 4.150.21–151.16 and 288.18–31. More surprising are the passages which include matter, producing a list of seven circumstances: *RG* 4.331.16–332.18, 4.364.31–366.5, 4.499–29–500.3. In *RG* 4.316.2–23 seven are listed initially,[61] but in what follows, which purports to cover all the circumstances, there is no illustration of matter; this suggests that matter has been added to a text that originally had only the standard six. Comparison of *RG* 4.405.3–407.3 with the parallel passage in *RG* 5.138.5–139.2 supports this inference: there are signs of additions and reordering in the *RG* 4 recension. Further confirmation comes when *RG* 4.150.21–151.16, with its seemingly unsuspicious six circumstances, is compared with *RG* 5.63.14–28: for in *RG* 5 this passage is not concerned with the six circumstances at all, but with the pairing of person and act.[62] We have here some clear illustrations of the pervasive divergence between the two recensions of Sopater's commentary, and good reason to think that the recension used in the composite commentary of *RG* 4 has been heavily redacted.[63] That the changes include the addition of matter to the list

[57] Minucianus' order is also followed by Syrianus, and in Sopater's *Division of Questions*; see too *RG* 4.239.14–21 (Marcellinus), 4.532.18 ('Syrianus, Sopater and Marcellinus'), 648.22 (Sopater), 651.4 (Marcellinus).

[58] Supply <*τόπος*>.

[59] At 389.31 supply <*τρόπῳ*>.

[60] At 595.10 read *τίς* for *τί*.

[61] At 316.4 supply <*τόπου*> (cf. 316.12).

[62] See n. 53 above.

[63] Rabe (n. 29), xc–xci draws attention to the three-way parallel *RG* 5.17.27–18.26 ~ *RG* 4.46.20–48.25 ~ *PS* 320.16–321.10. The answer to his question, 'quis tandem est genuinus Sopatri textus?', must be that *RG* 5 presents an (often radically) abbreviated version of the genuine text, and *RG* 4 an (also, often radically) redacted one. In this case the redactor has replaced *RG* 5.17.27–30 ~ *PS* 320.16–19 with *RG* 4.46.20–6, and effected a return to the original by

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of circumstances (contrary to Hermogenes himself and the consensus of his commentators) suggests that the redaction may have been influenced, directly or indirectly, by Porphyry.

F7 Porphyry *RG* 4.397.8–399.26.

This long extract from Porphyry, preserved in the composite scholia to Hermogenes' *On Issues* in *RG* 4, provides our best opportunity to observe Porphyry the rhetorical theorist at work in detail. In it Porphyry is concerned with the head of conjecture known as 'transposition of the cause'. It will be convenient to take the extract section by section.

(i) 397.8–15: In a case of conjecture the prosecution will identify what he claims are signs indicative of the defendant's guilt; this constitutes the head known as 'sequence of events' (*τὰ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀχρὶ τέλους*).[64] In the transposition of the cause (*μετάθεσις τῆς αἰτίας*) or 'gloss' (*χρῶμα*),[65] the defence responds by proposing an alternative, innocent explanation for the allegedly incriminating events. As Porphyry puts it, 'the defendant has to . . . assert that it was not because of the alleged wrongdoing that he acted, spoke or experienced the emotion'. The classification of the sequence of events as based on acts, words, or feelings is paralleled in Hermogenes (49.8–9); presumably it is something that Hermogenes had in common with Minucianus.

(ii) 397.15–30:[66] Porphyry bases the transposition of cause on the four kinds of counterposition (*ἀντίθεσις*): counterstatement (*ἀντίστασις*, arguing a benefit that compensates for the prima-facie wrongdoing), transference (*μετάστασις*, shifting the blame to a third party), counteraccusation (*ἀντέγκλημα*, shifting the blame to the victim), and mitigation (*συγγνώμη*). We have already noted (F2a(v)) that this passage is evidence that Porphyry followed Minucianus' order for the counterpositions. A further trace of Minucianus' doctrine (for which see Marcellinus *RG* 4.250.6–12) appears when Porphyry includes age among possible grounds for a plea of mitigation; for example, 'it is characteristic of young men to make threats about tyrannies and engage in that kind of empty bragging' (397.27–8).[67]

Hermogenes based a distinctive treatment of the transposition of cause on the threefold classification of the sequence of events: a different technique is recommended for the transposition of cause depending on whether the sequence of events

transposing *σοφῶς τὸ προοίμιον ἐνταῦθα ἔγραψε* (*PS* 320.20, omitted in the *RG* 5 recension) before *RG* 5.17.30 ~ *RG* 4.46.27 ~ *PS* 320.19.

[64] Since the sequence of events *is* the sign, the schematization of the heads of conjecture in Heath (n. 16), 80–1 is seriously flawed. Sequence of events should be grouped in (C) with the heads that respond to it; hence (B) examines the probability of the crime (witnesses, motive, capacity) and (C) examines the alleged signs. This in turn means that (C) should be regarded as the primary argument, (B) as preparatory. Note that Minucianus placed the transposition of cause immediately after sequence of events, unlike Hermogenes, who placed it after the counterplea: see Heath (n. 16), 86 on Hermogenes 48.3–9.

[65] The latter term is attributed here to 'the Hermagoreans', referring to the younger Hermagoras: see F2 above.

[66] Text: there is a lacuna at 4.397.23; read: . . . *ἐπίδοσιν*. <*μεταστατικὰ δὲ* . . . *ἀντεγκλημτικὰ δὲ* . . .>. *συγγνωμνικὰ δέ* . . . *κτλ*.

[67] The theme is that of a rich young man who boasts at a party that he will become tyrant: see Sopater, *RG* 5.52.14–15 ~ 4.122.5–6, 4.406.13–20; Marcellinus, *RG* 4.407.14–19. A more complex variant appears at Zeno 332.27–333.29; sch. Dem. 19.101 (228, p. 41.20–7); Sopater, *Division of Questions* 51.9–16; Epiphanius, *RG* 4.465.7–15; Syrianus 2.94.8–13; anon. *RG* 7.382.15–21, 383.22–384.4. Other themes mentioned in this context are the rich young man who maintains disinherited sons, and the man found burying a recently killed corpse: see Heath (n. 16), 83 (on Hermogenes 47.2–5) and 88 (on 49.16–19), respectively.

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involves words, acts, or feelings (49.8–23). Hermogenes' theory was widely (and justly) criticized.[68] The critique of Hermogenes in sch. Dem. 19.101 (228, p. 40.28–42.13 Dilts), which probably derives from Menander, gives an alternative view with significant parallels to Porphyry.

(iii) 397.30–398.9:[69] Porphyry notes next that some 'glosses' are given in the declamation theme itself (e.g. 'the man who left a talent in his will to another man's wife, saying that he did so because of her chastity; she is then charged with adultery.[70] Here the gloss is inherent in the question: i.e. that the gift was because of her chastity'); others have to be extrapolated from the theme ('as in the case of the rich man looking at the acropolis;[71] he will say that he was pitying the victims of tyranny').

(iv) 398.9–11: Porphyry refers back to a previous discussion of the advisability of using a single or multiple glosses, and on whether (in the latter case) they should be consistent or speculative. The point was also discussed by Hermogenes (50.2–19); cf. Sopater *RG* 5.135.27–136.29 ~ 4.389.6–29, Syrianus 2.85.4–86.26.

(v) 398.11–399.17:[72] The prosecutor has a number of techniques by which to refute the defendant's gloss. First, by denying or demanding the consequence (*ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀκολούθου ἀναιρέσεως ἢ ἀπαιτήσεως* 398.12–13). In demanding the consequence (398.13–23) the prosecutor posits a consequence of the innocent explanation claimed by the defendant, and then shows that this consequence is unfulfilled: if what he says were true, *x* would be the case; but it is not, so his explanation must be false. Here the consequence is stated first positively (*κατὰ θέσιν*) and then negatively (*κατ' ἀναίρεσιν*) to establish the desired conclusion (398.21–3). In the denial of the consequence (398.23–8), a consequence is first negated, and then shown to be fulfilled: if what he says were true, *x* would not be the case; but it is, so his explanation must be false. Porphyry illustrates the point from declamation themes,[73] but also refers to Demosthenes *On the False Embassy* to illustrate both the demand for the consequence ('Demosthenes in the *False Embassy*, when Aeschines says with reference to Phocis that he was deceived, note how he made the ejection of the gloss: "well then, you should hate the man who deceived you; but in fact you do not hate him—so you were not deceived" ' 399.8–11; cf. Dem. 19.102–4) and the denial of the consequence ('"I do not hear any of these words, nor do you [the jury]" ': 399.16–17; Dem. 19.109). There is a close parallel in doctrine and terminology in sch. Dem. 19.101 (228 p. 40.16–27 Dilts), immediately before the critique of Hermogenes cited in (ii) above, strengthening the case for Porphyry's influence. Compare also *RG* 7.313.15–314.18.

(vi) 399.18–20: A further point is the need to prepare for the argument in the prologue: 'One should eliminate the glosses right from the prologues; this was Demosthenes' custom in the case of counterpositions[74]—he prepared the solution to

[68] Heath (n. 16), 88–9 (on 49.23–50.2).

[69] Text: at 397.31 Kowalski (n. 8), 58 recovers *ἐν τῇ ὑποθέσει* from Py.

[70] Cf. Sopater, *RG* 5.135.22–7 ~ 4.388.27–389.6; Marcellinus, *RG* 4.453.28–454.3; a more elaborate formulation in Sen. *Contr*. 2.7.

[71] Heath (n. 16), 88 (on Hermogenes 49.21–3).

[72] Text: 398.23–4 (*κατὰ ἀναίρεσιν δὲ πάλιν τὸν τρόπον προτάττοντες διὰ τῆς θέσεως κατασκευάζομεν*) is corrupt. *κατὰ ἀναίρεσιν* has arisen from assimilation to the end of previous sentence: read (e.g.): *καὶ τὴν ἀναίρεσιν δὲ πάλιν τὸν <αὐτὸν> τρόπον προτάττοντες διὰ τῆς θέσεως κατασκευάζομεν*. At 399.10–11 Kowalski (n. 8), 77 recovers *ἀπατήσαντα* from Py.

[73] There is no parallel for the theme in which Pericles is tried by Megarians in connection with the decrees. For the young man who maintains disinherited sons, see n. 67 above.

[74] Here in the sense of opposing arguments introduced so that they can be refuted.

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counterpositions in advance.' For Demosthenes' practice of preparing his response to potentially damaging points in the prologue see sch. Dem. 1.1–2 (1c, 14d), 2.1 (1c).

(vii) 399.20–6: A further technique is the progressive elimination of causes. Eliminating all possible innocent explanations will leave the incriminating explanation as the only possible interpretation of the sequence of events: 'Demosthenes made use of this when he said "if you show through naivete or ignorance" ' (399.25–6; Dem. 19.98).[75]

The term 'elimination of causes' (ἡ τῶν αἰτιῶν ὑπεξαίρεσις) is not widely distributed in the rhetorical literature, but does appear in a number of other contexts. It can, as in this fragment of Porphyry, be used as a technique of argument. So in conjectural cases the head of motive and capacity can be argued using the topics of encomium and elimination of causes (Sopater, *Division of Questions* 61.18–20); this represents a distinctive extension to the common doctrine, in which only encomiastic topics appear (Hermogenes 46.8–24). In cases of letter and intent, elimination of causes can be used to establish the intention with which the defendant performed the contested action (Sopater, *RG* 4.805.21–5). However, it can also be used as a technique of amplification. In the scholia to Demosthenes' *Against Timocrates* (sch. Dem. 24.66 [148ab, 149], 174 [326], 190 [344b], 195 [348a, 349]) elimination of causes is used to develop the topic of intention and motive in the amplification of passages of invective. More striking is its appearance in a discussion of topics of amplification useful in the presentation of the sequence of events in a case of conjecture. This discussion, attributed to 'Sopater and Polemo'[76] (*RG* 4.364.32–366.5; for elimination of causes, see 366.1–5) and paralleled in Syrianus (2.78.10–79.2), has several points of contact with Porphyry: it too uses the example of a woman accused of adultery because she cries at night (4.366.2–5, Syr. 2.78.27–79.2; 4.399.23–6);[77] the larger context (365.27–366.1) makes use of Demosthenes 19.109, a passage important in this fragment of Porphyry; and it includes matter among the elements of circumstance (365.22–3), as does Porphyry (cf. F6). Since there is independent evidence that Porphyry's treatment of amplification was influential (F9, F14), we may reasonably suspect that he is the source for the doctrine in this instance too.

F8 Sopater, *Division of Questions* 35.20–6.[78]

This fragment comments on a declamation theme also used by Hermogenes (57.14–18): 'a rich general arrested the three sons of his poor enemy as traitors; he executed two, who made no confession under torture, and the third, who confessed to treason before torture; the father takes no action, and the general charges him with complicity'. The theme illustrates the class of conjunct conjecture known as pre-confirmatory (προκατασκευαζόμενος), in which the charge (in this case, the father's complicity) presupposes some other disputed statement of fact (that the sons were guilty of treason). Porphyry suggested that the father can, under the heading of exception (παραγραφικόν), argue that the irregularity of the general's treatment of the sons casts doubt on the procedural validity of the prosecution for complicity.

[75] This section is echoed in Georgius: Schilling (n. 8), 762, n. 3.

[76] For this attribution of the section starting at 363.25, see Rabe (n. 8), 588; for Polemo, see F15 below.

[77] Cf. (e.g.) Sopater, *RG* 5.52.13, 95.14–15; Marcellinus, *RG* 4.135.23–9, 324.17–20 (citing Maior); Syrianus 2.84.11–16; anon. *RG* 7.309.2–7.

[78] Text: note the corrections in D. Innes and M. Winterbottom, *Sopatros the Rhetor*, *BICS* Suppl. 48 (1988), 39–40.

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Sopater reports that opinion was divided about the use of this exception, without further comment.[79]

The proposed exception is based on the manner of the prosecution; we may infer, therefore, that Porphyry recognized exceptions based on all the elements of circumstance, by contrast with the less satisfactory formulation of Hermogenes.[80] For this doctrine, see Sopater, *RG* 4.316.2–23, 5.123.10–124.10, noting that at 4.316.4 matter is included among the elements of circumstance (see F6).

The source of the fragment is not stated. Porphyry's *Collection of Rhetorical Questions* is a possibility, if it resembled Sopater's *Division of Questions* in including analyses of the themes collected (see §2(iii) above); but declamation themes could be mentioned and discussed in the course of technical exposition in a commentary.

F9 'Sopater and Marcellinus' *RG* 4.520.20–522.26.

A discussion of the head of importance (*πηλικότης*) in the issue of definition[81] provides the opportunity for an extensive list of topics of amplification and the resources for their confirmation; Porphyry's name appears in the list (521.1).

Although the whole section (*RG* 4.518.17–524.27) is headed 'Sopater and Marcellinus', its coherent structure suggests an extract from a single commentary, rather than a compilation from two sources. If, as I think likely, the single commentary is Sopater, then this material (for which there is no parallel in *RG* 5) must be attributed to the redacted version used by *RG* 4; that would be consistent with the suggestion (F6) that the redactor was influenced by Porphyry.

The commentator discusses (i) the relationship between the two amplificatory heads, importance and relative importance (*πρός τι*, 518.17–519.10); (ii) the correct order of these two heads (519.10–520.6); and (iii) the reason for their position after legislator's intent (520.6–19). He then (iv) catalogues the resources for amplification (520.20–522.26), (v) illustrates amplification from Demosthenes' *Against Meidias* (522.27–523.12), and (vi) illustrates from *Against Leptines* the point that the resources can be generalized to amplification in other heads and issues (523.12–26). There follows (vii) an addendum, mentioning two more techniques of amplification (532.26–31); (viii) a note on the relationship between importance and presentation (*προβολή*), another amplificatory head (532.21–524.3);[82] (ix) a response to a question about *Against Meidias* (524.3–22); and (x) a brief illustration from a declamation theme (524.22–7).

The catalogue of resources for amplification in (iv) first mentions the topics of quantity and quality (520.21–8); then the resources which can be used for their confirmation (*κατασκευάσομεν*) are listed summarily (520.28–521.4) and illustrated at greater length (521.4–522.12). The structure of the catalogue is not easy to discern in either the listing or the subsequent illustrations (the obscurity may be due, in part, to lacunae), but becomes clearer when the two are correlated. The major groupings are:

(i) The heads of purpose: honour[83] and goodness (*καλόν*) are specifically mentioned (520.28–32).
(ii) The concomitants of an action (*ἀπὸ τῶν παρακολουθούντων τῇ πράξει*): here we have the standard elements of circumstance (person, place, manner, time,

[79] See further Heath (n. 16), 97, on Hermogenes 57.14–58.2.
[80] Ibid., 80–1, on Hermogenes 44.1–11.
[81] Ibid., 105–7.
[82] Ibid., 102–3, 105–6.
[83] At 520.29 read *ἐνδόξου* for *εὐδόξου*.

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cause), together with intention (γνώμη: cf. sch. Dem. 21.160 [548]) and, 'according to Porphyry', occasion (καιρός) and matter (520.32–521.1, 521.4–20).

(iii) Quantity, with respect to person, time, or consequences (521.20–522.1).

(iv) The encomiastic topics: individuality, age, status, occupation, fortune, nationality, gender (521.1–2, 522.1–6). For this connection between the elements of circumstance and the topics of encomium, compare Sopater, *RG* 4.331.19–24, one of the redacted passages which include matter (see F6).

(v) Probability: the examples show that what is meant is action contrary to what would have been expected for that occasion,[84] place, manner, or cause (521.3–4, 522.6–12). I have not found any parallel for the expression τὸ εἰκὸς τοῦ . . . in the rhetorical literature.

Porphyry's contribution seems prima facie to be simply the addition of occasion and matter to the list of the concomitants of an action; his inclusion of matter among the elements of circumstance is already known from F6. However, the citation of Porphyry's *Art* in a similar connection in F14 suggests that his treatment of the resources for amplification was particularly influential, and there must be a suspicion that the commentator has drawn more extensively on Porphyry than his localized acknowledgement implies. But even if this is true we cannot exclude the possibility of further elaboration by an intermediate source, or by the commentator himself, who concedes the element of competitive ambition in this extremely elaborate exposition (φιλοτίμως 522.12)[85] and goes on to provide a simpler alternative (522.13–25). The full extent of Porphyry's contribution must therefore remain uncertain.

F10 Anon. *RG* 7.235.4–21 (cf. Maximus Planudes, *RG* 5.266.13–15).

This fragment is concerned with the problem of differentiating counterplea (ἀντίληψις) and objection (μετάληψις): cf. F2a(v), F5c(iii).[86] Porphyry's solution is that in counterplea the act as a whole is permissible, but not in objection. For example, when Cleon charges Alcibiades with *hybris* for laughing when he made his promise about Pylos,[87] the defence is that Alcibiades' reaction was legal in every respect, and the case is counterplea. When a rich man is charged with murder because he has killed a poor enemy who has been condemned to death,[88] the defence is that the victim was under sentence of death; but since the identity of the killer (a personal enemy, not the official executioner) remains a point of difficulty, this is a case of objection (based on person).

The anonymous commentator gives Porphyry's position only qualified assent in a complex argument that also finds room for two other views, one (234.20–235.4) unattributed, the other (235.15–19) based on an observation of his own teacher Paulus.[89] It is in the course of this discussion that the commentator also mentions, but does not specify, the view of Antipater, which he flatly rejects (235.12–15): see F2c.

[84] At 522.6 read παρὰ for περὶ.

[85] On technical elaboration as an opportunity for competitive display, see T. Barton, *Ancient Astrology* (London, 1994), 139–41.

[86] Heath (n. 9), 115–16.

[87] Cf. (e.g.) [Apsines] 1.98–100; Sopater, *RG* 5.173.16–18, 4.587.24–6, 588.1–15; Marcellinus, *RG* 4.616.4–9.

[88] Cf. (e.g.) Zeno 339.11–14; Sopater, *RG* 4.189.12–22; Syrianus, 2.44.5–8, 154.1–7, 155.8–11.

[89] Walz's punctuation does not make it any easier to follow this argument: the full-stop at 235.7 should be deleted (235.5–7, ὡς ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἀντιλήψει . . . καὶ κρίνεται ὕβρεως is parenthetic); at 235.20 the colon after μόνον should be replaced with a comma, and οὖν deleted.

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F11 Anon. *RG* 7.203.22–204.4 (cf. Maximus Planudes, *RG* 5.261.1–4); Christophorus, fols. 101^{v}–102^{r}.[90]

This fragment is concerned with the problem of differentiating the counterpositions of transference (μετάστασις) and mitigation (συγγνώμη). Hermogenes notes that opinions on this point varied (39.17–19, 75.11–76.2), and it was widely discussed.[91]

According to Minucianus, transference invokes an external factor, mitigation an internal factor—treating outward events (such as a storm or torture) that work through an inner response (such as fear) as external (and thus assigned to transference), though others saw these as internal (and assigned them to mitigation). According to Hermogenes, however, transference invokes a factor that could be held to account (ὑπεύθυνος), mitigation one that cannot. Porphyry takes the view that the issue is transference if the wrong could have been avoided but there is an extenuating circumstance, and mitigation if it could not have been avoided. For example, an ambassador who does not set out within the specified time because he has not received his expenses from the treasurer could have acted otherwise (using his own money or taking out a loan), but has some excuse in the treasurer's default;[92] the generals who fail to recover corpses after a sea-battle because of a storm could not have acted otherwise.[93] This theory entails (as the testimonia observe) that the failure to recover the corpses because of the storm is mitigation; Minucianus, by contrast, would have treated it as transference (*RG* 4.688.14–22, 689.3–12, 7.206.15–207.8, 582.31–583.19, 586.5–9), as would Zeno (347.20–4). Furthermore, there is no blame in mitigation (because the wrong could not have been avoided), but there is blame in transference (because the wrong could have been avoided); for the defence to succeed this blame must be shifted to another party that is capable of bearing the blame, and hence accountable (hence ignorance, drunkenness, and youth are classed as mitigation in F7). This means that Porphyry's position approximates in effect to that of Hermogenes.

The anonymous commentator mentions a number of other views before opting for that of Porphyry: Hermogenes, Minucianus, Abas,[94] and 'others' (203.1–23). In assenting to Porphyry he is presumably following Eustathius, whose agreement with Porphyry on this point is noted by Christophoros.

F12 Anon. *RG* 7.596.14–20 (cf. Maximus Planudes *RG* 5.346.20–2); Georgius fol. 214^{v}.[95]

This fragment is concerned with the heads of the practical issue (πραγματική). Porphyry includes two heads devoted to amplification, importance (πηλικότης), and relative importance (πρός τι), neither of which are recognized by Hermogenes. The anonymous commentator rejects Porphyry's view, but Georgius reveals that Metrophanes accepted it.

When Sopater mentions these two heads in the issue of definition, he includes what seems to be a cross-reference to the practical issue (*RG* 4.484.5–7 ὡς ἔχομεν καὶ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ τῇ πραγματικῇ), although there is no trace of these heads in his treatment of that issue.[96]

[90] Rabe (n. 24), 247; Schilling (n. 8), 731.
[91] Heath (n. 16), 129.
[92] Ibid., 76 (on Hermogenes 39.11–14).
[93] Ibid. (on Hermogenes 39.15–16).
[94] Abas wrote historical monographs as well as an *Art of Rhetoric* (*Suda A*20); the identification of the historical works with those of *RE* Abas (11) = *FGrH* 46 has been questioned.
[95] Schilling (n. 8), 751–2.
[96] In fact, Sopater, *RG* 4.703.9 says (if the comma which Walz places before the οὐ is transposed, as it must be, after it) that the practical issue uses *only* the heads of purpose.

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Hermogenes divided both the documentary and the non-documentary classes of the practical issue using the heads of purpose. But Zeno (343.8–23) and Minucianus (Nilus fol. 142^{v} [97]) had a different division for the non-documentary kind. Minucianus' heads were 'natural goodness' (*τὸ φύσει καλόν*), custom, and 'reasonable grounds' (*εὔλογοι αἰτίαι*). The first of these is similar in form of expression to Zeno's *naturale iustum*; but in substance the closer parallel was probably between Zeno's *naturale iustum* and 'reasonable grounds', which provide the substance of the head of justice in Syrianus 2.174.18–176.15 and 'Sopater and Marcellinus' *RG* 4.735.19–737.3. Moreover, Syrianus 2.109.6–18, discussing the head of argument known as legislator's intention in definition, points to 'reasonable grounds' as a useful recourse when the speaker does not have a suitable law to appeal to (a situation analogous to non-documentary objection, where in the absence of a law the argument must be based on intrinsic justice). Since the term 'reasonable grounds' is attested for Minucianus, it is possible that these passages in Hermogenes' commentators draw their material from Porphyry's commentary.

F13 Marcellinus *RG* 4.268.16–269.1; Nilus fol. 170^{v}.[98]

This fragment is concerned with the relationship between the practical issue (*πραγματική*) and the legal issue known as conflict of law (*ἀντινομία*). According to Porphyry, conflict of law applies only to cases in which two laws already in force come into conflict; where there is a conflict between a law that is already in force and a law that is proposed, the question is practical: should the new law be passed? Given the standard doctrine that the practical issue is concerned with decisions about the future, while the other issues pass judgement on past acts, Porphyry's distinction is reasonable.

Marcellinus approves Porphyry's position in substance,[99] but notes an oversight. Even where there are two laws, both in force, the question is practical if the situation requires a decision about a future act (which of the two laws shall we violate in responding to this emergency?) rather than a judgement about a past act (which of the laws shall we apply in judging this case?).

F14 Sopater, *Division of Questions* 381.29–382.2.

In a discussion of the issue of ambiguity, Sopater declares that the argumentative resources for confirming importance (*τὰ τὴν πηλικότητα κατασκευάζοντα ἐπιχειρήματα*) are clear 'from *τὰ ὁρικά* and Porphyry's *Art*'. For the substantive doctrine, see F9.

If the cross-reference to *τὰ ὁρικά* is to the section on definition in Sopater's commentary (that is, to F9) this may seem to support the identification of the author of *Division of Questions* with Sopater the commentator.[100] However, this inference is blocked if, as seems likely, F9 comes from the redacted version of Sopater's comment-

[97] Gloeckner (n. 16), 43. [98] Ibid., 77.

[99] This part of Marcellinus' discussion appears in almost identical terms at 265.12–28 ('Syrianus, Sopater and Marcellinus': Rabe [n. 8], 588), without reference to Porphyry. At 265.19 *κρίνεται* is careless, since it implies that the example involves a prosecution for *γραφὴ παρανόμων*, a judicial problem that would not fall under the practical issue; the formulation at 268.22–3 (*Αἰσχίνης ἀντιλέγει*) makes it clear that what is in question is a deliberative debate about a legislative proposal.

[100] Against the identification, see Heath (n. 16), 245, citing evidence of doctrinal differences. The cross-reference to 106 (on Hermogenes 60.15–18) remains valid; but that to 95 (on 55.17–56.3) must be deleted in the light of Rabe (n. 8), 588 (*RG* 4.444.8–32, attributed to Sopater in Walz, is headed *ἐξ ἀνεπιγράφου* in the manuscript).

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ary, not from Sopater's original. The cross-reference need not be to the author's own commentary.

The cross-reference to Porphyry's *Art* is comparable to those to Metrophanes at 65.18–19 and 225.20, and should make us cautious in assuming that Porphyry's work was not directly available to later commentators. But it is possible that the phrase is a single cross-reference, to the Porphyrian material included in the commentary on *τὰ ὁρικά*.

F15 'Metrophanes, Athanasius, Porphyry, and Polemo' *RG* 4.422.18–429.5.[101]

The heading for this section is reported by Rabe.[102] Metrophanes and Athanasius both wrote commentaries on Hermogenes' *On Issues*, but Polemo is elusive. His name reappears in 'Sopater and Polemon' *RG* 4.363.25.369.21 (see on F7 above), and he is cited in Marcellinus, *RG* 4.120.19–23. It is clear from this last citation that he wrote on issue-theory; if he was specifically a commentator on either Minucianus or Hermogenes, then we cannot consider either the famous second-century sophist or the younger Polemo given a *floruit* under Commodus (A.D. 177–92) by the *Suda* (*Π*1890).

The extract is concerned with the epilogue. There is unfortunately no way of establishing positively the extent of Porphyry's contribution, and adaptation by intermediaries (cf. F9) cannot be controlled for; but we can at least eliminate sections with other identifiable sources. There are extensive borrowings from the Anonymus Seguerianus and pseudo-Apsines,[103] and sections that comment on Hermogenes' text also cannot be from Porphyry (although material that is simply attached to a Hermogenean lemma could be). In what remains there are citations of Plato's *Phaedrus* (423.3–6, 425.7–9) and *Apology* (423.10–424.9) and Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (424.30–425.3), which might seem appropriate for the philosopher Porphyry; but Metrophanes too was a Platonist.

This extract shows that Minucianus discussed the epilogue (422.30–423.2). What was the context of that discussion? In Hermogenes the epilogue is treated in connection with 'common quality' in conjecture (52.6–53.13), although quality is included among the heads of argument listed in the division of the issue; Metrophanes resolved this ambiguity by treating quality as a head of argument, while others treated it as something transitional between the arguments and the epilogue proper.[104] Minucianus placed quality in the epilogue (*RG* 4.536.25–29;[105] 7.443.3–7, 446.21–3, 447.13–16; Georgius fol. 131^{r} [106]), and may therefore have discussed the epilogue in the same context as Hermogenes.

[101] Text: at 423.4 read *Πλάτωνα* (Finckh) for *πλείωνα*; in the following line a lacuna can be supplied from Anon. Seg. 208; at 426.18 read <*μὴ*> *μεμνῆσθαι* (cf. Anon. Seg. 204). See Graeven (n. 42), xix. The following readings are drawn from Kowalski's collation of Py (n. 8): 422.24 *αὐτῆς*; 422.25 *προϋπέθετο*; 424.5 *ἄρα*; 424.6 *δείξαιμι* (but here one should restore *δόξαιμι* from Plato *Ap.* 34c); 424.9 *οὐδ' ὑμᾶς*; 424.29 *τὸν ἀκροατὴν ποιήσωμεν*; 425.18 *ἐρώτησιν*; 425.20 *ἐπαχθὲς ἦν*; 426.28 *ἀνάμνησιν ἔχει*; 427.8 *παθεῖν ἢ*; 427.14 *τὸ τέλειον*; 427.23 *εἰσάγῃ*.

[102] Rabe (n. 8), 588. Walz presents this section as part of the extract from Marcellinus beginning at 417.1.

[103] 426.17–19 ~ Anon. Seg. 204; 426.20–31 ~ [Apsines] 10.3.3–30 Patillon (discussed in M. Heath, 'Notes on pseudo-Apsines', *Mnemos.* 55 [2002]); 426.31–427.2 ~ Anon. Seg. 212; 427.8–10 ~ Anon. Seg. 205; 428.4–30 ~ Anon. Seg. 19–20, 237.

[104] Heath (n. 16), 90–1, 109–10.

[105] Text: at 536.26–7 read *τῶν ἐπ<ιλόγων εἶναι> αὐτὴν ἀποφαινόμενος*, with Gloeckner (n. 16), 34; at 536.28 Gloeckner deletes *τε καὶ κοινῇ*, but I would prefer to supply <*ἰδίᾳ*> before this phrase.

[106] Schilling (n. 8), 748.

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F16 Anon. *RG* 7.63.20–3.

An anonymous author of prolegomena to pseudo-Hermogenes' *On Invention* says that he will discuss the proem, not the other parts of a speech, because 'there has been adequate discussion of them by Hermogenes, Porphyry and others'.

F17 Simplicius, *In Cat.* 10.20–11.2.

Simplicius summarizes the views of Theophrastus and others on diction. The passage is printed as Theophrastus F683 Fortenbaugh, but not everything in it can represent Theophrastus directly: at 10.30–1 the use of 'ideas' reflects developments in stylistic theory of the second century A.D. and later.[107] The context indicates Simplicius' dependence on Porphyry (46F Smith); the source will have been a logical rather than a rhetorical work, but perhaps reflecting his familiarity with contemporary stylistic theory. The terminology is not identical to that of Hermogenes: *τὸ σαφές* corresponds to Hermogenes' *σαφήνεια*, and *ἡδύ* to Hermogenes' *γλυκύτης*; *μεγαλοπρεπές* (a word that Hermogenes does not use) presumably lines up with *μέγεθος*, and *πιθανόν* perhaps with *ἀλήθεια*. Since Syrianus wrote a commentary on Hermogenes' stylistic theory and his pupil Proclus uses Hermogenean terminology (*In Remp.* 2.8.1–8, *In Tim.* 3.199.29–200.27), its absence from Porphyry is significant.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The preceding commentary has inevitably focused on technical details that readers unfamiliar with the intricacies of issue-theory are likely to find confusing, if not positively repellent. It may be helpful, therefore, to conclude by briefly highlighting some of the main conclusions of this investigation.

Most obviously, it is clear that Porphyry invested a great deal of effort in rhetorical theory. Like some other third-century theorists (such as Maior or Metrophanes), he attempted to work out in greater detail the form of issue-theory that had been developed by second-century rhetoricians such as Minucianus and Hermogenes. His work displays originality in its detailed technical content, but also in his use of the commentary format as the vehicle for original contributions to rhetorical theory; and there is evidence that the content of his theory and its innovative format both had a significant influence on the later tradition. On this evidence, Eunapius' identification of Porphyry as a major contributor to rhetoric was eminently justified.

Porphyry's commentary resembles other contemporary commentaries, both technical and philosophical, in a number of respects. Those parallels, and the rapid adoption of the commentary format by sophists with no known philosophical orientation (such as Menander), attest a continuing interaction between rhetoric and other strands of contemporary intellectual life. Moreover, the persistence of such activities throughout the third century is evidence of the persistent vigour and creativity of rhetoric, and of cultural and intellectual life in general, during a period of social and political crisis.

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[107] W. W. Fortenbaugh, 'Theophrastus fragment 65 Wimmer: is it important for understanding Peripatetic rhetoric?', *AJP* 111 (1990), 168–75, at 174, n. 11 notes that *ἰδέαι* reflects later terminology in his cautious discussion of Ammonius, *Int.* 65.31–66.10 = Theophrastus F78.

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