Antiquorum series, compiled by John Falconer and Thomas Mannack, *Winchester College*.[4] It is the model of a good teaching collection; an even better one, if the fourteen vases that went missing in the 1960s are ever recovered.

NIGEL SPIVEY

[4] *Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum, Great Britain Fasicule 19: Winchester College*. By John Falconer and Thomas Mannack. Oxford U.P., 2002. Pp. 26, with 16 plates. £45.

Philosophy

The word 'morality' carries an air of gloom about it: we somehow recognize the legitimacy of its imperatives even while thinking that they conflict with our own best interests. The nice thing about Greek ethics is its commitment to leading us away from such inner torsion: Greek philosophers encourage us to pursue personal happiness safe in the knowledge that virtue is the eradication of conflict, that what really is in one's own interests always coincides with what one 'ought' to do. That, in any case, was always the story; but it is one challenged by Nicholas White in his *Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics*.[1] Focussing on Plato, Aristotle, Stoicism, and Epicurus, he suggests that their treatment at the roots of modern history of philosophy (especially at the hands of Kant and Hegel) has led to a simplistic view of Greek thought as straightforwardly eudaimonistic – i.e., based on the (unargued) premise that duty and happiness ultimately coincide. In fact, so White argues, no-one in antiquity thought that rational pursuit should be directed single-mindedly towards personal happiness except Epicurus – and no-one claimed a perfect harmony of all rational aims except the Stoics (the strength of whose theoretical commitment to eudaimonism White casts in doubt). This is an important exercise in adding shade and nuance to a term ('eudaimonism') that is without doubt too often invoked as a way of papering over difficulties. White also shows beautifully how ancient and modern philosophical thought can play off each other without either being given the upper hand. The bulk of the discussion centres on Plato (remember that his philosopher kings *must* rule the city despite their own inclinations towards the ivory tower) and Aristotle (note the conflicting models of happiness in his *Ethics*). It is striking, as I think these two major examples show, how much harder the work and more controversial the passages required to make the point for Aristotle: it does not, after all, go without saying that there are *conflicting* models of virtue in the *Ethics*. (Indeed, a fresh and attractive attempt to reconcile them is made by Sarah Broadie in her introduction to a new translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* discussed below.) And one can see why there might be a difference between Plato and Aristotle here: through his discussion of 'political virtue', Plato needs to keep something in reserve to make purification worthwhile for the immortal (part of the) soul. Aristotle is diffident about the existence of such a thing, which perhaps makes him more likely to expect ethical virtue to work out. Still, White knows his discussion is corrective, not Copernican, and as such it should be compulsory reading. Broadie's discussion of Aristotelian happiness is but a small part of an 82-page survey of Aristotle's ethics which introduces her commentary on Christopher Rowe's excellent new translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.[2] Her thought, both here and in her

[1] *Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics*. By Nicholas White. Oxford U.P., 2002. Pp. xv + 369. £35.

[2] *Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics*. Translation (with historical introduction) by Christopher Rowe; philosophical introduction and commentary by Sarah Broadie. Oxford U.P., 2002. Pp. x + 468. Paper £14.99.

https://doi.org/10.1093/gr/50.1.123 Published online by Cambridge University Press

line-by-line commentary on the work, is not obviously crafted to help the first-time ethicist (worth noting, since the volume as a whole is clearly intended for undergraduate teaching, as well as research); but with a little background (or a lot), one can revel in its incisive clarity and refreshing independence. Rowe's translation, backed up by remarks in his 'Historical Introduction', exemplifies what looks like a new trend of sensitivity to the literary qualities of the surviving Aristotelian works. Scholars have certainly been blinkered by the knowledge that we have lost Aristotle's dialogues, considered literary masterpieces in antiquity, and Rowe is quite right to alert us to the possibility that Aristotle wrote well even when (or if) he wasn't writing for publication. 'Some parts [sc. of the *Nicomachean Ethics*] . . . are close to being beautifully written,' he says; 'a few actually moving' (5). A new translation of *Aristotle On Poetics*[3] by Seth Benardete and Michael Davis likewise refuses to look down on Aristotle's work as an untidy collection of lecture notes, but explores it as an artful, and so, in this case, self-referential, composition. In the introduction, for example, Davis argues that chapter 12, traditionally viewed as an intrusive overview of various aspects of tragedy, in fact discusses matters of focal relevance to the chorus, so that its intrusive character can be viewed as a homage to the digressive nature of the choral ode (xxix–xxx). To avoid prejudging the issue, Benardete and Davis are concerned to keep their translation as literal as possible, as uninfected as possible by the terms of an anachronistic literary criticism. Rather than 'plot', for example, *muthos* is translated as it would be anywhere else in Aristotle: 'story'. Some words are only transliterated (*poiêsis* is one), and many more transliterations are dropped in alongside their translations. These often hint at new avenues of interpretation in quite subtle ways: when Aristotle says (actually *whenever* Aristotle says) 'I say . . .', or 'I mean . . .', it is dutifully followed by '[*legô*]'. Why? Presumably to flag up self-reflexivity again: Aristotle is *talking* and *meaning* about *speeches* (*logoi*). This suggests a target audience that will see, or have instructors to point out, the connection between *legô* and *logos* / *legein* (the latter pairing is all we get by way of explanation: 3 n. 9). But I like that: it stimulates thought without being too prescriptive about what one should think; and this will make a thoroughly enjoyable translation from which to teach – and learn. Benardete and Davis tend towards the assumption that the *Poetics* was only concerned with tragedy. Perhaps the best-known recent exponent of the view that there was a second book dealing with comedy as well is Richard Janko, whose controversial classic *Aristotle on Comedy*[4] has appeared at last in paperback, 18 years after it was first published. What caused the controversy was Janko's robust argument, not only that there had been a *Poetics* 2 on comedy, but that elements of it are preserved in an (otherwise) undistinguished medieval treatise on the subject: the Tractatus Coislinianus. The paperback preface shows Janko unrepentant; as does his defence of his position in Øivind Andersen and Jon Haarberg's *Making Sense of Aristotle*[5] – a collection of articles which (to be more specific) aims to make sense of Aristotle's *Poetics*. In addition to Janko's piece, there are valuable insights into the pleasure of tragedy (Malcolm Heath: it is the pleasure of virtuous response), and its appropriate length (Elizabeth Belfiore); and into

[3] *Aristotle, On Poetics*. Translated by Seth Benardete and Michael Davis. With an introduction by Michael Davis. St Augustine's Press, South Bend, 2002. Pp. xxx + 105.

[4] *Aristotle on Comedy*. Towards a Reconstruction of *Poetics* II. By Richard Janko. Duckworth, London, 2002. Pp. x + 294. Paper £14.99.

[5] *Making Sense of Aristotle*. Essays in Poetics. Edited by Øivind Andersen and Jon Haarberg. Duckworth, London, 2001. Pp. viii + 230. £40.

https://doi.org/10.1093/gr/50.1.123 Published online by Cambridge University Press

mimesis (Hallvard Fossheim, and Stephen Halliwell – who also has important things to say about the superiority of poetry to history in the treatment of 'universals'). Four papers deal with the reception and influence of the *Poetics* – from Pacuvius (Elaine Fantham) through the Renaissance (Daniel Javitch, Kirsti Minsaas) to Brecht (which is where Michael Silk ends). Terence Cave's closing article on 'The Afterlife of the *Poetics*' (which implicitly rebuffs the slightly nervous attempt in the editors' introduction to justify the collection by hinting at the possibility of a model under which one could talk of scholarly progress) provides a useful historico-philosophical survey of the work's treatment, and argues (with case study) that the obvious focus of interest for our own age should be the cognitive structures of fiction approached through a study of *recognition* (*anagoresis*). 'We have surely had enough, for the time being at least, of the emotive-psychological-psychoanalytic readings surrounding "catharsis"' (206). An attempt to let Aristotle speak for himself through more literal fidelity to his Greek is self-consciously evident too in James Lennox' edition of *Aristotle, On the Parts on Animals I–IV*.[6] By eschewing the Linnaean terms employed (notably) in the Loeb translation, for example, Lennox hopes to make the proper character of Aristotle's approach to taxonomy clearer, and also to focus attention on the more immediate philosophical issues raised by the *Parts of Animals* – e.g. the relationship between the discussion of explanation and inquiry in *PA* 1 and the actual investigations of *PA* 2–4; and between *PA* as a whole and the *Generation of Animals*. (Lennox argues that *PA*'s study of the living animal in its actualized, functional form has explanatory priority over the *GA*'s inquiry into causes.) *PA* 1 was treated, along with *GA* 1, in an early classic of the Clarendon Aristotle Series by D. M. Balme. But no-one will begrudge the overlap: it is extremely satisfactory to have a commentary on the work as a whole. There is one last study of Aristotle to mention this year. *Aristotle's Theory of Language and Meaning*[7] by Deborah Modrak advertizes itself as an explication of the 'description of meaning contained in *De interpretatione*' – though it passes through a number of more familiar stamping-grounds for Aristotelians on the way. The quick version of the conclusion is not all that surprising: language can *mean* (i.e. refer to the world outside the mind) because the internal states (concepts) to which it assigns phonetic values are based on the mind's grasp through perception of those very forms which are responsible for the furniture of the world in the first place. The real value of the book lies in Modrak's careful location of the theory in the wider context of Aristotle's thought. It is, for example, unusual and helpful to see Aristotle's theory of perception and imagination approached from this angle, though Aristotle himself makes the link by telling us that the *de anima* is needed to fill out his account in the *de interpretatione*. Pythagoras is one of the hardest challenges for a historian of philosophy: an unpublished philosopher whose later admirers credited him with almost every philosophical discovery; a man who wore trousers and a golden diadem, hinted that he was Apollo reincarnate, counselled against the consumption of beans, and had views about the square of the hypotenuse. In *Pythagoras*,[8] however, Christoph Riedweg manages to bring some order to the evidence

[6] *Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals I–IV*. Clarendon Aristotle Series. Translated with a commentary by James G. Lennox. Oxford U.P., 2001. Pp. xv + 404. £40.

[7] *Aristotle's Theory of Language and Meaning*. By Deborah K. W. Modrak. Cambridge U.P., 2001. Pp. ix + 302. £37.50.

[8] *Pythagoras*. Leben, Lehre, Nachwirkung. By Christoph Riedweg. C. H. Beck, Munich, 2002. Pp. 206, 3 illustrations, 1 map. Paper €20.50.

https://doi.org/10.1093/gr/50.1.123 Published online by Cambridge University Press

for his subject. In a careful and disciplined study, he uses Pythagoras' historical context and the earliest evidence for his activity as starting-points for assessing (rather than merely rejecting) the later testimonia. The picture that emerges is plausible without being reductive. Pythagoras was (*pace* Burkert) more than just a shaman or guru: Riedweg notes that even some among his guru-like 'sayings' (*akousmata*) point to a genuine interest in the nature of the cosmos. This study restores to Pythagoras a legitimate position in the history of rational philosophy, whose contributions include (as Riedweg's fascinating discussion has convinced me) the word 'philosophy' itself. There is a cursory overview of (Neo-)Pythagoreanism(s) down to the present day, and an appendix listing 2,600 years of the most important sources for Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism. Peter Kingsley's *In the Dark Places of Wisdom*,[9] by contrast, makes more of a guru and less of a logician out of Parmenides. Kingsley attempts to rescue Parmenides from what he sees as his reinvention by Plato and to set him in his proper social and intellectual context, which crucially includes the fact that he was a priest in a healing cult of Apollo Oulios in Veia (i.e. Elea). Parmenides' poem, it turns out, is nothing less than an account of his own experiences of incubation at his shrine: not an ascent into the realms of light, but a descent into Tartarus which is the source of light and night; a meeting with Persephone and a journey to a level of consciousness transcending space and time. Kingsley's sympathy for the benefits of incubation verges on the evangelical, and his apophthegmatic text is accessible and compelling (the impeccable scholarly references are neatly stored away at the back for those who want them). But he sneers not a little at what he sees as the arid pretensions of traditional scholarship, and this is harder to palate, not only because it is an unpleasant way of courting popularity, but also because, if Kingsley sees many things which other scholars have not seen, he does so partly by evading the serious question of Parmenides' engagement with the Ionian tradition of rational physics. Or does he mean, simply and implausibly, to deny any relationship with them? More conventional is Jürgen-Eckardt Pleines' *Heraklit*,[10] which attacks the idea that Heraclitus' *logos* is a unified ordering principle in the cosmos. Pleines traces the word *harmonia* in Heraclitus to its etymological root: *harmos*, he suggests, points to something more like 'interval' than unification. The 'harmony' of the cosmos, then, is not to be thought of as a transcendent concord or 'symphony', but rather expresses its inherently tensional structure. A surprising, though extremely welcome, addition to the Cambridge 'Greek and Yellow' series is Nicholas Denyer's edition of Plato's *Alcibiades*.[11] The foundational text of Platonic studies in antiquity, the work has more recently been despised and neglected. But Denyer provides a withering survey of the arguments moved against the work's authenticity (15–16, with a scathing critique of stylometry thrown in for good measure at 17–20), and argues that it didn't exactly fall from grace: it was pushed, elbowed from the canon by a developmental account of Plato's work that could not accommodate its combination of 'early', 'middle', and 'late' elements. Denyer argues against a view that aligns development with subject-matter or sophistication; and

[9] *In the Dark Places of Wisdom*. By Peter Kingsley. Duckworth, London, 1999. Pp. 255, 1 map. Paper £12.99.

[10] *Heraklit*. Anfängliches Philosophieren. Olms Studienbücher Antike 9. By Jürgen-Eckardt Pleines. Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 2002. Pp. 217. Paper €15.80.

[11] *Plato, Alcibiades*. Edited by Nicholas Denyer. Cambridge U.P., 2001. Pp. xi + 254. Cloth £45; paper £15.95.

https://doi.org/10.1093/gr/50.1.123 Published online by Cambridge University Press

he encourages us to see in the *Alcibiades* what antiquity saw in it: the best available introduction to Plato. The commentary is short on the broader discussion of themes; but is full of philosophical, philological, historical, and literary orientation and insight (e.g. 116–7 on ways of saying 'yes'; 143 on Alcibiades' prophetic lisp; and 152 on Peparethos, a place too obscure to be a by-word for obscurity). Denyer's dislike for the traditional developmental account of Plato is something he shares with the so-called Tübingen School of Platonic exegesis, whose work is celebrated in *Platonisches Philosophieren*,[12] a double *Festschrift* for its foremost exponent, Hans Krämer. ('Double', because it draws on conferences celebrating both Krämer's 65th birthday in 1994, and his 70th in 1999.) At the heart of Tübingen exegesis is a rejection of the idea that Platonic dialogues are essentially open-ended discussions: if they seem that way it is only because they need the 'unwritten doctrines' (for which we have some evidence in Aristotle) to complete them. No surprise, then, that most of the papers here deal with either the form of Plato's writings or the metaphysical content of the unwritten doctrines. In the former category, Vittorio Hösle asks why Plato presented his philosophy the way he did; Günter Figal and Klaus Oehler look at the consequences of his choice for us as interpreters. The central metaphysical question raised by the unwritten doctrines is the nature and role of the 'One' and the 'Many'. Jens Halfwassen here joins the Neoplatonists in believing that Plato posited a One above Being, while Maurizio Migliori argues that the One and Many are co-ordinate first principles; Giovanni Reale finds them at work in the *Symposium*. Wilhelm Schwabe's article (which weighs in at a hefty 146 pages) argues that what souls see in the super-celestial realm of the *Phaedrus* is not the Form of Knowledge, but an 'intelligence' that characterizes the realm of Forms as a whole. Also included are essays by Michael Erler (on Proclus' view of prayer), and Karl Albert (on Louis Lavelle's anticipation of Krämer in the use the unwritten doctrines). It is no coincidence that every contributor to this volume is German or Italian: Anglo-American scholarship has not, on the whole, embraced Tübingen, and nor have the French, whose opposition is exemplified in Luc Brisson's monumental *Le Même et l'autre,*[13] first published in 1974, and now in its third edition. The title suggests an overlap with Tübingen interests, but Brisson has no time for the 'unwritten doctrines' or Aristotle's claims about them (225). Instead this 'systematic commentary' on the *Timaeus* presents a series of studies of key *written* metaphysical topics: the Demiurge, forms, receptacle, world soul, material world, man, and necessity; the whole amounting to an examination of the 'underlying ontological structure' of the *Timaeus*. New in this edition is a *Postface* which lists reviews of the book (609), and contains a defence of its reissue: it remains (so he says) the only work which juxtaposes, on an equal footing, all previous interpretations of the *Timaeus*, ancient and modern (613). Paulo Butti de Lima clearly has little time for the Tübingen search for dialectical closure. In *Platone*,[14] he takes his cue from Socrates' discussion in the *Theaetetus* of the philosopher

[12] *Platonisches Philosophieren*. Zehn Vorträge zu Ehren von Hans Joachim Krämer. Spudasmata 82. Edited by Thomas Alexander Szlezák with the assistance of Karl-Heinz Stanzel. Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 2001. Pp. viii + 338. Paper €68.

[13] *Le Même et l'autre dans la structure ontologique du* Timée *de Platon*. Un Commentaire systématique du *Timée* de Platon. International Plato Studies 2. By Luc Brisson. 3rd edn. Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin, 1998. Pp. 613. DM 128.

[14] *Platone*. Esercizi di filosofia per il giovane Teeteto. By Paulo Butti de Lima. Marsilio Editori, Venice, 2002. Pp. 167. Paper €15.50.

https://doi.org/10.1093/gr/50.1.123 Published online by Cambridge University Press

and society to explore the three-way comparison of philosopher, sophist, and 'ordinary' citizen by way of a binary distinction between the slave and the free. Philosophy, he suggests, despite being unpersuasive and impractical (or perhaps because it is both) is characteristically the discourse of the free. Thematic connections and ramifications are traced from this central point, to which Lima constantly returns. Some of these, it has to be said, look like rather empty exercises in joining unnumbered dots; but others are helpful and stimulating: e.g. the use at 58–9 of the 'rationalist' physician and his empirical slave who appear in the *Laws* as an example of how the epistemological is political for Plato. Anne Balansard's *Technè dans les Dialogues de Platon*,[15] by contrast, is a work founded on the most rigorous tradition of continental philology. Starting from a systematic semantic study of words for skill and agency in Plato, Balansard goes on to draw some surprising and important conclusions for the way we read his works. We have tended to suppose that the invocation of 'skill' in the dialogues is due to the initiative of Socrates, who wishes to argue for a conception of virtue as itself a *techne*. And skills, we suppose, are productive: the cobbler makes shoes, the Demiurge makes a universe, the virtuous produce happiness (whether in themselves or in others). But Balansard shows that *techne* is by no means always thought of as a *productive* activity. Indeed, the Sophists lay claim to *skill* while (snobbishly) repudiating the suggestion that they are *producers*. This – and the fact that Plato's Socrates himself moves in exalted social and intellectual circles: he talks *about* producers, not *with* them – is Balansard's cardinal observation. Perhaps Socrates' interest in the arts of *production* is, in the end, a polemical gambit: he challenges the Sophists' claims to (knowledge-based) skill by forcing them to define themselves *against* specifically productive arts. Roslyn Weiss also tilts at the traditional identification of Socratic virtue as a *skill* in her study of the *Meno*, *Virtue in the Cave*.[16] She starts from those features of the *Meno* which have puzzled or annoyed most of its readers, concentrated around the work's central passage: the thesis that learning is really recollection. Apart from anything else, the paradigm for the theory, the supposed 'recollection' by the slave-boy of a geometrical proposition, looks at best like mere computation (achieved through heavy-handed guidance by Socrates). Weiss grasps the nettle: it's all a con (a 'myth'). In fact, the charade of 'recollection' is really a cunning way of encouraging Meno to engage in critical examination of his own beliefs through the dramatic presentation of a successful elenchus. Knowledge of moral truths is not, after all, possible for human beings, since we can't get the required distance on the subject (as we can on mathematics). The best we can hope for is to arrive at true beliefs about virtue which, as being a matter 'of the soul', are latent within it; and then to keep testing them in the elenchus. In fine, Weiss argues that the *Meno* is Socratic not Platonic: a call to live an examined life, not an invitation to the realm of the forms. Weiss's arguments, particularly for the differences between the *Meno* and the *Phaedo* (which she argues is the *Meno's* Platonic avatar), are important; but I am not convinced that the spare parts which would be needed to reconcile these differences would be any more costly than those by which the *Meno* is made resolutely Socratic. It is possible, but not *clear* that the *Meno* asks us to conclude

[15] Technè *dans les* Dialogues *de Platon*. L'Empreinte de la sophistique. International Plato Studies 14. By Anne Balansard, with an introduction in English by Luc Brisson. Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin, 2001. Pp. xvii + 430. DM 118.

[16] *Virtue in the Cave*. Moral Inquiry in Plato's *Meno*. By Roslyn Weiss. Oxford U.P., 2001. Pp. x + 229.

https://doi.org/10.1093/gr/50.1.123 Published online by Cambridge University Press

that knowledge of virtue is essentially unobtainable (that it is not like maths or other *technai*); and to respond to the paradox of inquiry by invoking the possibility of 'true belief' looks like missing the point. If we knew when we had true belief it would be knowledge after all – or else a characteristically Platonic form of 'true belief' which would appear to be disallowed by Weiss. Perhaps (and this would not be wholly implausible) a more consistent conclusion would be that Socrates, after all, is a moral Sceptic? *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*[17] this year ranges more widely across themes and periods. In vol. XXI, Sarah Broadie examines the Atlantis narrative in the wider context of Plato's project in the *Timaeus*; Mantas Adomėnas reads the *Laws* as a work designed to establish a community which would ensure its own preservation as a legal code; Richard Tierney investigates Aristotle's use of the phrase *kata sumbebekos*; and Stephen Menn revisits *ousia* in *Metaphysics Z*. There are three papers on Epicureanism: James Warren compares Epicurus' rather positive attitude to future pleasures with the Cyrenaics' indifference to them; Jeffrey Puriton suggests in a subtle paper that Epicurus did think of gods existing, but only as produced by the intensional activity of the mind; and Voula Tsouna examines Philodemus' use of *parrhesia* as his chief pedagogical device and therapeutic tool. Tad Brennan rounds the volume off with an enthusiastic discussion of Susanne Bobzien's *Determinism and Freedom*. Vol. XXII sees Luc Brisson take inspiration from Damascius in reading the second part of the *Parmenides*. Sylvain Delcomminette argues that the three difficult one-and-many problems of the *Philebus* are the product of dialectic; Kyle Fraser argues that we should view Aristotle's metaphysical study of being as a demonstrative science. Aristotle's psychology is tackled in an iconoclastic paper by Stephen Menn which repositions it as a kind of dualism; and by Jennifer Whiting, who considers the relationship posited by Aristotle between desire and perception. Michael Pakaluk saves Aristotle's commitment to the unity of virtues in the *Ethics* by showing that magnificence and magnanimity are not virtues restricted to the wealthy. Stoicism gets a look in with Gretchen Reydams-Schils, who argues that the importance of human relationships was upgraded in its later (Roman) manifestations; and with Charles Brittain, who explores the Stoic theory of non-rational perception and its influence on Augustine. Reydams-Schils' article sets a certain tone, as it happens; for this year has been remarkable for the upsurge of interest in philosophers of the Roman era at the expense of strictly Hellenistic thought. One exception is *Cratete di Mallo*,[18] a new edition of the fragments of Crates of Mallos by Maria Broggiato – at least it is an exception if one takes it (as Broggiato is inclined to do) that Crates really was a Stoic. The publication of this book is in any case a significant event: it is the first comprehensive collection of all the known fragments since Wachsmuth's edition of 1860 – and, thanks to finds at Oxyrhynchus and (especially) Herculaneum, more fragments are known now than were available then. The introduction and commentaries are lucid and careful; the whole is produced with the elegance one expects from the best Italian publishing houses, and at a price one no longer dares expect from anyone. Otherwise, Stoicism this year is all Roman. *Scienza, Cultura,*

[17] *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*. Edited by David Sedley. Vol. XXI, Winter 2001: Oxford U.P., 2001. Pp. 296. Vol. XXII, Summer 2002: Oxford U.P., 2002. Pp. 326. Cloth £35 each; paper £19.99 each.

[18] *Cratete de Mallo: i frammenti*. Edited with introduction and notes by Maria Broggiato. Agorà Edizioni, La Spezia, 2001. Pp. xciv + 357. €30.

https://doi.org/10.1093/gr/50.1.123 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Morale in Seneca[19] is based on a conference held to mark Seneca's 2,000th birthday. Tending perhaps more towards the *multiformità dei temi* of the preface than the *quadro unitario* to which the back cover believes they amount, the volume contains some interesting (though no ground-breaking) reflections on aspects of Seneca's life, his work, and the interrelation of the two. The final four of the fourteen papers come from a panel on the theme of education, and include a survey (by Michele Coccia) of Seneca's place on the contemporary school curriculum in a number of European countries, and an exploration of how the *Letters to Lucilius* might be taught according to the model of a hypertextual corpus (Mirella Scala). A. A. Long's *Epictetus*[20] is the first monograph for 34 years devoted to that most readable and read of all Stoics – which means that it is the first since the great flowering of interest in Hellenistic philosophy in the last decades of the 20th Century. Long's own prolific contribution to the understanding of Hellenistic Stoicism puts him in an ideal position to write this book, though his main aim here is to draw out what is distinctive about Epictetus' voice in particular. There is, in truth, rather little that is different in philosophical substance; but Long is very good on the way in which he personalizes even the cosmic dimensions of Stoicism, plays down the overtly technical and paradoxical terminology of traditional Stoic ethics, and focuses on individual 'freedom, judgement, volition, and integrity' (27). Particularly rewarding is the discussion of Epictetus' pedagogical style, which Long shows to be firmly and self-consciously rooted in an approach to philosophizing which owes more to Plato's Socrates than to the Cynical tradition with which Epictetus has often been associated. The book is constructed around translated excerpts from the *Discourses*, which are listed for easy reference at the beginning; and it ends with an epilogue on 'The Afterlife of Epictetus'. This is an exemplary work of intellectual history: it has never taken much to see that Epictetus is a witty, direct, and humane teacher of an interesting philosophy; it is good to have a study which explains something of what he (as opposed merely to it) is about. And it is a nice coincidence that Pierre Hadot's *The Inner Citadel*,[21] a study of Epictetus' most famous pupil, Marcus Aurelius (see *G&R* 46.1, 1999, 102), should make its first appearance in paperback this year. The study of Roman Epicureanism is promoted by two books: first, a reissue of Martin Smith's 1969 translation ⋆*Lucretius, On the Nature of Things*,[22] with a new introduction, and revised and extended notes. Its rivals are the (similarly priced) Penguin and Oxford World's Classics translations: like the latter it has a guide to further reading, and also decent notes (which in Smith's case are foot- not end-notes: scruffier, perhaps, but handier if one intends to use them); like both it has synopses of the various books. Unlike either it has the great virtue of an index (adapted from the 1975 Loeb, in which Smith had an active hand). The name of Don Fowler should be enough to recommend *Lucretius on Atomic Motion*,[23] the finally-, posthumously-published version of his 1983 doctoral

[19] *Scienza, cultura, morale in Seneca*. Atti del Convegno dei Monte Sant'Angelo (27–30 settembre 1999). Edited by Paolo Fedeli. Edipuglia, Bari, 2001. Pp. 302. €15.49.

[20] *Epictetus*. A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life. By A. A. Long. Oxford U.P., 2002. Pp. xiv + 310. £19.99.

[21] *The Inner Citadel*. The *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius. By Pierre Hadot. Translated by Michael Chase. Harvard U.P., 2001. Pp. x + 351. Paper £12.95.

[22] *Lucretius, On the Nature of Things*. Translated with introduction and notes by Martin Ferguson Smith. Hackett, Indianapolis, 2001 Pp. xxxviii + 224. Cloth £29.95; paper £7.95.

[23] *Lucretius on Atomic Motion*. A Commentary on *De Rerum Natura* 2.1–332. By Don Fowler.

https://doi.org/10.1093/gr/50.1.123 Published online by Cambridge University Press

thesis. Its subject matter is a draw as well, though. Lucretius 2.1–332 (on which it is a commentary) deals with complex and subtle issues which a plausible Epicureanism needs to get right at the beginning: in particular, how atoms move and how that movement is translated into the world of our experience. Or perhaps this puts it the wrong way round: Fowler, in fact, is keen to read the passage as an argument inferring the movement of atoms from the world of our experience. In this spirit, he is able, for example, to explain the notorious 'swerve' as a kind of brute fact inferred from the human experience of choice. (This seems to me to beg the question; but perhaps, as he does in various other contexts, Fowler would say that this is a problem for the theory, not its reconstruction.) The substantial commentary, which averages more than a page for every line of Lucretius, combines lucid passages of philosophical reconstruction with generous and learned philological analysis; Peta Fowler, who edited the work – itself a heroic act of devotion and scholarship – updated references, and has added, on occasion, quite extensive notes. Three appendices contain discursive papers by Fowler. One admittedly sets out in a different format material drawn from the commentary; but the other two date from a decade later, by when Fowler had become a powerful literary critic as well as philologist. (He reflects on his journey to this position at the beginning of the one previously unpublished paper – a brilliant discussion of Epicurus' 'reductionism'.) Nor are the Peripatetics and Sceptics left out. Maria Chiesara's *Aristocles of Messene*[24] deals with both, for it is an edition of a first-century AD Aristotelian philosopher (cf. xxi–xxiii) who is most important to us for the evidence the fragments of his philosophical history provide for Aenesidemus and the revival of Pyrrhonism. All eight of Aristocles' testimonia and fragments are here edited, translated, and set about with somewhat conservative, but thorough discussions of the literature and issues surrounding them. I do have one gripe: the lack of a General Index. Such a thing never hurts, and becomes essential in a book intended for reference. Luciano Floridi's painstaking *Sextus Empiricus*[25] traces the reception of the most important surviving representative of the Pyrrhonist tradition: the decline of his popularity in the West, his rediscovery in fourteenth-century Italy, and the spread of his influence Northwards. Admittedly not philosophical in substance, it is nevertheless a fascinating read for anyone interested in the history of Scepticism: and it is interesting and salutary to see the positive light in which Sextus start his Renaissance career as a humanist and friend of the Church. It was only in the seventeenth-century that his Scepticism came consistently to be viewed as a threat – to the new science as well as religion. Later Neoplatonist works can be, physically and intellectually, quite hard to get hold of. Hermann Schibli's *Hierocles of Alexandria*[26] helps in both respects, with a heavily annotated translation of Hierocles' one surviving work, the *Commentary on the Golden Verses* – a fascinating and relatively accessible treatise dealing with ethics and (something that plays an important role in Neoplatonism after Iamblichus) theurgy. A substantial introductory essay (a book in itself at 163 pages) covers the life and philosophy of Hierocles, whom Schibli discusses in terms of the Neoplatonist tradition as a whole

Prepared for publication by P. G. Fowler with help from friends. Oxford U.P., 2002. Pp. xv + 513. £70.

[24] *Aristocles of Messene*. Testimonies and Fragments. Edited with translation and commentary by Maria Lorenza Chiesara. Oxford U.P., 2001. Pp. xlii + 218. £40.

[25] *Sextus Empiricus*. The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism. American Philological Association: American Classical Studies 46. By Luciano Floridi. Oxford U.P., 2002. Pp. xvi + 150.

[26] *Hierocles of Alexandria*. By Hermann S. Schibli. Oxford U.P., 2002. Pp. xvi + 419. £60.

https://doi.org/10.1093/gr/50.1.123 Published online by Cambridge University Press

rather than a supposed 'Alexandrian' school in particular. As if this were not enough, Schibli adds a translation (also heavily annotated) of the summaries in Photius of Hierocles' lost work *On Providence*. Finally, some works of more general interest. I place in this category a new edition of Shelley's translation of *The Symposium of Plato*[27] because is not an obvious refuge for students of Plato's ontology, but does make a wonderful case study in the reception of Plato, and of his theory of love. David O'Connor's introduction locates Shelley's reading of Plato in the wider context of his poetry and thought; and his notes put right the more misleading moments of bowdlerism, error, or poetic fancy to be found in Shelley's text. Students of ancient philosophy are given to worrying about whether what they do counts as 'philosophy' or not. Many hope like anything that it does; but one gets the sense sometimes that this aspiration is motivated by an envy of the *kudos* attaching to forms of intellectual activity which in fact get along very nicely without us. I felt this reading the (otherwise entirely *simpatici*) articles collected by Valeria Andò and Andrea Cozzo in *Pensare all'antica*,[28] which aim to demonstrate the potential for social relevance of ancient philosophy. Cozzo's own book, *Tra comunità e violenza*,[29] traces the rise and development of the Greek word *logos*, arguing that *logos* displaced the aristocratic *epos*, becoming by turns the public medium of democracy, and finally (with the Stoics) the impersonal system of 'logical' deduction which was the distinguishing tool of the expert. Philosophically, Cozzo's theme is the potential for 'violence' in each of these modes of discourse, as different groups attempt to use them to suppress or silence others. Even Democratic *logoi* are not as even-handedly pluralist as they might be; and Cozzo ends up in sympathy with Sextus Empiricus, whose exhortation to follow the *phenomena* constitutes at last a language of non-violence. There is illuminating analysis here of the way people talk to each other; but if one takes too seriously the historical props Cozzo uses to structure his argument, it will seem very crude history. And if so, it might be good philosophy, but good *ancient* philosophy? Marcello La Matina aims, in *Il problema del significante*,[30] to reconcile semiotics with philology: the former's interest in meanings with the latter's in the form given to their expression. The theoretical issues involved are, again, not without interest; but their exegetical benefits are hard to see if La Matina's case studies are anything to go by. The discussions of shifting meaning in the *Euthyphro*, of Plutarch's 'seminars', and of Plutarchean quotations in Christian authors yield results which are thin in themselves and which could have been produced without the theoretical huffing and puffing. Incidentally, the insidious belief that the Greeks were incapable of silent reading (retailed at 164) is unwittingly exposed here by its juxtaposition with the (more plausible) claim that a lecturer might be guided by reference to written notes. For what use would notes (*as opposed to* a script: 165; cf. 148–9) be to a lecturer who couldn't know what they said until he had read them out loud?

GEORGE BOYS-STONES

[27] *The Symposium of Plato: The Shelley Translation*. Translated by Percy Bysshe Shelley. Edited and introduced by David K. O'Connor. St Augustine's Press, South Bend, 2002. Pp. xliv + 95. Paper.

[28] *Pensare all'antica*. A chi servono i filosofi? Edited by Valeria Andò and Andrea Cozzo. Carocci editore, Rome, 2002. Pp. 158. Paper €14.50.

[29] *Tra comunità e violenza*. Conoscenze, *logos* e razionalità nella Grecia antica. By Andrea Cozzo. Carocci editore, Rome, 2001. Pp. 334. Paper €21.17.

[30] *Il problema del significante*. Testi greci fra semiotica e filosofia del linguaggio. By Marcello La Matina. Carocci editore, Rome, 2001. Pp. 266. Paper €18.50.

https://doi.org/10.1093/gr/50.1.123 Published online by Cambridge University Press