these (pp. 583–606) in particular will help the reader enormously to discover the wealth of this exceptionally rich book.

The book's production is well-nigh flawless; there are not many misprints (p. 40, second para.: supply 'the' before 'city's culture'; p. 49 n. 110: read 'Dihle' instead of 'Dihke'; p. 63, second para.: read 'possibilities' instead of '-tes'; p. 138, second para.: read 'identified' instead of '-fed'; p. 142, first para.: read ἔρσεν- instead of ἔρασν-; p. 185, second para.: insert 'as' before 'a piece' and read 'Leichtgläubigkeit' instead of '-glaub-'; p. 191 n. 476: read 'Wedemeyer' instead of 'Weder-' and note that the second part of the title is not 'und die Dea Syria' but 'und die Schrift 'Über die syrische Göttin''; p. 194 middle: read 'wachsenden' instead of 'wächs-'; p. 266 l. 18: wrong accent on ἀγαθὰ; p. 311 n. 32: read πανηγύρεις instead of -ριες; p. 320, first para.: read Araros (from -ώς) instead of -us; ibid., second para.: read 'Phoenician' instead of '-can'; p. 372, first para.: read 'dedication' instead of '-ction'; p. 406, first para.: read 'Stephens–Winkler' instead of '-ckler'; p. 426, last para.: 'Herodotean' has fallen out before 'phrases'; p. 517 n. 7: read 'Amphiaraus' instead of '-raeus'; p. 524 n. 4: read 'Whittaker' instead of '-cker') and even fewer factual errors (p. 71: read 'Pelias' instead of 'Peleus'; p. 98 n. 46: read '12' instead of '11'; p. 108: forms like γίνομαι can already be found in Alexis and are normal in many writings of Aristotle, i.e. in the fourth century B.C.; p. 368: it is not 'in the land beyond the western ocean' where 'Lucian' and his crew discover an alleged inscription of Heracles and Dionysus in *VH* 1.7, but on the first island within that ocean; p. 384 n. 1: read 'Candaules' instead of 'Cambyses').

One may hope that L.'s book will quickly become a model, and that other still neglected writings of Imperial Greek Literature will be made as excellently accessible as *De Dea Syria* now is.

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PLOTINUS ON EROS

A. PIGLER: *Plotin: une métaphysique de l'amour. L'amour comme structure du monde intelligible.* Pp. 299. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2002. Paper, €32. ISBN: 2-7116-1577-4.

This monograph is a revised doctoral dissertation completed under the direction of Gilbert Dherbey at Paris-IV in 1999. Its central thesis is that Plotinus, though in most matters a self-consciously faithful exegete and interpreter of Plato, introduces a radically new conception of love (ἔρως). This new conception pervades—indeed, structures—his entire metaphysics. As a result, Plotinus is justly labeled a 'neo'-Platonist rather than the 'paleo'-Platonist he aspired to be. In the first three parts of the book (pp. 9–198), the author develops this thesis by means of a systematic consideration of the use of the concept of love in the central texts dealing with the three primary principles of Plotinus' metaphysics—the One itself, Intellect (νοῦς), and Soul (ψυχή). In the fourth part, she considers matter, as a principle of evil both at the cosmic and at the personal levels.

The core texts upon which Pigler bases her argument are found at 6.8 [39], Chapters 15 and 16, where Plotinus speaks of the first principle of all as 'itself love, object of love, and self-lover'. Since the One is absolutely perfect and simple, the remarkable implication of these passages is that Plotinus, against Plato, does not conceive of love

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as implying a defect or an imperfection. As we recall from the *Symposium*, Plato treats of love as a form of desire and desire as indicating a lack with respect to the object of desire. Specifically, love is 'desire to possess the good forever' (*Symp*. 206A11–12). But the first principle of all, the One, or equivalently, the Good, has no desire (ἐπιθυμία), in particular no desire to possess what it, uniquely, is.

There are two puzzles here. First, how does Plotinus interpret Plato's account of the 'downward' causal or explanatory path from the Good to the other Forms and then to everything else? Secondly, why does Plotinus choose to employ a concept laden with connotations of defect and even derangement to characterize the first principle? Obviously, both puzzles must be solved together. It is P.'s very considerable insight that the second puzzle cannot be ignored simply by making of love a grace note in the description of the One. For the One in its perfect simplicity is nothing but the activity that is supposed by Plotinus ultimately to explain the being of everything else. Thus, 'love' is but another name for this activity, identified variously as 'will', 'consciousness', 'hyperintellection', etc. P.'s entire book is in effect a sustained meditation on this puzzle.

One of the author's main arguments is that in embracing the idea that *bonum est diffusivum sui*, and identifying this with the superabundance of love, Plotinus sets himself apart—whether consciously or not P. does not say—from Plato. The Idea of the Good in *Rep*. 509B is said to be the cause of the being and essence of the other Forms and also of their knowability.

It is difficult to gainsay P.'s basic contention that Plato's first principle of all does not possess even the attenuated cognitive power of Plotinus' One or its superabundant life. However, she perhaps undervalues Plotinus' incessant use of 'in a manner of speaking' (οἷον) in attributing any characteristics to the One. Despite the qualification, if P. is right, then what Plotinus is surely doing is drawing out what he takes to be the consequences of Plato's recognition of the need for an absolutely simple first principle of all. In so doing, he transforms one metaphysical system into another, with the characteristics of personhood (however attenuated) an integral part.

Another important theme powerfully developed throughout the book is that Plotinus employs the concept of love to connect the 'downward' path of procession and the 'upward' part of return or reversion to the first principle. In effect, the reason why all things strive to return to their source ('possess the good') is that this desire is essentially the same fact as the presence of the One in them. But the One that is present is also transcendent or absent, and this absence accounts for the fact that love on the 'upward' path indicates a defect remediable only by union with the first principle.

Aristotle's rôle in this transformation, if it be such, is crucial. P. acknowledges that Aristotle's Prime Mover is intended as a first principle of all, and as such it is loved (ἐρώμενον, ὀρεκτικόν) and enjoys the best life. P. also rightly argues that the Prime Mover is, according to Plotinus, unsuitable as the real first principle owing to the intrinsic complexity of its noetic activity. But it is worth recalling that Plotinus was the pupil of Ammonius Saccas who, according to Plotinus' pupil and disciple Porphyry, was seized with the idea that Aristotle's philosophy was in harmony with Plato's. Plotinus himself, though a constant critic of Aristotle, is unstinting in his use of Aristotle's ideas to *express* Platonism. Plotinus was convinced that the Prime Mover was in effect Aristotle's version of Plato's Demiurge. And if the Prime Mover/Demiurge has a life and is loved, then the true first principle must have and must be 'in a manner of speaking' love and life itself, for it is the source of all that possesses being of any kind and 'virtually everything' (δύναμις πάντων). Indeed, its love must then be identical with its activity (ἐνέργεια, an Aristotelian word appropriated by Plotinus).

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This is an altogether splendid book, original in conception, provocative, and passionately argued. Remarkably for a book that is basically a Ph.D. thesis, it stands up very well indeed alongside the deeply reflective and learned works of Arnou, Hadot, Trouillard, and Gandillac. I recommend it wholeheartedly to all students of Platonism.

University of Toronto LLOYD P. GERSON

IAMBLICHUS ON THE MYSTERIES

E. C. Clarke: *Iamblichus:* De mysteriis. *A Manifesto of the Miraculous*. Pp. vii + 136. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001. Cased, £35. ISBN: 0-7546-0408-X.

This is a book warmly to be welcomed. Emma Clarke has produced a study of this remarkable work which will serve to define with greater accuracy than ever before its essential quality. This work, the true title of which is *The Response of the Master Abamon to Porphyry's Letter to Anebo, with Solutions to the Problems Raised Therein* (the usual title, *On the Mysteries of the Egyptians*, etc., is an invention of Marsilio Ficino, but it is undeniably somewhat snappier, so it is generally retained), is the second half of a polemical exchange initiated by Iamblichus' former teacher, Porphyry, in protest against Iamblichus' growing tendency to privilege 'theurgy', or the performance of ritual acts by properly qualified persons (what one might term 'sacramental theology') over philosophy proper. Not that philosophy was to be rejected; it was simply declared inadequate, by itself, to achieve the reintegration of the soul, damaged as it was, even in its essence, by descent into the body, with the realm of True Being, and, above that, with the One.

Iamblichus, of course, rejects Plotinus' theory that a part of the human soul remains 'above', and this acceptance of the complete descent of the soul would seem to be tied in with his promotion of ritual activity—a change of emphasis that affected Platonism ever afterwards, and which in consequence drew down upon Iamblichus the wrath of modern scholars dominated by modern ideals of rationality and enlightenment. However, in the last thirty years or so the situation has changed somewhat. It has been recognized that a case can be made for the inclusion of theurgy in an intellectual tradition which, it must be remembered, had many of the characteristics of a religion as well as of a philosophical movement. The pendulum can, however, swing too far in the direction of rehabilitating the *DM* from a rationalist viewpoint, and it is this against which C. is protesting. The *DM* is certainly well argued, on its own premisses, and even a rather sophisticated production, from a polemical perspective (the constant putting down of Porphyry by the high priest 'Abamon' exhibits, it seems to me, a degree of wit), but one must not be seduced into hailing it as a work of rationalism.

I quote, in this connexion, two programmatic passages from C., the one at the end of Chapter 1 (p. 12), the second near the beginning of Chapter 2 (p. 19):

> Although Iamblichus offers a point-by-point refutation in the *De Mysteriis*, his more sweeping answer to Porphyry is clear at the outset: all questions find their solution in the miracle of theurgy, not the intellectualist explanations of philosophy. The whole thrust of Iamblichus' argument depends upon the notion that Porphyry is asking the wrong questions in the wrong way. Iamblichus believes language to be an inadequate means of communicating

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