Contents

List of Maps, Figures, and Boxes *page* xvii
List of Tables xix
Preface xxi
List of Abbreviations xxxv
List of Authorities xxxvii
List of Statutes and Statutory Instruments xlvii

1 The Theoretical Framework 1

1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 The Theoretical Pillars 2
1.2.1 Legal Transplant Literature: The Clue is in the Context 2
1.2.2 Policy Diffusion and Transfer: Bringing a Method to the Spread 7
1.2.3 New Institutional Economics: Bridging the Gap between Process and Outcome 13
1.3 Constructing the Integrated Framework 15
1.3.1 The Life Cycle of a Statute 15
1.3.2 Adoption and Implementation: A Stepwise Enquiry of the Literature 16
1.3.2.1 Step 1: Setting the Stage 16
1.3.2.2 Step 2: Tracing the Process 16
1.3.2.3 Step 3: Evaluating the Outcome 17
1.3.3 The Framework of Analysis 19
1.4 Compatibility, Legitimacy, and the Interplay of Institutions 20
1.4.1 The Nature of Compatibility 21
1.4.2 The Dimensions of Legitimacy 22
1.4.2.1 Understanding Legitimacy 22

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1.4.2.2 Significance of Legitimacy 23
1.4.2.3 Generating Legitimacy 24
1.4.3 Compatibility and Legitimacy: Two Sides of the Same Coin? 26
1.5 The Framework in Action 26

2 Adoption of Competition Laws in India and Pakistan 28
2.1 Introduction 28
2.2 India and Pakistan: The Pre-conditions of Transfer 29
2.2.1 1969: India Adopts its First Anti-monopoly Legislation 29
2.2.2 1970 Pakistan: Promulgating the Anti-monopoly Ordinance 31
2.2.3 The Context at the Time of Adopting Modern Competition Legislation 32
2.2.3.1 The Indian Legal and Political Landscape in 2002 32
2.2.3.2 The Pakistani Scenario in 2007 32
2.3 Initial Adoption in India and Pakistan: Motivations, Mechanisms, and Institutions 34
2.3.1 Motivations for Acquiring Modern Competition Legislation 35
2.3.1.1 Domestic Self-reflection and Needs-Assessment in India and Pakistan 35
2.3.1.2 Impact of International Developments on Competition Legislation in the Two Countries 36
2.3.2 Mechanisms and Institutions at the Adoption Stage in India and Pakistan 37
2.3.2.1 The Deliberation Phase: Between the Raghavan and the World Bank-Led Committees 38
2.3.2.2 Formal Enactment of Competition Laws in India and Pakistan 39
2.3.3 Transfer Mechanisms and Interplay of Institutions in Adoption 40
2.3.3.1 India: A Case of *Socialisation* 40
2.3.3.2 Pakistan: A Study in *Coercion* 41
2.4 Adoption Continues: Amending the Indian and Pakistani Competition Laws 43
2.4.1 Amendments to the Indian Act 43
2.4.2 Pakistan: Two Ordinances and an Act 45
2.4.3 Evolution of Indian and Pakistani Adoption Strategies 45

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2.5 Indian and Pakistani Competition Legislation: An Unexpected Outcome? 46
2.5.1 *Socialisation* and the Content of the Indian Act 47
2.5.2 The Effects of *Coercion* in Pakistan 49
2.5.3 The Effects of *Emulation* and *Regulatory Competition* 52
2.6 Compatibility and Legitimacy of the Indian and Pakistani Competition Regimes 52

3 The Spread of Competition Laws across South Asia 55

3.1 Introduction 55
3.2 A Competition Tour of the South Asian Six 56
3.2.1 Countries That Have Completed the Adoption Stage 56
3.2.1.1 Sri Lanka and the Consumer Affairs Authority Act 2003 57
3.2.1.2 Nepal's Competition Promotion and Market Protection Act 2063, 2007 58
3.2.1.3 Bangladesh Enacts the Competition Act 2012 59
3.2.1.4 Maldives' Competition Act 2020 60
3.2.2 Countries still in the Adoption Stage 61
3.2.2.1 Enactment Interrupted: Afghanistan and the Draft Competition Act 61
3.2.2.2 Bhutan: To Enact or Not to Enact? 61
3.2.3 Adoption of competition laws in the South Asian Perspective 62
3.3 Pre-conditions of Transfer and the Adoption Process in the South Asian Six 63
3.3.1 Democracies and the Adoption of Competition Legislation 63
3.3.1.1 The Sri Lankan Context 68
3.3.1.2 Bangladesh's Efforts to Adopt an Enlightened Legislation 69
3.3.2 Adopting Competition Laws in Former Monarchies 72
3.3.2.1 The Context in Nepal 72
3.3.2.2 Maldives and Competition Legislation for a Small economy 73
3.3.3 Competition in Hard Places: The Context in Afghanistan and Bhutan 75
3.3.3.1 Afghanistan: Between the Draft and its Enactment 76
3.3.3.2 Bhutan: Too Small for Competition? 76
3.4 Transfer Mechanisms and Patterns across South Asia 78
3.5 Compatibility, Legitimacy, and the Potential for Success of the adopted legislation 80

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4 **Enforcing Indian and Pakistani Competition Acts: An Overview of the Authorities and their Operations** 84
4.1 Introduction 84
4.2 The Indian and Pakistani Competition Enforcement Authorities 86
4.2.1 CCI and CCP: their Structures, Mandates, and Compositions 86
4.2.1.1 Structures: The Limits of Independence 86
4.2.1.2 Mandates and Powers of the Authorities 87
4.2.1.3 Composition of the Authorities 88
4.2.2 Types of Enforcement Orders that the CCI and CCP may Issue 89
4.2.3 How do the CCI and CCP Decide? Issuing Orders at the Authorities 90
4.3 Achieving the Benchmarks of Success in the Indian and Pakistani Contexts 92
4.3.1 Enforcing Competition Laws: Pathways Prescribed for CCI and CCP 92
4.3.2 Interventions in the Competition Enforcement Pathways 94
4.3.3 The Pathways and the Benchmarks of Success 96
4.4 Measuring the Performance and Interaction of Competition Statutes 97
4.4.1 Orders of CCI and CCP as Data for Evaluating Benchmarks of Success 98
4.4.2 The Relevant Indicators and their Significance 99
4.4.3 Analysing the Indicators as Per the Orders of the CCI and CCP 100
4.5 Evaluating the Indicators in the Adoption–Implementation Continuum 109

5 **Anti-competitive Agreements and Interpretive Strategies in India and Pakistan** 114
5.1 Introduction 114
5.2 Establishing Anti-competitive Agreements in India and Pakistan 115
5.2.1 The Test for Anti-competitive Agreements in the Indian Act 115
5.2.2 Establishing Anti-competitive Agreements under the Pakistani Legislation 117
5.2.3 How the Adoption Processes shaped the Tests for Anti-competitive Agreements 119

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 17 Nov 2026 at 03:22:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009247184

5.3 Cartels and other Horizontals: The First Decade of the CCI and CCP 120
5.3.1 CCI and Agreements *Presumed* to be Anti-competitive 120
5.3.1.1 The Confusion that was the *Indian Banking Association* Case 120
5.3.1.2 An 'Agreement' under the Indian Act 121
5.3.1.3 Interpreting the Presumption of AAEC 123
5.3.2 Interpretive Challenges for the CCP 125
5.3.2.1 Defining the 'Agreement' 125
5.3.2.2 Between the 'Object' and the 'Effect' 126
5.3.2.3 CCP's Analytical Steps for Horizontal Agreements 128
5.3.3 Evolution of CCI's and CCP's Approach towards Anti-competitive Agreements 130
5.4 Vertical Agreements under the Indian and Pakistani Acts 131
5.5 Relating CCI and CCP's Interpretive Strategies to their Adoption Processes 137
5.5.1 Reliance on Models from Which Analytical Tests Were Derived 137
5.5.2 Continued Recourse to Transfer Mechanisms Employed in the Adoption Process 138
5.5.3 Impact of Adoption Processes on the Evolution of CCI and CCP's Interpretive Strategies 138

6 Understanding Penalties in the Context of the Adoption Process 142
6.1 Introduction 142
6.2 Adoption Process and Penalties: Understanding the Two-Pronged Impact 143
6.3 Direct Impact: CCI and CCP's Approach towards Penalties in their Orders 144
6.4 Indirect Impact: The Role of Competition Enforcement Systems 148
6.4.1 Establishing the Competition Enforcement Systems in India and Pakistan 148
6.4.2 Tribunals and the Recovery of Penalties 151
6.4.3 Beyond Penalties: Competition Enforcement Systems and Competition Jurisprudence 160
6.5 Adoption Processes, Penal Strategies, and Competition Enforcement 165

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7 **Pre-existing Legal Systems and Competition Enforcement** 167
7.1 Introduction 167
7.2 Mapping the 'Interactions' in the Indian and Pakistani Contexts 168
7.3 'Interactions' in India and Pakistan 172
7.3.1 Interaction between CCI and the General Courts 172
7.3.2 CCP's Interim Orders and Challenges before the General Courts in Pakistan 176
7.3.3 The Divergence in the Indian and Pakistani Experience: Are Court Systems Responsible? 180
7.4 Adoption Processes: Another Explanation for the Interactions 182
7.4.1 Engagement of the Judiciary in the Indian and Pakistani Adoption Processes 183
7.4.2 The Interplay of the Executive and the Legislature in the Adoption Process 185
7.4.3 The Adoption Process and the Divergence in Interactions 187
7.5 Competition Enforcement Systems, Interactions, and Enforcement 188

8 **Implementing Competition Laws across South Asia** 191
8.1 Introduction 191
8.2 Revisiting the Indian and Pakistani Experience 192
8.2.1 The Adoption Stage and Generation of Compatibility and Legitimacy 192
8.2.2 Impact of Compatibility and Legitimacy on the Implementation Stage 194
8.2.3 Compatibility and Legitimacy and the 'Hiatus' between Adoption and Implementation 196
8.3 The Implementation Experience of the Remaining South Asian Countries 198
8.3.1 Adoption Processes and Compatibility and Legitimacy in the South Asian Six 198
8.3.2 Implementing Competition Legislation in the South Asian Six 202
8.3.2.1 Sri Lanka: Consumer Welfare at the Cost of Competition 202
8.3.2.2 Nepal: To Enforce or Not Remains the Question 204
8.3.2.3 Bangladesh: Is Competition Forgotten? 205
8.3.2.4 Maldives: too early for implementation 206

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8.3.2.5 Bhutan even policies matter 206
8.3.2.6 Afghanistan ensuring competition without a law 207
8.3.3 Links between Adoption and Implementation in these Countries 207
8.4 The Hiatus Stage: Opportunity to learn from the Indian and Pakistani Experience 210
8.5 Patterns of Competition Diffusion and Transfer and Enforcement in South Asia 214

9 Bridging the Implementation Gap 218
9.1 Introduction 218
9.2 The Development Imperative 220
9.2.1 Economic Profiles and Challenges of South Asian Countries 220
9.2.2 Do Multi-lateral Packages of Economic and Institutional Reform Address Development? 222
9.2.3 Adapting Competition Legislation for Economic Development 224
9.3 Competition in the Digital Age 226
9.3.1 The State of E-commerce in South Asia 226
9.3.2 Digital and E-commerce Policies in South Asian Countries 228
9.3.3 Competition Regulation, the Digital Economy, and E-commerce 233
9.4 Regional Developments and Competition Law Enforcement 237
9.5 Possible Implementation Strategies for South Asian Countries 240

Bibliography 243
Index 255

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