theories and methodologies

# Theory by Analogy

C. D. BLANTON

A is—A.

—G. W. F. Hegel (*Science of Logic* 415)

*The thing stated and the restatement have constituted an analogy.*

—Wallace Stevens (129)

*M-C-M′.*

—Karl Marx (257)

THERE IS A HINT OF MINERVA'S OWL IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY'S RELATION TO THE APPARENTLY MUNDANE FORMAL QUESTION OF ANALOGY. The problem is everywhere in scholastic thought, inherited from Aristotle and Averroës, then adapted as one of the basic formal mechanisms through which Thomistic logic both transposes its own theological categories onto an older classical framework and apprehends metaphysical relations of being, of identity and difference. Classically, it is by analogy that one conceives the likeness of the unlike, extracting a concept from the individual instances and scattered genera in which it otherwise resides: the quality of wisdom that characterizes God, say, but might differently characterize humans; the property of animation that attaches to humans but differently qualifies beasts. Hegel notes this problem of scholastic analogy in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, when he comments of Aquinas that the category of "substance (*forma substantialis*) is, for instance, analogous to" Aristotle's notion of entelechy (3: 71) or when he dismisses medieval Latin more generally as "a quite unsuitable instrument" for the consideration of older philosophical forms—in effect, an imprecise exercise in analogy (38).

Neither is a major point, and, as with most matters involving scholastic thought, Hegel rushes on and adds little else. But analogy has a way of insinuating itself into the crevices of his grand survey more broadly. Earlier in his *Lectures*, discussing Neoplatonism's development of "a manifold dialectic, which merely passes back-

C. D. BLANTON, associate professor of English at the University of California, Berkeley, is the author of *Epic Negation: The Dialectical Poetics of Late Modernism* (Oxford UP, 2015).

© 2015 C. D. BLANTON



*PMLA* 130.3 (2015), published by the Modern Language Association of America

https://doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2015.130.3.750 Published online by Cambridge University Press

wa a
t
none
wa
mul
(
t . Later he fastens approvingly on experimentalism's shift away from narrow procedures of scholastic deduction and toward the material world that scholasticism sought to abandon, while deploring the Baconian "establishment of conclusions through induction and analogy" (3: 180). In cases like these, analogy registers a moment of philosophical imprecision and thus, for Hegel, a disappointment—one of those moments (in Andrew Cole's phrase) when "the dialectical process becomes erratic, sluggish, or faltering," when it seems to devolve "into another kind of dialectic" altogether (51). But what other kind of dialectic? As the figural residue of some abortive, or at least incomplete, encounter between difference and identity, analogy seems to acknowledge an unmet logical need. It seems, that is, to stand as the sign of a dialectic that has yet to grasp itself as such, forced to contend with like and unlike, to be sure, but unable to transcend the merely figural quality of the relation.

The achievement of *The Birth of Theory* lies, most obviously, in a sequence of philosophical and historical claims that force us to realign Hegel's place and orientation in several planes at once: in relation to now obscure traditions of early medieval theology and against the background of incomplete modernization embedded in modernity itself; against near contemporaries (like Marx and Adam Smith) that seem to share his world but don't and alongside later antagonists (like Nietzsche and Deleuze) that seem not to share his world but (perhaps) do. But I wish to suggest that the book's larger importance lies elsewhere: in the systematic reclamation of analogy's persistence and formal difficulty—not only as the matter on which Hegel's practice of dialectical phenomenology works, in its systematic recirculation through modes of identity and difference, but also as the recurrent impetus behind the formal transposition of figure and concept through which, Cole argues, we can recognize "theory" as the logical challenge left in Hegel's wake. So understood, theory after Hegel stages a kind of elliptical aspiration to dialectics, searching for a way to realize the faltering hesitations of figural language as logical claims. This is not to suggest, quite, that Cole's Hegel emerges as a thinker of mere analogy, in the more limited usual sense of simple comparison or correspondence. It is, rather, to consider the degree to which theory as here understood—related to but not exhausted by philosophy, forced to grapple with philosophy's oldest problems using ever-changing tools—entails analogy's recovery as the formal ground of a distinctive propositional mode and a historically novel kind of *fact*.

As the examples of Proclus and Bacon suggest, the analogy is for Hegel a provisional halting place or temporary impasse—a staging area from which the problem of the interpenetration of identity and difference can be attacked again. It is the evidence that a prior logical form has not completed its work, that some new one is required. In this respect, analogies constitute the accumulated debris of the history of philosophy, the varied heap of figural, and therefore only incipiently conceptual, relations that Hegel's method is called to resolve. So conceived, an analogy appears in the mode of what Aristotle terms a "dialectical problem." Not yet fully available to a more purely delineated "dialectical proposition" (195–97), the assertion of a more settled or absolute logical identity, it is forced nonetheless to grapple with an expansive field of raw historical materials, of things and thoughts and appearances that somehow come to resemble one another, even as they resist the strict linkage of a propositional form.

In its simplest terms, the problem to be resolved by Cole's Hegel originates in this

https://doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2015.130.3.750 Published online by Cambridge University Press

difference between problem and proposition, in the recognition that even Aristotle's notion of a dialectical problem is, in itself, a dialectical problem. Or, rather, it stirs from the observation that the dialectic as (re)thought into motion by Hegel—only to be remade by Marx and resisted (or perhaps renewed) by Nietzsche—derives not from the classical Aristotelian system at all, with its methodological axiom of rigorous noncontradiction, nor even from the classical philosophy from which we take the term more generally. It arises instead, Cole insists, in the reconsideration of the dialectical proposition's underlying shape. In this second sense, dialectical reason remains, historically speaking, unequal to itself, not only embedded in two distinct logical regimes but also expressed in two incommensurable grammars. On one side, then, dialectic retains its classical sense as the mere form of syllogistic reason, anxious to avoid the menace of contradiction or the snare of sophistry but unable finally to articulate any mode of pure logical identification beyond the tautological: A = A. The answer to that impasse, Cole demonstrates, emerges only secondarily, with Neoplatonism's invention of "a dialectic *contra* dialectic" (34). The expansive theological monism of a postclassical medieval age, developed by thinkers like Proclus or Plotinus, reinscribes contradiction even within the classical law of identity: the Not-One in the One. And, in so doing, it induces a momentary shudder in the operation of Aristotelian noncontradiction, dividing A against itself.

What is most crucial, however, is the shape of the figural relation henceforth established between two apparently incommensurable logical regimes. The second dialectic, formed within Neoplatonic theology, does not so much contravene or dismiss the Aristotelian axiom of noncontradiction—as if to refute the simplest tautological form of a proposition—as formulate the excluded thought of which it was productively incapable. In effect, it binds the law of noncontradiction against a countervailing law of contradiction in what amounts to both a categorical antinomy and a logical identity, now formed according to a third logic formally reducible to neither of its antecedents. The outworn terms *thesis*, *antithesis*, and *synthesis* will need to be abandoned at just this moment, then, simply because no logical common ground or thetic space exists for A and not-A, each suddenly locked into a logical procedure predicated on the priority of the thing that it must systematically fail to account or acknowledge. Or, to put the problem more simply, the common field opened in the move from dialectical problem to dialectical proposition does not yet exist. A dialectical proposition refers, but it refers to something of which no identity in the original sense can be affirmed, something in the process of being made across the historical interval of a sentence. Hegel's explanation in the *Science of Logic* thus offers us a new propositional form altogether: "*A is*, is a beginning that hints at something different to which an advance is to be made; but this different something does not materialize; *A is—A*; the difference is only a vanishing; the movement returns into itself. The propositional form can be regarded as the hidden necessity of adding to abstract identity the more of that movement" (415–16). In "the more of that movement," the logical proposition itself has been altered, relocated from the terrain of what is or is not true to that of what will or will not be. And for Cole theory is born here: with this second, Neoplatonic dialectic, which negates (even as it absorbs and reproduces) the first, Aristotelian one.

A simple proposition, then: Hegel's is a "medieval dialectic" (Cole, ch. 2 [24–61]). In practical terms, the claim summons a formal genealogy almost as sweeping in its extent as Hegel's own, explaining in retrospect, for example, why his history of philosophy should so strangely assert the apparently epigonic moment of Alexandrian cosmopolitanism as the apogee of classical thought, when "the

https://doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2015.130.3.750 Published online by Cambridge University Press

absolute is finally set forth in its entirely concrete determination" (*Lectures* 2: 452). Hegel himself provides more evidence for the claim when he reminds us that "this method in philosophy is carried into later times, continuing even through the whole of the Middle Ages" (450), perhaps even to the cusp of the modern age in the thought of a figure like Nicholas of Cusa. Historically, then, Cole's argument opens one of those circuits of identification and counteridentification in which Hegel's method seems to specialize. Hegel is made by the Middle Ages, even as he remakes them; the formalization of the identity of noncontradiction and contradiction in the early nineteenth century turns out to fulfill the medieval period's (partially) forgotten first thought. At the same time, Hegel is transfigured, drawn back into the early Christian centuries and resituated at the passage *into* a medieval world that lies, strangely, in the future. In the process, history seems to move contrariwise, for a moment at least, as if we moderns, insofar as we remain locked in the constitutive terms of the Hegelian system, were required to recall our own secretly medieval position on the threshold of some future radically alien from our own.

More important in this context, however, is the propositional form that Cole's argument for such a "birth of theory" has assumed. By the (now suddenly Neoplatonic) logic of identity and difference, after all, the claim that Hegel's is a medieval dialectic must be read both to assert what it says and, more cryptically, to deny it, interposing a recognition of difference between two previously logically equivalent terms—Hegel's dialectic and its medieval precursor—before restating both. When Cole insists that Hegel's is a medieval dialectic and offers that statement as a dialectical proposition in itself, he also names an entirely different set of problems, seemingly all but unrelated to the simpler question of Neoplatonism's influence. Indeed, here another medieval dialectic comes into view, connected now to the belated system of social relations that obtained in the duchy of Württemberg in the late eighteenth century, organizing the guild economies of Stuttgart and the vaguely monastic rituals of the medieval seminary at Tübingen, through which Hegel passed. If the first iteration of the medieval dialectic maintains an ineffable but fearsome abstraction, straining toward the thought of what Hegel terms absolute determination by way of the One, this second version seems stuck in empirical mire, in the real world of late German feudalism not yet swept away by the Napoleonic descent of spirit on horseback. But again Cole's argument is straightforward. Against the familiar and idealizing readings canonized by Alexandre Kojève and Jean Hyppolite, it reminds us that the masters and slaves of the *Phenomenology* are more properly *Herren* and *Knechte*, lords and bondsmen bound to each other not in some deterritorialized struggle for existential recognition but rather by their assigned places in a feudal hierarchy constructed on the principle of *Grundherrschaft*, or landed lordship.

Far from simply recontextualizing the most famous moment in Hegel's *Phenomenology*, Cole's reminder fundamentally rewrites it, restoring a series of key concepts to their rightful historical places. It is now possession, rather than mere formal acknowledgment, over which lords and vassals struggle, and it is the difference in the modes of possession available to each—guaranteed by title on one side, by labor on the other—that structures ethical and political relations. In the process, an array of problems more usually associated with Marx emerge in altered guises: alienation, produced now in the accumulated surplus of landed (rather than merely exchanged) labor; value, still concretely referred to the constitutive grounding of land rather than a fully formed market; even labor, not yet strictly commodified under a new and systematically elaborated mode of production, capital as such. The effect of the

https://doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2015.130.3.750 Published online by Cambridge University Press

second medieval dialectic is at one level obvious enough, discerning a proleptic reflection of Marx's dialectical materialism in unrecognized medieval shapes, each of them still tangibly available to a Hegel whose present does not quite coincide with Marx's, trapped instead in a Middle Ages that outlives itself.

Like the argument for the Neoplatonic origin of dialectics, this is a straightforward claim, veridical if not quite empirical, subject to historical affirmation or denial. But with this turn something different has happened as well. For it is here that Cole's basic argument that Hegel's is a medieval dialectic assumes a new theoretical complexity. To assent to such a claim, after all, one must not only grant the generically medieval source of Hegel's thought but also affirm two distinct, perhaps even contradictory, propositions regarding the medieval dialectic: that it originates in the third century, as antiquity decays, but that it also originates a millennium and a half later, in the vestigial forms of the Holy Roman Empire and Hegel's feudal Germany, generated by historically determinate forces with no particular relation to the first origin. Taken on its own, neither proposition entails a logical contradiction. When taken together, however, the two claims situate medieval dialectic as a concept founded in formal contradiction, subject to a predication that accretes propositional force as it shifts its shape in time. Cole's formulation exploits another of Hegel's familiar oppositions, suggesting that Hegel "adds feudal *content* to the already medieval dialectical *form* of identity/difference" (67), in effect detaching what was already a distinctively medieval content (Neoplatonic dialectical phenomenology) into a more transcendent formal principle, while also extracting a distinctively medieval system of formal relations (anchored in the overlapping economies of subinfeudation) as the implicit content of self-consciousness more generally. But even that formulation risks theoretical understatement. For the challenge lies not merely in the realization that form and content are inverted, and inverted again across large swathes of medieval history, but also in the propositional structure that underwrites their deeper logical equivalence. Conceived in this way, the restless difficulty of Cole's argument derives not from the assertion that Hegel's is a medieval dialectic but rather from the discovery (by way of Hegel) that a medieval dialectic is both A and not A—on its way to becoming another A entirely. In Hegel's formula, *A is—A*.

It is no doubt in the nature of the Hegelian system to admit the claim for multiple sources and origins at once, and, at least superficially, Cole's reclamation of Hegel's as a medieval dialectic retraces the same gesture, as if to produce the contextual key beneath an otherwise inscrutable code. What is different in Cole's version, however, is the sense of the medieval dialectic itself: its propagation of two radically different, perhaps even irreconcilable, historical propositions, the second emerging as soon as the first is secured, not to render it partial but to assert a still-unknown identity with it. Whatever one makes of Neoplatonism's lingering influence and speculative style, of the slow and uneven patchwork of German modernization, of Hegel's accounts of sacramental theology or the tradition of *Fürstenspiegel*, Cole's theoretical provocation lies in the demand that we construct a propositional grammar capable of accommodating an otherwise impossible thought: of an identity between third-century logical modes and eighteenth- or nineteenth-century landed relations and cultural forms, between things that have little to do with each other until Hegel draws them together. We seem to lack a positive or meaningful concept capable of ordering such an identity logically, an A capable of returning to identity beyond Hegel's fateful dash. Even the notion of the medieval stands revealed as a mere calculus of differences, a measure of distance from the modernity that comes after or the antiquity that comes before. But the deeper point is that Hegel lacks

https://doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2015.130.3.750 Published online by Cambridge University Press

that concept too, even as his method sets out to formulate a language and a posterior logic capable of accommodating it, constructing a system that discovers its origins in retrospect. The attempt to locate any other story of the origin of the Hegelian dialectic will encounter the same difficulty, as its very mode begins to insist on identities grounded in difference and on the need for some new means of expression measured to that expanding contradiction.

One might say, then, that theory is reborn here, with a different inflection, as critical theses about Alexandrian mysticism and German land claims are reshaped on a different plane. But this implies a still-deeper claim about what theory is in the wake of Hegel. In their traditional forms, Hegel's chosen conceptual regimes—theology, history, philosophy as such—strain to accommodate the twisting force that draws radically disjunctive sentences into constative equivalence as one seeks to complete that original sentence: "*A is. . . .*" Instead, they find themselves trapped in what the *Phenomenology* snarls to label "the abyss of vacuity" (9): the formalism of Kant's antinomies, the idealist night in which all cows are black (9), the cold measures of Aristotelian scholasticism—all incapable of vaulting beyond the constraint of noncontradiction. And though Hegel's practice cannot entirely evade such a law, cannot elude the governance of the concept while remaining philosophy, it also cannot submit straightforwardly. It must instead find a way to redouble and expand the logical proposition as it goes, to enhance identity's referential range by substantializing the dash between A and another A that eventuates first in negation but subsequently in a new and unforeseen identity. The singularity of theory after Hegel lies in its incorporation of its own logical aftermath, in the methodological recognition that "dialectics requires a figural supplement . . . to explain what identity/difference cannot"—in fact, "needs more than its own concepts" to complete even the most elemental historical predication of those concepts. Dialectics, Cole insists, "needs figures, too—other narratives, other modes of thinking, other ways of seeing and believing—to complete dialectics as both a critical practice and a style" (87).

The parabolic return of that last sentence, swerving from a first dialectics that lacks figuration to a second that suddenly includes what it once lacked, all while remaining dialectics, diagrams the challenge of this logic perfectly. In Cole's claim for the methodological centrality of the figural and for that difference as the distinction of theory—first offered in the context of an analogy between Hegel's account of the eucharist and Marx's analysis of the commodity—we should certainly hear again the transposition from Aristotelian noncontradiction to Hegelian contradiction. But we should also hear a reduplication of the original shift in which a properly dialectical proposition was formed, signaled now in philosophy's deeper recovery as "a critical practice and a style." Under this account, theory is born in the need to venture beyond philosophy in order to answer philosophy's original challenge, to complete its sentence historically. But I have suggested that Hegel's dialectical proposition privileges one figural supplement in particular as it wanders away from a first A and toward a second, only *then* to discover a hitherto nonexistent concept in the field made necessary by the comparison. In yoking Hegel's eucharist to Marx's commodity, Cole is of course proposing an analogy. What is most striking, however, is that each term of the comparison is analogical already, formed in the need to impose conceptual certainty on the (at first) figurally related terms of bread and body, labor and value. We are thus confronted with a second-order analogy between analogies, originating in the very difficulty of grasping the body in the bread, the labor in the thing.

> Objectively considered, then, the bread is just bread, the wine just wine; yet both are

https://doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2015.130.3.750 Published online by Cambridge University Press

> something more. This "more" is not connected with the objects (like an explanation) by a mere "just as." . . . Yet the connection of objective and subjective, of the bread and the persons, is here not the connection of allegorized with allegory, with the parable in which the different things, the things compared, are set forth as severed, as separate, and all that is asked is a comparison, the thought of the likeness of dissimilars. On the contrary, in *this* link between bread and persons, difference disappears, and with it the possibility of comparison. Things heterogeneous are here most intimately connected. (Hegel, qtd. in Cole 91)

The basic question here is essentially a theological one, slowly revealed as the (equally essential) province of philosophy instead, as difference emerges, substantialized into a "more," and then disappears into identity with something previously heterogeneous. But Hegel's claim that body and bread merge, that the relations among things absorb the relations among persons, remains only notionally or abstractly true. It is true, but figurally, and the truth of the eucharist in itself lies in the realization of an original analogy as a logically tenable but still abstract proposition awaiting its next identity.

Cole's narrative abounds in such analogies, each a deliberately jarring moment of theoretical reidentification, designed to chart a poetics "whereby figure is concept, and concept is figure" (135), whereby *Darstellung* and *Vorstellung* have internalized their philosophical contradiction to produce a new propositional mode. But it is in Hegel's encounter with Marx that analogy fully emerges as the instrument of "a critical practice and a style." For with the commodity something has shifted, as Marx surreptitiously encodes the abstract logic of sacramentality into the concrete system of commodity exchange. From the outset, Cole frames this central relation of Hegel to Marx by way of "two analogies": "What the Middle Ages is to Hegel, modernity is to Marx; what feudalism is to Hegel, capitalism is to Marx" (xvii). The first problem raised by the assertion is easily recognized as a search for an elusive common predication: what the Middle Ages is, what modernity is, A is. Between and through the grammar of the two analogies, a contradictory answer arises: the Middle Ages is what modernity is, feudalism is what capitalism is, which is to say that an abstraction has arisen—the concept of a mode of production, sufficient to regulate the larger historical relation formed between the two original terms. What is most crucial is not the implicit propositional identification: the medieval is the modern. The thought is impossible, categorically untenable under a law of identity. Logically speaking, feudalism remains feudalism only insofar as it is not capitalism, after all, and whatever modernity is, it is not the Middle Ages. But if the conceptualization of feudalism *as* a mode of production depends on the formulation of a posterior term, on Marx's intervention to complete Hegel's sentence, then the analogy is more than facile paradox—and ultimately more than merely figural. Neither simply assertoric nor merely metaphoric, reducible to neither statement nor pseudo-statement, it marks a capacity for propositional expansion, registering the possibility that history might complete the thought and make it true.

Formally, the implicit core of Cole's argument lies just here: if theory after Hegel consists in the practice of formulating dialectical propositions out of dialectical problems, then it depends on analogy's capacity for prefiguration, in a sense approaching Erich Auerbach's. The scattered elements of Hegel's Middle Ages—whether trapped in the mysteries of transubstantiation, vouched in the recovery of *Fürstenspiegel* as a rejoinder to classical political economy, or intimated in more recent critical accounts of allegory and utopia—accordingly emerge as evidence of something more than simply medieval. They are in fact *figurae* that, having originated in the dialectic of identity and difference, subsequently

https://doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2015.130.3.750 Published online by Cambridge University Press

impose themselves as real abstractions: the commodity, the state and the market, capital itself. "*Hegel knew that the modern reckons ceaselessly with the medieval*," Cole insists, and in the slant of the italics one discerns that the medieval dialectic is defined, finally, by its refusal to remain medieval (118). When Cole turns in conclusion to the problem of "dialectical interpretation," then, the medieval dialectic has begun to contend with modernity. But more important is the way in which it has begun to think modernity: the Middle Ages have invented the future.

I have already suggested that analogy is the instrument of that invention. But Cole's conjunction of figure and concept as the interlocking gears of Hegel's thought allows a further specification. In one respect, the relation of figure to concept is inescapably analogical in its own right: the figure's power to parody or anticipate the concept's propositional force launches the work of figuration again and again. But that relation admits two formal descriptions, two ways of understanding analogy, divided on the historical relation of present to future that the medieval dialectic frames.

To grasp the difference, we might return to the scholastic mode of analogy with which I began, to weigh it against the figural-conceptual practice in which Cole locates theory. When Hegel scorns scholasticism's practice of Aristotelian commentary, he takes analogy in the attested scholastic sense. In 1498 Thomas Cajetan produced the only systematic scholastic account of analogy, sifting through Aristotle, Averroës, and Aquinas to delineate its formal logic in *De nominum analogia* (*The Analogy of Names*). Like Cole's Hegel, Cajetan stands at the cusp of a postmedieval age. A few years earlier, he had engaged Pico della Mirandola in a public disputation at Ferrara (with some success); two decades later, he would be dispatched to Germany to assert papal power against Martin Luther's challenge (with considerably less). But in his attempt to codify "this doctrine . . . so necessary that without it no one can study metaphysics" (9), Cajetan looks back. Analogy as he conceives it is a necessarily fraught endeavor, menaced by the lure of false recognitions, always portending a fall into misnaming or misattribution. Accordingly, Cajetan denies that either name or attribution—in grammatical terms, the common application of a single noun or a single adjective, respectively, to multiple objects—underwrites analogy. Instead, he insists, analogy properly names a definitive relation of proportion: it asserts an abstract formal identity between phenomenally unlike analogates, but only when they share a common measure. For Cajetan, then, analogy is designed to safeguard and maintain noncontradiction, establishing "a mean between pure equivocation and univocation" and foreclosing the movement of A beyond A:

> By an *equivocal* name diverse things are so signified that, as such, they are united only by the external word. By a *univocal* name diverse things are so signified that, as such, they are united into some thing which in itself is absolutely one, and which is abstracted and separated from them in the cognitive order. By an *analogous* name, however, diverse things are so signified that, as such, they are united to diverse things according to one proportion. (30)

Analogy's reliance on a "double concept" (32), by this logic, acknowledges the inevitable conceptual imperfection of a fallen world by dreaming of identity (univocation) and resisting difference (equivocation), straining to purge that world of any profligate figurality.

At historical moments when another sense of analogy arises, however, in Neoplatonism's raw dialectical movement or even Baconian induction, the figure does a different work, implicitly opening a grammatical crevice tantamount to Hegel's stammering dash in the restatement of the law of identity. If Cajetan's notion of analogy forms a defensive tool of logical reduction, Hegel's preferred

https://doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2015.130.3.750 Published online by Cambridge University Press

figural mode does the opposite, seeking a language in which univocation and equivocation merge in the same statement, in which the absolute diversity of the external world divulges its absolute singularity. Cole does not argue that Hegel provides the formula by which modernity realizes the logic of the medieval dialectic—or tell us what A is. But if we take this dialectic as the sounding out of a proposition by way of analogy, the prefiguration of a conceptual identity historically to be made, it is possible to finish the sentence. Could it not be said that the logical form made possible by the medieval dialectic culminates in another universalizing formula of identity and difference, in Marx's "general formula for capital" (257)? (*A is—A*) is—(M-C-M').

## Works Cited

Aristotle. *Topics*. Trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge. *The Basic Works of Aristotle*. Ed. Richard McKeon. New York: Random, 187–206. Print.

Cajetan, Thomas. The Analogy of Names *and* The Concept of Being. Trans. Edward A. Bushinski. Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1953. Print.

Cole, Andrew. *The Birth of Theory*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2014. Print.

Hegel, G. W. F. *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. 3 vols. Trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson. London: Kegan, 1894–96. Print.

———. *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Trans. A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977. Print.

———. *Science of Logic*. Trans. A. V. Miller. London: Allen, 1969. Print.

Marx, Karl. *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*. Vol. 1. Trans. Ben Fowkes. London: Penguin–New Left Rev., 1990. Print.

Stevens, Wallace. "Effects of Analogy." *The Necessary Angel: Essays on Reality and the Imagination*. London: Faber, 1960. 105–30. Print.

https://doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2015.130.3.750 Published online by Cambridge University Press