One also wishes that Nagle provided a fuller development of his answer to his concluding question: "Was Aristotle right about the nature of human flourishing, and that the best place in which it might occur was the *polis*?" (314). Nagle has assumed that Aristotle was correct in his understanding of human flourishing, and he argues that despite its small size, the *polis* was the proper venue for human excellence due to "the high proportion of its citizens who engaged in public affairs" (314). Nagle raises the issue of whether or not human beings have benefited by the loss of "exercising meaningful citizenship in manageable political entities," living either in Hellenistic kingdoms, imperial Rome, or modern nation-states (317). The issue is significant, and some recent Aristotelian scholarship has focused on the tensions between modern liberal citizenship and premodern citizenship and the implications of such tensions on understandings of civic virtue, participation, and community. (See Jill Frank. *A Democracy of Distinction.* University of Chicago Press, 2005; Bernard Yack. *The Problems of a Political Animal.* University of California Press, 1993.) Given Nagle's impressive study of Aristotle's thought, a fuller treatment of this problem would undoubtedly have been of great interest and benefit to political theorists and philosophers. Moreover, it is not clear that one can speak of the desirability of Aristotle's conception of *polis* life without giving some defense of Aristotle's conception of human excellence.

Despite a few such claims that merit further engagement and development, this work is a richly documented, insightful, creative, and important study of a host of issues central to Aristotle's thought as well as to the study of Greek thought and culture writ large. It will be of great use and interest to political theorists and philosophers of all varieties. Nagle has written what is sure to be an influential work, incorporating a wide and impressive array of evidence and providing great insight into Aristotle's thought and the context in which he wrote.

–Daniel Kapust

ALL ABOUT HIM

Andrew M. Riggsby: *Caesar in Gaul and Rome: War in Words* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006. Pp. 271. $45.00.)

DOI: 10.1017/S0034670507000599

The war in Gaul (58–51 BC), by which Julius Caesar completed the Roman conquest of Gaul, was pivotal to his conquest of Rome. Caesar sought to be appointed governor of Gaul because he thought that Gaul was the Roman province most likely to provide him with wealth and triumphs. He was not disappointed. While he was able to wage war for years on all the Gallic cities and tribes that he wished, his soldiers grew older with him and

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became loyal to him rather than to Rome, enabling him to conquer them as well as the Gauls. It was from Gaul that Caesar set out to cross the Rubicon.

Despite the political significance of the Gallic War, Caesar's own *De Bello Gallico* is one of the few contemporary accounts of the wars, and none of the others seems substantially independent of it. We know of Caesar the conqueror mostly through Caesar the author. However, while Caesar was for a long time largely taken at his word, since the middle of the last century, and certainly since the rise of postmodern scholarship, scholars have often sought to discredit his account. Although clearly friendly to postmodernism, Andrew M. Riggsby offers a thoughtful study of Caesar's commentary which takes Caesar seriously, if not always at his word.

Caesar in Gaul and Rome is divided into two parts. The first, which Riggsby calls "external," deals with the constitution of Roman identity in the context of various non-Romans. The second, which he calls "internal," focuses on Caesar's own political self-fashioning. In the first, Riggsby discusses Caesar's presentation of the land and people of Gaul, of the relative effects of technology and virtue in the Gallic wars, and, specifically, of Roman identity. In the second, he takes up the questions of the function of a commentary such as Caesar's, the division in *De Bello Gallico* between the character Caesar and the narrator Caesar, the Roman view of a just war, and the ways in which documents such as Caesar's commentary were used to influence the political scene in Rome.

As is now the custom among many scholars writing books about books, Riggsby begins with an introduction devoted in part to a theoretical discussion of various contemporary linguistic terms (e.g., "intertextuality," "interdiscursivity," "discourse," "genre," and "covert"). One might initially fear that he, like so many others, will proceed to impose an anachronistic theory on a classical text. Despite his beginning, Riggsby mostly avoids that impoverishing mistake, especially in later chapters. Similarly, although he initially says that he is concerned with the likely or possible effects of *De Bello Gallico*, and not with Caesar's intention ("I do not find 'intention' a useful explanatory term" [8]), many of his most interesting suggestions concern Caesar's quite deliberate intentions.

On the other hand, although Riggsby devotes considerable attention to the distinction between Roman and non-Roman (which he calls "'Inside' and 'Outside'"), he overlooks the long, fundamental tradition in political philosophy and politics of the distinction between fellow citizens and foreign enemies. Riggsby is concerned with context, yet the context that he chooses sometimes seems askew. More often than not, it is cultural rather than political.

Riggsby, for example, offers a careful and intelligent account of Caesar's treatment of *virtus* in *De Bello Gallico*. While showing that Caesar places his own argument in the mouth of Critognatus, a Gaul, he comes to the intriguing conclusion that Caesar fundamentally alters the meaning of the word. Shifting the sense from manliness to what brings success in battle, Caesar softens *virtus* by making it dependent on the discipline of a commander.

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Where traditionally the *virtus* of the soldiery was distinct from the qualities of the commander, the *virtus* of troops in *De Bello Gallico*, Riggsby argues, depends on the commander's ability to impose his will on the troops. Caesar, thus, replaces the virtue of an individual by the virtue of a group. More important, he makes submission to hierarchy, in particular, to himself, an essential element of *virtus*. Riggsby, however, fails to develop the connection between Caesar's redefinition of *virtus* and his ambition to have Rome submit to him. Except for a cursory, tentative sentence near the end of his discussion ("It is possible, however, that Caesar was also looking forward while writing this, whether to a dictatorship such as he eventually established or, probably more likely, to some more conventional but still exalted position at Rome" [105]), he ignores the crucial context of the political transformation of Rome—a context which would enrich his strong insight.

By contrast, Riggsby takes Rome's political transformation into full account when he considers Caesar's change in who or what a Roman is. Unlike contemporary Romans such as Cicero, Caesar, Riggsby argues, suggests there is no fundamental opposition between Roman and Gaul, between Rome and "Other." In fact, as already indicated, Caesar allows a Gaul to speak for him in redefining Roman virtue. Caesar's political intention, here, is twofold. By breaching the line between Roman and non-Roman, he can add to the Roman Empire and, at the same time, legitimate his treating Romans as subjects. "If aliens can become Romans, why can't Romans become imperial subjects? ... [I]f empire is marching into Gaul at one point, there is no reason it cannot march inward to Rome soon after" (121, 132). For Caesar, the crucial distinction is not between Roman and non-Roman, but between himself and his subjects.

Perhaps the best example of Riggsby's grasping Caesar's thought in Caesar's own terms is his discussion of Caesar's attempt to justify his campaign in Gaul—a discussion which, as Riggsby says, leads to certain insights into the general tenor and history of Roman imperialism. Riggsby's discussion answers critics who contend that the Romans' attempts to justify their wars were nothing but hypocrisy. Riggsby, who begins by examining Cicero's understanding of a just war, argues that the charge of hypocrisy rests on an anachronistic relationship between motivation and justification. Where contemporary just-war theories, especially Christian and Kantian, tend to stress motivation, the Romans emphasized the circumstances of a war. Thus, while modern theories tend to limit just wars to those fought in self-defense, the Roman view permits wars fought to prevent injury as well as to avenge past harm. "A state need not be in danger of its existence to respond with military force, it need only have been wronged, or merely expect an injury" (159). The charge of Roman hypocrisy is thus fundamentally misplaced, for motives are simply not an issue. So long as there are enemies who threaten, a country need not wait but may act. The Roman Empire is the fulfillment rather than contradiction of the pre-Christian view of a just war.

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Caesar in Gaul and Rome, although somewhat uneven, offers a rewarding study of Caesar's written thought and political career as well as of Roman imperialism, in general. It is a valuable book that helps one see the significance of Caesar's actions and account.

–Jan H. Blits

THE ROOTS OF MODERNITY

Stephen A. McKnight: *The Religious Foundations of Francis Bacon's Thought* (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2006. Pp. xiv, 193. $37.50.)

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In a broad overview of many of Francis Bacon's works, Stephen A. McKnight seeks to show that Bacon is not an unbelieving philosopher and that his project—commonly referred to as the conquest of nature for the relief of man's estate—is rooted in "genuinely and deeply felt religious convictions" (11). In making his argument, McKnight usefully raises, but does not settle, the difficult question of the role of Christian belief in Bacon's thought and activities, a question related to the broader debate about modernity as secularized Christianity. As McKnight puts it, misunderstanding "the role of religion in Bacon's program … also distorts the understanding of modernity" (159).

McKnight takes issue with interpreters of Bacon's thought such as Faulkner, Kennington, Weinberger, and White, who "dismiss Bacon's religious references as disingenuous" (7). One explanation McKnight offers for the proliferation of so many apparent misreadings of Bacon is that scholars such as Weinberger "dismiss … the [intellectual, cultural, and political] context of Bacon's writings" (171, n. 17). Whether McKnight is correct or not about the inattention to context in these authors—and it is hard to see how, for example, a book like Weinberger's *Science, Faith, and Politics* (Cornell University Press, 1985), deeply steeped in Bacon's intellectual and cultural sources and in reflections on Bacon's relation to Machiavelli, can be accused of relying on the bare Baconian text alone—McKnight's own approach is also primarily textual. McKnight's avowed goal is to show that Bacon had "deeply felt religious convictions," and his primary argument consists in calling attention to religious "leitmotifs," "motifs," "key terms," "symbols," "elements," "themes," "patterns," "images," "imagery," "allusions," "associations," "references," "[drawings-upon]", "sentiments," "preoccupations," "tone," "esoteric traditions," "language," as well as to the religious "[self-]presentation" of Bacon (e.g., 1–4, 14–18, 20–21, 29, 35, 40, 42, 44, 47, 54–55, 64, 69, 71, 72, 76, 79–80, 86, 90, 102, 104, 113, 129, 135, 145, 149). McKnight himself states that his study "has sought to establish the central role religion plays in Bacon's thought *by demonstrating the*

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