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This essay discusses the presumptions of 'literalism' as an incoherent linguistic ideal, while arguing for the role of non-literal language in deepening historical understanding through architectural descriptions.

Literalism and its limits

Peter Olshavsky

> *It's natural that we extend our use up to this point, saying 'This is this,' although this is a perfectly stupid and useless.*
>
> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics*, XXX

What is an appropriate role for descriptive language in historical texts about architecture? This seemingly banal question opens onto a schism in architectural knowledge that plays out through language. The need for such a discussion is precipitated by a renewed argument for 'literalism,' which holds that architectural texts, including building histories, should use words in their usual or most basic sense. Shunning non-literal language, texts should be technically regimented and articulate a work's physicality with punctilious exactitude. The tacit rationale for this vocabulary is to match the increased mathematical accounting its booster's desire in architecture. The explicit reasoning is to address our intertwined social, political, and environmental crises. While literalism's moral orientation is just, I argue, their literary dictates within a global discipline do not offer a coherent ideal.

The literalist view of language is shown, in the words of philosopher Charles Taylor, to be a 'suburb of the vast, sprawling city of language, which could never be the metropolis itself.'[1] By highlighting its presumptions, literalism is exposed as not only flawed but also as troublesome for writing about the diverse field of architecture. This critical appraisal throws into relief the importance of non-literal description (e.g., figuring of A through B).

While the argument seems counterintuitive, valuing non-literal descriptions of decidedly material things, its relevance hinges on the indispensable variety of rational and non-rational dimensions of ancient, global, or even a-scientific contexts in which architecture arises. Let me be clear, this is not an argument of fact (literal) verse fiction (non-literal) or realism verse relativism. It is an argument about two kinds of architectural language as they are situated within the historically constituted tension between the symbolic and communicative dimensions of reality. My argument advocates for a living, disclosive, sometimes epiphanic language, over and against a dead and instrumental one. The former can manifest potent but hard to grasp matters in this tension. Thus, non-literal vocabulary is shown through multiple examples to enrich not obscure architectural history.

Literal orientation

Literalism has found its most recent advocate in the thoughtful architect and educator Kiel Moe. In his account, this view of human language offers something like this. Most written descriptions of buildings, he argues, promote a view that is 'vague.' They are part of a broader 'routine of abstraction' that has plagued 'modernity.' In architectural texts, including historical works, non-literal language cloaks our broken ecological and social milieu. Non-literal language has 'mainly begotten many of architecture's current ecological, social, and political blind spots.'[2] Within the hidden entanglements, the repeated use of non-technically precise vocabularies is complicit in maintaining the status quo of architecture's autonomy. Writers exacerbate this condition by using non-literal language to enlist readers – we can assume academics, designers, and students – to the ill-gotten conclusion that architecture is divorced from its 'bio-geophysical basis.'

Holding a position informed by the ecologist Howard T. Odum's 'ecosystem methods,' the author's intent is to address these blind spots by planetary accounting. The desire is to generate the 'most totalizing picture of world-systems material and energy flows.'[3] To achieve such a world picture, the field must undergo a suspicious reading. This style of interpretation has affinities with what philosopher Paul Ricœur termed the 'school of suspicion' à la Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche.[4] Literalists affirm this method to 'reveal' and 'unmask.' This interpretative style inherently turns architecture's literary treatments into surfaces that hide vital truth.

In what amounts to a *rappel à l'ordre*, Moe proposes, the discipline's descriptive language

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1 Toledo Glass Pavilion, Toledo, OH.

should be held to a higher level of propriety. The appropriate language for contemporary architectural life should be 'more literal'. If it does not act as a literalist tool, then language can only be an agent of economic, social, and political conditions of oppression and exploitation that it unconsciously affirms and propagates. When describing the Toledo Museum of Art's Glass Pavilion, completed by SANAA in 2006, presumably an author should not refer to its structural members as reed-like members bracing the impossibly transparent work *[1]*. Instead, they are 'three and a half-inch to four and a quarter-inch diameter steel columns carry vertical loads to the concrete plinth-and-mat foundation.'[5] Architectural description must forsake abstractions to be prosaic and as exacting as the building's own specifications. This has affinities to the work of author Emile Zola, whom theorist Arthur Symons joked, 'tried to build in brick and mortar inside the cover of a book.'[6] Words must abide by mimetic fidelity to the bundling of a work's constitution.

Writers employ these works and texts as tools to help readers understand what the author has found to be really happening. This enables them to conceptually migrate in two temporal directions. They can travel from a completed work back to its labour, materials, processes, and sourcing. Or, conversely, they can read into the future and its eventual demolition or dismantling. To achieve the character of a tool, language must be demystified. It must shed its inherent bifocality, so it can non-mysteriously encode and communicate predefined information about the material world to its readers. By helping them unlearn the 'enabling fiction' of abstraction, it mirrors the true journey of the stuff extracted from the earth and made in factories that for the time being is the Glass Pavilion along Monroe Street in Toledo, Ohio. With enlarged knowledge passed along by accurate instrumental descriptions, then, a more transparent vision of architecture's provenance will become obvious. This is because 'Gaia', Moe notes, recalling philosopher Bruno Latour, 'is in the details of the details of building.'[7] Diligent readers would grasp these larger chains to address the hydrocarbon waste, toxicity, or exploitation that resides in blind spots. Embracing this regimented vocabulary focuses a reader's attention on the fuller 'terrestrial' being of architecture.[8]

While it seems like the literalist argument should stop here, it does not. 'A different genre and activity of architectural description is necessary in this century.'[9] It appears that all descriptions should subscribe to this mimesis of veridiction. Words should precisely denote physical things, relationships, processes, and account for their energetics regardless of time, place, or people. Only via this means will the fragile and complex systems, through which living and non-living entities mix and modify the Earth, be screened no longer by non-literal language.

The literalist claim is essentially transitive. The observation of the effect (ecological and social crisis), approached via accounting (hermeneutics of suspicion), leads to an interpretive reconstruction of the cause (abstraction) that casts a decisive verdict (guilty) about non-literal language as a cloak. This leads to a sentencing (disbarment) of the non-literal. Anything other than literalism is active 'climate change denial.'[10] With neo-platonic verve, literalism casts itself as a ladder out of Plato's dark cave that became modernity's dumping ground.[11] By demystifying illusory projections, the designative tool of language brings to bear its illuminating capacity to expose the intersecting crises of environmental collapse, scarcity, and exploitive inequality. Or so we are told.

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Doubtless defective

Literalism, unsurprisingly, does not receive the same demystifying treatment as its cousin. It operates in the self-assured space historically provided by the powerful institutions of the natural sciences. Here, it safely presumes to have exclusive access to the real. This epistemological problem is well rehearsed, so I will not bore readers with another paraphrasing. But the consequences in architecture due to this language are not well understood. So, they are worth unpacking.

A helpful guide is *The Language Animal* by Taylor. He historicises the development of the literalist project by showing that it was rendered in its paradigmatic form through the work of Hobbes, Locke, Condillac, and their ilk.[12] This project's construction rests on a 'designative' view of semantics. Language, according to the 'HLC' view, is a human tool to extend knowledge. If we are to get clear about the world as it 'really is', then this tool should be used to as unobtrusively as possible encode and communicate thoughts and information as if seen in a mirror. The problem, author George Eliot concedes in her novel *Adam Bede* (1859), is the trouble at the centre of such a formidable mimetic task. As she puts it, 'the mirror is doubtless defective.'[13] Its flaw involves four crucial presumptions that prop up larger problems with the entire project.

In the literal view, the first defect is that language is self-evident. An author, knowingly or not, assumes the whole of language exists before they write. Words are predominantly introduced into a text to designate architectural features or processes that have already or can easily rise to attention in the physical world. For the Baths of Caracalla in Rome *[2]*, we read, its 'masonry architecture – and the modulation of its resulting interior flow fields – was originally motivated by the thermodynamics, delight, and hygiene of rapid physiological modulation in the bodies of its bathers.'[14] Self-evidence is a progeny of the dominant tendency to see the 'real' in Kantian terms as 'that which is connected (*zusammenhängt*) with the material conditions of our experience.'[15] Thus, vocabularies should not stray from the obviousness of our current 'real' world.

Building upon the first issue, literal language must be compatible with physicalism. Description must not deviate from a project's material, physical, or performative make-up. The façade of the Seagram's Building should not be described as 'bronze' like the historian Kenneth Frampton does in his *Modern Architecture*.[16] Instead, this surface should be described as 'fabricated from a yellowish-brown alloy of copper with one-quarter tin.'[17] Such a description demands assertions be made within a nominatively fixed linguistic framework using the already agreed upon terms of alloy, copper, and tin. This vocabulary arises from an 'obvious' technical standpoint and is policed to fit within a contemporary Western perspective.



2 **Baths of Caracalla, Rome, Italy.**

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Privileging the third-person perspective is the third problem. The description of architecture as 'literal' is grounded in the supposition of the third-party 'neutral' writer. They are set against a first-person embodied and emplaced perspective entangled with the world and the vicissitudes of their subject position, attachments, passions, and the ways these intersect with a host of categories. Instead, literalism propagates a strangely cold figure in whom seeing operates transparently as if, in Moe's words, opening 'new eyes'. Like its Cartesian forebearers, it still rests on vision metaphors. These are implicated in worn suppositions about the transparency of 'actual' knowledge through a re-inscription of an ocular centric epistemology.[18] By working to extend the powerful practices of analysis over worldly affairs, it motions towards perceptual objectivity even as it pictures shifting spatial and temporal dynamics.

The first three issues – reduction of the real to self-evident facticity articulated through a language of physicalism via third party assertions – have effects. Precisely because these are privileged, the 'figuring' dimension of language (A through B) must be confined. This is the fourth presumption. The non-literal dimension of language that appears in metaphor, analogy, idioms, symbols, and the like must be controlled. Inventions like 'nylon' or phrases like 'lungs of the city' run afoul of this mandate. For the literalist, this language cloaks. 'The dictionary', Ricœur jests, 'contains no metaphors.'[19] Literalism, at its extreme, tends to avoid non-assertions, ambiguity, rhetorical phrasing, and non-technical truth claims because there is little place for embodied experience, emotions, symbolism, human meaning, cultural difference, or other non-technical subtleties that actively shape social and communicative spaces of architecture across the globe. When this language is sometimes deployed, as with terms like 'network', 'flow field', or 'emergy', they merely serve to denote some positive or negative feature and little more.

These four presumptions are tied to a larger problem. While bringing valuable technical light to architectural matter, by seeing materials within the network of their production, literalism extends its faith in a universal foundation for the 'discipline'. This faith is well suited to highly regulated sites like research labs or architectural specifications where linguistic references seek a correspondence theory of truth. Nonetheless, theorist Dalibor Vesely explains, it extends the problematic and deeply modern 'process that reduced all that is worth knowing about the making of architecture to transparent productive knowledge.'[20] This makes literary treatments that employ non-literal language objects of knowledge but never sources of actual knowledge.

What is at stake in this seemingly well-meaning argument, then, goes well beyond academic disputes about appropriate descriptions. 'In every society', literary theorist Roland Barthes observes, 'various techniques are developed intended to *fix* the floating chain of signifieds in such a way as to counter the terror of uncertain signs.'[21] The terror elicited by vague language is asking for literalist policing because it is simply too unruly. The demands placed on 'grammar', philosopher Donna J. Haraway notes, 'is politics by other means.'[22] A call for literalism is a call for a narrow epistemology that elides the contemporary Western technician's preferred description (what is) with normativity (what should be) for all architectural texts. In advocating for fidelity, literalism is trying to bring its suburban values to the whole of architectural life.

Constitutive language

Whatever the importance of exposing the protracted processes of making and unmaking of buildings through writing (and I, for one, think they are important), language's place in architectural life exceeds the literalist reduction. The linguistic capacity is never as transparent as one might hope. This is what makes words so attractive and contentious as a site of intervention. Embracing a fuller sense of language means not trying to extricate its place in the 'extralinguistic' dimension of human affairs.

When faced with the vast intents and purposes of writers and readers of histories, a view of language that better addresses a sundry of roles is what Taylor calls 'constitutive' and 'expressive'. This view had its modern formation in the eighteenth-century work of Hamann, Herder, and Humboldt. The 'HHH' tradition, with poetics at its heart, elevates 'human meanings' or what Taylor calls 'metabiological meanings.'[23]

Human life, and our interactions with buildings, entail contentful scenes in time. The use of constitutive language, which includes the literal, attempts to articulate what in a scene is always beyond 'objectively recognizable patterns of need and action.'[24] The constitutive view expresses the aims, purposes, and discernments that involve the social, cultural, and varied subjectivities that are part of 'inside' judgements that communities make in their holistic and evolving settings. This is why a constitutive view of language was adopted by the Romantics, post-Romantics, and an endless list of creative writers. James Joyce says as much, 'One great part of every human existence is passed in a state which cannot be rendered sensible by the use of wideawake language, cutanddry grammar and goahead plot.'[25] Like Joyce, architecture's vitality demands a living, open-ended, and dynamic language.

Now we do not need to adopt Joyce's 'writing of the night' to give pride of place to a semantic logic that articulates what is evident and harder to grasp issues and connections. Consider an author working on a building's history with the help of editors, machines, and software. They make thoughtful, though not always transparent choices. During the process, they find turns of phrase for appropriate expressions about complex form, space, matter, process of making, means of extraction, or context. These experiences, which quickly elude technical rationality, call for

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3 **Seagram Building, New York, NY, USA.**

metaphor, symbol, idiom, and the like. We hear this in historian Sigfried Giedion's description that 'construction in the nineteenth century plays the role of subconscious.'[26] This statement is provocatively curious, perhaps even emotive. While it does not hold the status of a firm truth, it cannot be ignored.

Setting aside the stereotype that expressive language just presents an author's subjective feelings, the striking part is that it enables a translation of an experience with a work. A text is capable of placing a reader, sometimes imaginatively, in an architectural setting with sense while synaesthetically conjuring particular feelings. This even occurs with harder to describe things like abstract drawings as historian Robin Evans does with educator Daniel Libeskind's *Chamber Works* (1983): 'A floating nest of semi-breves here, comical crotches on ruptured staves there; resolution into cipher-like bits is occasional and partial.'[27] This instance, drawing on the latent horizon of collective understanding, focuses attention on previous unexplored meaning, which in this case was the drawings' relation to music. The text helps readers by affirming, connecting, even strengthening links to

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deeper, wider, or larger spheres of reference. It even attempts to generate 'resonance', to borrow sociologist Hartmut Rosa's term, with the gap between drawing and architecture.[28]

There is also the matter of what Taylor calls a 'template'. Unlike a discrete metaphor that figures one domain of life through a dissimilar domain (e.g., the architect ploughed through the coordination meeting), templates are broader and structural. Moe's arguments are often elaborated through the template of a 'network'. What underwrites this image is a non-literal 'web' that links a multiplicity of slow bio-geophysical arcs through time. This word choice was not the only image available to the author. An environmental history of the Seagram's Building *[3]* could use any number of other tropes, including writing its 'geography' or 'biography'. The template of a network nudges attention, image, shape, continuity, flux, duration, and most importantly a moral sense to a reader's understanding of a building's physical stuff and processes. The history of the sciences is replete with examples of how templates shape experience and frame thinking.[29] Structuring templates conjure a particular state of affairs, linguist George Latkoff and philosopher Mark Johnson note, because even our most 'ordinary conceptual system is metaphorical in nature'.[30] As literary critic Rita Felski explains, 'all forms of knowing – whether poetic or political, exquisitely lyrical or numbingly matter-of-fact – rely on an array of formal resources, stylistic conventions, and conceptual schemata.'[31] This means language may be truthful and of value even when it is not designative.


It is not uncommon to be at a loss for words in front an architectural scene. The creative openness of language plays a part here too. To have a language, to paraphrase Humboldt, is to unceasingly conspire with it to understand and expand its capacities.[32] To enlarge the sayable is often seen as the province of creative writers. Think of the myriads of inventions by William Shakespeare. But this act is not foreign to history writers. Consider Daniel Barber's 'planetary interior' or David Gissen's 'subnatures' as two examples of the constitutive power of language.[33] The latter gives voice to 'those forms of nature that are more primitive, filthy and uncontrollable.'[34] The new non-literal term gathers for attention things like smog, dust, exhaust, sewage, debris, and the other undesirable by-products of urbanisation and industrialisation. Yet, the term does not cloak, nor does it simply offer a positive or negative feature. The term's ambiguity transforms what is understood, the ways it relates to other detritus, and enlists architects collectively towards a possible focal interest.

It is misleading, then, to think that what separates a 'Roman brick' of the Baths of Caracalla and the Robie House in Chicago was little more than



4 **Hopi Indian Pueblo of Walapi (or Walpai) on mesa, c. 1901.**

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5 Architecture of Hyperspace Geometry by Claude Fayette Bragdon.

heterogeneous mixtures of earthly material processed from distinct spots on the earth. Reducing a brick to a factual litany tells us something, no doubt. Nevertheless, it bleaches the messy historical sense of how materials were entangled with a Roman understanding. Ancient Romans would never recognise themselves in literalism's descriptions. The Vitruvian understanding of matter illustrates the problem. A brick's matter was connected to a larger cosmic order, architectural historian Indra McEwan explains, that is only grasped by understanding the 'perfect blending of unified bodies, *pneuma* (active divine breath made up of fire and air) entirely permeates matter (passive earth and water) to constitute not only the bodies of stones and men, but also the living body of the entire world.'[35] A brick is most richly understood within the fecundity of the Roman world's hierophany in which a brick is always more than a brick.

The same holds for the wood, sandstone, and adobe used in the architecture of Hopi society along the Black Mesa in the southwestern portion of what is now called the United States. While literalism can tell us considered things about these materials' contemporary ecological network, its Western technical demands colonise how these materials are entangled with the Hopi world. Consider the communal making of a house *[4]*, as historian David G. Saile summarises, even such a modest structure is understood as 'living.'[36] Materials, before and after its construction, are implicated in complex rituals matrices to appease the spiritual world. When quarrying stone, prayers are made to the 'flesh of the rock.'[37] There are even examples of existing houses being reconsecrated, like at Acoma where 'war chiefs

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moved from house to house' 'to fortify the walls' by 'pressing bow and flint against the corners.'[38] Matter for the Hopi is never literal. It plays a non-technical role in health, power, fertility, and even in warding off evil within each clan's tri-level cosmology.

Even the translation of this world into an English description has a cost. In the Hopi language, archaeologist David W. Anthony notes, grammatical markers must be used that 'specify whether you witnessed the event yourself, heard about it from someone else, or consider it to be an unchanging truth.'[39] Descriptions of reality are framed about 'the source and reliability of their information.' Whereas English, like every Indo-European language, demands users to 'pay attention to tense and number when talking about action.' Action is past, present, or future and the subject of a sentence by necessity is either singular or plural. 'It is impossible,' he continues, 'to use an Indo-European verb without deciding on these categories.'[40] Such a difference shows the subtle but automatic ways of grammaring our human involvement in the world.

A more contemporary Western example, like the work of architect Claude Bragdon (1866–1946), challenges literalism. The theosophy collective he was involved with, even if we smirk at their new age beliefs, pursued higher dimensions of reality. 'Hyperspace philosophy,' linked to architectural materials, raised what the mathematician Charles Howard Hilton described as a 'four-dimensional' communal cosmic consciousness.[41] Geometry spatialised and embodied through ecumenical building material in the form of ornamentation, according to Bragdon, opened human experiences of these materials in three dimensions to be psychically elevated into n-dimensional space *[5]*. Consequently, stone, metal, and glass become numinous vehicles with broader communion. To textually describe this quest, the literalist demands for self-evident matter that is compatible with physicalism viewed from a third-person perspective and described without vagueness can only address part of the scene.

What these examples demonstrate is that the literalist argument turns peculiar as supposedly universal and self-evident grasp of materials and processes escape the spatiotemporal envelop of their formation. Its purifying demands create questionable histories, as Bruno Latour worried, in which tuberculosis really did kill Pharoah Ramses II even though it was not invented.[42] Such historical anachronisms, which literalism cannot help but produce, rely on reality denying claims about knowledge's independent existence from the scientific objects of architecture and their historically specific circumstances.

Understanding this aporia puts limits on literalism. 'Material realities,' Felski contends, 'cannot ground patterns of sense-making that fluctuate dramatically within and across cultures.'[43] Grasping this, as a means to temper technical ways of knowing and planetary aspirations unscathed by time, space, or people, enables a historical community's conceptual schema to be organised within their cultural terms and in relation to a broader world. If history writers are to come anywhere near understanding Stoic cosmic physics, indigenous cosmology, or a-scientific collective's conceptions of our world within their own spatiotemporal envelope, a constitutive view of language is needed.

Aggrandised agency

Holding a constitutive view of language means understanding architecture's experiential basis and the ambiguity of how textual descriptions come to be. Texts are always constituted through a host of wonderful differences like an author's capacity in the language employed, topic under examination, thesis, material composition of the work, available evidence, intended audience, and other subtleties of writing and publishing. This is to say nothing of the reader. A published text can be appreciated for dissimilar, even unreconcilable rationales (like its outward facing sense) from what an author intends due to the multiplicity of readers and their scenes of reading. Accountability to accuracy, then, is contingent at least on the person and their project.

This does not mean that we must give up what philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer saw as the effort to discover truth in history that is intelligible and valuable for our day.[44] Most authors strive to share as much common ground with what is being remembered, interpreted, and textually described as their project demands. Yet, they do not need to resign themselves to conservative thinking (as Gadamer is sometimes charged). The writer, nor the reader, of such texts are not required to relinquish either their contemporary prejudice against prejudice or their political agency.

The emergent and productive relationships between architecture and ecological practices inevitably place demands on historical texts. These logically raise concerns about language's place in architectural life. 'It matters what matters we use to think other matters with,' Haraway riffs, 'it matters what stories we tell to tell other stories with; it matters what knots knot knots, what thoughts think thoughts, what descriptions describe descriptions, what ties tie ties. It matters what stories make worlds, what worlds make stories.'[45] Yet, care should be taken not to adopt an enlarged supposition of description's actual power. There is something too optimistic, Felski observes by drawing on literary critic Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, 'in the belief that the sheer gesture of exposing and demystifying ideas or images will somehow dissipate their effects.'[46] This 'aggrandized agency,' as literary critic Amanda Anderson dubbed it, can delude us into believing that technical accounting inherently releases emancipatory expressions of resistance and the fuzzy warmth of planetary care and repair.[47] History shows us, Rosa notes, that 'scientific penetration and technological domination aim at nothing other than the intensive and extensive expansion of humanity's share of the world' and with it the possibility of increased exploitation.[48] I, for one, remain unpersuaded that acts of linguistic disbarment advance either the basis for a real sociopolitical rallying cry or sound writing in architecture.

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Indeed, architectural history is poorly served by such catchall appeals to linguistic propriety. Literalism has a place, but being in a global field should compel writers to pay attention to the meanings, symbols, and social footings that are equally intertwined with building or un-building the world. 'No longer', linguist Benjamin Whorf rightly said over a half century ago, can a few European languages and their rationalising techniques be 'envisioned as spanning the gamut of reason and knowledge but only as one constellation in a galactic expanse.'[49] This will certainly fluster the designative view's boosters and, no doubt, a few others. But it is clear that 'the quest for absolutely rigorous concepts', literary critic Toril Moi explains echoing Wittgenstein, 'is a hopeless enterprise.'[50]

Literalism, at the peak of its powers, collapses into tautology. Reducing an architectural work to 'this is this' is to miss vital features about a diverse field. Non-literal language, then, is not an obstruction to the discovery of architecture, matter, or their ecological place in the world. It can elicit a dense plurality of meanings, semantic depth, rhetorical potence, human emotions, and strong values. It can bring to life architecture's polyvalent purposes, fulfilments, and potential. In its capacity to multiply viewpoints, by expanding the sayable, it can transform and renew our ends. Writers and readers should be empowered by the richness of scenes they encounter to embrace the curious variety of language in use. Literally, anything less does injustice to the full shape of architecture's diversity.

Notes

1. Charles Taylor, *The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity* (Cambridge, MA and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), p. 263.
2. Kiel Moe, 'A Case for a More Literal Architecture', *Metropolis*, 27 May 2020 <https://metropolismag.com/viewpoints/literal-architecture-kiel-moe> [accessed 1 March 2024].
3. Kiel Moe, 'Nonlinear Perspective', *LOG* 47 (autumn 2019), pp. 118–30 (p. 125).
4. Paul Ricœur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970).
5. Kiel Moe, *Integrated Design in Contemporary* Architecture (New York, NY: Princeton Architectural Press, 2008), p. 104.
6. Arthur Symons, *The Symbolist Movement in Literature* (New York, NY: Dutton, 1919), p. 5.
7. Kiel Moe, 'Building Agnotology', *Journal of Architectural Education*, 75:1 (2021), 10–12 (p. 11).
8. Terrestrial refers to 'all the things, entities, and processes that mix on the surface of the planet'. Kiel Moe, *Unless: The Seagram Building Construction Ecology* (New York, NY: Actar, 2021), p. 31.
9. Moe, *Unless*, p. 42.
10. Kiel Moe, 'Architectural Agnotology and Broken World Models', *LOG* 50 (autumn 2020), pp. 157–62 (p. 157).
11. The title character in Plato's *Cratylus* speculates that certain words name the things they refer to accurately. This was a common view in ancient times. Thus, etymology can grant insight. As Cratylus puts it, 'Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing.' Plato, *Plato: Complete Works*, ed. by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997), p. 151.
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13. George Eliot, *Adam Bede* (Chicago, IL, New York, NY, and San Francisco, CA: Belford, Clark & Co., 1888), p. 160.
14. Kiel Moe, 'Magnificence: On the Appearance of the Baths of Caracalla', *Journal of Architectural Education*, 71:2 (2017), 241–6 (p. 242).
15. Chiara Bottici, *Imaginal Politics: Images Beyond Imagination and the Imaginary* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2014), p. 28.
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21. Roland Barthes, 'The Rhetoric of the Image', in *Image | Music | Text* (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1977), pp. 32–51 (p. 39).
22. Donna J. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), p. 3.
23. Taylor, *The Language Animal*, pp. 184–90.
24. Ibid., p. 91.
25. James Joyce, *Letters of James Joyce*, vol. 3 (New York, NY: Faber and Faber, 1957), p. 146.
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