the philosophical reader, S.'s interesting and rewarding book is quite successful even if, like the Platonic dialogue it treats, it is not completely satisfying.

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CLITOPHON

M. KREMER (ed.): *Plato's* Cleitophon. *On Socrates and the Modern Mind.* Pp. xii + 87. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, and Oxford: Lexington, 2004. Paper, £16.95. ISBN: 0-7391-0818-2.

Clitophon is gaining acceptance as an authentic dialogue of Plato's. The most authoritative voice on the dialogue, Simon Slings, states his hesitant faith in the dialogue's authenticity in *Plato: Clitophon* (Cambridge, 1999). This is a turnaround on the issue of authenticity from his 1981 doctoral thesis. J. A. Bailly's commentary, *Plato's Euthyphro and Clitophon* (Newburyport, MA, 2003), suggests by the title a belief in its authenticity that is at times belied by some comments he makes. Those who appear to have wavered regarding the status of the dialogue are Shorey, Taylor, and even Ficino. No one in the ancient tradition, with the possible exception of Xenophon, appears to have questioned the dialogue.

Mark Kremer's *Plato's Cleitophon. On Socrates and the Modern Mind* includes, along with his introduction, translation, and interpretive essay, three important articles from the 1980s that broke a relative silence concerning the dubious piece, and speak to its authenticity. Reproduced are Roochnik's 'The Riddle of the Cleitophon' (*Anc. Phil*. 4 [1984], 132–45), Orwin's revised version of 'The Case against Socrates' (*CJPS* 15/4 [1982], 741–53 and Blits' 'Socratic Teaching and Justice' (*Interpretation* 13 [1985], 321–33).

K.'s translation is literal and does not convey Clitophon's mastery of elenchus or rhetoric. The A, D, and F MSS of the dialogue all give *poreuomai* at 410c and only a later hand on the A MS (A^2) gives *poreusomai*, but Kremer translates 'I will go to Thrasymachus' without comment. Slings has pointed out that *poreusomai* is inept, suggesting that the reading should follow ADF. Gonzales' translation notes this and follows ADF, as does Orwin's. However, 'I will go to Thrasymachus' (A^2 = *poreusomai*) as opposed to 'I go to Thrasymachus' (ADF = *poreuomai*) lends itself to the idea that Clitophon is *threatening* to defect to Thrasymachus, where no such threat, but rather an explanation of a present state of affairs, occurs.

K.'s suggestion that we see the movement from Clitophon's abandonment of *techne* to support of logical positivism (Roochnik had called this radical relativism) is less convincing without the implications of A^2, namely that *Clitophon* precedes *Rep.* I and that Clitophon has defected to Thrasymachus by the time of *Rep.* I. K. dismisses Bruell's claim that we don't know the relative order of the dialogues, on the basis that K.'s ordering must be correct for K.'s argument to go through. There is an absence of a real attempt to address Slings's authoritative work on the dialogue; he is barely mentioned by K. (the other articles occurred long before Slings's latest position). Slings appears as an afterthought, dismissed by K. on the grounds that an appreciation of the meaning of the dialogue speaks more to its authenticity than philological assessment.

Roochnik's treatment of Clitophon as politically fickle (a thought that is also suggested by Nails in her recent *The People of Plato* [Indianapolis, 2002]) is forced

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prosopography; Aristophanes' characterization of Theramenes is foisted upon Clitophon, based on his association with him as a fellow student of Euripides. Clitophon votes once in agreement with Theramenes in the *Athenian Constitution* and once on his own suggests that the ancestral laws be consulted. While his actions may have produced different results in 411 and 404, Clitophon acts consistently in *Ath. Const.* and *Rep.* 1, advocating an appeal to the laws. Roochnik mentions only the act where he is associated with Theramenes in *Ath. Const*. The omission is reproduced by Kremer in his notes on the dialogue. Orwin gives both passages.

Orwin's and Blits's treatments of the dialogue are more cautious and solid, but at the same time are less committal regarding the relationship of the dialogue to *Rep* I. We do owe a profound debt to each of the papers presented in K.'s volume, and this collection ought to inspire new interest in *Clitophon*'s status and developmentalist/unitarian interpretations of Plato.

Bilkent University G. S. BOWE
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FROM *REPUBLIC* TO *LAWS*

C. BOBONICH: *Plato's Utopia Recast. His Later Ethics and Politics*. Pp. xii + 643. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. Cased, £57.28. ISBN: 0-19-925143-6.

This excessively long book is a typical product of the Anglo-American analytic approach to Plato's dialogues, displaying both its strengths and its weaknesses. It is characteristic of such an approach to read them as if they were philosophical treatises rather than as belonging to the literary genre of Socratic dialogue. Yet Christopher Bobonich never justifies this basic assumption of his own approach, although it underpins most of his interpretive claims about the dialogues as places for staking out philosophical positions. For instance, one of B.'s central claims is that there is a fundamental shift in Plato's attitude with regard to non-philosophers as citizens of an ideal polis between the *Republic* (where they are excluded) and the *Laws* (where they are included). Characteristically, B. sums up this radical shift in four claims that he thinks are denied in the *Republic* but endorsed in the *Laws:*

1. At least some non-philosophers are capable of being genuinely virtuous; i.e. not merely demotic but philosophic virtue;
2. At least some non-philosophers are capable of valuing virtue for its own sake; i.e. capable of believing that virtue is good for its own sake, and of desiring virtue for its own sake (and not merely instrumentally);
3. At least some non-philosophers are capable of valuing for its own sake the genuine well-being or happiness of others; in particular, virtue as its primary constituent;
4. At least some non-philosophers are capable of living happy lives.

In connection with these claims, it is necessary to clarify what B. calls Plato's 'Dependency Thesis'. He argues (p. 54) that a necessary condition of Dependent Goods being good for their possessors is that they have some appreciation of why they really are worth desiring; i.e. some appreciation of their value. An adequate explanation requires some grasp of how things instantiate genuine value properties.

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