some experts (generals, judges, orators, and public educators) have 'a substantial title to be exercising a statesmanlike skill'. The ideal ruler is also the subject of M. Schofield's paper, 'The Disappearance of the Philosopher King', in which he suggests that, whereas his initial non-appearance in the *Timaeus* and his total non-appearance in the *Statesman* can be explained without damage to a unitarian view of Plato's dialogues, his non-appearance in the *Laws* cannot, and 'the familiar developmental story of optimism turning to pessimism is vindicated'. R. Kamtekar agrees that many differences between the *Republic* and the *Statesman* can be explained by the differing purposes of the dialogues (what Schofield terms the 'bottom up' creation of the ideal state vs. the 'top down' definition of the ideal ruler), but she also argues that the *Laws can* be viewed much more positively as an attempt to establish in practical terms the nearest approximation to the ideal state and the ideal ruler.

References in that colloquium to paradigms and approximations link very closely with the three remaining colloquia. D. R. Miller welcomes L. Brisson's 'accurate and useful' discussion of 'Plato's Theory of Sense Perception in the *Timaeus*: How it Works and What it Means' (which includes a translation of and commentary on colours in *Tim*. 67c–68d) but does not share his view that the links between body and soul and within the soul are ill-defined.

Exactly what it is that the perceiving and thinking soul/mind is doing is also the central issue both in M. Dixsaut's paper 'What is it Plato Calls Thinking?' and in N. D. Smith's 'How the Prisoners in Plato's Cave are "Like Us" '. D. argues that thinking (*dianoeisthai*), defined in the *Theaetetus* as the dialogue of the soul within itself, is common to all four states of mind/soul on the Divided Line and in fact *is* the line, 'the single underlying activity' which is thus divided. She then equates *eikasia* with the state of conjecture and uncertainty of the soul working with images of objects, and *dianoia*, its counterpart on the top half of the line, with the state of conjecture and uncertainty of the soul working with images of the intelligibles. The aspect of *eikasia* which S. stresses, on the other hand, is that of the resemblance or approximation of the shadow or image to its original. He takes Socrates to be referring to his present company and to their attempts in Book 1 to define justice, which though inadequate do 'capture some of the truth of the Platonic conception' and are not entirely jettisoned. 'It follows that the *Republic* is a remarkably unified work', a view with which D. Roochnik wholeheartedly agrees. He does, however, suggest yet another interpretation of *eikasia*, that of a 'kind of double seeing', since we do not commonly mistake shadows and reflections for their originals. In which case the prisoners 'like us' are not in a state of *eikasia*, but of *pistis*, a confident trust in their sensory perceptions.

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STOICISM

K. Ierodiakonou (ed.): *Topics in Stoic Philosophy.* Pp. 259. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999. Cased, £40. ISBN: 0-19-823768-5.

This collection consists of the editor's introduction and eight articles, none previously published in English.

The first two articles concern Stoic logic. Jonathan Barnes asks whether there is anything that Chrysippus in his logic held because of something that Aristotle had held in his logic, taking 'because' broadly. The interest of the article lies more in the nature of the ground covered than in the conclusion, which is that there is not enough

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evidence to answer the question. Writing about the Liar paradox, Mario Mignucci argues that the Stoics had identified a genuine paradox, and that their authentic response is in Cicero's *Academica Priora* 95. He claims that their position contains an important philosophical insight about propositions, but the article ends too abruptly for this claim to be developed.

The remaining articles form a loosely coherent series dealing with topics relating to Stoic moral theory. Michael Frede and Brad Inwood treat Stoic conceptions of the good, and of moral reasoning, respectively. David Sedley tracks down a dispute between Zeno and Polemo about the best way to present practical guidance to life. Phillip Mitsis presents the Stoics' claim to be the originators of the doctrine of natural rights. Dirk Obbink discusses questions arising within the development of Stoic political thought from Zeno's city of the wise, through Chrysippus' conception of the cosmos as a polity, to Cicero's notion of universal natural law. Finally, Susanne Bobzien presents a reconstruction of Chrysippus' theory of causes. Standards of scholarship and clarity are throughout very high. The articles by Frede and Inwood are comprehensive enough to be taken as introductions.

Frede's article is focused on Cicero's *De finibus* 3.20–1, on the well-known problem of explaining how reflection can naturally transform one from a rational pursuer of natural attractions to one whose *summum bonum* is 'concord' in action. Like others, F. rejects the view that this radical transformation depends on our acquiring a conception of ourselves as essentially rational beings, so that we become concerned for ourselves as rational agents. Instead, the Stoic claim would have been that, as we reflect on the rational structure of our world, we naturally become attracted to behaviour, no matter whose, that exhibits a certain perfect rationality. The originality of F.'s hypothesis lies in his characterization of such behaviour as being admirably, even stunningly, insightful, resourceful, inventive, simple, elegant, and so on (pp. 76, 87–8). Our admiration for it is as for a work of art, not as for an instrument. Even so, will reflection on nature's amazing ingenuity really draw me out of my self-concern once I have realized what nature can or will do to me?

However much we may agree that we must act in concord with nature, we still have to determine what that requires in the actual situation. Inwood emphasizes the flexibility and sensitivity of Stoic moral reasoning to the particular situation. Although they devised codes of behaviour, these did not function as hard-and-fast rules. For those in progress they were 'entrenched but modifiable general rules', providing a framework for moral reasoning (p. 109, cf. p. 125) and linking normative cosmology to the particular action-situation. But the wise, who could reason directly from the background to the particular situation, were in no way constrained by these rules: their understanding set them above the law, like kings. Other contributors implicitly challenge this reading. Sedley, for example, believes that there was a Stoic rule, 'Always respect your parents', corresponding to an unconditional obligation (p. 129). Again, for I. a particular action is a *kathêkon* only if a case can be made for it (pp. 109–10, cf. p. 125), whereas S. holds that it must be shown to have been in accordance with the rational natures of the agent and of the world (p. 129).

Mitsis's article examines Stoic ethical theory, in order to determine whether it could or does contain a conception of rights that belong to their owners *qua* human beings. Against Alasdair MacIntyre, Richard Sorabji, and John Cooper he argues that in effect it can and does. Using the Benthamite identification of having a right with being the intended beneficiary of an obligatory action, he holds that for the Stoics human beings hold rights *qua* socially undifferentiated subjects of the law that expresses the sovereign will of Zeus or nature and binds them in a community. Trying

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to capture the idea that a human right cannot be justifiably rescinded, he concludes that for the Stoics the basic human right ought to be the right to moral personality, i.e. to the power of giving or witholding assent (p. 172). But it must be an objection that there is almost no injustice against which this 'right' would protect its owner. It is noteworthy that M.'s understanding of this law is much stronger than Inwood's, for whom being a law does not necessarily imply more than having prescriptive force (cf. p. 163 with pp. 96–7).

Bobzien's article reconstructs, as far as the evidence allows, what Chrysippus said about causation. In discussing the later technical terminology she uncovers a philosopher, not a taxonomist. In particular, Chrysippus' compatibilism rested on a distinction between necessitating and non-necessitating antecedent causes. The standard view that the rolling cylinder's shape is the 'perfect and principal' cause of its motion is untenable: all change requires at least two causal factors. The article is comprehensive, tightly argued, and convincing.

All this is preceded by the editor's introduction, which is a helpful survey of the history and recent state of Stoic studies. The short but dense historical sections are of particular interest. As inspirer of the volume she has assembled a collection of articles exhibiting the fine combination of scholarly and philosophical understanding that now marks the best Stoic studies.

The volume includes a select bibliography of work published since 1985, an *index locorum*, and an index of names. A list of abbreviations would have been helpful. There are misprints on pp. 72 (*is*), 211 (*ulla*), and 223 (*sunkatathêseôs*).

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HONOURING JOHN DILLON

J. J. CLEARY (ed.): *Traditions of Platonism. Essays in Honour of John Dillon.* Pp. xxv + 416. Aldershot, etc.: Ashgate, 1999. Cased, £55. ISBN: 1-84014-684-2.

This collection of essays in honour of John Dillon brings together an interesting set of twenty-two papers (in English, French, and German) written for the occasion by a number of leading scholars in the field. John Dillon's epoch-making *The Middle Platonists* (London, 1977) made the world familiar with the continuing Platonic tradition. The new edition (London, 1996), with a new afterword, shows how little he needed to change his account. His work stimulated new studies in this area, though he also covered many other stages in Platonism (in particular Iamblichus). The papers rightfully range over the whole of the Platonic tradition, divided into four main sections: The Platonic Legacy (four papers), The Middle Platonic Tradition (five), Plotinus (five), and The Neoplatonic Tradition (eight). The papers vary in range and detail, but most deal with genuine problems in the field. I shall report selectively on the most interesting or rewarding pieces.

Denis O'Brien contributes a very readable piece on Plato's reuse of Empedocles in his *Timaeus*, in particular on the (slightly anachronistic) question of evil in the creation of the universe. O. first convincingly shows with two examplary passages how Empedocles' positions are combined with other views to serve Plato's purposes. The question of evil is then linked to the precosmic motion of elements. O. shrewdly puts to use the newly discovered papyrus (*P. Strasb.* ed. by Martin–Primavesi [Berlin, 1999])

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