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INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2498

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[November 15, 2019]

Introduction

On November 15, 2019, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2498,[1] which extended the mandate of the previously established Panel of Experts of Somalia by an additional year; the Resolution also expanded the scope of the Panel's inquiry by specifically tasking the Panel to investigate Al-Shabaab's revenue sources and illegal taxation schemes.[2]

Panel of Experts on Somalia

In Resolution 2444 of November 14, 2018, the Security Council had established a Panel of Experts on Somalia; the Panel was to operate until December 15, 2019.[3] The Panel was established at the same time as the existing Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group was disbanded; the Monitoring Group had been set up in 2004, through Resolution 1558, to monitor the arms embargo and other sanctions that had been imposed on Somalia.[4] The original mandate of the Panel was relatively broad and referred to previous Security Council Resolutions: the Panel was to carry out tasks originally given to the Monitoring Group and set forth in Resolution 2060 (2012); such tasks were further updated in Resolutions 2093 (2013), 2182 (2014), 2036 (2012), and 2444 (2018).[5] Some of the Panel's main tasks included: to monitor and implement various measures imposed on Somalia, such as the arms embargo, travel ban, asset freeze, and charcoal ban; to assess actions taken by Somali authorities to implement the arms embargo regime; to investigate activities, means of transport, seaports, airports, and other facilities used to generate revenues to commit violations of the Somalia arms embargo; to investigate seaport operations in Somalia that may generate revenue for Al-Shabaab; to recommend additional measures to improve overall compliance with the sanctions regime; to provide an assessment of the progress made by the government of Somalia in establishing relevant procedures for the use and storage of weapons by its security forces; and to assist in identifying areas where state capacity could be strengthened to facilitate the implementation of the sanctions regime.[6] The Panel consisted of six members and was based in Nairobi, Kenya.[7]

Extension of the Panel's Mandate Under Resolution 2498

In Resolution 2498, the Security Council, as stated above, decided to extend the Panel's mandate by an additional year and to expand its tasks to include "conduct[ing] an analysis of all of Al-Shabaab's revenue sources, their methods of storage and transfer, and mapping of illegal taxation systems."[8] The expansion of the Panel's mandate has been explained by the Security Council Member States as necessary to support and extend the existing sanctions regime, as well as to "curb the main threat to security in Somali [sic] that is Al-Shabaab."[9] In addition, the extended mandate for the Panel, requiring the latter to investigate Al-Shabaab's revenue sources, was likely necessitated by the Panel of Experts on Somalia's Report to the Security Council Committee, submitted on November 1, 2019.[10] In the Report, the Panel of Experts concluded that Al-Shabaab "remains the most immediate threat to peace and security in Somalia."[11] More specifically, the Report provided evidence that Al-Shabaab was manufacturing homemade explosive devices and using them to carry out an unprecedented number of attacks, and that Al-Shabaab's revenue generation had new sources, such as the taxation of imports into the port of Mogadishu.[12] The latter conclusion may have prompted Security Council Member States to expand the Panel of Experts' mandate in order to request that they investigate Al-Shabaab's revenue sources.

According to the Report, Al-Shabaab has likely expanded its ability to generate revenue sources, as the group has infiltrated Mogadishu's port institutions and other commercial shipping agents within the city.[13] As noted in the Report, in April 2019, Al-Shabaab contacted business owners in Mogadishu to inform them that all imports into Mogadishu port would be subject to taxation by the group.[14] In addition, the Report notes Al-Shabaab's continuous ability to generate revenue even in areas not physically controlled by the group, due to the group's ability to infiltrate

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government institutions and to provide relief to local populations in places where the Somali government is inefficient.[15] In areas where Al-Shabaab does not exercise physical control, the group functions as a shadow government and "routinely taxes trade, livestock and agricultural production through a series of checkpoints."[16] The Report also emphasizes that Al-Shabaab continues to take advantage of Somalia's unregulated mobile money and domestic banking services, in order to collect and transfer revenue within Somalia.[17] The Report establishes that Al-Shabaab remains a powerful threat to regional peace and security, which is evidenced by the group's attack on a hotel complex in Nairobi, Kenya, on January 15, 2019, in which 21 individuals died.[18] The Panel's investigation into this attack also revealed the existence of Al-Shabaab's network in the region and its aim of kidnapping foreign nationals.[19] According to the Report, Al-Shabaab controls and finances several "cells" in Kenya and Tanzania, and approximately $100,000 has been transferred by Al-Shabaab operatives in Somalia to four cells based in different East African countries.[20]

In light of such strong conclusions from the Panel of Experts that Al-Shabaab continues to pose a significant regional threat, and that the group has expanded its revenue sources, it is unsurprising that the Security Council, in Resolution 2498, decided to direct the Panel of Experts' attention to Al-Shabaab financing. It is also worth noting that the Security Council had in the past passed resolutions aimed at suppressing the financing of terrorist acts. In particular, on March 28, 2019, the Security Council passed Resolution 2462 on Countering the Financing of Terrorism, which "pulls together previous resolutions to create a consolidated document that also covers several key emerging issues" and calls upon the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism to "play a leading role in identifying ways to suppress terrorist financing."[21] Resolution 2498, directed inter alia at investigating Al-Shabaab's revenue sources, falls squarely within the Security Council's recent focus on the suppression of terrorism financing.

Conclusion

While Resolution 2498 seems to have resulted from relative consensus within the Security Council that Al-Shabaab poses a significant threat in the region and that its financing requires serious investigation, it is important to note that supporters of the current Somali government perceive this Resolution as a threat to Somali existence as a nation-state and a neocolonial encroachment of its sovereignty.[22] Somali United Nations Ambassador Abukar Dahir Osman called for the lifting of "outdated" sanctions against Somalia and expressed concern that the Panel of Experts' investigations "will not properly address the root causes of the problem."[23] Instead, Ambassador Osman encouraged Somalia's partners to invest in rebuilding the government's capacity to control its borders and the flow of foreign fighters and illegal weapons.[24] Despite the Somali government's opposition to the Panel of Experts' investigation and expanded mandate, it appears that the Security Council Member States support the Panel and believe it should expand its work to investigate Al-Shabaab's sources of revenue, with the more general goal of issuing recommendations regarding ways to suppress this terrorist group's financing.

ENDNOTES

1 Security Council Resolution 2498 (2019), S/RES/2498 (2019), Nov. 15, 2019, https://undocs.org/S/RES/2498(2019).

2 *Id.* ¶ 1 ("requests the Panel, with input from FGS and UNODC, to conduct an analysis of all of Al-Shabaab's revenue sources, their methods of storage and transfer, and mapping of illegal taxation systems . . ."); *id.* ¶ 29 ("[d]ecides to renew . . . until 15 December 2020, the Panel on Somalia . . .").

3 Security Council Resolution 2444 (2018), S/RES/2444 (2018), Nov. 14, 2018, https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2444%20(2018).

4 Security Council Resolution 1558 (2004), S/RES/1558 (2004), Aug. 17, 2004, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/751%20SRES%201558.pdf; *see also* Resolution 2444, *supra* note 3, ¶ 10 ("[d]ecides to terminate the mandate of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group").

5 Resolution 2444, *supra* note 3, ¶ 11.

6 United Nations Security Council, Panel of Experts, Work and Mandate, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/work-and-mandate.

7 Resolution 2444, *supra* note 3, ¶ 12.

8 Resolution 2498, *supra* note 1, ¶ 1.

9 United Nations, Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, Security Council Renews Mandate for Panel of Experts, Sanctions Regime on Somalia, Adopting Resolution 2498 (2019) by twelve Votes in Favour, three Abstentions, Nov. 15, 2019, https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc14021.doc.htm.

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10 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated Sept. 27, 2019 from the Panel of Experts on Somalia addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, S/2019/858, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/S_2019_858_E.pdf.

11 *Id*. ¶ 9.

12 *Id.* ¶ 10 ("Definitive evidence that Al-Shabaab is manufacturing its own explosives . . . means that the group now has at its disposal a readily available supply of improvised explosive device inputs."); ¶ 12 ("Al-Shabaab's ability to generate domestic revenues through the 'taxation' of all aspects of the Somali economy is undiminished . . . with preliminary evidence indicating that the group has begun taxing imports into Mogadishu port . . .").

13 Panel of Experts Letter, *supra* note 10, ¶ 31.

14 *Id.*

15 *Id.* ¶ 18.

16 *Id.*

17 *Id.* ¶ 12.

18 *Id.* ¶¶ 36–37.

19 *Id*. ¶¶ 46–47.

20 *Id*. ¶¶ 47–48.

21 UN News, Landmark terror finance resolution adopted by Security Council, Mar. 28, 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/03/1035671; Security Council Resolution 2462, S/RES/2462 (2019), Mar. 28, 2019, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/sres24622019.

22 OneWorld Global Think Tank, UNSC Resolution 2498 (2019): A Threat to Somali Security & Existence as a Nation-State, Nov. 24, 2019, available at https://oneworld.press/?module=articles&action=view&id=1178.

23 *Id.*

24 *Id.*

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2498*
[November 15, 2019]

United Nations S/RES/2498 (2019)

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 November 2019

Resolution 2498 (2019)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8665th meeting, on 15 November 2019

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, and *underscoring* the importance of working to prevent destabilising effects of regional disputes from spilling over into Somalia,

Expressing its support for the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in their efforts to reconstruct the country, counter the threat of terrorism and tackle the flow of illegal arms and armed groups, *further expressing* its intention to ensure the arms embargo in this resolution will enable the FGS in the realisation of these objectives, and *noting* its intention to set out all of the provisions of the arms embargo in this text,

Condemning Al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia and beyond, *expressing* grave concern that Al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region, particularly through their increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and *further expressing* grave concern at the continued presence in Somalia of affiliates linked to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL also known as Da'esh),

Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,

Condemning any flows of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia in violation of the arms embargo, including when they result in supplies to Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to ISIL, and when they undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region, and *further condemning* continued illegal flows of weapons and ammunition from Yemen to Somalia,

Expressing serious concern at reports of increased exploitation of Somalia, by Al-Shabaab and transnational organized crime networks, as a transit and transhipment point for the trade in sub-standard, illicit and dual-use goods and the revenues this trade generates for Al-Shabaab, and *further expressing* concern at continued reports of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in waters where Somalia has jurisdiction, and *encourages* the FGS, with support from the international community, to ensure fishing licenses are issued in accordance with the appropriate Somali legislation,

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Reiterating the importance of co-operation and coordination between the FGS and the Federal Member States (FMS) and implementation of the National Security Architecture and *noting* that a successful transition to Somali-led security from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as set out under the Transition Plan is fundamental to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region,

Expressing concern at the continued reports of corruption and diversion of public resources in Somalia, *welcoming* efforts made by the FGS to reduce corruption including the enactment of the Anti-Corruption Law on 21 September 2019, progress made by the FGS in strengthening public financial management and the positive work of the Financial Reporting Centre, and *calling* for the FGS to continue its efforts to address corruption and to continue to accelerate the pace of reform,

Expressing serious concern at the humanitarian situation in Somalia, and *condemning* in the strongest terms any party obstructing the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance, any misappropriation or diversion of any humanitarian funds or supplies, and acts of violence against and harassment of humanitarian workers,

Further expressing serious concern over the widespread nature and persistence of sexual and gender-based violence in Somalia, and *encouraging* the Somali authorities to further strengthen efforts to address it, including by implementing measures in line with resolution 2467 (2019),

Taking note with appreciation of the final report of the Panel of Experts (the Panel) on Somalia (S/2019/858) and the technical assessment mission report of the Secretary-General (S/2019/616), *expressing* serious concern that the FGS has not been cooperating with the Panel during the majority of their mandate, *welcoming* the FGS's collaboration and active participation with the technical assessment team on their visit, *urging* the FGS to engage on a way forward which will enable the Security Council to better assess and monitor compliance with the sanctions regime, and *recalling* that panels of experts operate pursuant to mandates from the Security Council,

Welcoming regional efforts with a view to supporting the normalisation of relations between Eritrea and Djibouti including disputes regarding their shared border, and *expressing* concern at continuing reports of Djiboutian combatants missing in action,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Condemns* Al-Shabaab's extraction of revenue from natural resources in addition to the charcoal trade, including the taxing of the illicit sugar trade, agricultural production and livestock, *notes with concern* their ability to store and transfer resources, and *requests* the Panel, with input from FGS and UNODC, to conduct an analysis of all of Al-Shabaab's revenue sources, their methods of storage and transfer, and mapping of illegal taxation systems, and to provide recommendations to the Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia (the Committee);

2. *Requests* the FGS to strengthen cooperation and coordination with other Member States, particularly other Member States in the region, and with international partners to prevent and counter the financing of terrorism, including compliance with resolution 1373 (2001), resolution 2178 (2014), resolution 2462 (2019), and relevant domestic and international law, and *requests* the FGS to submit, in their regular reporting to the Committee, an update on concrete actions taken by the FGS to counter the financing of terrorism;

3. *Calls upon* the FGS, in coordination with the FMS, to accelerate the implementation of the National Security Architecture, including decisions around the composition, distribution and command and control of the security forces, and to take further steps to deliver the Somali-led Transition Plan, and *underlines* the responsibility of the FGS to ensure the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment and their distribution, including implementation of a system which allows tracking of all such military equipment and supplies to the unit level;

4. *Reiterates* the importance of the FGS and FMS enhancing civilian oversight of all their security institutions and implementing appropriate vetting of all defence and security personnel, including human rights vetting, *calls upon* the FGS to continue to investigate promptly and as appropriate prosecute individuals responsible for violations

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of international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and *recalls* the importance of the Secretary-General's Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy in relation to the support provided by the United Nations to the Somali security forces and AMISOM;

5. *Calls* upon the international community to support implementation of the Somali-led Transition Plan to help develop credible, professional and representative Somali security forces, including providing additional and coordinated support to develop the weapons and ammunition management capacity of the FGS and FMS, with a particular focus on training, storage, support for infrastructure and distribution, technical assistance and capacity building with regard to countering financing of terrorism, and support in tackling the threat of IEDs;

Arms Embargo

6. *Reaffirms* that all States shall for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia, implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia, including prohibiting the financing of all acquisitions and deliveries of weapons and military equipment and the direct or indirect supply of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, until the Council decides otherwise (as initially imposed by paragraph 5 of its resolution 733 (1992) and paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002));

7. *Decides* that weapons and military equipment sold or supplied solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces or Somali security sector institutions other than those of the FGS in accordance with paragraph 9 of this resolution shall not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by any individual or entity not in the service of the Somali National Security Forces or Somali security sector institution to which it was originally sold or supplied or the selling or supplying State or international, regional or subregional organisation;

8. *Reaffirms* that the FGS, in cooperation with the FMS, and AMISOM shall document and register all weapons and military equipment captured as part of offensive operations or in the course of carrying out their mandates, including recording the type and serial number of the weapon and/or ammunition, photographing all items and relevant markings and facilitating inspection by the Panel of all military items before their redistribution or destruction;

(i) EXEMPTIONS, ADVANCE APPROVALS AND NOTIFICATIONS

9. *Decides* that until 15 November 2020 the arms embargo on Somalia shall not apply to deliveries of weapons and military equipment or the provision of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, intended solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces or Somalia security sector institutions other than those of the FGS to provide security for the Somali people, except in relation to items in Annex A and B to this resolution and the delivery of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, which are subject to the relevant advance approvals and notification procedures as set out in paragraphs 10–17;

10. *Decides* that deliveries of items in Annex A to this resolution intended solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces, or Somali security sector institutions other than those of the FGS, to provide security for the Somali people, require an advance approval by the Committee on a case by-case basis, submitted at least five working days in advance by the FGS or the State or international, regional or subregional organisation delivering assistance;

11. *Decides* that deliveries of items in Annex B to this resolution and the delivery of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities intended solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces to provide security for the Somali people are subject to notifications to the Committee for information submitted at least five working days in advance by the FGS or the State or international, regional or subregional organisation delivering assistance;

12. *Decides* that deliveries of weapons and military equipment listed in Annex B to this resolution or the delivery of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, intended solely for the purposes of helping develop Somali security sector institutions other than those of the FGS, may be provided in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of receiving a notification from the

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supplying State or international, regional and sub-regional organisation and *requests* States or international, regional and sub-regional organisations to inform the FGS in parallel of any such deliveries at least five working days in advance;

13. *Decides* that the FGS has the primary responsibility to seek approval from or notify the Committee pursuant to paragraph 10 or 11, as applicable of any deliveries of weapons and military equipment or the delivery of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities to the Somali National Security Forces, at least five days in advance, and that all requests for approvals and notifications should include: details of the manufacturer and supplier of the weapons and military equipment, a description of the arms and ammunition including the type, calibre and ammunition, proposed date and place of delivery, and all relevant information concerning the intended destination unit in the Somali National Security Forces, or the intended place of storage;

14. *Decides* that the State or international, regional or subregional organisation delivering weapons and military equipment or technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities to the Somali National Security Forces pursuant to paragraph 10 or 11, may alternatively, make an advance request for approval or notification, as applicable, in consultation with the FGS, *decides* that a State or international, regional or subregional organisation choosing to do so should inform the appropriate national coordinating body within the FGS of the advance request for approval or notification and provide the FGS with technical support with notification procedures where appropriate, and *requests* the Committee to transmit advance requests for approval and notifications from States or international, regional or subregional organisations to the appropriate national coordinating body in the FGS;

15. *Decides* that a State or international, regional or subregional organisation delivering any weapon and military equipment, technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities to Somali security sector institutions other than those of the FGS, pursuant to paragraph 10 or 12, has responsibility for seeking approval from or notifying the Committee, as applicable, for any deliveries of those items, advice, assistance or training, and informing the FGS in parallel at least five working days in advance;

16. *Decides* that where paragraphs 10 or 11 apply, that the FGS shall no later than 30 days after the delivery of weapons and military equipment, submit to the Committee a post-delivery notification in the form of written confirmation of the completion of any delivery to the Somali National Security Forces, including the serial numbers for the weapons and military equipment delivered, shipping information, bill of lading, cargo manifests or packing lists, and the specific place of storage, and recognises the value of the supplying State or international, regional or subregional organisation doing the same, in cooperation with the FGS;

17. *Reaffirms* that the delivery of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use shall be notified to the Committee five days in advance for its information only, by the supplying State or international, regional or subregional organisation;

18. *Notes with concern* reports that States were not adequately following the notification procedures set out in prior resolutions, *reminds* States of their obligations pursuant to the notification procedures, set out in paragraph 10–17, and *further urges* States to follow strictly the notification procedures for providing assistance to develop Somali security sector institutions other than those of the FGS;

(II) EXCEPTIONS

19. *Reaffirms* that the embargo shall not apply to:

(a) Supplies of weapons or military equipment or the provision of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities intended solely for the support of or use by United Nations personnel, including the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); AMISOM's strategic partners, operating solely under the latest African Union Strategic Concept of Operations, and in cooperation and coordination with AMISOM; and the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Somalia, all as per paragraph 10 (a)–(d) of resolution 2111 (2013);

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(b) Supplies of weapons and military equipment destined for the sole use of States or international, regional and subregional organisations undertaking measures to suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, upon the request of the FGS for which it has notified the Secretary-General, and provided that any measures undertaken shall be consistent with applicable international humanitarian and international human rights law;

(c) Supplies of protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Somalia by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel for their personal use only;

(d) Entry into Somali ports for temporary visits of vessels carrying weapons and military equipment for defensive purposes provided that such items remain at all times aboard such vessels (as previously affirmed by paragraph 3 of resolution 2244 (2015));

Targeted sanctions in Somalia

20. *Recalls* its decisions in its resolution 1844 (2008) which imposed targeted sanctions and its resolutions 2002 (2011), and 2093 (2013) which expanded the listing criteria, and recalls its decisions in its resolutions 2060 (2012) and 2444 (2018), and *further recalls* that the listing criteria includes, but is not limited to, planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender based violence;

21. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to share relevant information with the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011), and *invites* the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to share relevant information with the Committee, as appropriate;

22. *Decides* that until 15 November 2020 and without prejudice to humanitarian assistance programmes conducted elsewhere, the measures imposed by paragraph 3 of its resolution 1844 (2008) shall not apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia, by the United Nations, its specialised agencies or programmes, humanitarian organisations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance, and their implementing partners including bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organisations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan for Somalia;

Somalia Charcoal ban

23. *Condemns any* exports of charcoal from Somalia in violation of the total ban on the export of charcoal, *reaffirms* its decision regarding the ban on the import and export of Somali charcoal, as set out in paragraph 22 of its resolution 2036 (2012) ("the charcoal ban"), and paragraphs 11 to 21 of resolution 2182 (2014), and *decides* to renew the provisions set out in paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014) until 15 November 2020;

24. *Reiterates* its requests that AMISOM support and assist the FGS and FMSs in implementing the total ban on the export of charcoal from Somalia, and *calls upon* AMISOM to facilitate regular access for the Panel to charcoal exporting ports;

25. *Reaffirms* the importance of the efforts of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) to disrupt the export and import of charcoal to and from Somalia, and *encourages* the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to continue its work with the FGS and FMS, within its current mandate, under the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime to bring together relevant States and international organisations to develop strategies to disrupt the trade in Somali charcoal, and the trafficking of other licit and illicit goods that may finance terrorist activities in Somalia;

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IED components ban

26. *Noting* the increase in IED attacks undertaken by Al-Shabaab, *decides* that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer of the items in part I of Annex C to this resolution to Somalia from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the item(s) will be used, or a significant risk they may be used, in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices;

27. *Further decides* that, where an item in part I of Annex C to this resolution is directly or indirectly sold, supplied or transferred to Somalia consistent with paragraph 27, the State shall notify the Committee of the sale, supply or transfer no more than 15 working days after the sale, supply or transfer takes place, and *stresses* the importance that notifications pursuant to this paragraph contain all relevant information, including the purpose of the use of the item(s), the end user, the technical specifications and the quantity of the item(s) to be shipped;

28. *Calls upon* Member States to undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the sale, supply, or transfer of explosive precursors and materials to Somalia that may be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, including inter alia items in part II of Annex C, to keep records of transactions and share information with the FGS, the Committee and the Panel regarding suspicious purchases of or enquiries into these chemicals by individuals in Somalia and to ensure that the FGS and FMS are provided with adequate financial and technical assistance to establish appropriate safeguards for the storage and distribution of materials;

Panel of Experts on Somalia

29. *Decides* to renew, with effect from the date of adoption of this resolution, until 15 December 2020, the Panel on Somalia and that the mandate of the Panel shall include the tasks referred to in paragraph 11 of resolution 2444 (2018) and paragraph 1 of this resolution, *requests* the Secretary-General to include dedicated gender expertise, in line with paragraph 11 of its resolution 2467 (2019), and *expresses* its intention to review the mandate of the Panel and take appropriate action regarding any extension to the mandate no later than 15 November 2020;

30. *Urges* the FGS to cooperate with the Panel to facilitate interviews of suspected members of Al-Shabaab and ISIL held in custody, *reiterates the importance* of cooperation between the Panel and the FGS, *urges the* FGS to resume full cooperation with the Panel, including setting a date for a visit by the incoming Panel to Somalia without further delay, *notes* the importance of the Panel carrying out their mandate in line with document S/2006/997, and *requests* the Panel to give recommendations to the Committee on how to support the FGS in weapons and ammunition management including efforts towards establishing a National Small Arms and Light Weapons Commission;

31. *Reiterates its request* for States, the FGS, the FMS and AMISOM to provide information to the Panel, and assist them in their investigations, *urges* the FGS and the FMS to facilitate access for the Panel, on the basis of written requests to the FGS by the Panel, to all FGS armouries in Mogadishu, all FGS-imported weapons and ammunition prior to distribution, all FGS military storage facilities in Somalia National Army (SNA) sectors and all captured weaponry in FGS and FMS custody, and to allow photographs of weapons and ammunition in FGS and FMS custody and access to all FGS and FMS logbooks and distribution records, in order to enable the Security Council to monitor and assess implementation of this resolution;

Reporting

32. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council with an update, no later than the 31 July 2020 on any further developments towards the normalisation of relations between Eritrea and Djibouti;

33. *Requests* the Panel to provide monthly updates to the Committee, including a comprehensive mid-term update as well as to submit, for the Security Council's consideration, through the Committee, a final report by 15 October 2020 to include a focused analysis on the financial revenues of Al-Shabaab pursuant to paragraph 1;

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34. *Requests* the Emergency Relief Coordinator to report to the Security Council by 15 October 2020 on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia;

35. *Requests* the FGS to report to the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014) and as requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2244 (2015), by 15 February 2020 and then by 15 August 2020, on the structure, composition, strength and disposition of its security forces, and the status of regional and militia forces, including as annexes the reports of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2182 (2014), and incorporating the notifications regarding the destination unit in the Somali National Security Forces or the place of storage of military equipment upon distribution of imported arms and ammunition, and *requests* future reports of the JVT to cross-reference serial numbers of weapons documented by the JVT with available records detailing the distribution of arms to the security forces;

36. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex A

Items subject to the Committee's advance approval

1. Surface to air missiles, including Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS);

2. Weapons with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm, and components specially designed for these, and associated ammunition;

Note: (This does not include shoulder fired anti-tank rocket launchers such as RPGs or LAWs (light anti-tank weapon), rifle grenades, or grenade launchers.);

3. Mortars with a calibre greater than 82 mm and associated ammunition;

4. Anti-tank guided weapons, including Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and ammunition and components specially designed for these items;

5. Charges and devices specifically designed or modified for military use; mines and related materiel;

6. Weapon sights with a night vision capability;

7. Aircraft, specifically designed or modified for military use;

Note: 'Aircraft' means fixed wing, swivel wing, rotary wing, tilt rotor or tilt wing vehicle, or helicopter.

8. 'Vessels' and amphibious vehicles specifically designed or modified for military use;

Note: 'Vessel' includes any ship, surface effect vehicle, vessel of small waterplane area or hydrofoil and the hull or part of the hull of a vessel.

9. Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (listed as Category IV in the UN Register of Conventional Arms).

Annex B

Equipment requiring a notification with regard to deliveries to the Somali National Security Forces and Committee approval for Somalia security sector institutions other than those of the FGS

- All types of weapons with a calibre up to 12.7mm: and associated ammunition;
- RPG-7 and recoilless rifles, and associated ammunition;
- Helmets manufactured according to military standards or specification, or comparable national standards;
- Body armour or protective garments, as follows:
  - Soft body armour or protective garments, manufactured to military standards or specifications, or their equivalents;

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Note: military standards or specifications include, as a minimum, specifications for fragmentation protection.

- Hard body armour plates providing ballistic protection equal to or greater that level III (NIJ 0101.06 July 2008) or national equivalents;

- Ground vehicles specifically designed or modified for military use;
- Communication equipment specifically designed or modified for military use;
- Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) positioning equipment, specifically designed or modified for military use.

Annex C

Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Components

Explosive materials, explosives precursors, explosive-related equipment, and related technology

Part I

1. Explosive materials, as follows, and mixtures containing one or more thereof:
   a. Nitrocellulose (containing more than 12.5% nitrogen w/w);
   b. Trinitrophenylmethylnitramine (tetryl);
2. Explosive-related goods:
   a. Equipment and devices specially designed to initiate explosives by electrical or non-electrical means (e.g. firing sets, detonators, igniters, detonating chord).
3. "Technology" required for the "production" or "use" of the items listed at paras. 1, 2 & 3.

Part II

1. Explosive materials, as follows, and mixtures containing one or more thereof:
   a. Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO);
   b. Nitroglycol;
   c. Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN);
   d. Picryl chloride;
   e. 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (TNT).
2. Explosives precursors:
   a. Ammonium nitrate;
   b. Potassium nitrate;
   c. Sodium chlorate;
   d. Nitric acid;
   e. Sulphuric acid.

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