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The Southern African security order: regional economic integration and security among developing states

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Abstract. Theories in international relations, predicated on particular assumptions, for explaining the relationship between regional economic integration and regional security miss the challenges to security in the developing world. Unlike the developed world, regional interdependence in much of the developing world engenders negative externalities. The relationship between regional economic integration and regional security depends on the nature of the security threats that define the region – traditional state vs state threats on one hand versus new security threats on the other hand. The nature of the security threat, or security dilemma, will determine how different forms of regional economic integration, *laissez faire*, functional, and developmental, define or re-define a particular regional security order. Building a 'security community' in the developing world, therefore, calls for new architectural principles. In the case of southern Africa, both, *laissez faire* (free trade area) and functional cooperation (spatial development initiatives) will foster insecurity rather than security.

Introduction

While the study of international security has broadened to include non-state threats such as, economic underdevelopment, immigration, small arms proliferation, HIV/AIDS, and weak states, theories explaining the generation of these new security threats have not escaped the state-centric assumptions of traditional international relations theory. The processes generating security or insecurity operating beneath, across, or above the state point us in a different direction – away from a focus on the state itself and in the direction of regional security. However, although economic groupings in Africa are expected to foster peace,[1] moving away from a focus on the state and on traditional security threats, challenges the conventional wisdom that regional economic integration improves regional security.

In Africa, and in much of the developing world, intra-state threats are more salient than interstate threats. States do not typically directly threaten other states. Nonetheless, domestic instability within a weak state can lead to cross-border destabilisation.[2] Security in the developing world must be examined in a regional

[1] David J. Francis, *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), p. 4.
[2] Laurie Nathan, 'Domestic Instability and Security Communities', *European Journal of International Relations*, 12:2 (2006), p. 280.

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context. But the two assumptions underlying our understanding of the relationship between regional economic integration and regional security that concern, respectively, the nature of anarchy and the unitary state, need to be recast to fit the developing world. Once this is done, we can explore how different forms of regional economic integration impact on regional security and thereby better understand the regional dimension of security.

The southern African security order is used here to contrast the security dynamics of developed and undeveloped regions and challenge the conventional argument that interdependence fosters greater security. Southern African is defined as the regional members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC): Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.[3] These countries are challenged by new security threats and are highly interdependent; the combination of these two facts shapes a structural context that generates more insecurity than security. In particular, regional interdependence within an *insecurity complex* coupled to *laissez faire* (or market) economic regional integration can be destabilising because it causes unequal rates of growth that, in turn, generate or exacerbate the new security threats.[4] That is, different forms of regional economic integration have different neighbourhood effects, depending on whether they are pursued, respectively, within an *insecurity complex* or a *security community*.

The remainder of this paper proceeds in three parts. Section II distinguishes two types of regional security complexes – *insecurity complexes* and *security communities*. Southern Africa is a regional *insecurity complex*. By relaxing the anarchy and unitary state assumptions that support most theories on regional security complexes, the southern African security order changes from what Buzan and Wæver's label a 'standard [security] complex', which is anarchic in form with 'predominantly a military security agenda',[5] to what here is labelled a *insecurity complex*.[6] The focus is thereby shifted from looking at how states threaten, or do not, other states, to the development of sub-national and transnational threats to regional security.

From Buzan and Wæver's perspective '[W]ithin a standard RSC [regional security complex], the main element of security politics is the relationship among regional powers inside the region';[7] this is not the case in southern Africa. Section three, therefore, examines post-apartheid South Africa's security dilemma and links regional economic integration to security externalities created by uneven economic development in the region. While it is the unquestioned regional hegemon, South Africa is aware that uneven regional development is its largest security challenge.[8] Because different forms of regional economic integration have different effects on

[3] The DRC was not an original member of SADC. It joined by the strong support of Nelson Mandela, largely because its impact on southern African security.

[4] For an elaboration on this typology that includes, as well, a discussion of ad hoc and functional regional integration/cooperation see, James J. Hentz, 'South Africa and the Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43:1 (2005).

[5] Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 55.

[6] They look at two defining dimensions, variations in polarity and variations in amity and enmity. Ibid., p. 53.

[7] Ibid.

[8] See Hussein Solomon, 'From Apartheid Destabilisation to a Southern African Security Community', in *Towards a Common Defense and Security Policy in the Southern African Development Community* (ed.); Solomon (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004), 33;

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economic development in southern Africa, they may either exacerbate or ameliorate regional security. The security externalities of two forms of regional economic integration, *laissez faire* (market integration) and functional integration are examined. Each is part of the institutionalisation of regional economic integration in post-apartheid southern Africa. Each creates security externalities, such as immigration, small arms proliferation, HIV/AIDS, and collapsing states, linked to uneven regional economic development.

Finally, the conclusion returns to the challenges the southern African regional *insecurity complex* creates for theories in international relations (IR) and international security. Because economic development and interdependence is linked to regional security, regional economic integration, depending on how it is institutionalised, can lead to either more or less regional security.

Regional security complexes and regional economic integration

Regions have become a more salient feature of international politics in the post-Cold War era.[9] Southern Africa is a regional security complex defined by intra-state rather than interstate security issues. This is an important distinction because it challenges the central assumptions concerning the nature of anarchy and the nature of the state that underpins the study of regional security complexes. Buzan and Wæver, who have pushed the envelope on regional security studies, nonetheless, apply a neo-realist structural framework to regional orders. They argue that regional security orders are defined by their 'anarchic structure and its balance-of-power consequences' combined with the 'pressure of local geographical proximity'.[10] This section agrees with their conclusion, but argues that the classical understanding of anarchy and its concomitant assumption of unitary states misreads how local geographical proximity affects regional security in much of the developing world. By opening up Buzan and Wæver's model, we can better account for the effects different forms of regional economic integration have on regional security complexes.

The national security literature assumes that states are the main actors in the anarchical international system and that they are, furthermore, unitary actors. The main difference between liberalism and realism is their respective emphasis on the benefits versus the costs of interdependence,[11] but both almost always assume a utility-maximising state working within an anarchical environment. From a realist perspective, Edward Mansfield and Rachel Bronson relate how trading blocs ameliorate the security dilemma.[12] From a liberalist perspective, Paul Papayoanou makes a similar claim when he states, '. . . [I]f there is sustained economic integration, the stakes may be so high that states eschew any thoughts of resorting to force for

Solomon, 'State vs Human Security: Reflections on the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation', in *Towards a Common Defense*, p. 187.

[9] David Lake and Patrick Morgan, 'The New Regionalism in Security Affairs', in David Lake and Patrick Morgan (eds), *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 6.

[10] Ibid., p. 45.

[11] Dale Copeland, 'Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations', *International Security*, 20:4 (1996), p. 12.

[12] Edward Mansfield and Rachel Bronson, 'Alliance, Preferential Trading Arrangements, and International Trade', *American Political Science Review*, 91:1 (1997), p. 94.

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Laissez Faire ***Cooperation***		**Developmental** **Cooperation**
Insecurity ***Complex***	**Instability**	**Stability**
Security ***Community***	**Stability**	**Stability**

Figure 1. *Regional security complexes.*

gain'.[13] Within a classical security dilemma, allies can ignore relative gains (who are getting richer) because their collective gains augment their power *vis-à-vis* an external threat.[14] Therefore, alliance partners trade more with each other than with non-alliance partners.[15] However, even the formal literature allows that while trade engenders peace, asymmetrical trade can increase the chances of war.[16]

The analytical lens of traditional realism and liberalism focuses our attention on the wrong actors when looking at security in the developing world. This is particularly true with formal models analysing the effects of interdependence that start '. . . from the premise that nation-states are rational unitary actors who try to maximize national welfare'.[17] Less reliance on the unitary actor assumption and a more solid micro foundation is needed in empirical studies.[18] This does not write the state out of the script; it remains central to the prospects for security in southern Africa.[19] In Peter Vale's words:

> . . . the affairs of southern Africa continue to pivot around the strongest player. This was, and remains, South Africa – the first in a community of unequals.[20]

[13] Papayoanou, 'Great Powers and Regional Orders: Possibilities and Prospects after the Cold War', in Lake and Morgan, *Regional Orders*, p. 138. Bruce Russett makes a similar claim. Russett, 'A neo-Kantian Perspective', p. 374.

[14] Joanne Gowa, *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Others have argued that increasing trade in the international system does not, by itself, necessarily promote stability. Copeland, 'Economic Interdependence'.

[15] Mansfield and Bronson, 'Alliance, Preferential Trading Arrangements'.

[16] There is a vast amount of formal modelling dealing with this issue. McMillan's review of the literature concludes that the liberalist argument that interdependence leads to peace is stronger than the realist argument that posits the opposite. Susan McMillan, 'Interdependence and Conflict', *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41:1 (1997), p. 43. Building on the insights of Hirschman, others argue that asymmetrical trade causes conflict. Albert Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press). See also, Peter Wallensteen, *Structure and War: On International Relations 1920–1968* (Stockholm: Raben and Sjogren, 1973).

[17] Katherine Barbieri and Gerald Schneider, 'Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of Trade Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research*, 36:4 (1999), p. 399.

[18] Ibid., p. 388.

[19] Others, particularly critical theory, have argued that the state itself is the security problem. See, Kevin Dunn, *Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity* (London: Palgrave, 2003).

[20] Peter Vale, *Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Press, 2003), p. 115.

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However, South Africa is not at the centre of a traditional security dilemma. There is, for instance, no balance of power game or alliance system to speak of. Instead, to pick up Vale's thread:

> Concentrated in South Africa, however, its [southern Africa's] bounty has not generated an equal generation of its riches. This, more that any other factor, represents an obstacle to the creation of genuine security in Southern Africa.[21]

Figure 1 depicts a dynamic that explains stabilising and destabilising forces within regional security complexes. *Insecurity complexes* and *security communities* are distinguished by, respectively, the negative and positive externalities that are produced by regional interdependence. In David Lake's definition, 'externalities are costs (negative externalities) and benefits (positive externalities) that do not accrue only to the actors that create them. They are also known as spillover or neighborhood effects'.[22] To apply this matrix to southern Africa, we must make a clear distinction between an *insecurity complex* and a *security community*.

In international relations literature, a *security community* is considered a special case of a *security complex*. The concept of a *security community* comes from Karl Deutsch's work on the North Atlantic Community.[23] It is built on the notion that interdependence and interaction among a collection of states engenders positive externalities. In this case, '[A]n intensive and extensive pattern of networks between states' leads to peace;[24] interdependence leads to peace.[25]

As Gerrie Swart and Anton du Plessis, explain: '[A] distinctive feature of a security community is the link it makes between stable peace and the existence of a transnational community'.[26] But this is not necessarily the case where a region's intra-state insecurity is more germane than interstate threats. Deutsch argued that '[I]n a pluralistic *security community* the members give no thought to using violence in their relations with one another'.[27] But within the context of an *insecurity complex*, it is quite possible to have instability even as the constituent states do not threaten each other; it is not enough that states have committed to pacific relations.[28] In an *insecurity complex*, the security externalities caused by a high level of interdependence are mostly negative. The most obvious is a weak or collapsing state, but the externalities include what are often called the 'new security issues', such as: immigration, gunrunning, gangs and domestic crime, HIV/AIDS, transnational crime, and poverty.[29]

[21] Ibid., p. 143.
[22] David Lake, 'Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach', in Lake and Morgan (eds), *Regional Orders*, p. 49.
[23] Karl Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 5–6.
[24] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 'Framework for the Study of Security Communities', in Adler and Barnett (eds), *Security Communities*, p. 54.
[25] Bruce Russett, 'A neo-Kantian Perspective', in Adler and Barnett (eds), *Security Communities*, p. 374. Much of the early neofunctionalist literature on the European Community made a similar argument.
[26] Gerrie Swart and Anton du Plessis, 'From Apartheid Destabilisation to a Southern Africa Security Community', in Solomon (ed.), *Towards a Common Defense*, p. 18.
[27] Morgan, 'Regional Security Complexes', p. 36.
[28] Nathan, 'Domestic Insecurity', p. 293.
[29] Marianne Marchand, Morten Bøås and Timothy Shaw, 'The Political Economy of New Regionalism', *Third World Quarterly*, 20:5 (1999), p. 905; Andrew Hurrell, 'Security and Inequality', in Hurrell and Ngaire Woods (eds), *Inequality and Globalization, and World Politics*

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Economic underdevelopment and intra-regional economic disparities have negative spillover effects.[30] Within a regional *insecurity complex*, asymmetries, such as define the southern Africa regional economy, can be exacerbated by the institutionalisation of *laissez faire* regional economic integration, and, because most threats travel more easily over a shorter distance,[31] in the short-term by functional integration as well. Regional underdevelopment exacerbates or activates new security issues. Thus while in the case of southern Africa polarity matters – South Africa is the hegemon, it matters for a different reason than that proffered by a traditional security dilemma. It is the juxtaposition of a strong Westphalian state, South Africa, to weak neighbours that creates and defines security interdependence in southern Africa. In Laurie Nathan's words weak states have problems that define the regional security dilemma, because they have trouble:

> . . . halting the flow of violence, weapons and armed forces in and out of their territories and contribute to the absence of a clear dividing line between domestic and regional instability.[32]

Thus while Karl Deutsch argued that state powers and cores of strength facilitate the development of a *security community*,[33] in the case of southern Africa, South Africa as a core of strength may facilitate greater insecurity. South Africa's economic strength may be the problem, because inequality can be destabilising.[34]

The anarchy assumption, which dominates international relations theory and in particular the sub-discipline of international security, describes the relationship among hard-shelled Weberian states where in a Hobbesian world one state arms to defend itself, thereby threatening other states, which in turn must arm themselves. But anarchy means something different in a world populated by weak states, such as in much of Sub-Sahara Africa. To recast Alexander Wendt, the issue is not what states make of anarchy, but rather that states must make something of different forms of anarchy.[35] Both mainstream realism and liberalism are handicapped by a narrowly defined notion of anarchy. As Edward Kolodziej argues:

> What is important to recognize is that anarchy may be ordered in many ways. What form it assumes as security systems may perhaps be neither obvious nor logical, but still coherent and compelling in driving behavior.[36]

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 259; Hettne, 'The New Regionalism', p. xvii. For specific discussions of the 'new security' threats in post-apartheid southern Africa, see Laurie Nathan, 'A Framework and Strategy for Building Peace and Security in Southern Africa' (unpublished manuscript) (Cape Town: Centre for Intergroup Studies, 1992); Nathan, 'Domestic Instability', Roger Southall', 'Regional Security: The 'New Security' in Southern Africa', *Southern Africa Report*, 10:5 (1995).

30 African Strategic Alternatives, 'An Audit', p. 119.

31 Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Power*, p. 12.

32 Nathan, 'Domestic Instability', p. 289.

33 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 'Studying Security Communities in Theory, Comparison, and History', in *Security Communities*, p. 424.

34 Andrew Hurrell, 'Security and Inequality', in Hurrell and Ngaire Woods (eds), *Inequality and Globalization, and World Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 253.

35 Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It', *International Organization*, 46:2 (1992).

36 Edward Kolodziej, 'Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lecto'r', *International Studies Quarterly*, 36:1 (1992), p. 436.

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Southern Africa is not so much an unstructured regional security complex where local states cannot project power,[37] as it is a regional security complex structured by the inability of states to project power to their own peripheries.[38]

The externalities engendered within an *insecurity complex*, with its attendant untraditional security dilemma, in contrast to a *security community*, with its attendant traditional security dilemma, are defined by how regional economic integration is institutionalised, because of their different effects or regional development. In post-apartheid South Africa, three types of regional cooperation/integration are vying for influence: the *laissez faire* model, the developmental model, and functional integration.

In the *laissez faire*, or sometimes called the market cooperation model, '[T]he integrating force of the market is released through the removal of restrictions and barriers to regional trade, rather than through positive government interventions'.[39] This typically starts by reducing barriers to intra-regional trade such as tariffs (a FTA) and adopting a common tariff toward non-members (customs union). It progressively can include dismantling barriers to other factors of production, such as the movement of people (common market) and allow for the free flow of capital and possibly, as in the case of Europe, a single uniting currency. Southern Africa adopted this model under the auspices of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). In this approach, the more developed state, in this case South Africa, usually reaps a disproportionate share of the region's aggregate gains, because of what is called 'trade diversion' and 'polarization'.[40] Trade diversion is when there is a shift from a low-cost external producer to a high-cost regional producer (versus trade creation where there is a shift from a high-cost external producer to a low-cost regional producer). Polarisation is when the most developed country in the region obtains disproportionate gains, typically from attracting foreign investment, and becomes the pole of development.

The developmental approach seeks to ameliorate the natural inequities caused by trade diversion and polarisation that accompany *laissez faire* integration through a strong role for the state.[41] In James Mittelman's words:

> The *developmental integration* model was introduced as an alternative to a one-sided emphasis on efficiency maximization of existing capacity – not surprising, in the context of a low level of productive capacity.[42]

It typically uses distributive mechanisms or compensatory and corrective measures, for instance planned industrial development and common investment codes.

Functional cooperation does not nicely fit into either the *laissez faire* or the developmental category.[43] It is typically pursued through the development of

[37] Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Power*, p. 62.
[38] Jeffrey Herbst, *States and power in Africa* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
[39] C. G. Gore, 'International Order, Economic Regionalism and Structural Adjustment: The Case of Sub-Saharan Africa', in *Progress in Planning*, 3:3 (New York: Pergamon Press, 1994), p. 207.
[40] See, Bela Balassa, *Theory of Economic Integration* (Homewood, IL, 1961); Gunner Myrdal, *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions* (London, 1957).
[41] Balefi Tsie, 'States and Markets in the Southern African Development Community (SADC): Beyond the Neo-Liberal Paradigm', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 22:1 (1996), p. 75; Söderbaum, 'The New Regionalism in Southern Africa', p. 85.
[42] James Mittelman, *The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 116.
[43] The three types offered above are often offered as the possible forms for regional co-operation in Africa. For instance, Ravenhill outlined the three possible forms as: 'largely unregulated

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infrastructure projects in areas such as transport, energy, and water delivery. In 1991, the late Chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation (South Africa) outlined the pro-functional cooperation stance:

> Political reform in South Africa has opened up further opportunities for cooperation in [southern Africa] in the fields of tourism, transport, electricity supply, and the development and use of scarce water resources. These are the sinews that bind together the region . . .[44]

Each of these three kinds of regional economic integration has security implications for southern Africa. So, while post-apartheid South Africa debated the best approach to regional economic integration,[45] it was also debating its national security policies and paradigms.[46] In the process, Pretoria challenged notions of traditional security rooted in neoliberal and neorealist IR theory and reexamined the relationship between regional economic integration and security within an *insecurity complex*. In Buzan and Wæver's nomenclature,[47] South Africa is the securitising agent.

The external threats that during the apartheid years played such an important role in shaping the South African perception and the nature of the defence force have ceased to exist.[48] But as Buzan and Wæver posit, a state or group of states can pose a structural threat even if they do not have hostile intensions,[49] because, as they add, security is about different things in different regions.[50] This is he case in southern Africa. For instance, in post-apartheid southern Africa, Zimbabwe announced (June 1994) plans to make deep cuts in its armed forces numbers and budget. President Robert Mugabe stated that he planned to halve the 70,000-strong army to 35,000.[51] But, instability in Zimbabwe under Mugabe is a much greater threat to the region than his army.[52] As well, post-apartheid South Africa is no longer the kind of threat it was during the apartheid era. Nonetheless, while the likelihood of interstate conflict in the region is diminished, the southern African regional security order can not be described as a *security community*.[53]

unions/common markets, common markets with industrial planning with possibly explicit counter-dependency objectives, and ''functional co-operation'' '. John Ravenhill, 'Collective Self-Reliance or Collective Self-Delusion: Is the Lagos Plan a Viable Alternative', in Ravenhill (ed.), *Africa in Economic Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 97.

[44] Gavin Reilly, *Southern Africa-The Challenge of the 90s: Summary of Workshops and Keynote Addresses* (Harare: Institute of Directors, Zimbabwe Division, 1991), p. 60.

[45] For a fuller discussion of this debate see, James J. Hentz, 'South Africa and the Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43:1 (2005).

[46] Cawthra argues that South Africa's 'negotiated revolution' allowed for a new approach to defense. Gavin Cawthra, *Securing South Africa's Democracy: Defense, Development and Security in Transition* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997), p. 53.

[47] See Buzan and Wæver's discussion of this, *Regions and Power*, p. 71.

[48] Africa Strategic Alternatives, 'An Audit of Southern African Development Community Defense Policies', Solomon (ed.), *Towards a Common Defense*, p. 118.

[49] Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Power*, p. 51.

[50] Ibid., p. 86.

[51] *Reuters*, 28 June 1994. Overall defense spending in the region has, in fact, declined, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 269.

[52] See James Hentz, 'State Collapse and Regional Contagion in Sub-Sahara Africa: Lessons for Zimbabwe' *Scientia Militaria*, July/August (2004).

[53] For a list of reasons why it cannot be considered a security community, see Fred Söderbaum, 'The New Regionalism in Southern Africa', *Politeia*, 17 (1998), p. 80. See also, Nathan, 'Domestic Instability', p. 279.

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The debate within South Africa on how to define national security in the post-apartheid era points to the distinction between an *insecurity complex* and a *security community*. It also contrasts the different security externalities created by a *laissez faire* approach to regional economic integration within an *insecurity complex*, largely negative to the effects within a *security community* which are largely positive.

The new security dilemma in southern Africa is consistently framed as an issue of poverty and underdevelopment.[54] Post-apartheid South Africa increasingly recognised that inequality linked to a particular set of regional interdependencies was destabilising the region and, most importantly, had spillover effects into South Africa.[55] Among the new security threats linked to regional dynamics are: immigration, the proliferation of small arms, HIV/AIDS, collapsed states, and transnational and domestic crime. South Africa, or at least some in positions of authority, understood the destabilising effects of free trade, or *laissez faire* regional economic integration, on the region.

The southern African regional security complex and regional economic integration

Uneven regional economic development creates security externalities. This partially refutes Buzan and Wæver's assertion that economic underdevelopment is not a security problem.[56] Paradoxically it remains consistent with their assertion in the same sentence that politics and economics cannot be separated.[57] In short, uneven economic growth caused by trade diversion and polarisation in southern Africa generates new security threats. There is a direct link between poverty, underdevelopment and conflict.[58]

South Africa accounts for 78.4 per cent of southern Africa aggregate GDP; for the rest of the region, defined as the original members of the Southern African Development Community (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe) it is 21.6 per cent. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) is Africa's only legitimate source of indigenous investment capital, ranking tenth in the world in market capitalisation. The stock exchanges in Africa had a combined market capitalisation at the end of 1995 of just over $265 billion; the JSE accounted for $240 billion. The rest of Sub-Sahara Africa (Botswana, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe) accounted for $9.2 billion (North Africa accounted for $14.5 billion).[59]

Laissez faire regional economic integration

A free trade area (FTA) (the narrow edge of *laissez faire* regional economic integration) will exacerbate regional security in southern Africa through trade diversion and polarisation.

[54] van Aardt, 'Doing Battle with Security', pp. 21, 26; Nathan, 'Strategies for Peace and Prosperity in Southern Africa', p. 3.
[55] Batchelor and Willett, *Disarmament and Defense*, p. 120.
[56] Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Power*, p. 75.
[57] Ibid., p. 223.
[58] Francis, *Uniting Africa*, p. 84.
[59] These statistics are from, *Mbendi: Information for Africa* ⟨http://mbendi.co.za/exaf.htm#Introduction⟩. The Tanzanian and Malawian stock exchanges opened in 1996 and the Ugandan and Mozambique exchanges in 1997 and 1998, respectively.

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The potential destabilising effects of polarisation and trade diversion led South Africa to link its position on a regional free trade area (FTA) to its national security. Ironically, South Africa, as the country most likely to benefit in purely monetary terms, challenged the free trade approach embraced by SADC.[60] Following South Africa's accession to SADC, a Department of Trade and Industry delegation visited the SADC Industry and Trade Coordination Division (SITCD) in Dar-Es-Salaam and registered concern for the neo-classical approach.[61] Two studies were conducted to assess the impact a Free Trade Area (FTA) would have on the SADC region, as proposed by the SADC Trade Protocol. One study, commissioned by SADC, argued that a FTA would benefit the whole region. A South African study conducted by the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), a South African parastatal, came up with a fundamentally different conclusion.

> It found that South Africa stood to gain from a FTA in terms of increased GDP, total exports and manufactured exports. In contrast, four of the remaining non-SACU SADC countries were likely to experience a negative impact on their economies, primarily in the form of de-industrialization, as a result of increased competition to domestic industry from South Africa.[62]

The IDC's position was supported and reinforced by the Development Bank of Southern Africa. The reason is quite simple. The regional economic dominance of South Africa would trigger trade diversion and polarisation and subsequently engender unequal regional economic development.

South and southern Africa have a historical precedent and therefore a well-established ledger of the effects of regional economic integration under the auspices of *laissez faire* integration via a custom union. South Africa's partners in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) did, in fact, suffer from the negative effects of trade diversion and polarisation. SACU, formed in 1910 and renegotiated in 1969 (to address the problem of unequal regional development), originally included Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland (Namibia joined later). South Africa's partners lost between $20 million and $30 million per year because of participation in SACU.[63] SACU does have a revenue sharing mechanism that is meant to compensate for this. But, as Fred Söderbaum states, there is 'no clear evidence that the funds (SACU) have had any positive effect on economic diversification and development' in southern Africa.[64] The southern African states had been importing overpriced South African goods and paying for them with hard currency[65] – trade diversion. In 1992 alone, South

[60] Merle Holden, 'Is a Free Trade Agreement the Answer for Southern Africa: Insights form Development Economic Theory', in Peter Vale, Larry Swatik and Bertil Odén (eds), *Theory, Change and Southern Africa's Future* (London: Palgrave), p. 154.

[61] Rosalind Thomas, 'A South Africa Perspective on the SADC Trade and Development Protocol'. Paper presented for the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) (Johannesburg, 1997), p. 2.

[62] Ibid., p. 20.

[63] Carol Thompson, 'African Initiatives for Development', *Journal of International Affairs*, 46:1 (1992), p. 132. See also, Richard Gibb, 'Regional Integration in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa: The Case for Renegotiating the Southern African Customs Union', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 23:1 (1997).

[64] Fred Söderbaum, Minor Field Studies Series 3, Department of Economics at Lund University. 1996. See also Tom Østergaard, 'Classical Models of Regional Integration – What Relevance for Southern Africa', in Bertil Odén (ed.), *Southern Africa after Apartheid: Regional Integration and External Resources* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1993), pp. 335–6.

[65] Reginald Green, 'The Economic Implications of Post-Apartheid Southern Africa: How to Add Ten and One', in *The Challenges of Post-Apartheid South Africa: Conclusions and Papers Presented at a Conference of the Africa Leadership Forum*, 8–10 September, Windhoek 1991.

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Africa's trade surplus with the SACU countries was eight billion rand, accounting for more than 40 per cent of its total manufactured exports.[66]

The following tables reflect South Africa's trade profile early in its transition to post-apartheid rule and at the cusp of its full participation in SADC. It is almost a perfect harbinger of trade diversion under conditions of freer trade and predicts uneven economic development in the region. Most importantly, it triggers immigration and concomitant new security issues.

Section		Value R 000	% Total exports to Africa	% Total exports in section (all areas)
1.	Animals & Products	56,906	1.3	7.3
2.	Vegetable Products	302,856	6.9	13.2
3.	Animal &Vegetable Fats	76,997	1.7	50.8
4.	Foodstuffs & Beverages	356,205	8.1	19.2
5.	Mineral Products	236,195	5.3	3.3
6.	Chemical Products	642,511	14.6	19.9
7.	Plastic & Rubber Products	241,950	5.5	32.5
8.	Hides, Skins & Leather	5,023	0.1	1.2
9.	Wood & Articles	22,379	0.5	5.9
10.	Pulp, Paper & Products	143,112	3.2	7.5
11.	Textiles	182,866	4.1	10.1
12.	Footwear & Related	12,035	0.3	22.2
13.	Stone & Related Products	70,438	1.6	19.1
14.	Jewellery	1,421	>0.1	>0.1
15.	Articles of Base Metals	639,455	14.5	6.7
16.	Machinery & Appliances	804,755	18.4	37.4
17.	Vehicles & Related	484,680	11.0	20.8
18.	Optical Equipment	42,567	1.0	24.5
19.	Misc. Manufactures	73,955	1.7	24.3
20.	Art	244	>0.1	1.3
21.	Unclassified	8,440	0.2	>0.1
TOTAL	**4,407,012**			**6.5**

Source: Monthly Abstract of Trade Statistics: Foreign Trade Statistics of the common customs area of Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland released by the Commissioner for Customs and Excise of the Republic of South Africa January–December 1992, Pretoria, 1993.[67]

Table 1. *Exports of the common customs area of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland to the rest of Southern Africa, January–December 1992*

Table 1 skews South Africa's trade statistics because it is based on SACU's trade with the region. However, the SACU is acknowledged to have retarded the industrial development of the Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and the export statistics for SACU are typically used as a proxy for South Africa's export statistics.

[66] Botswana 1994. 'Botswana Country Paper', Prepared for the Workshop on Reconstituting and Democratising the Southern African Customs Union (Gaborone, 7 March 1994), p. 8.

[67] Robert Davies, D. Keet and M. Nkuhlu, *Reconstructing Economic Relations With The Southern African Region: Issue and Options for a Democratic South Africa: MERG Occasional Paper Series* (Cape Town: The Centre for Development Studies), p. 73.

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Table 2 below ranks the importance of southern Africa to South Africa's (SACU's) exports according to the percentage of exports in that sector that go to the region, and by rand value of that sector's regional exports (from Table 1).

	Percentage of total exports	Rand value
Machinery & Appliances	37.4	804,755,000
Plastic & Rubber Products	32.5	241,950,000
Vehicles & Related	20.8	484,680,000
Chemical Products	19.9	642,511,000
Foodstuffs & Beverages	19.2	356,205,000

Source: IDC Data Base.[68]

Table 2. *Percentage of total sectoral exports and total value, January–December 1992*

ISIC Grouping										
Country	1&2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Other
Angola	30	18	–	7	4	12	6	6	16	1
Botswana	54	9	–	–	2	6	–	4	2	23
Lesotho	71	12	1	2	1	6	2	3	–	2
Malawi	34	14	3	2	7	24	7	3	3	3
Mozambique	41	23	–	8	–	11	4	11	–	2
Namibia	65	6	3	4	4	7	6	2	1	2
Swaziland	58	2	–	3	12	10	4	1	9	1
Tanzania	34	17	4	3	8	13	1	7	11	2
Zambia	35	8	3	4	4	15	8	12	10	1
Zimbabwe	33	12	3	3	6	14	4	18	5	1
South Africa	14	7	2	3	9	22	5	18	19	1

Source: UNIDO data-base (1992); Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa (1991); World Bank country studies; Commonwealth Secretariat (1992); UNIDO (1990).
Notes: UNIDO dates were available for the following countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia. South African figures were from the IDC data base, Zimbabwe's data from the 1986/87 *Census of Industrial Production*; Namibia's are authors' estimates based on the 1992 Commonwealth Secretariat study of Namibian industry; Angola's data were based on the 1990 UNIDO Industrial Development Review; and Mozambique data on the World Bank's 1990 *Industrial Sector Study*.[69]
ISIC Groups: 1. foodstuffs; 2. beverages and tobacco; 3. textiles and clothing; 4. leather and footwear; 5. wood, wooden products and furniture; 6. paper, printing and publishing; 7. non-metallic minerals; 8. chemicals, rubber and pharmaceutical; 9. metals and metal products; 10. machinery and transport equipment; 11. other or not classified.

Table 3. *Sub-sectoral composition of manufacturing added (MVA 1987 (%)) in Southern Africa*

[68] Alan Hirsch, 'Trading Up: Towards a Trade Policy for Industrial Growth in South Africa – Industrial Strategy Project Draft Final Report' (Cape Town: Development Policy Research Unit, University of Cape Town, 1993), p. 73.
[69] African Development Bank. *Economic Integration in Southern Africa, Executive Summary* (Abidjan: ABD, nd.), p. 251.

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Comparing Table 2 to Table 3 reveals that South Africa exported to the region manufactured products that its trading partners did not produce themselves. According to Table 3, the ISIC groups 1 to 6, which are predominantly consumer goods industries, account for over 50 per cent of MVA for South Africa's neighbours, but only 23 per cent for South Africa. The only group among these important to South Africa's regional trade, which is according to the aggregate figures offered in the two tables, is food and beverages. The elasticity of demand for South Africa's exports in southern Africa is, therefore, limited, and particularly tight for labour-intensive goods. Nonetheless, high unemployment in South Africa in the post-apartheid era has placed a premium on producing just the sort of labour-intensive goods its neighbours produce. While it may seem that there is potential for complementary trade between South Africa and the region, politics would preclude an open South African market for labour-intensive goods.[70] As Andrea Goldstein concluded, South Africa is not likely to import more labour intensive products from its neighbours.[71] This means job creation in the region will be retarded and impetus for immigration increased.

Trade diversion is lowest when countries have very low levels of trade with countries outside the potential customs union. However, southern Africa, like Africa in general, has a low level of intra-regional trade. In fact, South Africa's non-competitive capital-intensive sector would benefit from the twin advantage of geographical proximity and lower tariffs in relation to its natural overseas competitors, triggering trade diversion rather than welfare-enhancing trade creation. Robert Davies argued that during apartheid southern Africa provided a significant market for a range of manufactured goods that would have been unlikely to find export markets elsewhere.[72] South African goods sold in the region, he surmised, may have been as much as 15 to 25 per cent higher than FOB prices of comparable goods from elsewhere.[73] It is also unlikely that a customs union would stimulate intra-industry trade. This occurs primarily when trading partners are at similar levels of development, which is not the case for South and southern Africa. Finally, such trade as might be created would likely mimic relations of dependency between the North and the South because of the higher value-added quotient of South African exports. Trade diversion will limit the growth of domestic economies outside South Africa and coupled with South Africa's sensitive labour market, limit regional economic growth.

This brings us to the Catch 22. Investment in industrial development necessary for sustained development will flow to the most developed region – polarisation. As Samson Muradzikwa argues, the small states of southern Africa will gain from a FTA only if productive investment flows accelerate.[74] But countries such as Zambia and Zimbabwe (outside of South Africa, relatively advanced in the southern African context) have suffered from de-industrialisation because trade liberalisation has not

[70] Viner's concepts on trade diversion and creation are often misunderstood. If two countries have competing production structures, produce the same things, then the most efficient will capture the union market and, in theory, there will be a reallocation of resources in a more efficient direction.

[71] Andrea Goldstein, *Regional Integration, FDI and Competitiveness in Southern Africa* (Geneva: OECD Development Centre, 2004), p. 15.

[72] Robert Davies, 'Emerging South African Perspectives on Regional Cooperation and Integration after Apartheid', *Transformation*, 20 (1992), p. 77.

[73] Ibid., p. 78.

[74] Samson Muradzikwa, 'Foreign Investment in SADC', *Working Paper 02/67* (Cape Town: DPSU, University of Cape Town (2002), pp. 1, 10.

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Country	1983–1987	1988–1992	1993–1997
South Africa	− 38	9	755
Angola	160	190	254
Namibia	5	53	110
Zambia	39	108	93
Zimbabwe	39	108	93
Mozambique	2	13	50
Swaziland	20	63	39
Malawi	1	14	19
Lesotho	3	12	13
Botswana	65	34	− 12

Source: UNCTAD: Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Performance and Potential, New York, 1999.

Table 4. *FDI to SADC(C) countries. Annual average, millions of dollars*

been complemented by sufficient investment.[75] As well profitability of investment is related to the stability of the economic environment.[76]

Under *laissez faire* integration where there are disparities in national wealth, the most economically advanced country will attract a disproportionate share of foreign direct investment (FDI). Table 4 below tracks FDI into the SADC region between 1983 and 1997.[77]

As expected, South Africa draws a disproportionate amount of the regions FDI. What Table 4 does not tell us, however, is what percentage of FDI into SADC countries comes from South Africa. Since the end of apartheid, South Africa has aggressively penetrated the region and it is the largest source of FDI into the region, accounting for 85 per cent of all FDI in other SADC countries in 2000.[78] This means the disparity between South Africa and its SADC partners, with the possible exception of Angola, is even greater than implied in Table 4. It is also important to note that South Africa's investment into the region is not necessarily going to promote industrial development.[79]

Uneven regional economic development triggers economic decline which in turn exacerbates unemployment and domestic instability. The Department for International Development (UK Government) report, *The Causes of Conflict in Africa* classified the causes of conflict into three areas: perennial economic decline, high levels of unemployment, and the spillover effects of internal conflict.[80] In fact, the new security threats in Africa are trans-national in character.[81]

Regional underdevelopment and instability exacerbates the immigration problem. As Rocklyn Williams stated in 1995, 'The presence of the migrants has already

[75] Ibid.
[76] Janvier D. Nkurunziza and Robert Bates, 'Political Institutions and Economic Growth in Africa' (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Center for International Development, 2003).
[77] In 2001 it remained at approximately 70 per cent. Goldstein, *Regional Integration*, p. 40.
[78] Muradzikwa, 'Foreign Investment in SADC', p. 6.
[79] For instance, much of South Africa's regional investment is in the retail sector; but South African retailers tend to source from their home market. Goldstein, *Regional Integration*, p. 105.
[80] DFID, *The Causes of Conflict in Africa*. London: Cabinet Sub-Committee on Conflict on Conflict Prevention in Africa, April 2001, cited in Francis, *Uniting Africa*, p. 65.
[81] Francis, *Uniting Africa*, p. 87.

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generated such problems as competition with locals over scarce resources, strains on provincial economies, weapons smuggling, and drug smuggling'.[82] A team of research professionals, African Strategic Alternatives, based in Pretoria stated: '. . . the key threat experienced by South Africa, results from large numbers of refugees who regard South Africa as the continent's ''El Dorado'' . . .'[83] At the 1997 SADC Summit, and following attacks by South African street vendors on foreign hawkers in downtown Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela warned that South Africa was sensitive to the impact of immigration on unemployment at home.[84] South Africa's political economy is simply not able to absorb large numbers of immigrants.

The end of apartheid triggered a wave of illegal immigration into South Africa. It also opened the door for professionals from neighbouring countries to move to higher-paying jobs in South Africa, which could balance post-apartheid South Africa's own brain drain. In May 1997, the South African government released a 'green paper' on reforming its immigration policy.[85] The paper reveals a tension between South Africa's needs and the regional reality.

> As long as economic growth is polarised in Southern Africa and there is limited job creation elsewhere in the region, we can expect abnormal movements of economic immigrants to continue. The trade imbalance between South Africa and the region is a major cause for concern since it creates jobs here and destroys them elsewhere.[86]

Nonetheless, the paper suggested a 'labour-market based point system' where South Africa could 'pro-actively recruit immigrants with the skills, expertise and resources to make a contribution to the development of our country'.[87] This amounts to a trade diversion of a new sort – a brain drain. Sub-Sahara Africa has already suffered a serious 'brain-drain' over the past three decades.[88] But most of the skilled and educated African workers left Africa for Europe and America;[89] now, many of them will immigrate to South Africa.

The flip side of attracting desired immigrants is what the green paper called 'the third and most controversial stream of people'.[90] When combined with the pull of economic opportunity in South Africa, the push of poverty and war in South Africa's near abroad triggers immigration. These are the unwanted immigrants. The unregulated flow of immigrants to South Africa would exacerbate an already tense labour problem, which could be politically destabilising. This would affect investment coming into South Africa and concomitantly shrink the pool of resources South Africa could use to invest in the region.

[82] Rocklyn Mark Williams, 'South Africa's New Defense Force: Progress and Prospects', *CSIS Africa Notes* (2000), p. 7. See also, Kenneth Booth, and Peter Vale, 'Security in Southern Africa: after Apartheid, beyond Realism', *International Affairs*, 71:2 (1995), p. 286. Williams has since passed away.
[83] Africa Strategic Alternatives, 'An Audi', in Solomon (ed.), *Towards a Common Defense*, p. 117.
[84] Jakkie Cilliers, 'Commentary: Consolidating Africa's Regions,', *Africa Security Review*, 10:1 (2001), p. 4 (electronic copy).
[85] South Africa, South African Department of Home Affairs *Draft Green Paper on International Migration* (Pretoria, 1997).
[86] Ibid., p. 9.
[87] Ibid., p. 2.
[88] See, Erich Leistner, 'Migration of High-Level African Manpower to South Africa', *Africa Insight*, 4 (1993), (draft)
[89] One study estimated that 30 per cent of Africa in the EEC. Ibid.
[90] South Africa, *Draft Green Paper on International Migration*, p. 2.

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A common market (a logical extrapolation within the *laissez faire* model), propagated within South Africa by some, only would worsen regional instability by codifying the free movement of labour.

> Conscious of the potential for dangerous competition and conflict between 'national' and foreign workers, South African trade unionist such as Muzi Buthelezi, general secretary of the Chemical Workers' Industrial Union, emphasize that more balanced economic development and employment opportunities must be created in all the countries of southern Africa. Or, as National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa regional education officer Tony Ruiters [now a successful businessman] has said: 'We need a job creation strategy not only in South Africa but for the whole region.'[91]

Free regional factor mobility that would include labour would mean, by one estimate made early in South Africa's transition, that South Africa would have to absorb 500,000 to 750,000 low-income people.[92]

The new security threats are linked. Many immigrants coming to South Africa smuggle small arms across the border.[93] Weapons left over from the long civil wars in Angola and Mozambique are a particular problem. For instance, at the turn of the century 1.5 million AK-47s were unaccounted for in Mozambique.[94] The spread of small arms impedes development in Africa and destabilises South Africa. It is a regional problem. James Hall claims:

> The 14 member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have a mutual security pact as the centerpiece of their organization, and if for no other reason than the tide of destabilizing illegal arms that passes through their countries.[95]

Ms Virginia Gamba, the former director of the Arms Management Programme of the South Africa Institute for Security Studies summarises that the spread of small arms:

> . . . may escalate conflicts, undermine peace agreements, intensify [the] violence and impact of crime, impede economic and social development and hinder the development of social stability, democracy and good governance.[96]

Curbing the demand for small arms means alleviating poverty and structural inequality in the region.[97] South Africa has framed its own concerns with the spread of small arms within a regional context. It has sponsored several regional programs to stop the spread of small arms. For instance, Pretoria conducted weapons seizure programs with Mozambique codenamed Operations Rachel I, II, and III; more than one hundred tons of small arms and ammunition were destroyed.[98] It also has a program named Operation Mouflon, begun in July 2000, which would destroy domestic stocks of surplus and confiscated weapons.

[91] Dot Keet, 'Labour Issues in Southern Africa: Critical Choices for Trade Unions', in Minnie Venter (ed.), *Prospects for Progress: Critical Choices for Southern Africa* (Durban: Longman), p. 127.
[92] Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside, 'Project of Rethinking Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa', Regional Integration Conference (Harare, 1992), p. 52.
[93] In urban South Africa the black market price for an AK-47 is $20, down from several hundred dollars four years ago. This reflects the growing supply. They are, nonetheless, three times as expensive as in neighbouring Angola or Mozambique.
[94] Joao Honwana and Guy Lamb, 'Small Arms Proliferation and Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa: A Conceptual Paper' (Cape Town: Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town), p. 7.
[95] James Hall, 'Small Arms Flood Southern Africa', *Inter Press News Agency*, 18 January (2003).
[96] Michael Fleshman, 'Counting the cost of gun violence', *Africa Recovery*, 15 (2001), p. 2.
[97] Ibid., p. 9.
[98] Rachel Stohl, 'South Africa Takes Action on Small Arms Problem', *Weekly Defense Monitor*, 3 (1999), p. 6.

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Small arms originating in regional conflict areas, such as Angola, Mozambique, and the DRC, that illegally find their way to South Africa (as many as four million[99]) are redefining South Africa's security issues.[100] These weapons often end up in the hands of criminal syndicates or tsotsis (gangsters) in South African townships. One such tsotsi stated: 'I can still get any weapon I want from the gun runners, pistols, rifles, even a grenade. I can even get a gun as a loan, and pay it off with the profit I make from hold-ups'.[101] The cost to South Africa has been profound, as more and more criminals have access to firearms. In the year 2000, South Africa spends $1.96 billion on law enforcement; $1.56 billion on health.[102]

Laissez Faire regional economic cooperation can exacerbate economic regional inequalities. Ironically, SADC's precursor, the Southern African Coordination Conference (SADCC) formed in 1980, was an experiment in developmental economic cooperation. SADC's post-apartheid FTA initiative seemed to reject many of its ancestor's premises.

The southern African regionalsecurity complex and functional cooperation

Andre Goldstein summarising the state of the southern African regional economy posited: 'In the SADC, industrial activity, already highly polarised in the richest and largest market, will likely concentrate even further in South Africa . . .' He then cautioned that, as well '. . . improving the transport infrastructure, which may strengthen the incentives for business to concentrate in the core rather than move to the periphery'.[103] Uneven regional economic development and its attendant security challenges for South Africa are redefining how Pretoria thinks about national security.

Functional cooperation, as represented by the Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) in southern Africa, occupies the grey area between *laissez faire* cooperation and developmental cooperation.[104] Scholars are divided over how to classify SDIs. Some consider them as part of South Africa's neo-liberal thrust[105] and, in particular, part of its neo-liberal *GEAR* policy.[106] Other scholars see a developmental lining in the SDIs. Certainly, the fact that South African corporate capital is driving the SDI's initiative taints it in some people's minds.[107] But another interpretation is that South Africa is still finding its regional voice. In the late long-time observer Colin Legum's words, 'Pretoria has clearly been having difficulty in deciding its own role as the

[99] Fleshman, 'Counting the cost of gun violence', p. 4.
[100] The South African parastatal, ARMSCOR, gave AK-47s from Bulgaria and Hungary to RENAMO. Margaret Keegan, 'The Proliferation of Fire Arms in South Africa', 30 April 2005. ⟨http://www.iansa.org/regions/safrica/documents/proliferation-firearms-southafrica.pdf⟩.
[101] Hall, 'Small Arms Flood Southern Africa'.
[102] Fleshman, 'Counting the cost of gun violence', p. 5.
[103] Goldstein, *Regional Integration*, p. 134.
[104] Except for a broad correlation between investment and infrastructure, the relationship between infrastructure and economic development is poorly understood and under-researched. See, Amanda Driver, and João Gabriel de Barros, 'The Impact of the Maputo Development Corridor on Freight Flows', *Working Paper 00/38* (Cape Town: DPSU, University of Cape Town, 2000), p. 2.
[105] See, Fred Söderbaum and Ian Taylor, 'Transmission Belt for Transnational Capital or Facilitator for Development? Problematising the Role of the State in the Maputo Development Corridor', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39:4 (2001).
[106] Ibid., p. 681.
[107] Tsie 'International Political Economy and Southern Africa', p. 141.

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engine of the region'.[108] In any case, functional cooperation, like any form of regional economic integration, is expected to promote regional development.

The South African government, of course, depicts functional cooperation as a developmental initiative. Mfundo Nkuhlu, ex-Director, DTI, Africa Bilateral Trade Relations, has been consistent in relating this position:

> This restructuring of [regional] relations is intended to promote: i. Coordinated regional development through the cluster approach as well as spatial development initiatives; ii. Project – oriented approach to infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction; iii. Measures to give the less developed regional states access to the South African Market in an isometric fashion, as well as coordination of macro-policies.[109]

Paul Jourdan, who as then Deputy Director General of South Africa's Department of Trade and Industry was in charge of the initiative, stated:

> SDIs are therefore targeted interventions by central government for helping unlock economic potential and facilitate new investment and job creation in a localized region or area.[110]

The question, however, is not one of labelling, but rather do the SDIs generate negative security externalities. Unquestionably, outside of South Africa, Sub-Sahara Africa lags behind the rest of the world on infrastructure development.[111] For instance, James Mittelman states:

> In Southern Africa, the search for development generators has emphasized corridors, understood to mean geographical linkages created to spur economic growth within countries and across borders.[112]

At present there are a number of SDIs planned or in the process of being constructed in southern Africa. Most notable are the Maputo Development Corridor (Mozambique–South Africa); Lubombo Initiative (Mozambique–South Africa–Swaziland); Nacala Development Corridor (Malawi–Mozambique), Malange Development Corridor (Angola), Lobito Development Corridor (Angola–DRC-Zambia), Namibia Development Corridor (Angola). And the Mtwara Corridor (Malawi, Mozambique, and Tanzania). There are in addition five SDIs within South Africa. The Maputo Development Corridor (MDC), which is considered the flag SDI project, has been described as '. . . a series of projects to upgrade the infrastructure that makes up the transport route from Gauteng to Maputo'.[113] It includes the road, railway, the border post, and the port of Maputo. Thus, the SDIs are largely about transport corridors. Ironically, they mirror SADCC's 1980s initiative to reduce reliance on South Africa using the 'corridor principle';[114] but they, in effect, tie the regional closer to South Africa's transportation network.

[108] Colin Legum, 'Balance of Power in Southern Africa', in York Bradshaw and Stephen Ndegwa (eds), *The Uncertain Promise of Southern Africa* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press), p. 14.
[109] Mfundo Nkuhlu, 'Southern Africa After Apartheid: Perspectives on Institutional Arrangements for Multi-Lateral Relations', Prepared for Workshop on the Correlation of Political Systems and Economic Development in Southern Africa (University of Fort Hare, 1–2 November, 1993), p. 83.
[110] Paul Jourdan, 'Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) – The Official View', *Development Southern Africa*, 15:5 (1998), p. 718.
[111] Muradzikwa, 'Foreign Investment in SADC', p. 15.
[112] James Mittelman, *The Globalization Syndrome*, p. 226.
[113] Driver and de Barros, 'The Impact of the Maputo Development Corridor', p. 2.
[114] Oliver Saasa, 'The Effectiveness of Regional Transport Networks in Southern Africa', in Bertil Odén (ed.), *Southern Africa after Apartheid* (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1993), p. 140.

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The developmental impact of these initiatives can be evaluated using economic geography theory. The main conclusion important for this analysis is that improved transportation between the periphery (South Africa's near abroad) and the core (South Africa) can engender polarisation.[115]

> At sufficiently high transport costs, there is a unique stable equilibrium in which manufacturing is evenly divided between the regions. When transport costs fall below some critical level, new stable equilibria emerge in which manufacturing is concentrated in one region.[116]

Paul Krugman describes what is essentially polarisation:

> Manufacturing will move toward more desirable sites and away from less desirable ones, but in so doing it will change the market potential map, typically reinforcing the advantage of already favored locations.[117]

Thus the SDIs, at least in theory, will have a similar impact as *laissez faire* economic integration. In the most thorough study of the impact of the Maputo Development Corridor on transportation costs, Driver and de Barros concluded that the cost of freight transport will in fact decrease.[118] There are, however, two important caveats. First, while an initial decline may foster a concentration of industry, further decline may do the opposite.[119] Second, rival centres can thrive if they are far enough apart.[120]

Finally, even before the end of apartheid, South Africa's transportation network was poised to dominate the region. This is due in part to South Africa's destabilisation policies of the 1970s and the 1980s, and in part due to the sanctions campaign against Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).[121] Under the Transport and Communication Commission, SADCC originally gave top priority to breaking free from dependence on South Africa's transportation network. It failed. The South Africa Chamber of Business (SACOB) reported that by 1994, SADCC's transport projects had not even restored pre-1975 capacities.[122] This was despite the fact that SADDC's transport sector had received 'the lions share of all total SADDC project'.[123] Given the pattern of investment in southern Africa, not much new investment is likely. The fact that Oliver Saasa predicted that market criteria would dictate the pattern of infrastructural development in post-apartheid southern Africa is foreboding for South Africa's neighbours.[124]

[115] Goldstein, *Regional Integration*, p. 15. Goldstein does note that 'selected projects with large multiplier effects' can be beneficial. Ibid.
[116] Masahisa Fujita, Paul Krugman and Anthony Venables, *The Spatial Economy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), p. 68.
[117] Paul Krugman, *Development, Geography, and Economic Theory* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), p. 62.
[118] Driver and Barros, 'The Impact of the Maputo Development Corridor', p. 20. The focus on the Maputo Port at one end of the MDC, will also detract from Mozambique's Beira and Nacala ports, which do not service South Africa.
[119] Fujita, Krugman and Venables, *The Spatial Economy*, p. 111.
[120] Krugman, *Development, Geography and Economic Theory*, p. 66.
[121] MERG, *Reconstructing Economic Relations with the Southern African Region: Issues and Options for a Democratic South Africa* (Belville: The Centre for Development Studies, University of Western Cape, 1993), p. 29.
[122] South Africa Chamber of Business (SACOB), 'South Africa's Options for Future Relations with Southern Africa and the European Community: Discussion Document' (Johannesburg: SACOB, 1992). See also, Saasa, 'The Effectiveness of Regional Transport Networks', p. 140.
[123] Saasa, 'The Effectiveness of Regional Transport Networks', p. 136.
[124] Ibid., p. 140.

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Ironically, the SDIs, in the short term, may not only exacerbate regional economic inequality and therefore immigration (and its attendant security issues), but may make it easier for people to travel. The increased movement of people since the end of apartheid has contributed to South Africa's HIV/AIDS crisis.

HIV/AIDS is a regional security issue.[125] The Clinton administration stated that the AIDS epidemic could eventually topple governments, fuel ethnic wars and undermine free-market economies. In particular, it declared a strong relationship between disease and political instability.[126] J. Stephen Morrison predicts that AIDS will lead to more state failure and violent insecurity, 'which translates into new forms of transnational security threats'.[127] South Africa went from a very low incidence of HIV prevalence to, at the turn of the century, the highest absolute number of cases in the world. It has the second- or third-highest percentage of infected people in southern Africa, going from 1 per cent in 1990 to about 20 percent in 2001.[128] HIV/AIDS indirectly affects security through its economic impact, and directly affects security through its affect on the military.[129]

One study predicts that in by 2010 HIV/AIDS will shave 7 to 10 per cent off per capita income in South Africa and reduce GDP from what it would otherwise have been by 17 per cent.[130] South Africa has been projected to have a negative population growth (− 1.4 per cent by 2010) because of HIV/AIDS.[131] And the populations of the most severely affected countries also will have a new shape – 'the population chimney'. Essentially, the size of the productive population will severely shrink and the proportion of 15 to 25 year-olds will double.[132] The military has been hit particularly hard. Stephen Elbe lists some reasons why: the military is more mobile and away from home for long periods of time; sex workers are attracted to the military; and the pressures of war lead to more alcohol and drug abuse, and thus unprotected sex.[133] In South Africa, one study showed half of the soldiers between the ages of 23 and 29 to be HIV-positive.[134]

[125] See for instance CSIS, *Global HIV/AIDS: A Strategy for US Leadership* (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1994); L. Heinecken, 'AIDS: the New Security Frontier', *Conflict Trends*, 4 (2000); L. Heinecken, 'Strategic Implications of HIV/AIDS in South Africa', *Conflict, Security Development*, 1 (2001); J. D. Wolfensohn, 'The Impact of AIDS on Pace and Security in Africa', Speech delivered to the UN Security Council Special Session on The Situation in Africa: the Impact of AIDS on Peace and Security, 10 January 2000. It should be noted that understanding the relationship between HIV/AIDS and security lags significantly behind the rhetoric. J. Stephen Morrison and Jennifer Cooke, 'Preview of Major Findings', in Morrison and Cooke (eds), *Africa Policy in the Clinton Years* (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2001), p. 8; J. Stephen Morrison, 'US Policy Toward HIV/AIDS in Africa', in *Africa Policy in the Clinton Years*, p. 31.

[126] CNN.com 30 April 2000.

[127] Morrison, 'US Policy Toward HIV/AIDS', p. 31.

[128] Ibid., p. 18.

[129] See H. Jackson, 'AIDS and the Military: The Quintessential AIDS in the Workshop Issue', *SAFAIDS News*, 4:2 (1996); R. Yeager, 'Armies of East and Southern Africa Fighting a Guerilla War with AIDS', *AIDS Analysis Africa*, 5:6 (1995).

[130] United States Institute for Peace (USIP), 'AIDS and Violent Conflict in Africa', USIP Special Report, 2001.

[131] Karen Stanecki, *The AIDS Pandemic in the 21st Century*. Draft Report XIV International Conference on AIDS (Barcelona, 2002).

[132] Douglas Webb, 'The Sexual & Economic Politics of (Re)integration: HIV/AIDS & The Question of Stability in Southern Africa', in David Simon (ed.), *South Africa in Southern Africa: Reconfiguring the Region* (Athens: Ohio University Press), p. 230.

[133] Stephen Elbe, 'HIV/AIDS and the Security Sector in the Southern Africa Region', in *New and Critical Security*.

[134] HIV/AIDS and the Security', p. 103.

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The rapid penetration of AIDS in South Africa is directly linked to the movements of people back and forth across borders, and the virus spreads fastest where regional infrastructures are most developed. For instance, SADF units along the South Africa–Mozambique border reportedly have rates upwards of 70 per cent.[135] Douglas Webb shows that prevalence rates in southern Africa are exaggerated along major transport routes, and particularly at transport nodules.[136]

Finally, HIV/AIDS has a perverse regional dimension. It may have an asymmetrical impact on region investment, mimicking the problems of polarisation. According to *BussinessMap South Africa*, as a result of HIV/AIDS investors demand a 15 per cent–20 per cent return on investment in South Africa, and an even higher one in the rest of the region – 25 per cent or more.[137] It might also affect the ability of South African forces to conduct regional peace keeping operations. Not only because its military is disproportionately infected with HIV, but because other countries may not welcome those forces.[138]

Lack of equitable economic development in much of southern Africa as a result of both *laissez faire* and functional regional economic integration can further weaken the state, and in some cases trigger state failure. In Africa, state collapse has been proceeded by economic failure. Weak and collapsing states have an explicit regional security effect.[139] That is, regional instability is triggered by the breakdown within states.[140] As Morten Bøås explains, weak states lack an efficient bureaucracy and lack control over their hinterland.[141] These weak states create black holes that by their nature regionalise their instability.[142] The collapse of an etiolated Zaire started in its penumbra, shared with Uganda and Rwanda, as well as with those countries' assistance. The civil war in Angola was tied to the instability of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),[143] and the DRC continues to destabilise, among others, neighbouring Zambia. The spillover effect from both Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (both members of SADC), in van Nieuwkerk's words, '. . . will have a potentially disastrous impact on SADC's common security project',[144] which

[135] P. Kirk, 'Sixty Percent of Army may be HIV-positive Reports', *The Mail & Guardian*, 31 March 2000, cited in Elbe, 'HIV/AIDS and the Security', p. 12.
[136] Webb, 'The Sexual & Economic Politics of (Re)integration', p. 229.
[137] Cited in, Robyn Pharaoh and Martin Schönteich, 'AIDS, Security and Governance in Southern Africa: Exploring the Impact', *Occasional Paper No. 65* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2003), p. 6.
[138] For a thorough study on the impact of HIV/AIDS on southern Africa militaries, see Martin Rupiya (ed.), *The Enemy Within: Southern African Militaries' Quarter Century Battle with HIV and AIDS* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2006).
[139] See for instance, William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Press, 1998); Christopher Clapham. *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Jeffrey Herbst, 'Responding to State Failure in Africa', *International Security*, 21 (1996); William Zartman (ed.), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Press, 1995).
[140] Fred Söderbaum, 'Africa in the Global Political Economy: Globalization, Regionalization, or Marginalization', in *The New Regionalism and the Future of Security and Development*, p. 125.
[141] Morten Bøås, 'Towards a Political Economy of Regionalized and Transregionalized States: Informal Economies, Floating Borders and Networks', Paper presented at the IPSA meeting, 31 July–4 August (2000), p. 4.
[142] Hettne 'The New Regionalism; A Prologue', p. xxv.
[143] Björn Hettne and Fredrick Söderbaum, 'Global Governance Meets the New Regionalism: Modes of Regional Governance in Africa', Paper presented at the IPSA meeting, 31 July–4 August, Quebec (2000), p. 9.
[144] Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, 'Conflict Management in Africa: Southern Africa's Experience with Security Cooperation', Paper presented at the IPSA meeting, 31 July–4 August, Quebec, 2000.

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explains South Africa's commitment to the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). Björn Hettne and Fred Söderbaum went as far to warn of the 'West Africanization of Southern Africa'.[145]

If this were to happen in southern Africa, Zimbabwe would be the epicentre.[146] The state itself is in rapid decline and the economy is in a free-fall. As with other cases of state collapse, such as Liberia and the DRC, collapse would most likely come from the out-side-in. Robert Mugabe's support comes from the countryside and his ex-comrades in arms. The opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) dominates the urban centres of Zimbabwe, as did earlier challenges to ZANU rule by the Zimbabwe Unity Movement in 1990 and by the Forum Party in 1995. Mugabe's regime has responded by using the land issue to shore up its rural base and to reward cronies, particularly military leaders. Mugabe also established a national youth training program in 2001, know as the 'green bombers'; they serve as an informal party militia.

The risk of state failure in Zimbabwe does not necessarily come from continued ZANU-PF rule, as bad as that might be, but from the failure to move from patrimonial rule to an inclusive democracy. Zimbabwe would tragically come to resemble Liberia, where an elite controls the urban area(s), and well armed disgruntled factions patrol the periphery. There has already been violence between ZANU and the MDC, more than a hundred have died in the last three years and thousand more injured. After their success in parliamentary elections in 2003, rural areas were a no-go for the MDC.[147] If driven from power, the remnants of Mugabe's regime would have ready made networks to fund insurgencies. Among the powerful Zimbabweans mentioned in a UN report on the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the collapsed DRC are: Speaker of the Zimbabwean parliament Emmerson Mnangagwa, Zimbabwean Defense Force commander General Vitalis Zvinavashe, and Defense Minister Sidney Sekeramayi.[148]

If the MDC were to come to power, intra-party factionalism and competition within the ZANU-PF, such as between the Zezuru and Karanga factions, could become violent and each would be well funded.[149] Veterans who participated in the farm occupations were mainly ex-ZANLA forces attached to Mugabe's ZANU. Ex-ZIPRA soldiers attached to Joshua Nkoma's ZAPU were opposed to forceful farm occupations.[150] Zimbabwe's Fifth Brigade's actions in Matabeleland between 1982 and 1984 (up to 10,000 civilians of the minority Ndebele who supported Mugabe's rival Joshua Nkoma were killed[151]) left the latent rivalry between the Ndebele and Shona highly flammable.[152] The structure of Zimbabwe's demobilisation programme after Mugabe's

[145] Hettne and Söderbaum, 'Global Governance Meets the New Regionalism', p. 10.
[146] For a fuller explanation of this see, Hentz, 'State Collapse and Regional Contagion'.
[147] USIP, 'Zimbabwe and the Prospects for Nonviolent Change', Special Report 109, August 2003, p. 7.
[148] *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 18 May 2003. 'Zimbabwean elite ''looted'' DRC', ⟨http://www.zwnews.com/issuefull.cfm?ArticleID=6785⟩. See also, 'Gunning for Mnangagwa', *Africa Confidential*, 45:8 (2004), p. 1.
[149] See, Chris Maroleng, 'Fiddling While Zimbabwe Burns', *Situation Report* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 13 October 2003).
[150] For a thorough discussion of this point see, Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, 'Elections, Land and the Politics of Opposition in Matabeleland', *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 1:4 (2001).
[151] USIP, 'Zimbabwe and the Prospects for Nonviolent Change', p. 3.
[152] In October 2006, the 'old wounds' of the 'Gukurahundi' (Five Brigades activity 1986/87), led to a bitter dispute between Robert Mugabe and his Deputy President. *allAfrica.com* ⟨http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200610190653.html⟩.

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election in 1980 may make it worse, because it did not sever ties between ex-combatants and their wartime military factions (because of deep-seated mistrust between ZIPRA and ZANLA); each force was assembled and encamped separately.[153]

In most cases of state collapse in Sub-Sahara Africa, economic stagnation has been the tipping point. Zimbabwe cannot afford further economic decline, which could be accelerated by trade diversion and polarisation. The economic evisceration of Zimbabwe and concomitant state failure would have many neighbourhood effects. Criminal groups in Zimbabwe,[154] along with Zambia and South Africa, have developed the most extensive networks in southern Africa.[155] Groups of thugs known as *Akaplas*, which are made up of remnants of *ex anti* apartheid combatants (who could not or would not be assimilated by the post-apartheid South Africa National Defense forces) have formed transnational criminal organisations within South Africa.[156] There is a growing organic link among criminal groups across the sub-continent. The best solution to the problem is domestic job growth.

Conclusion: the development of insecurity in post-apartheid South Africa

New security issues have led South Africa to deploy its military to combat the security externalities of an underdeveloped region and its own domestic poverty,[157] a *de facto* broadening of its national security.

> The military's contribution is significant. In 1997, for example, the army set up over 4,000 roadblocks and 5,000 vehicle control points, carried out over 100,000 patrols and 3,414 ambushes, mounted 2,255 cordon and search operations and established over 20,000 observation and listening posts in support of the police. Twenty-six light infantry companies were deployed alongside the policy for border protection in which further anti-crime actions took place.
> During the previous year, the Air Force flew 1,737 sorties to combat crime; it spent 3,339 hours patrolling the country's borders, and 564 more helping the South African Navy patrol the coastline. The Navy spent 939 hours patrolling the coast, during which it assisted in the inspection of seventy-three ships. The cost of these activities was an estimated R1 billion out of the defense budget.[158]

Post-apartheid South Africa's security threats, all of which are 'new security threats' and regional in nature, blur the distinction between international security and

[153] Michael Westphal, 'Critical Factors in Demobilization, Demilitarization and Reintegration: An Analysis of Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe', Prepared for: Office of the Secretary of Defense International Security Affairs, Office of African Affairs, OSD/ISA/AFR, February (2002), p. 57.

[154] On crime and human security in Zimbabwe see, Charles Goredema, 'Zimbabwe and Beyond Declarations of Intent: Transnational crime initiatives and legislative reform in Zimbabwe', *African Security Review*, 10:3 (2001). ⟨http://222.iss.co.za/Pubs/ION3/Gordema.html⟩.

[155] Peter Gastrow, 'The SADC Region: A Common Market for Criminals', *Africa Security Review*, 10:4 (2001). ⟨ww.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/10No4/Gastrow.htm⟩.

[156] Gary Kynoch, 'The "Transformation" of the South Africa Military', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 34:3 (1996), p. 456.

[157] South Africa justifies the use of its military in internal policing roles under the national security banner of human security encapsulated in Chapter 11, Article 198 of the 1996 Constitution and reiterated in the 1997 Defense Review. Jean-Jacques Blais and Jeremy King, 'Internal Military Development in Support of Security in South Africa'. Paper prepared for IPSA RC#40 Workshop, Halifax (2000), p. 1/6.

[158] Ibid., pp. 2–6.

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internal economic development and security. How interdependence relates to security needs to be reconsidered.

The end of apartheid redefined the southern African security landscape. South Africa was no longer aligned against the region, but rather part of the region. It is also part of a regional *insecurity complex*. But the assumptions that link regional economic integration to a security community need close examination.

Looking at regional interdependence through a non-state centric prism reveals a particular set of security concerns. In southern Africa, the threat to peace is not interstate, but rather intra-regional and, as is argued above, unequal trade may exacerbate the security environment. The security dilemma facing the developing world is distinct: '. . . it is not primarily states that defect from interstate balances of power, but rather a range of transnational and sub-national actors and structures'[159] that define the security dilemma.

Traditional IR theory on regionalism is the wrong toolkit for understanding Africa. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett discuss three stages in the formation of a *security community*. Stage two is an intensive and extensive pattern of networks between states.[160] Buzan et al. made a similar claim when they state, 'Regional integration will eliminate a *security complex*, which with it is coextensive, by transforming it from an anarchic subsystem of states to a single, larger actor within the system'.[161] But while interdependence has advanced in post-apartheid southern Africa, insecurity has not abated. Immigration, weapons proliferation, HIV/AIDS, and failing and collapsed states largely define the pattern of interaction in southern Africa.[162] So, as Michael Schulz, Fred Söderbaum and Joakim Ojendal note, 'Increased interaction and integration can also give the rise to conflict, exploitation, dominance, misallocation of resources . . .'[163] In the African context, the very high frequency of cross-border/cross-region interaction has not created anything that remotely resembles a *security community*.[164] In fact, it has created a new security dilemma because, as Tim Shaw notes, the intensification of inequalities in Africa provides some of the causes of 'new' conflicts.[165] In particular, Thomas Ohlson and John Stedman have argued that asymmetrical economic development is one of the primary conditions of conflict in southern Africa.[166]

At issue, therefore, is the level of development and its associated security dynamics, which are regional in nature. Economic development is explicitly linked to security. As Mark Duffield states:

[159] Karl Cerny, 'The New Security Dilemma: Divisibility, Defection and Disorder in the Global Era', *Review of International Studies*, 26:4 (2000), p. 64.
[160] Adler, and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities', p. 54.
[161] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Press, 1998), p. 5.
[162] Senzo Ngubane, 'Sources of Southern African Insecurity', in Solomon (ed.), *Towards a Common Defense*, pp. 52–3.
[163] Michael Schultz, Fredrick Söderbaum and Joakim Ojendal, 'Introduction', in Schultz, Söderbaum and Ojendal (eds), *Regionalization in a Globalizing World: A Comparative Perspective on Forms, Actors and Processes* (London: Zed Books), draft chapter, p. 11.
[164] Bøås, 'Towards a Political', p. 312.
[165] Timothy Shaw, 'Africa in the Global Political Economy', p. 107.
[166] Thomas Ohlson and Stephen John Stedman, *The New is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 257, 263.

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> In other words, the promotion of development has become synonymous with the pursuit of security. At the same time, security has become a prerequisite for sustainable development.[167]

Because regional economic integration in the developing world is primarily about economic development, it is also about security.[168]

The relationship between regional security and regional economic integration is different within the context of a developing region from that within a developed region. As Björn Hettne has persuasively and repeatedly argued:

> Their [developing countries'] overall situation therefore makes 'security regionalism' and 'developmental regionalism' more important than the creation of free trade regimes.[169]

Because it exacerbates economic inequality, a *laissez faire* approach (from a FTA to a common market) to regional economic integration, rather than a developmental approach, in an anarchical environment characterised by 'new security' threats fosters insecurity in southern Africa. Functional cooperation may also cause insecurity. Unlike the *security communities* in the North, interdependence characteristic of *insecurity complexes* in the South may engender negative externalities.

The African security *problématique* remains regional, and all regional players see some form of regional economic cooperation as necessary. The right institutional framework is essential. The core of this problem is economic development grounded in regional inequalities. South African policymakers (or some of them) understand this.

> The negative spillover effects for RSA [of an FTA] would include increased clandestine migration of illegal economic refugees into her own territory and a degree of destabilization in the region that would increase dramatically its own political and social costs. This lop-sided trade profile certainly contributes to the distrust of RSA in the region.[170]

In Björn Hettne's words, '. . . regional cooperation for development reduces the level of conflict and the peace dividend facilitates further development cooperation'.[171]

The relationship between regional economic integration and regional security depends on the nature of the security threats that define the region. Traditional state vs state threats on one hand and new transnational threats on the other hand determine how different forms of regional economic integration, *laissez faire*, functional, and developmental, define or re-define a particular security complex. In the case of southern Africa, both, *laissez faire* (free trade area) and functional cooperation (spatial development initiatives) will foster regional inequality and insecurity because they exacerbate the 'new security' threats. What is needed is a developmental approach to regional economic integration.

[167] Mills makes a similar argument for southern Africa. Mills, 'South Africa and Africa: Regional Integration and Security Cooperation', *Africa Security Review*, 4 (1995), p. 9.
[168] Keller and Rothchild argue there is a link between stability and the possible success of regional integration. Edmund Keller and Donald Rothchild (eds), *Africa in the New International Order* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Press, 1996), p. 50.
[169] Björn Hettne, 'Development Security and World Order: A Regionalist Approach', in Sheila Page (ed.), *Regions and Development: Politics, Security and Economics* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 52.
[170] Thomas, 'A South Africa Perspective on the SADC', p. 10.
[171] Hettne 'Development Security and World Order', p. 62.

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