Appendix C

Further Details, Chapter 4

C.1 FOREIGN AID DATA

Testing the hypotheses in Chapter 4 requires historical data on the subnational distribution of foreign aid projects in Kenya, Malawi, and Sierra Leone.

In the case of Malawi, I rely on data from the Malawi Government's Aid Management Platform.[1] This dataset provides spatial coordinates for approximately 80 percent of all international development financing reported to the government from 2000 to 2012. In the case of Sierra Leone, I rely on data from the government's Development Assistance Database. This database tracks donor commitments across 856 projects affecting 2,314 locations from 1992 to 2014.[2]

The Kenyan government has not systematically tracked donor activities. However, both the World Bank and the African Development Bank publish reports on all committed projects in Kenya.[3]

I and a team of research assistants read all relevant reports from 1992 to 2010. I then coded each project with a geographic coordinate (or set of coordinates) representing its location (or locations), as well its geographic scope.[4] Additionally, for projects that were complete as of 2011,

[1] Peratsakis, Christian, Joshua Powell, Michael Findley, Justin Baker, and Catherine Weaver 2012.

[2] AidData (2017)

[3] World Bank Project Database, available at http://worldbank.org/projects, accessed March 1, 2011; African Development Bank Projects and Operations, available at http://afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations, accessed March 1, 2011.

[4] In coding these data, I relied on a coding scheme designed by Findley et al. (2011).

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I rely on existing data from the AidData project.[5] Using these data, I am able to estimate the total value of allocated aid going to each of Kenya's constituencies. This provides a dataset of 3,780 constituency-years (210 constituencies × 18 years), representing over $7 billion in committed aid. These data were originally used in Jablonski 2014, 2013.

C.1.1 Matching Aid to Constituencies

There are many challenges in identifying how much foreign aid goes to a particular location that are somewhat unique. Unlike other spatial data, foreign aid project locations can rarely be uniquely placed in space. And even where this might be possible, donors are unable or unwilling to track projects at a highly disaggregate level of precision. For example, a donor might target a country or district for spending, but then hand off the implementation of the project to an NGO or government in ways that are difficult to track. Or a donor might also spend on something like a road that borders multiple administrative areas. In some cases, donors will report each district or location affected by such a project. In other cases, a donor might only report the entire region affected by the project.

A related problem arises in trying to code the amount of money targeted to a particular geographic area. Even in cases where donors report the precise geographic locations affected by a project, they will rarely report the precise share of funding allocated to each geographic location.[6]

Thus, in order to analyze the relationship between aid and voting, it is necessary to rely on some assumptions. In the main analysis, I assume that project funding is distributed in proportion to population.[7] So if a project crosses a constituency boundary, I assume that the funds are distributed in proportion to each constituency's population. Likewise, if a project can only be geolocated to a district rather than to a specific constituency, I assume that each constituency receives aid in proportion to its share of the population.

An alternative assumption is that projects are distributed in proportion to number of constituencies regardless of population. So if a project crosses a boundary, we could assume that both constituencies equally

[5] Tierney et al. 2011.

[6] The Sierra Leone and Malawi platforms do not report any location-specific funding. In the case of Kenya, it is sometimes possible to infer from project documents how funding was distributed across project locations. I do this where possible.

[7] Following the approach used in Jablonski (2014).

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benefit. If we reestimate the results under this assumption, the size and magnitude of the treatment effects remain similar.

C.2 ELECTORAL DATA

C.2.1 Kenya

Kenya holds elections every five years in December for the president and 210 constituency-level members of the National Assembly. The president is elected by a plurality rule, with the contingency that he must obtain 25 percent of the vote in five of Kenya's seven provinces. MPs are similarly elected by a plurality rule in single-member districts. While a number of parties contest each of these elections, in practice almost all votes go to the two leading parties in each election.

Using data from Kollman, Ken, Allen Hicken, Daniele Caramani, David Backer, and David Lublin (2020) supplemented with data from the Electoral Commission of Kenya, I code the percentage of support the incumbent party received in National Assembly elections in each of the 210 constituencies only from 1992 to 2010. Since I am interested in the effect of electoral politics and Kenya has only held multiparty elections since 1992, I look at the allocation of aid after this date.[8]

From 1992 to 2002, I assume that the allocation of aid was influenced by the regime of Daniel arap Moi and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) party.[9] In 2002, Moi stepped down, and Kibaki and the National Alliance of Rainbow Coalition (NARC) came to power in a contested election. Thus from 2002 until the election in 2007, I assume that the Kibaki regime influenced the allocation of aid.

Coding the decision rules from the December 2007 election to the end of my study period in 2010 is less straightforward. The 2007 election in Kenya was highly contested and resulted in widespread violence. In the

[8] While Kenya held elections prior to 1992, they were widely considered to be a referendum on the ruling regime rather than a competitive election.

[9] One might object to this coding on the grounds that Daniel arap Moi was term limited after 1997 and so had few incentives to bias aid in the KANU's favor. However, despite being term limited, Moi appears to have been invested in the KANU victory. This is due in part to Moi's intention to retain control over the KANU government behind the scenes. In addition to appointing Uhuru Kenyatta as his chosen successor, Moi appointed himself the chairman of the new KANU party with veto power over policy decisions and cabinet appointments. As an additional incentive, Moi faced the very real (though largely unrealized) threat that he and his family would be prosecuted if the KANU were to lose the election, see Steeves (2006) and Branch (2011).

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aftermath, the United Nations brokered a power-sharing arrangement between the two front-runners, Kibaki (now Party National Unity [PNU]) and Raila Odinga (Orange Democratic Movement [ODM] Party). The provisions of this agreement included joint heads of state, unanimity rules, and a shared cabinet. This joint arrangement makes it difficult to determine a clear decision rule. However, most ministries involved in aid delivery were held by the ODM, potentially giving it more influence. I therefore code the ODM as the incumbent. For further discussion and evidence on this assumption, see Jablonski (2014).

C.2.2 Malawi

Malawi holds national elections every five years for 193 single-member parliamentary constituencies. Due to limited scope of Malawi's aid management platform, I can code aid to constituencies only from 2000 to 2013. Data on election results come from Kollman, Ken, Allen Hicken, Daniele Caramani, David Backer, and David Lublin (2020), supplemented by data from the Malawi Election Commission in the case of missing data.

From 2000 to 2004 and again from 2004 to 2009, the government was held by the United Democratic Front. In 2009, the government was controlled by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), though under the same president, Bingu wa Mutharika.

C.2.3 Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone holds national-level elections every five years. I focus on parliamentary elections and code support for the ruling party in Sierra Leone's 112 single-member constituencies. I focus on elections from 2002 to 2013. 2002 was the first election in which an incumbent (Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP) had largely uncontested control over the government. I only include up to 2013 due to limitation on the scope of data on foreign aid. Obtaining accurate election results at the constituency level prior to 2002 is also difficult. Data on election results come from Kollman, Ken, Allen Hicken, Daniele Caramani, David Backer, and David Lublin (2020).

Throughout this history, Sierra Leone has been dominated by two main parties: the Sierra Leone People's Party (the SLPP) and the All People's Congress (the APC). These parties tend to split the vast majority of votes between them. From August 2007 to November 2012, and

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again from November 2012 to March 2018, the government was held by the APC under Ernest Koroma. From May 2002 to August 2007, the government was held by the SLPP under Ahmad Kabbah.

One challenge in coding the 2002 election is that the election commission never released constituency-level voting data. To address this challenge, I use voting data from the 2007 election as a proxy for the support that the SLPP received in the 2002 election. Since the same parties contested the 2007 election, this assumption is mostly reasonable. However, it should be noted that the SLPP lost a significant share of voters between the 2002 and 2007 elections, so this assumption may underestimate SLPP support, particularly in more contested areas.

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