Clashes in the Assembly

Erik Voeten

Since the end of the Cold War, scholars of international politics have searched for paradigms that can make powerful and parsimonious claims about conflict and cooperation in post–Cold War global politics. According to some, the everlasting struggle between rich and poor countries has become the dominant division in world politics, meaning that the old North-South cleavage has superseded the Cold War East-West division.[1] Others argue that global conflict has become dominated by clashes between different civilizations[2] or that the dominant mode of conflict in global politics is between liberal democracies and nondemocracies.[3] Still others discern the rise of a counterhegemonic bloc of states seeking to challenge the dominant power of the United States.[4] One could argue that all of these views are correct on specific issues but that in general there is no single dimension that can explain global conflict since the end of the Cold War.

Although theoretical debates about the structure of post–Cold War conflict have been rich, few empirical studies have analyzed the merits of different perspectives. One of the problems faced by such empirical studies is the lack of data on state behavior. I provide an empirical contribution to these debates by applying a novel method (NOMINATE scaling) to analyze both Cold War (1946–88) and post–Cold War (1991–96) roll-call voting behavior of states in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Although some see voting in the UNGA as largely symbolic, it is the only forum in which a large number of states meet and vote on a regular basis on issues

I would like to thank Michael Doyle and Howard Rosenthal for many extremely helpful comments, suggestions, and discussions. I also thank George Downs, Joanne Gowa, Kimberly Morgan, Brian Pollins, the editors of *IO* and two anonymous referees, the participants of the 1998 ISA-NE conference, the 1999 Midwest Political Science Conference, and the Princeton University International Relations seminar. I am indebted to Soo Yeon Kim and Bruce Russett for sharing the 1991–93 data. This research profited from the generous support of the MacArthur Foundation and the Center of International Studies at Princeton University.

1. Kim and Russett 1996.
2. Huntington 1996.
3. Fukuyama 1992.
4. Huntington 1999.

International Organization 54, 2, Spring 2000, pp. 185–215
© 2000 by The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

concerning the international community. Even if the UNGA is seen as "merely a passive arena for the political interaction of member states,"[5] studying this interaction over a long period of time and across different issue areas should reveal changes in the behavior of states and in the dimensionality of global conflict. Analyzing voting behavior in the UNGA is in some ways problematic, but it is one of the best ways to systematically explore the questions that the current debate about the structure of post–Cold War global politics tends to address in an ad hoc fashion.

In this article I analyze three research questions that can be extracted from the debate about the structure of post–Cold War global politics. First, how has the dimensionality of conflict changed since the end of the Cold War? If alliances between states have become more fluid or if we are now living in a multipolar world, a model of higher dimensionality would be needed to explain UNGA voting behavior in the post–Cold War period than in the Cold War period. Second, what are the determinants of the voting behavior of states and are these consistent across different issue areas? This question relates to the interpretation of the dimension(s) of conflict that have replaced Cold War conflict. Is the relative position of states in post–Cold War conflict determined by regime type, wealth, civilization, or a combination of these factors? Third, to what extent is the structure of conflict in the post–Cold War period different from that in the Cold War period? Have the lines of divisions in world politics changed completely since the fall of the Berlin Wall, or has part of Cold War conflict carried over into the post–Cold War world?

To answer these questions, I establish the dimensionality underlying the structure of UNGA voting and measure the relative positions of states on the main dimensions of conflict. I obtain such measures by applying a new method specifically designed for the analysis of roll-call voting: NOMINATE scaling. NOMINATE allows for a much more accurate test of the dimensionality and relative positions of states than more conventional factor analytic and multidimensional scaling techniques.[6] It is well understood that factor analyses applied to roll-call voting have a tendency to overestimate the dimensionality of conflict.[7]

First, I extract a set of hypotheses from international relations theory that relate to the three research questions of this article: the dimensionality, content, and stability of conflict in post–Cold War world politics. Second, I explain the merits of NOMINATE scaling in comparison to factor analysis. Third, I analyze the results, first focusing on the dimensionality of conflict, then the substantive interpretation of the post–Cold War structure, and finally the stability in comparison to the Cold War. I conclude that post–Cold War voting behavior is mostly one-dimensional, in contrast to Soo Yeon Kim and Bruce Russett, who find that three independent factors account for post–Cold War voting behavior of states.[8] On the single dimension, the United States and its Western allies occupy one extreme pole. On the opposite pole I find a "counter-

5. Dixon 1981, 47. Dixon finds in a review of empirical scholarship of the UN that the UN has predominantly been studied by scholars of international politics as a passive arena for interaction.

6. Poole and Rosenthal 1991 and 1997.

7. See Coombs 1964; and Morrisson 1972.

8. Kim and Russett 1996.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

hegemonic" bloc of countries that consists of rising powers (such as China and India) and a group of countries with little in common except that they have clashed with the West and the United States in particular (for example, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea). Regime type and wealth partly determine how countries are positioned along this dimension. I also find that the positions of countries along this dimension correspond much more closely to their positions on the Cold War East-West dimension than the North-South dimension.

Theoretical Perspectives on Post–Cold War Global Politics

Global politics during the Cold War can be characterized and simplified by a bipolar continuum that roughly divided the world into three parts: the "Eastern" and "Western" blocs formed the extreme poles of the continuum and a group of "nonaligned countries" formed the center. The Western bloc consisted of a group of wealthy and democratically governed nations, led by the United States, that were all more or less engaged in an ideological, political, economic, and sometimes military battle with a group of communist states led by the Soviet Union.[9] The third group of states included a large number of states that claimed to be nonaligned but varied widely both in their involvement in the Cold War conflict and in their political, economic, geographic, and cultural characteristics. In the shadow of the East-West division, analysts identified a North-South cleavage that divided countries along lines of economic development. Studies using a variety of methods have shown that voting behavior in the UNGA followed this bipolar division.[10] With the end of the Cold War came the collapse of the bipolar system that dominated both world politics and UNGA politics for over forty years. The breakdown of the most important behavioral voting alignment may lead either to a situation in which states vote in a way that is less constrained by alignments (dealignment) or to a realignment along existing or newly created lines.

Dealignment implies that states vote according to their preferences on separate sets of issues without relying on stable geopolitical affiliations. We may still find states voting as blocs on specific issues, but these rather ad hoc coalitions do not necessarily transfer to other issues. For example, most European countries might vote with the United States on defense issues, since it is in their interest to do so, but this alliance may not hold on human rights issues or on trade issues. In their analysis of party realignment in the U.S. Congress in the late 1960s Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal found a sudden and temporary increase in the dimensionality of conflict because groups of Republicans and Democrats coalesced around different issues (mostly economic issues, tax policy, and race).[11] A similar temporary or more perma-

9. Huntington 1996, 21.

10. Studies used factor analysis (Alker 1964; Alker and Russett 1965; and Newcombe, Ross, and Newcombe 1970), multidimensional scaling techniques (Holloway 1990), agreement analysis (Lijphart 1963), and Mokken-scaling (Van Staden and Stokman 1970).

11. Poole and Rosenthal 1997, 86–115.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

nent dealignment may have occurred in the UNGA. This view predicts that, since countries align differently on different issues, the dimensionality of voting behavior in the UNGA has increased. The positions of countries along these dimensions are heavily influenced by the specific issues on the agenda and are thus likely to be not very stable.

The realignment thesis argues that voting behavior in the UNGA is not necessarily less well structured in the post–Cold War period, but that other alignments have replaced the East-West division. What form we expect these new alignments to take depends on the way we interpret change in international politics. The most dominant division in international relations theory is the one between realists, who mainly view change in terms of changes in the international structure of power, and liberals, who mostly define change in terms of domestic principles and institutions. I develop a number of hypotheses that stem from these two broad theoretical perspectives and discuss how we can or cannot distinguish between them.

Realist Hypotheses

In realist terms we can describe the collapse of the Soviet bloc as a basic shift in power arrangements. In Robert Gilpin's typology such a change is labeled "systemic" in the sense that these developments have affected the international distribution of power and the global hierarchy of prestige.[12] States respond to such a change by adjusting their behavior in accordance with the new distribution of capabilities, without altering the basic character of their goals and interactions with other states.[13] This view of international change leaves us with more than one perspective of how international politics has changed since the end of the Cold War. I derive three hypotheses from different realist perspectives.

Stability hypothesis. In general, a realist view argues that the end of the Cold War has not changed the basic factors that motivate state behavior: nations pursue security in a "state of war" in which each state is a potential threat to each other state. In the words of Kenneth Waltz, "Countries have always competed for wealth and security, and the competition has often led to conflict. Why should the future be different from the past?"[14] Aside from the fact that former Soviet bloc countries now pursue their security concerns in an alignment with the West, this view would not expect changes in the behavioral voting alignments in the UNGA. One change that Waltz and other realists expect is that European countries will move away from the United States somewhat in order to balance U.S. power.[15] The stability hypothesis states that, other than former Communist countries aligning with the West and European countries moving somewhat away from the United States, the structure underlying voting behavior of countries in the UNGA is still very similar to the Cold War period.

12. Gilpin 1981.
13. Ikenberry and Doyle 1997.
14. Waltz 1993, 64.
15. Ibid., 75.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Structuralist hypothesis. A structural view of global conflict argues that weak states share a common interest in blocking adoption of policy positions of powerful states.[16] Economically weak states are inherently more vulnerable than strong states and therefore seek protection of strong international regimes.[17] The conflict over UN supranationalism during the Cold War can be interpreted in this way. Developing states (the "South") shared a common interest in a strong UN in general and the UNGA in particular, whereas more powerful states (the "North") were determined to keep UNGA authority limited. "Southern structuralists" stressed that for the South to be successful in transforming the international system, they needed to form a cohesive front.[18] During the 1970s and 1980s, developing nations succeeded in forming an extremely cohesive voting bloc against the North through the Group of 77. A recent study by Soo Yeon Kim and Bruce Russett suggests that in the early 1990s the North-South cleavage has superseded Cold War alignments in the UNGA.[19] State preferences are now primarily defined along developmental lines. In the structuralist view, the voting behavior of developing countries is determined by their perception of powerlessness resulting from their position of relative (economic) power in the international system. The old North-South dimension has superseded the East-West dimension.

Counterhegemonic bloc hypothesis. Some scholars have argued that the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a balancing force for U.S. power has led to the emergence of a counterhegemonic bloc.[20] Hegemonic stability theorists argue that in times of great hegemonic power weak powers tend to bandwagon with the hegemon. Balancing behavior may occur, however, because hegemons have a tendency to seek domination over other states and to interfere with the internal affairs of weaker states. This may lead to alliances between countries opposing the ruling principles of the international system that serve the hegemonic power. Challenges to hegemony thus come from rising powers with disproportional growth rates (such as China) and other states that seek opportunities for expansion outside the ruling principles of the international system (such as Iraq). The counterhegemonic bloc hypothesis thus states that a counterhegemonic voting bloc has formed consisting of countries that challenge the United States and the (liberal) principles that rule the international system.[21]

Liberal Hypotheses

Liberals argue that change in international politics results from changes in domestic principles and structures. Voting realignments in the UN are not merely determined

16. Iida 1988.
17. Krasner 1985.
18. Doyle 1983a.
19. Kim and Russett 1996.
20. Huntington 1999. See the controversy between Mark S. Sheetz and Michael Mastanduno for an interesting debate considering the relevance of hegemonic stability theory in the post–Cold War period. Sheetz and Mastanduno 1998; and Mastanduno 1997.
21. The Marxist variant of the formation of counterhegemonic blocs is based on a challenge by weak states against the powerful. The Marxist counterhegemony hypothesis thus closely resembles the structuralist hypothesis. Cox 1987.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

by structural variables, but may be caused by shifts in domestic political regimes. Bruce Moon finds, for instance, that revolutions have produced voting realignments by developing countries, whereas Joe D. Hagan argues that nonrevolutionary regime changes may also cause shifts in the voting behavior of these countries.[22] I define three liberal hypotheses relating voting behavior to domestic regime type and one hypothesis stating that culture may determine state behavior.

Democracy Hypotheses

The importance of the end of the Cold War for liberals is mostly that it ended an ideological conflict between communist states and capitalist democracies. A rather extreme liberal interpretation is Francis Fukuyama's thesis that with the end of the Cold War there also came "the end of history." Liberal democracy has triumphed over Marxism and Leninism and will be adopted as "the final form of human government" in states all over the world. This will lead to the emergence of a relatively harmonious world in which there will be no place for global conflict, although some conflicts may still occur in the periphery. This view presumes that a major alliance between liberal democracies has formed against those states that have not yet been transformed. From the perspective of this hypothesis, a large and strong group of democratic countries and a peripheral group of nondemocratic countries form the new voting blocs in the UNGA.

More moderate and systematic hypotheses on the influence of democratization on the foreign policy of a state have been developed in the democratic peace debate. This debate is mainly concerned with explaining the observation that democracies do not go to war with each other.[23] Some authors, however, have stretched this hypothesis to the more general statement that democracies tend to follow moderate foreign policies.[24] In this view, regime type influences the overall voting behavior of countries. The Kantian liberal internationalism thesis that underlies Michael W. Doyle's interpretation of the democratic peace does not imply that democracies would generally follow a specific kind of foreign policy on all issues.[25] It does, however, imply that democracies as members of a Kantian pacific union should agree on issues that concern human and political rights and principles of economic liberalism. Respect for these principles is the moral foundation for the democratic peace. The weaker, Kantian thesis is that democracy only has an effect on the voting behavior on resolutions considering the liberal political and economic international order.

Civilization Hypothesis

Another argument concerning the importance of domestic variables is Samuel P. Huntington's claim that conflict in the post–Cold War world will be determined by

22. See Moon 1985; and Hagan 1989.
23. For a good overview of the debate, see Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller 1996.
24. Snyder 1995.
25. Doyle 1983b.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 1. *Summary of specific predictions of hypotheses*

Hypotheses	*Main determinants of state behavior*	*Dimensionality*	*Similarity with Cold War*
Dealignment	Issue specific	High	Little
Stability	Security and wealth	Low	Strong
Structuralist	Wealth	Low	Strong (with North-South)
Counterhegemonic	Opposition to United States	—	Little (new bloc has emerged)
Fukuyama	Regime type	Low	Little
Democracy	Regime type	—	—
Kant	Regime type on some issues	—	Strong on some issues
Civilization	Civilization	High	Little

"clashes of civilizations."[26] In Huntington's view conflict and cooperation between states are shaped not only by the pursuit of power and wealth but also by cultural differences and similarities. The West is to some degree a cultural entity, but non-Western societies have little in common with each other except for not being Western. For the first time in history, global politics has become both multipolar and multicivilizational. Huntington divides the world into eight major "civilizations" and argues that the commonalities and differences between these "civilizations" largely shape the interests and preferences of states. If this assertion is true, it should show up in the voting behavior of states in the UNGA, since this is one of the few arenas where states from all "civilizations" meet, debate, and vote over matters of principle. This hypothesis thus claims that new voting blocs have formed along civilizational lines in a multidimensional UNGA.

Table 1 summarizes the predictions of the different hypotheses considering the three main research questions of this article. As the table clearly shows, the hypotheses are not always mutually exclusive. The formation of a counterhegemonic bloc of nondemocratic states can, for instance, be seen as evidence for both the counterhegemonic bloc hypothesis and the democracy hypothesis. In general, most developmental theories of international change are based on a mixture of materialist and ideological determinants of change.[27] Where possible, I seek to falsify the different hypotheses, but I explicitly allow that the different views may complement rather than contradict each other.

26. Huntington 1996. Katzenstein has also argued that culture has become a major determinant of state behavior since the end of the Cold War. Katzenstein 1996. He finds Huntington's definition of civilizations too rigid. In Katzenstein's view identities are neither fully fluid (constructed) nor primordial (determined). Even though Huntington's definition may not capture all the effects that culture has on state behavior, its rigor makes it more appealing for constructing empirical tests than Katzenstein's broader definition of culture.

27. Ikenberry and Doyle 1997.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Data and Method

Data

In this study I include all adopted resolutions put to a roll-call vote during the first forty-three plenary sessions of the UNGA (1946–88) and the forty-sixth through fifty-first session (1991–96).[28] The study thus includes a before (Cold War) and after (post–Cold War) measurement of conflict in the UNGA. It is not within the scope of this article to explain what happened during the period of transition. Previous studies have often limited their analyses to a small number of important roll-call vote and/or states because of limitations in computer capacity. Since this problem no longer exists, I include all states and all roll-call votes with a sufficient degree of disagreement.[29]

For purposes of analysis, I have divided the Cold War into three periods. The aftermath of World War II and the new world order resulting from that largely shaped conflict in the early years of the UNGA (1946–53). After the end of the Cold War membership deadlock, membership in the UN more than doubled during the second period of analysis (1954–69). Through the new membership of first Asian and later African former colonies, the balance in the UNGA shifted. The West could no longer count on a steady majority on most roll-call votes, but often found itself isolated against a coalition of developing countries and the Soviet bloc. In the third period (1970–88), voting behavior of developing countries became much more cohesive through the efforts of the Non-Alignment Movement and Group of 77 that succeeded in creating a voting bloc of developing countries.

Method

Like factor analysis, NOMINATE scaling seeks to discover the unobserved dimensions of conflict that underlie the voting behavior of states in the UNGA. The purpose of both methods is essentially information reduction. Both methods can be used to address the question of how we can best represent the voting behavior of a large number of countries on a large number of roll-call votes in a concise way that reveals the structure underlying the voting behavior of these countries. They both provide measures of the proportion of variance explained by each factor or dimension, the position of states along these factors or dimensions, and the way individual roll-call votes relate to those factors or dimensions.

Each method relies on different analytic models. The factor analytic model is designed to analyze data that express dominance relationships between entities.[30] In other words, if I assign a score of 10 on some evaluation index to an apple, 8 to a

28. The data for sessions 1 to 40 are taken from the ICPSR, study number 5512. Soo Yeon Kim and Bruce Russett from Yale University graciously shared sessions 46 to 48. Sarah Tani and I entered the remaining data.

29. I exclude all roll-call votes with less than 2.5 percent of the voters on the minority side. States with less than twenty-five votes during a period are also excluded from the analysis.

30. Jacoby 1991.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

banana, and 6 to an orange, I prefer an apple to a banana and both of these fruits to an orange. If a large number of individuals would all rate a number of different fruits on the same index, factor analysis can be used to discover patterns in the way these individuals appreciate different fruits. We could, for instance, find an "apple" and an "orange" factor, where the first factor would represent appreciation for apples, bananas, and pears, and the second factor a like/dislike for citrus fruits. This would imply that people's preferences for "apple-like" fruits and citrus fruits are, in general, uncorrelated.

However, in the UNGA, states are not asked to evaluate resolutions, but to choose between accepting or not accepting resolutions. Factor analytic studies of roll-call voting have generally circumvented this problem by rescaling a nominal voting decision ("yes," "no," or "abstain") into an evaluation scale (typically, "yes" = 1, "abstain" = 0, and "no" = –1). The factor model then analyzes the correlation matrix that is computed based on these scales. This approach has several problems. First, some early critics of the application of factor analysis to the analysis of roll-call voting in the UNGA demonstrated that correlation coefficients derived from scales computed in this way seriously distort the true amount of agreement between states.[31] NOMINATE analyzes the actual vote matrix and thus avoids this distortion.[32]

Second, this procedure assumes that a state that abstains from voting is indifferent between the "yes" and "no" alternatives. This assumption is problematic in the context of the UNGA. Since UNGA resolutions are not binding, what really matters is whether or not a state is willing to go on the record for supporting a resolution. The numerical dominance of nonaligned countries since the mid-1960s has increased the average majority to about 80 percent. The chance of defeating resolutions became small, resulting in little practical difference between voting against resolutions and abstaining from voting. Both are essentially ways a state can express its unwillingness to comply with the text of a resolution. Since the mid-1960s the number of abstentions has outnumbered "no" votes by at least a factor two. In this study, an abstention and a "no" vote are therefore both treated as signs of not accepting a resolution.

Third, there is no good way to deal with countries that are absent during a number of votes other than coding them as abstentions, which distorts the correlation coefficients, or deleting them from the analysis, which eliminates cases from the analysis. In this analysis, states that vote a minimal number of times (twenty-five in this study) are included only on the basis of their actual votes, meaning that absences are treated as missing data and not as abstentions or missing cases. Fourth, the interpretation of goodness-of-fit indicators in factor analyses is not intuitive. The percentage of variance explained by a factor represents the extent to which the factor explains variance in the correlation matrix, not variance in voting behavior. NOMINATE generates char-

31. See Lijphart 1963; and Mueller 1967.

32. Heckman and Snyder have developed a factor analytic model designed to analyze choice behavior. Heckman and Snyder 1995. Poole and Rosenthal demonstrate that Heckman-Snyder solutions correspond closely to NOMINATE solutions on the main dimensions. Poole and Rosenthal 1997.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

acteristics that indicate how well actual voting decisions can be explained by individual dimensions.

The NOMINATE model is based on an explicit model of voting behavior: the spatial model with probabilistic voting.[33] The main assumption of this model is that all states have an ideal point in a policy space of one or more dimensions and that policy outcomes can be mapped into the same space.[34] The model assumes that the likelihood of a state accepting a resolution depends on the distance of the state's ideal point from the outcome point for accepting the resolution. However, it is problematic to estimate the outcome points for accepting and rejecting a resolution. The NOMINATE model therefore estimates the point (or line in two dimensions) that divides the states predicted by the model to favor a resolution from those expected to vote against it. The closer a state is to this "cutting line," the more uncertain the model is on how this state will vote.

The NOMINATE algorithm estimates the positions of country ideal points and roll-call cutting points such that the likelihood assigned to each observed vote is maximized. The estimated ideal point of a state should be seen as the point that best represents a state's position in the UNGA relative to other states. The more certain the model is that it predicts countries' voting choices correctly, the better the model fits the data. By estimating models with different dimensionality and comparing their fit, we can assess the dimensionality of conflict in the UNGA. The dimensionality of voting behavior is thus an empirical question, not an assumption of the model.

Figure 1 provides a hypothetical example with five countries and two dimensions: East-West and North-South. In the figure I have also drawn three cutting lines that refer to the three independent factors Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce Russett found in their classical study of voting behavior in the early years of the UNGA: colonialism, UN supranationalism, and Cold War conflict.[35] The independent factors resulting from a factor analysis reflect different locations of the cutting lines rather than independent dimensions of conflict. The UN supranationalism cutting line illustrates conflict on a typical North-South issue with the West and the Soviet bloc voting together against the South. The colonialism and the Cold War cutting lines are located far apart from each other, but they divide countries along the same dimension. The fact that on one set of issues (colonialism) the United States is voting against the rest and on another set of issues (Cold War) the USSR is voting against the rest does not mean that these different sets of issues represent different underlying dimensions of conflict. In this case a NOMINATE analysis would generate a two-dimensional solution, whereas factor analysis would find three independent factors. This is an example of the tendency of factor analysis to overestimate dimensional-

33. For an overview, see Enelow and Hinich 1984.

34. The preferences of a state along a dimension are assumed to be single-peaked and symmetric. Single-peaked means that a state will evaluate a resolution more favorably the closer the resolution is to its ideal point. Symmetric means that a state is indifferent between resolutions that are equidistant from its ideal point.

35. Alker and Russett 1965. Figure 3 demonstrates that the structure of this example closely resembles the real UNGA in that period.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press




FIGURE 1. *Two-dimensional example with five states and three cutting lines*

ity.[36] NOMINATE scaling is a more accurate method for determining the dimensionality of conflict.

The Dimensionality of Conflict

If global politics has become multidimensional or if major dealignment has taken place since the end of the Cold War, we expect that a spatial model with low dimensionality does not fit the post–Cold War data as well as it does the Cold War data. We also expect the underlying dimensions in the post–Cold War model to be less stable than in the Cold War model. In this section, I investigate these hypotheses. Before turning to the results of the NOMINATE analyses I first discuss the criteria that can be used to evaluate these hypotheses. The objective of the NOMINATE algorithm is to maximize the likelihood assigned to each observed vote. A measure that indicates how well each state's voting behavior fits this model is the Geometric Mean Probability (GMP). This indicator reflects the exponential of the average log-likelihood of observed choices.

36. See Coombs 1964; and Morrisson 1972.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Although the GMP is an appropriate measure of fit, there are other, more intuitive ways to evaluate the fit of a NOMINATE analysis. For each roll call, NOMINATE estimates a cutting line that divides the countries predicted by the model to accept the resolution from those predicted to reject it. The classification percentage indicates how successfully the model explains the overall voting behavior of countries. A classification of 80 percent for a one-dimensional model means, for instance, that ordering states along a single dimension and estimating cutting lines that divide the states can explain 80 percent of voting behavior on all challenged roll-call votes. However, the interpretation of classification percentages is problematic. Suppose, for instance, that all roll-call votes in the UNGA would be passed or rejected with a 90 percent majority. We could then achieve a classification percentage of 90 percent applying a model with the simple prediction that all countries always vote with the majority. In order to judge how impressive large-classification percentages really are, we need to evaluate how much the model improves on one that simply states that all countries will always vote with the majority. The Aggregate Proportional Reduction in Error (APRE) depicts the percentage reduction in classification errors the NOMINATE model achieves with respect to the majority model.

Table 2 summarizes the results of two-dimensional NOMINATE analyses applied to the three Cold War periods and the post–Cold War period. To compare the different periods, I have also estimated models for shorter time periods within each period. The results in Table 2 show that spatial models of low dimensionality explain voting behavior in the UNGA with considerable accuracy. The classification percentages, the APREs, and the GMPs are high, not only in absolute terms but also compared to analyses using data from the U.S. Congress in a similar time period.[37] The classification percentages increase over time. Judging from the APREs and the average GMPs, the model explains the data least well in the early years of the UNGA.

From Table 2 we can see that in the 1991–96 period 91.8 percent of all voting decisions of states can be explained by ordering these states along a single dimension. Adding a second dimension to the model explains only 1.2 percent more voting decisions of states correctly. The first dimension is also responsible for the largest proportional reduction in error (APRE1): 62.1 percent. A two-dimensional model increases the APRE by only 5.6 percent, meaning that the first dimension explains about eleven times as much variance in voting behavior as the second dimension. In general, the results indicate that although in a number of Cold War periods the second dimension explains a substantial proportion of the variance in voting behavior, the underlying structure of voting behavior in the UNGA has mostly been one-dimensional. This is especially true since the end of the Cold War.

The best way to evaluate dimensionality is to compare the APRE from a two-dimensional model with the APRE from a one-dimensional model (APRE2 − APRE1). This measure controls for variations in majority size. In only two periods did the

37. For the post–World War II House, McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal find classification percentages of 84.5 percent in one dimension and 86.0 percent in two dimensions. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 1997. For the Senate, these numbers are 82.0 percent and 84.2 percent, respectively. The APREs in two dimensions are 54.4 percent and 50.4 percent, and the GMPs are .73 and .70.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 2. *Summary results of one- and two-dimensional NOMINATE models*

Period	Roll calls (no.)	States (no.)	Classification %, 1-dim.	Classification %, 2-dim.	APRE1	APRE2	APRE2–APRE1	GMP
1946–49	232	59	86.1	89.2	46.6	58.7	12.1	.78
1950–53	151	60	86.3	88.6	52.2	60.0	7.8	.77
1946–53	383	60	85.9	88.0	48.1	55.8	7.7	.76
1954–57	124	82	86.8	89.5	57.4	66.2	8.8	.78
1958–61	253	104	87.1	89.6	61.1	68.4	7.3	.78
1962–65	104	115	89.7	91.2	66.0	71.0	5.0	.80
1966–69	181	126	87.3	88.8	53.5	59.1	5.6	.77
1954–69	662	126	86.5	88.2	55.5	61.4	5.9	.76
1970–73	552	136	87.3	89.0	44.3	51.6	7.3	.77
1974–77	385	147	90.9	92.7	48.7	58.9	10.2	.83
1978–81	447	152	92.1	93.5	54.3	62.5	8.2	.85
1982–85	542	157	92.0	93.6	53.4	62.2	8.8	.85
1986–88	353	158	93.0	94.1	56.4	62.9	6.5	.86
1970–88	2,279	158	90.3	91.8	46.8	54.8	8.0	.81
1991–93	167	179	93.4	94.6	69.5	75.0	5.5	.87
1994–96	176	182	91.2	92.5	59.3	65.3	6.0	.82
1991–96	344	186	91.8	93.0	62.1	67.7	5.6	.83

second dimension add more than ten percentage points in APRE.[38] When comparing the APRE in two dimensions and in one dimension, it appears that a second dimension was very important in the early years of the UNGA. The importance then steadily declined, indicating that Cold War conflict became the dominant cleavage. However, with the formation of the Group of 77 in the early 1970s, an important second dimension emerged again (the North-South dimension).

The results in Table 2 demonstrate that the end of the Cold War meant a return to single dimensionality. In the 1991–93 period, the classification percentage and APRE for a one-dimensional model are higher than ever before.[39] The additional proportion of variance that is explained by adding a second dimension is small in comparison to most Cold War periods. This result stands in contrast to the findings of Kim and Russett, who find that three independent factors are relevant during the exact same period. The different finding is due to a difference in method: the independent factors

38. Adding a third dimension increases the classification percentage by more than one percentage point only in the first two periods and does not increase the APRE by five percentage points or more in any of the other periods.

39. These results are in no obvious way an artifact of less conflict in the post–Cold War period. In the period immediately preceding the end of the Cold War the average majority ("yes" versus "no" and abstentions) on resolutions that were voted on was 87 percent; in the post–Cold War period this was 80 percent. However, the proportion of resolutions accepted by consensus is higher in the post–Cold War period: 76 percent versus 62 percent in the 1986–88 period.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Kim and Russett find refer to different locations of the cutting lines rather than to different dimensions of conflict. I further clarify this point in the discussion on the interpretation of the dimensions.

The dominance of the first dimension and the improved fit of the model over time are not artifacts of the growth in UN membership since the 1950s. In analyses that only include the sixty members that participated in the early years of the UN I find the same pattern. The one-dimensional model fits the post–Cold War data better than the Cold War data, and a second dimension explains less additional variance in voting behavior than during the Cold War.[40] It should be noted that in the 1994–96 period, the model does not seem to fit the data as well as in the preceding period. Further analysis shows that this is probably not caused by a substantive change in the first dimension: the first-dimension coordinates between both periods correlate strongly ($r = .96$). The second-dimension coordinates correlate much less strongly ($r = .57$). This finding indicates that the content of conflict on the second dimension may have changed.

If world politics has become multidimensional and if dealignment has taken place, it does not show up in the voting behavior of states in the UNGA. In fact, voting in the UNGA in the post–Cold War period is more driven by a single dimension of conflict than ever before. I will now address the second research question of this article: how should we interpret the substantive content of the behavioral voting alignments since the end of the Cold War?

Interpretation of the Dimensions of Conflict

One way to interpret the NOMINATE results is by visual inspection of the states' estimated ideal points. It is possible to plot the estimated coordinates for each state in a two-dimensional space in order to visualize where states are located in the issue space. By combining knowledge of international politics with the observed positions of states along the main dimensions of conflict, one can make a subjective interpretation of the meaning of the dimensions. In interpreting these plots, one should not emphasize small differences on the second dimension, because it is far less important than the first dimension in explaining variance. This problem of interpretation also occurs when plotting factor analytic solutions in a multidimensional space, since the different dimensions usually explain substantially different portions of variation.

A second way of interpreting the dimensions is to analyze the angles and locations of the cutting lines of the different roll-call votes. In a two-dimensional solution, cutting lines that cut the first dimension orthogonally divide countries along the first dimension of conflict.[41] Cutting lines that have angles close to zero or 180 degrees

40. The APRE in one dimension for this model is 69.5 for the 1991–96 period, 54.9 (1970–88), 56.9 (1954–69), and 48.1 (1946–53). A second dimension adds 3.6 percent in 1991–96, 9.2 percent in 1970–88, 5.6 percent in 1954–69, and 7.7 percent in 1946–53.

41. In more dimensions, cutting lines become hyperplanes and this method of evaluation becomes more complicated.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

divide countries along the second dimension of conflict, whereas cutting-line angles in the intermediate range point to issues that divide countries along both the second and the first dimension. By analyzing the substantive content of the different roll-call votes with comparable angles and locations, we can attribute meaning to the underlying dimensions. This method can supplement the visual inspection of the spatial solutions. A first look at this data confirms the dominance of the first over the second dimension in the post–Cold War UNGA: over 80 percent of the roll-call cutting lines divide countries primarily along the first dimension of conflict. This is true for only around 50 percent of cutting lines in the Cold War periods.[42]

A third way to interpret the NOMINATE solutions is to regress the estimated ideal points of states on characteristics of these states suggested by different theories of international relations. The advantage of this method is that one can examine the independent effects of the determinants of state behavior. I employ all three methods to explain the structure of UN voting behavior in the post–Cold War period. First, I briefly present the results from the Cold War periods in order to be able to draw comparisons.

The Cold War in the UNGA

Alker and Russett, in their classic study of UNGA voting, conclude that the East-West distinction became the dominant underlying dimension of conflict early in the history of the UN. North-South politics also frequently underlay patterns of voting behavior.[43] East-West conflict consisted of Cold War issues, such as membership questions, and colonialism issues. Alker and Russett found that the issue of Palestinian partition was the most dominant North-South cleavage in the 1947 UNGA. The superpowers cooperated on this issue in the early years of the UN even though in later sessions the Palestinian question became part of East-West conflict.

Figure 2 plots the coordinates of the sixty early members of the UNGA. The scatter plot clearly shows the Western bloc and the Soviet bloc, where the Soviet bloc appears to be very isolated from the rest of the world. In this time period the United States was in the majority on 77 percent of all roll-call votes, the USSR only in 39 percent of all cases. "Southern" countries are dispersed along the second dimension. Latin American countries tended towards the West in the East-West conflict but were divided on the Palestinian question. Nearly every Asian and African country supported the Arabs on the Palestinian matter, but they were more divided on matters of UN supranationalism that took over the second dimension of conflict in later years of this period.[44]

Alker and Russett discover a number of issue factors that represent different substantive issue dimensions for each session they study (1947, 1952, 1957, and 1961).

42. "Primarily along the first dimension" means with an angle between 60 and 120 degrees.
43. Alker and Russett 1965.
44. See Alker and Russett's discussion of the seventh session of the UNGA.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press




FIGURE 2. *Structure of conflict in the UNGA (1946–53)*

They argue that each of these factors is more or less related to the more general underlying (and unidentified) East-West and North-South conflict. In Figure 3 I have plotted cutting lines for the three substantive issue dimensions that occurred repeatedly in their factor analyses of four different UNGA sessions: Cold War, colonialism, and UN supranationalism. These are mean cutting lines of those roll-call votes belonging most strongly to these factors.[45] This means that not much weight should be given to whether a country falls just to one side of a cutting line. It should be remembered that the model implies that there is more uncertainty about the voting behavior of countries that are located close to a particular cutting line than countries that are far removed from a cutting line.

45. Roll-call votes are coded following Alker and Russett 1965. "Mean cutting lines" reflect the mean position that the lines on these issues cut the axis and the mean angle with which they do so.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press




FIGURE 3. *Structure of conflict in the UNGA (1954–69)*

Figure 3 nicely illustrates how conflict on these three substantive issue dimensions can be captured in a spatial analysis with two dimensions. The Soviet bloc appears to be less isolated in this period than in the preceding period. In fact, this bloc ended up being in the majority almost as frequently as the United States in this period. This was largely a result of the growing importance of the colonialism issue in the UNGA. Stimulated by the admission of new member states after the end of the Cold War membership deadlock, the right of self-determination for colonial peoples became a core topic in the UNGA.[46]

Colonialism issues also produced divisions within the Western bloc, especially on resolutions concerning South Africa (apartheid). Some Latin American states occasionally supported the West on questions of colonial policies and on the Palestinian

46. Illustrated by the adoption of the *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples* UNGA 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

question, which became closely correlated to the colonial question as far as the underlying structure of conflict is concerned. In general, the Western bloc started to become more isolated in the UNGA, whereas the Soviet bloc was increasingly building alliances with the South. The voting behavior of developing countries on issues labeled as "UN supranationalism" contains elements of both anti-Soviet as well as anti-colonialism voting. About 15 percent of all roll-call votes in this period have cutting lines such as the one labeled "UN supranationalism" in Figure 3. These resolutions were often questions concerning global institutions (frequently the Trusteeship Council) or economic issues (such as guarantees for a secure flow of capital).

During the last period of analysis, the developing nations became a much more cohesive voting bloc and the Western bloc grew increasingly isolated, which Figure 4 clearly shows. On East-West issues the United States found itself voting with the majority only 24 percent of the time versus 78 percent for the Soviet Union. The Cold War conflict dominated other conflicts in the UNGA, although many issues in the conflict between the superpowers hardly made it to the agenda of the UNGA. For instance, the UNGA has never voted on the Vietnam conflict.

Especially after the 1973 Algiers Summit, developing countries attempted to define their own agenda and leave the Cold War out of UN politics. This resulted in a large number of anti-colonialism or anti-Western imperialism votes (about 43 percent of all votes in the 1970–88 period), a smaller number of anti-Soviet or anti-communism votes (about 7 percent), and a number of votes that were both and can be described as pure North-South issues (about 14 percent).[47] The cutting lines shown in Figure 4 illustrate the cleavages that dominated conflict in the UNGA in the years preceding the end of the Cold War. Figure 4 also illustrates how Cold War conflict and North-South conflict correlate with each other, an observation that complicates the task of testing the hypothesis of whether or not North-South conflict has superseded East-West conflict.

In sum, the East-West dimension has been the consistent, dominant voting alignment in the UNGA, and the North-South dimension a somewhat less consistent, but not unimportant, second alignment. The positions of states on the main dimensions correlate strongly between the different Cold War periods. The coordinates of the East-West dimension in the 1946–53 and 1954–69 periods have a Pearson correlation of .95; the coordinates of the North-South dimension, .68. The correlation coefficients between the second and third periods are slightly lower (.81 and .62). The correlation between the position of the sixty early member states on the East-West dimension of conflict and the first and last Cold War periods is .79. This finding indicates that the main East-West dimension of conflict has been very stable and consistent across the forty-three years of voting behavior being analyzed.

47. I have calculated these numbers on the basis of the angles and locations of the cutting lines. The criterion is that a cutting line must clearly separate one bloc from the others. The lines drawn in the figure represent the border cutting lines for category membership. The remaining 36 percent of cutting lines were more ambiguous.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press




FIGURE 4. *Structure of conflict in the UNGA (1970–88)*

Voting Alignments Since the End of the Cold War

Figures 5 and 6 show the distribution of states' estimated ideal points in the UNGA from 1991 to 1993 and 1994 to 1996. The positions of states along this first dimension strongly correlate between the two periods (r = .96). Given the countries that are on the extremes of the first dimension, one could appropriately label the poles as "Western" and "non-Western." On the "Western" side of the dimension, the United Kingdom, France, the United States, and Israel occupy the most extreme positions. In that respect, little seems to have changed since the Cold War, except perhaps that the United States has moved further away from most other Western countries since the Cold War, as expected by the counterhegemonic hypothesis.[48] Most of the East-

48. The category *Western countries* in the figures includes the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the countries of the European Union except the Nordic countries.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press




FIGURE 5. *Structure of conflict in the UNGA (1991–93)*

ern European states are now located closer to Western European states than to Russia. Countries belonging to the former Soviet bloc have thus switched sides since the end of the Cold War.

"Non-Western" is a good label for the second pole, because its prototypical members are exactly those states that have been involved in clashes with the West and, in particular, the United States in the 1990s. On this side of the dimension, the remaining communist states Laos, North Korea, Vietnam, China, and Cuba group together with states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Sudan, Burma, and, in the 1994–96 period, India. Of these countries, only Vietnam and Cuba can be found on extreme positions to the East in the period preceding the end of the Cold War (see Figure 4).

The first dimension represents a continuum, with the United States and its Western allies on one extreme, followed by the Orthodox former Soviet republics, the Latin American countries, a group of African and Asian countries in the middle, and at the

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press




FIGURE 6. *Structure of conflict in the UNGA (1994–96)*

other extreme a counterhegemonic voting bloc of countries that challenge U.S. hegemony. The countries on the "non-Western" pole are not the prototypical representatives of the countries that were seeking to establish a new international economic order in the 1970s and 1980s. They are states that challenge principles of political liberalism and the dominance of the United States. This finding therefore supports the counterhegemonic bloc hypothesis rather than the structuralist hypothesis that North-South conflict has superseded East-West conflict.

The finding could also be seen as evidence for the hypothesis that regime type matters, since most countries on the "non-Western" pole are nondemocracies. The substantive meaning of the continuum that underlies the voting behavior of states can be further evaluated by constructing multivariate tests that relate different possible determinants of state behavior to their position on this continuum. I will develop

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

such tests in the next section. Until then I refer to the continuum as "Western–non-Western" after the groups of countries that occupy its extreme poles.[49]

The second dimension of conflict is much harder to interpret by visual inspection. It appears that Islamic countries in particular group together on one side of the dimension. However, the positions of countries along this dimension are not very stable across the two periods ($r = .57$) and only a very small number of roll-call votes have cutting lines that separate countries along the second dimension (about 2 percent). Post–Cold War voting behavior in the UNGA is highly unidimensional, and differences along the second dimension should not be overstated. The validity of the theoretical perspectives should be evaluated primarily by their ability to explain variation in the relative positions of states along the first dimension.

The Effects of Civilization, Democracy, and Wealth on Voting Behavior

A more objective test of the merit of the different hypotheses is to regress the estimated ideal points of states on characteristics of these states, such as their "civilization," wealth, and level of democracy. I develop a set of regression models with this objective. I have coded "civilizations" in the same way as Huntington.[50] In the regression models I include dummy variables for the five "civilizations" that include the largest number of countries: Islamic, Western, Orthodox, Latin American, and African. Countries belonging to the other three "civilizations"—Buddhist, Sinic, and Japanese—serve as reference category.[51] I include gross national product (GNP) per capita as a proxy for economic development.[52] Democracy is measured by a score taken from the Polity III data set that measures the extent to which a regime is democratic or authoritarian according to a set of rather formal criteria.[53] The score runs from 1 for fully democratic to –1 for fully authoritarian states. Both GNP and the democracy scores correlate strongly with the dummy for Western civilization. Deleting Western countries from the analysis completely eliminates the correlation between GNP and level of democracy and thereby the potential collinearity problems.[54] I report results from analyses that exclude the West in order to evaluate whether democracy and wealth have any impact outside the Western countries.

49. So countries that behave more "Western," position themselves closer to the "Western" pole of the continuum.

50. Huntington 1996, 26, map 1.3.

51. I estimated models including Buddhist civilization, but I found no significant or substantive effects.

52. As suggested by Krasner 1985. I include average GNP per capita in tens of thousands of dollars. World Bank 1997.

53. This score is taken from the Polity III data; see Jaggers and Gurr 1995. They use a ten-point scale measuring a country's level of democracy and another ten-point scale measuring the level of authoritarianism. Both scales are built up from the same underlying variables, but they do not overlap. I have subtracted the authoritarian index from the democratic index to get a twenty-one-point scale with 10 as a maximum and –10 as a minimum score and then rescaled the variable to fall within a –1 to 1 interval. Unfortunately this data only runs until 1994. I have used the average score for 1991–93 as the indicator for that period and the score for 1994 for the 1994–96 period.

54. For the 1991–93 period, this correlation is .39 including the Western countries and .04 excluding these countries.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 3. *Effects of wealth, democracy, and civilization on post–Cold War voting behavior*

	1991–93		*1994–96*	
Model	*With West*	*Without West*	*With West*	*Without West*
Constant	.63	.67	.56	.62
	(7.7)	(7.5)	(6.8)	(6.9)
GNP per capita	−.17	−.23	−.16	−.22
	(−3.1)	(−2.9)	(−2.7)	(−2.9)
Democracy	−.17	−.26	−.11	−.22
	(−2.7)	(−2.7)	(−1.9)	(−2.5)
West	−.69	—	−.73	—
	(−9.2)		(−9.3)	
Islam	−.04	−.09	−.06	−.16
	(−.6)	(−.8)	(−.8)	(−1.3)
Orthodox	−.32	−.54	−.39	−.61
	(−6.0)	(−5.9)	(−6.8)	(−6.7)
Latin American	−.10	−.19	−.16	−.26
	(−1.6)	(−1.7)	(−2.4)	(−2.4)
African	−.04	−.11	−.02	−.08
	(−.6)	(−.9)	(−.2)	(−.7)
R^2_{adj}	.76	.43	.72	.45
N	138	104	139	105

Note. Entries are standardized coefficients; *t*-values are in parentheses.

Table 3 presents the results of regression analyses with the first dimension coordinates for both the 1991–93 period and the 1994–96 period as dependent variables.[55] These variables run from –1 (West) to 1 (non-Western). Because of the different scales and nature of the independent variables, I consistently report standardized coefficients.[56] The negative and significant coefficients for GNP and democracy indicate that a higher GNP and greater degree of democracy are both related to more "Western" voting behavior. This pattern can be observed even more strongly when Western countries are eliminated from the analysis. This finding indicates that these effects are not artifacts of the fact that Western countries usually tend to be both democratic and wealthy. The wealth and level of democracy of a country thus relate strongly to the extent that a country's voting behavior corresponds to that of the West.

The results in Table 3 also demonstrate that some civilization variables have significant effects, most predominantly the dummies for Western and Orthodox civiliza-

55. Some caution is warranted with the interpretation of regression coefficients, because the number of cases is fairly small. I have only reported results that were stable across different specifications of the models. In footnotes I illustrate the alternative models I have estimated.

56. I thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

tions and the dummy variable for Latin America in the 1994–96 period.[57] This analysis mainly confirms the findings from the visual inspection of Figures 5 and 6. In a separate regression analysis with only Asian, African, and Islamic countries, I find that only GNP and democracy have a significant effect on the position of countries.[58] In a regression with only African and Islamic countries I find few significant effects for any of the variables included in the analysis.[59] This finding indicates that the variables included in the model so far do not explain very well the variation in positions of African and Islamic countries along the first dimension. African and Islamic countries are divided along civilizational lines on the second dimension. In the 1991–93 period, Islamic countries separate from African and Latin American countries on this dimension.[60] In the 1994–96 period I find that both democracies and Islamic countries are somewhat to the "North" on this dimension.[61] Since the structure of voting behavior in the post–Cold War UNGA is mostly unidimensional, we should not give much weight to the second dimension that is unstable over time and explains very little variance in voting behavior.

The analysis in this section largely confirms and somewhat refines the findings from the previous section. The most important refinement is that wealth and level of democracy have independent effects on the voting behavior of non-Western countries. Level of economic development and democracy independently contribute to more "Western" voting behavior. In the next section I further refine these results by evaluating whether the effects of these independent variables vary across different issue areas.

Wealth, Democracy, Civilization, and Issue-Specific Voting

In this section I repeat the analysis from Table 3 for different sets of substantive issues. Roughly following Kim and Russett I have coded roll-call votes into four basic categories: disarmament, colonialism, Middle East, and "human and political

57. The result that all civilization dummy variables have negative coefficients can largely be explained by the positive coefficient for the constant.

58. A regression analysis with the 1991–93 coordinates as dependent variable and only African, Islamic, and Asian countries in the analysis finds significant effects for two variables: GNP (regression coefficient –.38, t = –3.3) and democracy (–.33, t = –2.8) and the constant (.69, t = 7.7). Dummies for African and Islamic civilizations had no significant effect (not even on a 10 percent level). The R^2_{adj} of the model is only .16. The same model estimated for the 1994–96 period yields similar results.

59. Because of the small N here, judging significance becomes somewhat more arbitrary. In the 1991–93 period I found a substantive effect for democracy that was almost significant at the 10 percent level. A civilization dummy and GNP had no substantive effects.

60. A regression analysis with the 1991–93 coordinates as dependent variable finds significant effects on a 5 percent significance level for two variables: Islam (regression coefficients .33, t = 2.7) and African (–.25, t = –2.1). On a 10 percent significance level the Latin American dummy is also significant (–.22, t = –1.9). The R^2_{adj} of the model is only .27. The other civilization dummies, GNP, and the constant are not significant.

61. A regression analysis with the 1994–96 coordinates as dependent variable finds significant effects on a 5 percent level for two variables: Islam (regression coefficients .27, t = 2.1) and democracy (.22, t = 2.2). The R^2_{adj} of the model is only .18. The other civilization dummies, democracy, and GNP are not significant.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

rights."[62] The latter category also includes many UNGA resolutions on the conflict in the former Yugoslav Republic that related to human and political rights.[63] Furthermore I analyze the subset of issues that the U.S. Department of State argues "directly affected important United States interests and on which the United States lobbied extensively."[64] Analyzing this particular subset of roll-call votes enables us to evaluate whether countries adhere to a different voting pattern on resolutions on which the world's strongest power actively lobbies.

I estimated NOMINATE solutions for each subset of issues. All of these subsets are strongly one-dimensional, but the fit varies substantially with the set of "important" issues having the worst fit.[65] This can partly be explained by the fact that as opposed to the other categories, this category includes a variety of different issue areas. Moreover, it includes a disproportionate number of human rights issues, which is the issue area that fits a one-dimensional model least well. The human rights dimension is the only dimension where the United States is not the prototypical member of the "Western" pole. In fact, almost all other Western countries "pass" the United States on this dimension. Country positions on all issue areas correlate strongly with their position on the "Western–non-Western" dimension, indicating that this dimension is stable across issue areas and issue importance. The positions of states along the Middle East dimension also correlate strongly with the second dimension coordinates.[66] As already indicated in Figures 5 and 6, issues related to the Middle East most clearly divide countries along the second dimension.

Table 4 shows the results of a regression of the independent variables used in Table 3 on the position of states on each issue area. First, the analysis shows that democracy matters, but not equally on every issue area. The democracy score is most relevant in explaining voting behavior of countries on colonialism, human rights, and "important" issues. These results provide support for the Kantian thesis that democracies should agree on issues related to political and human rights. The evidence is somewhat inconclusive about whether regime type has any further influence on the voting behavior of countries. Democracy has a small effect on the position of countries along the disarmament dimension, but no significant effect on the position of countries along the Middle East dimension.

Wealth has a particularly strong effect on the position of countries along the human rights dimension, even stronger than democracy. This result also holds when

62. For a more thorough analysis of issue-specific voting behavior, I refer the reader to Voeten 1999.

63. About 5 percent of all roll-call votes could not be fitted into either category and have been eliminated.

64. The U.S. Department of State submits reports to Congress on the voting behavior on these issues pursuant to public law 101-167: *Voting Practices in the United Nations* (1991–1997 eds.). For a similar breakdown, see also Wang 1999.

65. Colonialism has an APRE of 80.5 ($N = 75$), disarmament 70.9 ($N = 75$), Middle East 67.2 ($N = 108$), human rights 60.0 ($N = 45$), and important issues 55.7 ($N = 76$). The APRE in one dimension with all issues included is 62.1.

66. Middle East coordinates correlate .85 with the first dimension and .51 with the second. The other issue dimensions do not correlate with the second dimension. The correlation coefficients with the first dimension are .90 (colonialism), .92 (disarmament), .85 (Middle East), .86 (human rights), and .93 (important issues).

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 4. *Effects of wealth, democracy, and civilization on post–Cold War voting behavior by issue area*

Model	*Disarmament*	*Colonialism*	*Middle East*	*Human rights*	*Important issues*
Constant	.56	.38	.29	.67	.27
	(6.4)	(3.9)	(3.5)	(10.5)	(3.5)
GNP per capita	−.17	−.14	−.11	−.41	−.20
	(−2.8)	(−2.3)	(−1.6)	(−7.8)	(3.2)
Democracy	−.12	−.19	−.07	−.15	−.16
	(−1.9)	(−2.8)	(−0.9)	(−2.7)	(2.4)
West	−.72	−.60	−.68	−.52	−.64
	(−9.0)	(−7.2)	(−7.1)	(−7.5)	(−7.7)
Islam	−.11	.03	.06	.01	−.04
	(−1.5)	(.4)	(.6)	(.1)	(−.5)
Orthodox	−.36	−.31	−.32	−.24	−.33
	(−6.4)	(−5.3)	(−4.7)	(−4.9)	(−5.6)
Latin American	−.03	−.07	−.21	−.19	−.26
	(.4)	(−.9)	(−2.5)	(−3.3)	(−3.7)
African	−.07	.04	−.08	−.00	−.01
	(−1.0)	(.5)	(−.9)	(−.1)	(.2)
R^2_{adj}	.72	.71	.60	.80	.70
N	140	137	138	132	139

Note: Entries are standardized coefficients; t-values are in parentheses.

Western countries are eliminated from the analysis and thus wealth and democracy are no longer correlated.[67] Perhaps human rights is a postmaterialist issue that only becomes important to states once they have reached a certain level of economic development. It is noteworthy that the level of economic development is a much more potent predictor of state behavior on the human rights dimension than on a dimension that fits better within the traditional concerns of North-South conflict (redistribution): the disarmament dimension.

The most interesting result from the civilization dummies is that Latin American countries vary strongly among the different issue areas in their adherence to the "Western" position. On disarmament and colonialism issues they can hardly be distinguished from African and Islamic countries. On Middle East issues, human rights issues, and especially the "important" issues, Latin American countries are positioned substantially further to the "West." The relatively high estimated coefficient on the subset of "important" issues raises the suspicion that Latin American countries tend to bandwagon with the United States on issues the United States finds important. On average, Latin American countries vote on 62 percent of these issues with the United States, whereas on the basis of the composition of these issues we

67. In this analysis GNP has an estimated coefficient of –.43 (t = –6.6). Also, the estimates for the effects of democracy are very similar: –.12 (t = –3.4).

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

would expect this to be just 46 percent.[68] This result fits with T. Y. Wang's finding that countries that receive more development aid vote more with the United States on these issues than other countries.[69]

Changes in Voting Behavior Since the End of the Cold War

Finally, I investigate the last research question: to what extent have patterns of voting behavior really changed since the end of the Cold War? A visual inspection of Figures 5 and 6 does not immediately reveal what has changed, other than that most countries belonging to the former Soviet bloc have switched sides and that a group of "anti-Western" countries is now occupying the position furthest removed from the United States and its Western allies. Perhaps the combination of the two realist hypotheses of stability and the formation of a counterhegemonic voting bloc explains most of the change in behavioral voting alignments in the UNGA.

In this section I investigate this hypothesis by evaluating how much of the old "East-West" voting alignment has carried over to the post–Cold War period. I also investigate the alternative hypothesis put forward by Kim and Russett that Cold War North-South conflict has superseded East-West conflict since the end of the Cold War. Finally by comparing Cold War and post–Cold War voting behavior we can evaluate whether countries that have become more democratic have also become more "Western" in their voting behavior and whether countries belonging to specific "civilizations" have changed their voting behavior since the end of the Cold War.

Table 5 presents the results from two regression analyses. The dependent variable in the left-hand column is the position of countries on the first dimension in the 1991–93 period. The model includes as independent variables the position of countries on the East-West and North-South dimensions in the 1986–88 period. It also includes a variable that indicates the change in the level of democracy between the two periods.[70] The dummy variable for the Orthodox civilization has been replaced by a dummy variable that indicates membership in the former Eastern European Soviet bloc.

The estimated coefficients for the 1986–88 East-West and North-South dimensions indicate that post–Cold War voting alignments resemble old East-West conflict much more than North-South conflict. The coefficient that measures the carry-over effect of North-South conflict is clearly not significant. This finding contradicts Kim and Russett's conclusion that North-South conflict has superseded East-West conflict since the end of the Cold War. The dummy variable for Eastern Europe has a large and significant effect, reflecting the switching of sides of Eastern European countries. The negative and significant coefficient for "change in democracy" implies that countries that have become more democratic vote more "Western" since the end of

68. This is an expected value based on the average agreement of Latin American countries with the United States on different issue areas and the frequency of issue areas in the set of important issues.

69. Wang 1999.

70. This is computed as the difference between the level of democracy in the 1991–93 and 1986–88 periods, measured by the POLITY scores.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 5. *Relationship of voting behavior of countries in the post–Cold War and Cold War eras*

Model	*Position on first dimension, 1991–93*	*Change in position, 1986–88 to 1991–93*
Constant	.22	.05
	(3.2)	(1.5)
East-West dimension 1986–88	.41	—
	(2.9)	
North-South dimension 1986–88	−.11	—
	(−1.6)	
GNP per capita	−.22	−.14
	(−2.6)	(−1.5)
Democracy	−.16	−.12
	(−2.4)	(−1.8)
Change in democracy	−.16	−.20
	(−2.6)	(−3.1)
West	−.19	.03
	(−1.6)	(.4)
Eastern Europe	−.61	−.68
	(−11.4)	(−11.4)
Islam	.13	.11
	(2.4)	(2.0)
R^2_{adj}	.89	.69
N	119	119

Note: Entries are standardized coefficients; t-values are in parentheses. Dummy variables for Latin American and African civilizations had no significant effect in any of the analyses and therefore have been eliminated from the model.

the Cold War. An analysis excluding Western countries does not change the results of the analysis in any substantial way, indicating that the effects of GNP and democracy are not caused by collinearity.

The dependent variable in the right-hand column is the change in position of countries on the first dimension between the last Cold War period (1986–88) and the first post–Cold War period (1991–93). Only three of the independent variables are significant predictors of the change in voting behavior. First, as expected, the results show that Eastern European countries have changed their position quite radically. Second, countries that have become more democratic have moved toward the "West," whereas countries that have become less democratic have moved in the opposite direction. This effect occurs independently from the regime changes in Eastern Europe. I reestimated the model excluding the Eastern European countries from the analysis, but this did not alter the estimated coefficient for the change in democracy. Third, Islamic countries have moved away from the "West" since the end of the Cold War. Controlling for other factors, Islamic countries were, in the 1990s, relatively further removed from the "West" than during the Cold War era, perhaps a sign of increasing civilizational conflict between the Western and Islamic countries.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Conclusions

In this study I demonstrated that the underlying structure of conflict in the post–Cold War UNGA is one-dimensional. The position of countries along this single dimension is stable across time, issue area, and importance of issues. If global politics has become multidimensional and alliances have become ad hoc and issue based, this does not show up in the voting behavior of countries in the UNGA. This finding rejects the dealignment hypothesis.

The analyses also revealed a surprising degree of stability in the voting patterns of states. Much of the Cold War East-West conflict has carried over into the post–Cold War period. The evidence contradicts the structuralist hypothesis that North-South conflict has superseded East-West conflict. The results suggest that there is some truth to the stability hypothesis that argues that besides the countries belonging to the former Soviet bloc that are now aligning with the West, the behavioral voting alignments have changed little since the end of the Cold War. Moreover there is some indication that European countries have moved away somewhat from the United States, another prediction of the stability hypothesis.

However, the stability hypothesis does not tell the whole story. Some things have changed since the end of the Cold War. First, I found considerable evidence of an emerging "counterhegemonic voting bloc." Whereas the United States and its Western allies occupy one pole of the main dimension of conflict, the other pole is occupied by a group of rising powers (China and India) and some other countries (for example, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea) that challenge the neoliberal world order and have been involved in clashes with the West, particularly the United States. The emergence of this bloc indicates that the positions of countries along the first dimension are at least partly explained by their degree of opposition to U.S. hegemony, as stated by the counterhegemonic hypothesis.

Second, the results indicate that the regime type of countries affects their voting behavior. This effect occurs independently from the effect of the level of economic development on state behavior. Moreover, states that have become more democratic since 1989 have started to vote more with the "West," even when I exclude Eastern European countries from the analysis. However, the effect of democracy on state behavior is not the same across issue areas. The evidence supports the Kantian hypothesis that democracies tend to vote with each other on issues concerning principles of political and economic liberalism. It is somewhat inconclusive about whether regime type has any general influence on the voting behavior of countries.

Third, the study clearly rejects the general claim that post–Cold War global conflict is dominated by "clashes of civilizations." However, I do find some evidence of divisions between non-Western "civilizations." Islamic countries separate from African and Latin American countries on the less-important and less-stable second dimension of conflict. Moreover, I find that in comparison to the Cold War period Islamic countries have moved away from the West.

Identifying the position of countries in global conflict by their relative position on a "Western–non Western" dimension is undoubtedly a simplification of global poli-

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

tics, but it is a simplification that explains voting behavior in the post–Cold War UNGA extremely well. The stability of the positions of countries along this dimension over time, issue area, and issue importance is truly remarkable. A one-dimensional explanation of global politics may not be as simple-minded as perhaps it first appears. It incorporates the emergence of a counterhegemonic bloc and the importance of levels of democracy and economic development as determinants of state behavior. Moreover it captures some regional distinctions that are considered important in world politics. Further research should investigate whether the relative positions of countries on this "Western–non-Western" continuum might accurately predict clashes and cooperation outside the UNGA.

References

Alker, Hayward R., Jr. 1964. Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly. *American Political Science Review* 58 (3):642–57.

Alker, Hayward R., Jr., and Bruce M. Russett. 1965. *World Politics in the United Nations General Assembly*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Brown, Michael E., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller. 1996. *Debating the Democratic Peace*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Cox, Robert W. 1987. Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces and the Making of History. New York: Columbia University Press.

Coombs, Clyde. 1964. *A Theory of Data*. New York: Wiley.

Dixon, William J. 1981. The Emerging Image of U.N. Politics. *World Politics* 34:47–61.

Doyle, Michael W. 1983a. Stalemate in the North-South Debate: Strategies and the New International Economic Order. *World Politics* 35 (3):426–64.

———. 1983b. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (3):205–35 (part 1), (4):323–53 (part 2).

Enelow, James M., and Melvin J. Hinich. 1984. *The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.

Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hagan, Joe D. 1989. Domestic Political Regime Changes and Third World Voting Realignments in the United Nations 1946–1984. *International Organization* 43 (3):505–41.

Heckman, James N., and James M. Snyder, Jr. 1995. A Linear Latent Factor Model of Roll-Call Voting. Mimeograph. University of Chicago.

Holloway, Steven. 1990. Forty Years of United Nations General Assembly Voting. *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 23:279–96.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

———. 1999. The Lonely Superpower. *Foreign Affairs* 78 (2):35–49.

Iida, Keisuke. 1988. Third World Solidarity: The Group of 77 in the United Nations General Assembly. *International Organization* 42 (2):375–95.

Ikenberry, G. John, and Michael W. Doyle. 1997. Conclusion: Continuity and Innovation in International Relations Theory. In *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, edited by Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, 266–80. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Jacoby, William G. 1991. Data Theory and Dimensional Analysis. In *Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences*, vol. 78. London: Sage Publications.

Jaggers, Keith, and Ted Robert Gurr. 1995. Tracing Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data. *Journal of Peace Research* 32 (4):469–82.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996. Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World. In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, 498–537. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kim, Soo Yeon, and Bruce Russett. 1996. The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly. *International Organization* 50 (4):629–52.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1985. *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1963. The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal. *American Political Science Review* 57 (4):902–17.

Mastanduno, Michael. 1997. Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy After the Cold War. *International Security* 21 (4):49–88.

McCarty, Nolan M., Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Income Redistribution and the Realignment of American Politics*. Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute Press.

Moon, Bruce E. 1985. Consensus or Compliance? Foreign Policy Change and External Dependence. *International Organization* 39 (2):297–329.

Morrisson, Richard J. 1972. A Statistical Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis. *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 2 (2):235–47.

Mueller, John E. 1967. Some Comments on Russett's "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations." *American Political Science Review* 61 (1):146–48.

Newcombe, Hanna, Michael Ross, and Alan G. Newcombe. 1970. United Nations Voting Patterns. *International Organization* 24 (1):100–21.

Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1991. Patterns of Congressional Voting. *American Journal of Political Science* 35 (1):228–78.

———. 1997. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Russett, Bruce M. 1966. Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations. *American Political Science Review* 60 (2):327–39.

Sheetz, Mark S., and Michael Mastanduno. 1998. Debating the Unipolar Moment. *International Security* 22 (3):168–74 (correspondence).

Snyder, Jack. 1995. Myths, Modernization, and the Post-Gorbachev World. In *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*, edited by Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, 109–26. New York: Columbia University Press.

Staden, A. van, and Franz N. Stokman. 1970. Niet-Gebonden Landen en Oost-West Tegenstellingen; een Poging tot Positiebepaling (Non-Aligned Countries and East-West Confrontations; an Attempt to Determine Positions; in Dutch, with English summary). *Acta Politica* 5:133–64.

Voeten, Erik. 1999. Roll Call Voting in the United Nations General Assembly. Unpublished paper, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1993. The Emerging Structure of International Politics. *International Security* 18 (2):44–79.

Wang, T. Y. 1999. US Foreign Aid and UN Voting: An Analysis of Important Issues. *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1):199–210.

World Bank. 1997. *World Development Indicators* (CD-ROM). Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551154 Published online by Cambridge University Press