expectations of their contemporaries, for instance by stressing the fact that Epicurean philosophy offers knowledge of philosophical dogmata, but also the ability to turn those dogmata into maxims of practical action. A focus on later developments in Epicureanism could have strengthened E.'s case that Epicurus' philosophy is attractive even today, because of its claim to be adaptable and practicable in different cultural contexts.

E. has interesting things to say about how to use Epicurean arguments in the context of modern life. Sometimes, however, his arguments seem rather speculative and even unconvincing. E.'s Epicurus sometimes seems to look like a modern lifestyle guru. It should not be forgotten that Epicurus does advanced philosophy and strives for real knowledge of how the world works. His thirty-seven books of *On nature* obviously were a very tough read. It is true that the Epicureans advocate the good life or *eudaimonia* as the goal of all actions. But it should be kept in mind that Epicurean *eudaimonia* stands for tranquillity of mind and for the conduct of a successful and fulfilled life, which can be achieved and measured by rational human means like the hedonistic calculus. It seems doubtful that Epicurus really wants—as E. seems to claim, following the modern rather subjective concept of *Glück* (and 'Happiness'?)—that everybody will be happy 'nach seiner Façon' (p. 137). Epicurus rather wishes that everybody will happy *nach Epikurs Façon*, which for everyone will be the same.

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PLUTARCH VS. EPICUREANS

J. BOULOGNE: *Plutarque dans le miroir d'Épicure. Analyse d'une critique systématique de l'épicurisme*. Pp. 253. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2003. Paper, €27. ISBN: 2-85939-805-8.

In his second monograph on Plutarch, B. returns to the subject of his 1986 *thèse d'État*. Rather than to close-read the three extant anti-Epicurean essays one by one, B. offers a structured synoptic account of Plutarch's attacks, arranging the evidence and argument by topic with elegant pedantry. Part I addresses natural philosophy, covering the theories of perception and cognition, atomist physics, theology, the nature of the soul, and language. Part II deals with a variety of issues related to hedonist ethics as well as with the attitudes to law and friendship. No index of any kind is provided.

My guess is that the (unstated) ambition of the book was to become a counterpart to D. Babut's monumental *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*; indeed, B. notes that for Plutarch anti-Stoic and anti-Epicurean polemics run parallel (p. 32 with n. 76). Like Babut, B. attempts rationalized stock-taking, on the assumption that hostility towards Epicureanism is a stable axis of the Plutarchan oeuvre (pp. 18–19). Plutarch's lunges against Epicurus and Colotes are themed and classified, nearly always confronted with Epicurean material, and concisely compared with other authors' polemics (Cicero: pp. 139, 212–13, 215–16).

B.'s aim is to evaluate Plutarch's critique of Epicureanism objectively, for what it is worth (p. 39). Plutarch is plausibly credited with adequate first-hand knowledge of the Epicurean texts (pp. 14–17, 220–1, and *passim*)—although I remain unconvinced

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about his familiarity with Lucretius (pp. 14–16, 79–80). Highlighting (e.g. pp. 149, 219–20) that Plutarch's procedure as a polemicist is to seek out internal contradictions within the Epicurean discourse, B. argues that the Plutarchan battle is primarily 'de caractère scolaire' (p. 38). At the same time it is evident that Plutarch's disagreement with Epicurus precedes his assaults on the doctrine: he is pre-programmed to be *tendancieuse*. In his, however well-informed, caricatures the Epicurean model of sense-perception is reduced to confused scepticism; to defeat Epicurus' concept of pleasure Plutarch focuses narrowly on its ties with the body and debased corporeal gratification (e.g. pp. 141–4, 166–7, 176–7). A true dialogue between a dualistic and a materialistic framework of thought, B. concludes, is impossible: 'on ne discute pas au niveau des postulats eux-mêmes' (p. 224).

Overall, this is sound, quality scholarship that somehow lacks a spark. B. tends to be slightly repetitive in the argument and the passages he quotes (e.g. p. 130 n. 27 = p. 136 n. 47). Now and then stimulating comments and observations crop up, such as pointing out the frequency of negative ἀ-adjectives and nouns in polemical passages (p. 213 n. 71), or the remarks that Plutarch's anti-Epicurean criticism is also an interface of his self-revelation (p. 223) and that the method of seizing upon the internal (in)coherence of the opponent's logos goes back to Carneades and, ultimately, to Socrates (pp. 202, 218). Unfortunately, B. rarely develops these insights in interesting directions—so in the end we hardly see anything special about Plutarch's image in the *miroir* of the doctrine he takes to task. The biggest problem of B.'s exposition is its topsy-turvy structure. It would have been natural to outline Plutarch's profile as a Platonist from the outset as a basis for understanding his anti-Epicurean stance. Instead, having (rightly) acknowledged that Plutarch's opposition to Epicureanism grows out of 'ses propres positions sur l'homme et le monde' (p. 38), B. postpones telling what those were until the last pages of the book; important aspects of Plutarch's Platonism are banished to footnotes (e.g. p. 167 n. 78, p. 172 n. 99, p. 179 n. 37, p. 223 n. 20). The result is a fragmented and generally meek analysis: B. whispers, as it were, where he could have afforded to be assertive or explorative. For example, the subchapter on language (pp. 130–8), awkwardly sandwiched between the multifaceted discussions of atomism and hedonism, intimates what might have been a starting-point for a searching reconstruction, in the spirit of J. Mansfeld's *Prolegomena*, of the principles and mechanisms of ancient philosophical polemics.

And there are other opportunities clearly missed. Thus, we could wish for more on Caesar-the-restless-Epicurean (and what about Cassius the conspirator?). As it is, B. postulates a link between Epicureanism and the subversive and decadent ideologies of the Late Republic (p. 29), but does not really explain how the 'développement du parti césarien' fits in with the quietist attitude praised in the Epicurean texts. B.'s view (pp. 19, 37–8) that Plutarch did not feel any serious doctrinal danger from Epicureanism and engaged with it primarily for pedagogical ('didactique') reasons is perhaps too placid: the anxiety about the addressee Senecio's opinion-of-the-day on the 'pleasures of body and soul' (*Quaes. conv.* 672D–E) reflects the ongoing struggle for the hearts and minds of the audience of patrons-cum-disciples.

B. does not seem to have updated his bibliography very much since 1986. One quickly becomes aware of the absence of the more recent studies of Epicureanism (e.g. G. Striker, J. Annas, D. Fowler, E. Asmis, J. Warren) and, worse, of the immediately relevant Plutarchan scholarship. Thus, no reference is made to S. Swain's *Hellenism and Empire* in the section on Greek political élite (pp. 26–32), or to F. Albini's work on the *Live Unknown. Dio, idee e materia* by F. Ferrari and *In Search*

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of the Truth by J. Opsomer are included in the bibliography; however, I could not find the former mentioned anywhere in the footnotes, while the latter is not cited for discussion of Plutarch's standing *vis-à-vis* Academic scepticism (p. 67 n. 95). Likewise, when talking about Plutarch's views on the void, atomic movements, and magnetism (pp. 77–80), B. fails to refer to Opsomer's 1999 article on *antiperistasis* in A. Pérez Jiménez et al. (edd.), *Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles*, Madrid, pp. 417–29. The list could go on. It is emblematic that in the opening lines of B.'s introduction we are directed, for the *état présent* of Plutarchan research, to a bibliographical survey (by R. Flacelière) that was published in 1968!

Proof-reading is below par throughout the book: 'Ieal' for 'Ideal' (p. 27 n. 49), 'rejtée' (p. 111), 'Diels/kranz' (p. 76 and n. 16 *ibid.*), *Προπτρεπτικός* (p. 33); unnecessary 'ï's (p. 152 n. 9). There are two typos in Empedocles' name in Greek (p. 100 nn. 104 and 109); Isnardi Parente is just as unlucky—she gets italicized (p. 210 n. 60) and rebaptized 'Margharita' (p. 86). On p. 154, l. 10 'que le plaisir' appears to be printed twice; p. 94 n. 79 should read 'Two studies'; p. 196 n. 64 needs *τύχωσι* to complete the sentence; an obviously Freudian slip in reference to Babut (p. 223 n. 20). Bibliography, too, displays a rash of typos and inaccuracies (cf. entries for Adorno, Farrington, Freymuth, Gallo, Geigenmüller, Miller, 'Momogliano', Russell, etc.). Portalupi features in footnotes, but not in the bibliography. This is not to mention missing inverted commas, brackets, and the like—as well as thoroughly haphazard capitalization in Anglophone titles . . .

B.'s book is a useful, logically presented (yet regrettably non-indexed) collection of evidence. As such, it will be of service to scholars both of Plutarch and of Epicureanism, even though on the interpretative side it may not stand up to the demanding expectations of today.

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PLUTARCH AND TRAJAN

P. A. Stadter, L. Van der Stockt (edd.): *Sage and Emperor. Plutarch, Greek Intellectuals, and Roman Power in the Time of Trajan (98–117 AD)*. (Symbolae Facultatis Litterarum Lovaniensis, Series A, 29.) Pp. viii + 354, ills. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002. Cased, €42.60. ISBN: 90-5867-239-5.

Plutarch, author of one of the largest corpora to survive from classical antiquity, famously claimed that he came from a small town and stayed there so that it did not become smaller (*Dem.* 2.2). Many of his dialogues are set either in his own house in Chaeronea or in neighbouring towns or locales: Thespiae, Delphi, Athens, Eleusis. Recent studies have tended to emphasize this Greek background, seeing Plutarch as moving in an essentially Greek world, writing for a Greek audience, and insulated from, if not deliberately ignoring, Roman power. Against this view, Philip Stadter has argued in a number of recent papers (e.g. in L. Van der Stockt [ed.], *Rhetorical Theory and Praxis in Plutarch* [Leuven, 2000], pp. 493–510) for a Plutarch much more politically engaged with the centre of power in Rome. Plutarch mentions a number of

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