Introduction

> Whatever belongs to the liturgical offices, objects, and furnishings of the Church is full of signs of the divine and the sacred mysteries, and each of them overflows with a celestial sweetness when it is encountered by a diligent observer who can extract honey from a rock and oil from the stoniest ground [Deut. 32:13]. Who knows *the order of the heavens and can apply its rules to the earth* [Job 38:33]? Certainly, he who would attempt to investigate the majesty of heaven would be overwhelmed by its glory. It is, in fact, a deep well from which I cannot drink [cf. Jn 4:11], unless He who *gives all things abundantly and does not reproach us* [Jas 1:5] provides me with a vessel *so that I can drink with joy from the fountains of the Savior* [Isa 12:3] *which flow between the mountains* [Ps 103:10].
>
> Quecumque in ecclesiasticis officiis, rebus ac ornamentis consistunt, diuinis plena sunt signis atque misteriis, ac singula celesti sunt dulcedine redundantia, si diligentem tamen habeant inspectorem qui norit mel de petra sugere oleumque de durisimo saxo. Quis tamen nouit ordinem celi, et rationes ipsius ponet in terra? Scrutator quippe maiestatis opprimetur a gloria. Si quidem puteus altus est et in quo aquam hauriam non habeo, nisi porrigat ille qui dat omnibus affluenter et non improperat, ut inter medium montium transeuntem hauriam aquam in gaudio de fontibus saluatoris.
>
> William Durand, *Rationale divinorum officiorum*, Prologue, 1[1]

In the first paragraph of the modern translation of the *Rationale divinorum officiorum* of William Durand (c. 1230–1296) are markers of the change this book seeks to chart. One is immediately visible. The translator, Timothy M. Thibodeau, chose to distinguish through the use of italics what he then identifies, through the use of brackets, as biblical texts. Those italics and those brackets do not simply mark the modern sense of "source," of a particular relationship between Durand and Scripture, that postdates Durand himself.[2] They distinguish Scripture and, in so doing, obscure Durand's understanding of revelation and its relationship to "ecclesiasticis officiis, rebus ac

[1] Prologue, RDOE I, 1; RDOL1, 3.

[2] Carruthers 2008; Carruthers 1998. For an early sixteenth-century example of the text, without such marks, see the 1510 edition published by Jacob Sacon in Lyon: https://opacplus.bsb-muenchen.de/title/BV010814304. By 1559, printers in Lyon were producing editions identifying the biblical references in the margins. See, for example, https://opacplus.bsb-muenchen.de/title/BV011540178.

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ornamentis." There in the opening paragraph of the Prologue and throughout the *Rationale*, Durand presents a different relationship entirely among *ecclesiasticis officiis*, *rebus* and *ornamentis*, and biblical history, prophecies, psalms, Gospels, and Epistles.

A second measure of that change is Thibodeau's choice to translate the Latin phrase, *diuinis plena sunt signis atque misteriis*, into relationships that make sense today: "full of signs of the divine and sacred mysteries." Durand, however, had written "full of divine signs as well as mysteries." For Durand, the *res* and *ornamenta* were not solely signs but were filled with both signs and mysteries. As we shall see, the stone of altars, the linen of albs, rubrics on the pages of missals – "matter" – participated complexly in the communication of divine mystery that took place in the liturgy.[3] As the following chapters reveal, *redundantia* points toward the nature of divine communication, not simply its many different forms and their interreferentiality but also their amplitude, the evidence of divine intent to communicate.

The understanding of the liturgy of which the *Rationale* is evidence has suffered a fate similar to the memory practices Mary Carruthers illumined.[4] As she showed, the modern notion of "memory" does not simply differ from how medieval authors and monks conceived of the human mind and its relationship to texts. The modern frame of reference impedes our ability to hear the monks and to understand their rhetorical practices. Analogously, the understanding of the liturgy set forth in the *Rationale* has largely been read in terms of a sense of liturgy – as preeminently, for many, essentially, verbal, even textual, and as occurring within time governed by clocks – which postdates the fifteenth century. Again, there in the modern translation is a trace of the distance between medieval understandings and modern, in Thibodeau's utterly reasonable decision to translate "rebus ac ornamentis" as "objects and furnishings" – no one word in English can capture the medieval valences of *res* or *ornamentum*.[5] Even as the *Rationale* has been brought into circulation in a welcome modern edition and translation, it has been read in terms of how we have been taught to conceive of matter and time, of modern physics, in the wake of Reformation.

This book is a study of the sea change reflected in those italicized words and translations of *res* as objects, *ornamenta* as furnishings. Beginning with *The Eucharist in the Reformation*, I have held a model of "fragmentation" as capturing the splintering the medieval Western Christian Church into many Churches, all of which traced their roots to the same origins in the person of Christ, his preaching, his parables, his acts. But "fragmentation," chosen as a way to conceptualize simultaneously shared histories and division, accords the splintering of the sixteenth century definitive importance. This book returns to the puzzle that the iconoclasts of Zurich and Strasbourg posed to me years ago: Why risk their lives for mere matter?[6] Smashing as they did eternal lamps and altars as well as altarpieces and panel paintings, carpenters and shoemakers and church assistants committed the capital crime of blasphemy. They knew the penalty, even as they characterized the victims of their violence as "idols." This book offers an answer

[3] For an archaeology of the word, "liturgy," as well as its relative, "office," see Agamben 2013.
[4] Carruthers 2008 and 1998.
[5] On *res*, see foremost, Ohly 2005a. On *ornamentum*, see Fletcher 1982; Wilson 2021.
[6] Wandel 1995.

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to that question. In so doing, it recasts the story from fragmentation to one of the most far-reaching ruptures of early modernity, from a sense of matter as a medium of divine revelation to the sense of "mere matter" that, ultimately, translated the violence from an assault against God to property damage.

The *Rationale* proved the key to answering the puzzle of the iconoclasts. Prior to Reformation, it was measurably the most widely produced commentary on the liturgy. It was the fifth book printed in Gutenberg's shop, after the Bible, a missal, a psalter, and a Latin grammar.[7] Some 200 manuscripts and some 44 separate printed editions prior to 1500 have been identified.[8] Before the sixteenth century, it was printed in fifteen cities across Europe. It is the preeminent trace of a way of thinking about the relationship of liturgy and matter before the sixteenth century. Divided into eight books, covering the church, altars, images (Book I) through the Calendar (Book VIII), the *Rationale* is not simply the most comprehensive commentary on the liturgy. It offers the fullest articulation of a sense of liturgy that was gone by the end of the sixteenth century. Book IV, on the Mass, follows Book I on the church, altars, and images, Book II on the clerical orders, and Book III on vestments. The entire *Rationale* concludes with a chapter on time, on the calculus for the calendar which enacts Christian history in the rhythms of each Christian's experience of the year. For Durand, the church, altars, images, vestments and the persons of clergy, and the calendar were not, as they came to be, something apart from the communication of divine mysteries in the liturgy but "full of" those mysteries which they brought in their distinctive ways to collective worship.

The way of thinking about connections among Scripture, liturgy, and matter set forth in the *Rationale* was one of the earliest targets of sixteenth-century Evangelical criticism.[9] In 1520, in one of his most successful and widely disseminated pamphlets, *The Babylonian Captivity of the Church*, Martin Luther encompassed the *Rationale* in his attack on "allegories":

> Similarly, in the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, what does this Dionysius do but describe certain churchly rites, and amuse himself with allegories without proving anything? Just as has been done in our time by the author of the book entitled *Rationale divinorum*. Such allegorical studies are for idle men. Do you think I should find it difficult to amuse myself with allegories about anything in creation? Did not Bonaventura by allegory draw the liberal arts into theology? And Gerson even converted the smaller Donatus into a mystical theologian. . . .Who has so weak a mind as not to be able to launch into allegories?[10]

This passage is part of a much larger attack on what Luther called a figurative reading of Scripture, which, he argued, was the foundation for wrong understandings of just what

[7] "Next to the Bible and the two service books, the *Rationale* is the oldest complete printed book to survive. The first printed edition of the *Rationale divinorum officiorum* appeared on October 6, 1459, from the Mainz firm of Fust and Schoeffer, successors of Gutenberg. The second edition was a product of the press of Günther Zainer of Augsburg and appeared on January 22, 1470," White 1974, 49–50.

[8] On the number of manuscripts, see Davril 1992; and Introduction, RDOL1, xxvii–lx, which provides a list of the manuscripts. Clarence Cecil Ménard began the process of identifying surviving manuscripts, Ménard 1967. On the incunabula of the *Rationale*, see Albaric 1992.

[9] In Chapter 5, I explain more fully my use of the term "Evangelicals." Briefly, it serves to name diverse preachers, magistrates, artisans, and peasants, all of whom shared a sense that "the Bible" was a codex, that is, the Word of God had a particular material form; and that the Word of God was contained within that form.

[10] LW 36, 110; WA, 6, 562.

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a sacrament is. Evangelicals' rethinking of the relationship among Scripture, liturgy, and matter is the subject of the second part of this book. Here let me dwell for a moment on how Luther deployed the word "allegories" and its cognates.[11] In a line that can be traced to most modern studies of allegory, which locate its origins in classical rhetoric, Luther construed it as an exclusively verbal practice.[12] He also reduced to a single thing, allegory, what Durand and others had held to be rich and dynamic interconnections among scriptural referents to the physical world, that physical world, and divine mysteries.[13] Luther not only vehemently rejected allegory as a mode of biblical exegesis.[14] He rejected the entire way of thinking about divine communication which had construed Creation and Scripture as interreferential. The words of the Bible were where the faithful were to look for divine communication.[15] Meaning was located in a printed text, a codex, clear to its true reader. In this pamphlet and others, Luther laid the foundations for the modern understanding of liturgy as a direct and verbal expression of the "plain" sense of Scripture. In so doing, he recast the relationship between the liturgy and Creation and with it the nature of "revelation."

I do not wish to argue that Luther alone effected the change this book charts. In the sixteenth century, all Evangelicals, from Anabaptists through Anglicans, rejected the interwoven lives of Scripture, matter, and the liturgy. Luther neither called for nor supported the acts of violence that ultimately did transform the landscape of Christianity in Europe, violence not only against images but, more tellingly, also against matter that was not an "image" in the modern sense:[16] altars, eternal lamps, candlesticks, and bells. Many risked their lives to destroy the matter of the medieval liturgy. But Luther did give voice, in one of the most widely disseminated pamphlets of the

[11] "Luther, as we know, has many sagacious criticisms to make of the abuses of allegorism. Quite early in his career he abandoned the use of the 'four senses,' although he had started out by using them. But he does not lose his grasp of the essential elements of spiritual interpretation and continues to follow St. Paul and St. Augustine. For Luther, Christ is really the key to all Scripture," de Lubac 1968, 75. For an introduction to the conceptual richness of allegory as a mode of visual cognition, see Melion and Clifton 2019, especially Melion, "Introduction," 14–39.

[12] "Permutatio est oratio aliud verbis aliud sententia demonstrans. Ea dividitur in tres partes: similitudinem, argumentum, contrarium," Cicero 1954, 344–345. "Allegory says one thing and means another. It destroys the normal expectation we have about language, that our words 'mean what they say,'" Fletcher 1982, 2. On the early history of allegory, see Pépin 1958. On the history of the term, see Whitman 1987, "Appendix I," 263–268. On the difference between literary and biblical allegory, see Ohly 2005a, 15.

[13] In the Prologue, Durand differentiates allegory, anagogy, tropology, and history, Prologue 10–12, RDOE1, 4–5; RDOL1, 7–8.

[14] "For a long time, allegory was taken by theology to mean, and often in the broadest sense, the mysteries of Christ and of the Church as they appeared in Scripture," de Lubac 1968, 12. "It was [De Lubac's] reading of the Church Fathers that gave him the idea that is central to *Medieval Exegesis*, which is that 'spiritual exegesis' or allegory is not a borrowing of literary techniques from the Greeks but rather a distinctly Christian approach to the Old Testament as found in the New Testament, particularly in the letters of St. Paul," Robert Louis Wilken, Foreword to de Lubac 1998, xi–xii.

[15] "Although [God] is present in all creatures, and I might find him in stone, in fire, in water, or even in a rope, for he certainly is there, yet he does not wish that I seek him there apart from the Word, and cast myself into the fire or the water, or hang myself on the rope. He is present everywhere, but he does not wish that you grope for him everywhere. Grope rather where the Word is, and there you will lay hold of him in the right way. Otherwise you are tempting God and committing idolatry," Luther, "The Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ – Against the Fanatics" (1526), LW 36, 342. See also Strier 2007.

[16] On the modern notion of the "image," see foremost, Belting 1997; Koerner 2004.

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sixteenth century, to a way of thinking that recast the relationship among Scripture, matter, and liturgy. And by the end of the sixteenth century, as we shall see, Luther, Huldrych Zwingli, and John Calvin, whom modern scholars now call "Protestants," articulated a radically new understanding of what the liturgy was, what its relationship to Scripture was, and what the relationship of liturgy to matter was. By the last session of the Council of Trent in 1564, Catholics, too, had come to consider images as objects, things apart from the liturgy. This book seeks to chart, in other words, not a break between Catholic and Protestant but a sea change between the medieval Church and modern Churches, Catholic as well as Protestant.

LITURGY AND TIME

The change runs very deep. It is there in the ways modern scholars approach the two nouns, liturgy and matter, in their separation from one another since the sixteenth century, and in the ways each has been discussed. For Durand, "liturgy" encompassed both the Mass and the Divine Office. Prior to the sixteenth century, the Divine Office shared the space, the site, the images, and the crosses with the Mass. Bells sounded the Office's rhythms across the European landscape, creating a soundscape which encompassed not only the religious but even non-Christians who lived within hearing of the bells.[17] Modern histories tend, at a minimum, to treat the Divine Office and the Mass in discrete chapters; some histories of "liturgy" treat the Mass alone.[18] This book follows that narrower sense of "liturgy," as the collective act of worship of the entire congregation or body of the faithful, and excludes the orthopraxis of those who took vows. The separation of the Divine Office from the Mass and the narrowed definition of liturgy as the Mass reflect, inter alia, the erasure of the Divine Office in a number of sixteenth-century Churches. For this book, that narrower definition reflects foremost the need to set boundaries to a topic that has few natural ones.

The very notion that the Mass has a history may well be a product of the sixteenth century, with its rethinking of the relationship among living community of the faithful, "this do," what was encompassed in "in remembrance of me," and time. As we shall see when we turn to altars, excising the matter of the liturgy also contributes to a sense of time as linear and encoded in texts, chronological in the way texts exist in relationship to one another. Altars abide as sites at which divine presence occurs rhythmically. More critically, those histories trace a direct line from the words of institution as found in Scripture, here, for example, First Corinthians, to contemporary practice, excising both matter and Creation:

> The first holy Mass was said on "the same night in which He was betrayed" (1 Cor. 11:23). Judas' resolution had been taken, the next few steps would bring our Lord to the Mount of Olives where an agony would overtake Him and His enemies seize Him. In this very hour He gives His disciples the Holy Sacrament which for all time would be the offering of the Church. The setting was significant – the paschal meal. Since the withdrawal of the people

[17] Le Goff 1988; Adler and Strohm 2023, 9–28.
[18] For an example of the former, see Jones, Wainwright, Yarhold, and Bradshaw, 1992. For an example of the latter, see Klauser 1979.

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> out of Egypt the paschal lamb had served year after year to prefigure the great expectation. The fulfillment, too, would serve to recall the exodus not only from Egypt but from the land of sin, and the arrival not into a promised land but into God's kingdom. From this hour on it was to continue as a fond reminiscence from generation to generation. But the records of the Last Supper contain few details concerning the ceremonial of the meal, probably because this ceremonial was not meant to be the lasting setting of the celebration.
>
> Joseph A. Jungmann, *The Mass of the Roman Rite: Its Origins and Development*[19]

In a study encompassing hundreds of textual sources, Joseph A. Jungmann accorded one brief section to "Accommodations of Space," which he held to be "an outer frame surrounding the celebration of Mass."[20] He echoed Luther in designating a group of medieval liturgical commentators as applying "the allegorical method"; for him, as for Luther, medieval commentators on the liturgy from Pseudo-Dionysius through Durand did not seek to link matter, Scripture, and the liturgy but "to put an allegorical interpretation on sacred texts whenever they appeared mystifying."[21] "Allegory," as for Luther, was a fiction imposed; Durand was an allegorist, not a liturgist connecting Creation and liturgy.[22]

[19] Jungmann 1986 I, 7. Herder published five editions of Jungmann's *Missarum Sollemnia: Eine genetische Erklärung der Römischen Messe* in German, the last in 1962; the Verlag nova & vetera reissued the 1962 edition in two volumes in 2003. All German citations in this book are from the nova & vetera edition. The only English translation of the full German edition remains that of Francis A. Brunner, *The Mass of the Roman Rite: Its Origins and Development*, 2 vols., first published in 1951, thus before the final Herder edition, and reissued by Christian Classics, Allen, TX, in 1986. All English citations are from the 1986 Christian Classics edition.

[20] Jungmann 1986, I, 252.

[21] Jungmann 1986, I, 87. Jungmann takes up the "allegorisierende Deutung," of commentators in the "Gothic" period, among whom he numbers Durand, as well as John Beleth, Ivo of Chartres, Sicard of Cremona, and Rupert von Deutz, in Jungmann 2003, I, 143–156. Even Thibodeau, in his Preamble to the modern edition of the *Rationale*, places it "in the grand tradition of the allegorical interpretation of the liturgy, inaugurated in the West by Amalar," Timothy Thibodeau, "Préambule," RDOL1, viii. Paul Rorem offers a different criticism, equally grounded, however, in the separation of liturgy from Creation, Rorem 2010.

[22] See, foremost, Jungmann's discussion of "The Gothic Period," 2003, I, 137–168; 1986, I, 103–127. Gregory Dix, in another influential twentieth-century study, takes up vestments, lights, and incense in a chapter tellingly titled "The Development of Ceremonial"; like Jungmann, his conception of the essence of the Mass is verbal, neither gestural nor material, the "action" of the Mass, theological, not corporeal, Dix 1945. Even scholars as attentive to the physical environment of worship as Klauser neither acknowledge that their sources might have seen that environment as divinely created nor construe the Bible as having physical referents that were present in the space of worship. See, for example, Klauser's careful reconstruction of a Roman bishop's Mass, c. 700, in which he acknowledges the presence of the altar but does not explore how it participated in the meaning of the liturgy at that moment, in Klauser 1979, 59–72. Recent handbooks on the history of the liturgy have chapters on music or liturgical art, but they, too, remain rooted in that post-Reformation conceptualization of the made world and therefore of its relationship to liturgy: Those chapters remain discrete from considerations of either the theology of the liturgy or liturgical practice. For example, the iconic *The Study of the Liturgy* has a section, "The Setting of the Liturgy," with chapters on "Ceremonial" (Hugh Wybrew), music and singing (J. Gelineau), hymnody (Alan Dunstan), architectural setting (Peter G. Cobb), and vestments (W. Jardine Grisbrooke). There are chapters, "Liturgical Music" by William T. Flynn, "The Spatial Setting" by James F. White, "Visual Arts" by Marchita Mauck, and "Vestments and Objects" by Joanne M. Pierce in Wainwright and Westerfield Tucker, 2006, 769–857, fewer than 100 pages in a 900-page book, and treated apart from the chapters on liturgy, both historical and confessional. In Meyer 1989, there is one section on "Elemente der Gestaltung" (221–226), which accords a little over one page to the "Raum der Feier," and roughly two pages each to "Gesang und Musik" and "Mitfeier der Gläubigen." So, too, histories that approach the

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It is not simply that these histories of the liturgy privileged clerical sources: Church Fathers, the books produced for monasteries, the books authorized by bishops, the commentaries of canon lawyers such as Durand or theologians such as Thomas Aquinas. For these historians, liturgy itself *is* textual. The movements of the priest, as well as his vestments, were, for Jungmann as for Gregory Dix and others, "ceremonial," something added on to liturgy.[23] The altar, as Jungmann wrote, "[t]he heart of the church, the focal point at which all lines converge, ... the place of the sacrifice," nonetheless for him, as for others, brought nothing to the Mass, neither scriptural allusion nor temporal complexity.[24]

LITURGY AND MATTER

Reformation led to the study of liturgy in terms of texts – missals, hymnals, psalters, the Book of Common Prayer, and service books. That we speak of altars, altarpieces, eternal lamps, crucifixes, candlesticks, or liturgical books as objects is the clearest evidence of how deeply Evangelical violence and sixteenth-century liturgies severed all of them from worship. They have become discrete from one another – a sense of object we shall see more fully in Part II. The deepest severance is the least visible to modernity: For Durand, all were forms of *materia*, that is, they belonged to Creation. Sixteenth-century Evangelicals smashed altars into pieces of stone, stripped pigments from wooden panels, and melted precious metals, revealing the stuff of Genesis as things apart from human hands, as indeed vulnerable to human hands, and not a place to discern revelation.

A broad range of modern fields of scholarship trace their origins to that severance, from a notion of "art" that is to be found in museums through work in "material religion" and "sensational religion" to theorizing about the "agency" of matter.[25] The scope of the transformation of one form of matter, images, can be traced in their transposition to museums, their reconceptualization as art, as well as in the studies, in the hundreds, of individual altarpieces and panels as both detachable from their original location and defined by the human being who designed them.[26] David Morgan, one of the most influential scholars of "material religion," in a recent article mapped "a process that consists of at least nine aspects or moments, each of which captures a key aspect of an object's materiality and its relevance for those who put the object to religious use."[27] There, in the formulation of one of the most sympathetic scholars, is that Reformation

Mass through the lens of social history construct that history through textual sources. See, for example, de Thorey 1994. An important exception is Palazzo 2000.

[23] Manuel Vásquez has protested the absence of the human body in so much theorizing of religion, Vásquez 2011.

[24] Jungmann 1986, I, 254.

[25] The fields of work on "materiality" and on "material culture" are protean. For an introduction to "materiality," see foremost, DeMarrais, Gosden, and Renfrew 2004; Miller 2005. On medieval and early modern material culture, see, for example, Richardson, Hamling, and Gaimster, 2016; Lahti and Räsänen 2008. For a critique of the concept of the "agency of matter," see Jung 2018.

[26] On the argument about the origins of "art," see foremost Belting 1997; and Koerner 2004.

[27] Morgan 2017, 15. For introductions to the field, see, for example, Engelke 2011; Houtman and Meyer 2012; Tim Hutchings and Joanne McKenzie, "Introduction," Hutchings and McKenzie 2017, 1–13. Uta

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separation: An "object" is put to human "use."[28] So, too, does the study of religion and the senses or sensational religion take as its point of departure the physics of the Evangelicals: "Matter" is not an autonomous medium of divine communication but what human beings take up, in the materiality of their own bodies, to express something about a transcendent being.[29] That sense of a dynamic limited to matter and human being also informs the extraordinarily rich variety of conceptualizations of the "agency" of matter.[30]

Late medieval European Christians held a sense of divine Creation that was dismantled over the centuries following the sixteenth, in the wake of Reformation reconceptua lizations of the relationship of matter to liturgy.[31] They shared, as we do not, some version of Aristotle's notion of "prime matter" or *prima materia*.[32] Aristotelian physics was primarily concerned not with the composition of the physical world – what Robert Pasnau has called "integral parts" – but with change in it, "generation" and "corruption," and with what did not change.[33] Materiality could take different "forms" – and just what "form" encompassed and its relationship to "matter" were themselves

Karstein and Thomas Schmidt-Lux offer a different history and orientation in Karstein and Schmidt-Lux 2017, 3–22. Plate 2011 and 2015, each present key words in the field.

[28] So, too, does Kirstin Faupel-Drevs conceive of the relationship as "use," Faupel-Drevs 2000. A volume David Morgan edited in 2010 took up "various ways that belief should be studied as taking place in material practices. Belief should not be understood as coming only before such things as the veneration of relics or the ecstatic drudgery of pilgrimage, but as being constituted by them," "Introduction," in Morgan 2010, 11. So, too, Arweck and Keenan state as "its essential subject matter – the human quest to give voice, sight, form and shape to the sacred or numinous or transcendent," "Introduction," Arweck and Keenan 2006, 6. Arweck and Keenan do allow for "insiders" to perceive the matter of their religion differently (9), but their conceptualization of "material religion" remains exclusively human in origin and communication. One rich vein of consideration of "matter" in the wake of Reformation iconoclasm concerns "the fetish." See Keane 1998; Pietz 1985 and 1987. Matthew Engelke is also engaged in a critique of "primitive religion" in his work.

[29] "Matter is all around us: we cannot escape it. We are literally material beings in a material environment, populated with material objects, situated amidst the material stuff of nature, bound in intimate and more distant relations with other persons through shared material habits and habitats. Objects, images, and a proliferation of material substances engage, shape, and interact with human bodies, events, and ideas just as profoundly, subtly, and emphatically as the words with which scholars generally exercise more comfortable interpretive familiarities. Pictures and things surround us, and people work with them, and they with people, to construct selves, communities, and worlds. The entities thus formed include, along a mutually invested continuum, *immaterial* compositions and worlds and thus embodied, unbodied, and imagined habitations of soul and spirit," Promey 2014a, 4. For an introduction to work on the early modern period, see Boer and Göttler 2012. For an introduction to the senses as a field of historical research, see, for example, Howes 2005; and Newhauser 2019. Cf. "Any treatment of religion that fails to consider bodies is guilty of ignoring the materiality of religions," Meyer, Morgan, Paine, and Plate 2011: 6.

[30] Brown 2001; Bennett 2010; Ingold 2013; Vedeler 2019; Hodder 2021. There is a series of volumes based on conferences held by the McDonald Institute; the most important of those for this volume is DeMarrais, Gosden, and Renfrew 2004. For an introduction to work on "fetishism," see Speyer 1998.

[31] Kukkonen 2014.

[32] "Even with respect to what is most central to the Aristotelian project – prime matter, sensible qualities, and substantial forms – we have a woefully poor understanding of what exactly the scholastics thought. . . . It is emblematic of the poverty of our knowledge in these areas that even with regard to our topic's central organizing concept – substance – scholars have labored under the most grievous misunderstandings, even with respect to the canonical figures of the seventeenth century," Pasnau 2011, 5.

[33] "Our starting-point is a world in which material things apparently come into being, change and disappear spontaneously; and over which we have acquired a certain degree of control," Toulmin and Goodfield 1962, 22.

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disputed.[34] In one of the most popular late medieval textbooks, the *Philosophical Pearl*, for example, first published in 1503, Gregor Reisch wrote: "The prime matter truly remains the same which was first under the form of air, now under the form of fire; but this [prime matter] is not a sensible."[35] Everything that could be tasted, touched, seen, heard, or smelled had its origin in "prime matter," which, for Christians, conformed with Creation, as set forth in Genesis 1: "In the beginning when God created the heavens and the earth, the earth was a formless void [In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram terram autem erat inanis et vacua]."[36] That is, altars and vestments may have had different textures, weights, colors, and rigidities, but both had their origin in *prima materia* – and not in stone or marble or silk or linen, which were formed of that original nonsensible *materia*.

Throughout this book, when referring to buildings, altars, vestments, and images in the aggregate, I use the phrase *the made world*. Among the many legacies of Reformation, as we shall see in Part II, is the distinction so commonly made between the natural world and the things human beings have made.[37] The line between that which God had created and what human beings fashioned was not as hard for Durand as it was for Luther, Zwingli, or Calvin.[38] For Durand, the matter of the liturgy was formed from matter God had created.[39] Human hands had not changed that matter; they had fashioned it into forms that, in the case of churches, altars, and vestments, were scripturally authorized. The phrase, the made world, intentionally aims first to blur the distinction between Creation and human fashioning, to erase some, but not all, of the importance that came to be accorded human hands in the making of places of worship. It also aims to blur the distinction among the things human beings made that has so shaped their study in the past two centuries: churches as separate from the images that were in them, vestments as separate from the persons who wore them, altars as separate from the places in which they were used.

LITURGY, MATTER, SCRIPTURE

> non solum voces, sed et res significativae sunt [not only words, but things too are significative]. Hugh of St.-Victor[40] Quaelibet enim res, quot habet proprietates, tot habet linguas

[34] See, for example, Gregor Reisch's *Philosophical Pearl*: "MASTER: You conclude nicely from what was said that there are three principles of things, namely Matter, Form and Privation. Because these are primary [principles], they do not come to be from other things, nor are they constituted of each other, but everything else is constituted of them. But we say that form is drawn out of the potency of matter, not because something of the form is hidden inside matter, but because without such matter as its subject, a natural agent would not produce the form," Reisch, 25. Reisch also provides an overview of divergent conceptions of matter and form, Book 8, chapter 34. Thus, even sympathetic studies of "material Christianity" in America are predicated on a different conception of matter. See, for example, McDannell 1995.

[35] Reisch, Book 8, chapter 7, 75.

[36] All biblical quotations are from NOAB and BSV. On *prima materia* and Creation, see, for example, Reisch, Book 8, chapter 7, 27.

[37] A protean body of research has detailed the "craft" diverse materials demanded for their forming. Iconic of these studies is Baxandall 1980. For more recent work, see, for example, Anderson, Dunlop, and Smith 2014.

[38] Martindale 1972. See also Kruse 2000.

[39] Kukkonen 2014.

[40] Quoted in Ohly 2005a, 4.

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> aliquid spirituale nobis et invisibile insinuantes, pro quarum diversitate et ipsius nominis acceptio variatur
>
> [Indeed every created thing has as many meanings suggesting to us something spiritual and invisible as it has properties, in proportion to the diversity of which even acceptance of the name itself varies].
>
> Peter of Poitiers[41]

In 1958, in his inaugural lecture at Kiel, Friedrich Ohly called attention to the Latin word *res* and how medieval theologians construed its relationship to *vox*, which he translated as the sound of a word. In the article from that lecture, first published in 1977 in German, he argued: "Whereas antiquity ... had been concerned only with the meanings of words, the Christian philology of the Middle Ages goes beyond that and is concerned with the 'thing significations' of everything present in creation."[42] Drawing on a range of medieval authors, Ohly identified a way of conceptualizing the relationship between Creation and Scripture, which, he argued, defined medieval Christianity.[43] In the following chapters, my use of the term *scriptural res* is rooted in Ohly's work.

Marie-Dominique Chenu, Mary Carruthers, and Caroline Walker Bynum have argued compellingly that the boundaries we draw are not those of medieval monks, theologians, nuns, or laity.[44] For the twelfth-century theologians Chenu studied, there were two books of Revelation: the Bible and nature.[45] A similar sense of revelation, as not exclusively verbal and to be read in the surrounding world, pervades the *Rationale*. For sixteenth-century Evangelicals, the Bible was the preeminent, even exclusive, locus of revelation. Even as they continued to acknowledge divine design and intentionality in Creation, they severed what human hands had fashioned from Creation and divine design, and they accorded Scripture sole authority in determining worship.

The boundary sixteenth-century Evangelicals placed between the made world and revelation has also shaped the conceptual models we bring to bear on the material traces of past worship. Modern scholars tend to posit one of two relationships between God and matter: either absence – and matter is inert, mute, and "presence" is a subjective perception on the part of the human viewer – or a "presence" which is *in* the matter.[46] Or, to put it in another modern bipolarity, "transcendence" and

[41] Quoted in Ohly 2005a, 5.
[42] Ohly 2005a, 5.
[43] Ohly 2005a, 29–30.
[44] Chenu 1968; Carruthers 1998 and 2008; Bynum 2011.
[45] "[I]t was still true that knowledge of God and his designs was derived both from nature and from history. These, men said, were the two 'books' in which God taught us; for creation, in its metaphorical manner, was a book even as it was a mirror:

> Omnis mundi creatura
> Quasi liber et pictura
> nobis est speculum

'Every creature in the world is, for us, like a book and a picture and a mirror as well.' So wrote Alan of Lille, and before him Hugh of Saint-Victor had said: 'The entire sense-perceptible world is like a sort of book written by the finger of God." Chenu 1968, 117.
[46] Here I am mindful of Robert Orsi's careful articulations of the relationships among a Christian God, Catholic devout, and their rosaries, statues, prayer cards, and other haptic and visual media. See, foremost, Orsi 2005; and Orsi 2016. Peter Pels offers a fruitful critique of the reduction of possibilities Pels 1998.

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"immanence."[47] Durand, however, posited neither. From that opening paragraph he construed matter as created: not simply by God but with divine intentionality; not embodying God, which was doctrinally distinct and unique in the person of Christ, but originating in divine design and, for Durand, consisting in an ongoing divine communication with humankind. Durand did not argue that God was "present" in the matter of, say, stone or linen – though God was indeed present for Durand in the matter of the elements, the Host and the wine, after the words of consecration. For Durand, matter was a *medium* between God and humankind, in ways explicitly analogous to Scripture.[48] Divine mysteries were communicated through and in altars and vestments, for those devout who could discern them. Revelation was not the same as presence but communication with humankind, communication which was multiform and oblique – mysteries and signs.

Scripture and Creation were not discrete from one another, nor was their relationship verbal description and materialization, as Luther would posit.[49] Scripture and the made world were complexly interreferential – in ways that the chapters on churches, altars, and vestments detail. The same fourfold approach to Scripture could be applied to the made world:

> Similarly, Jerusalem is understood historically as that earthly city that pilgrims seek; allegorically, it represents the church militant; tropologically, any faithful soul; anagogically, the heavenly Jerusalem, or our homeland.
>
> William Durand, *Rationale divinorum officiorum*, Prologue, 12[50]

Jerusalem was a biblical site, both word and place, simultaneously. That same sense of layers of meaning of the scriptural text as Henri de Lubac set forth in his study – the four senses: historical, allegorical, tropological, and anagogical – the *Rationale* applies to the made world.[51]

In a 1993 article, Thibodeau argued for the expansion of Lubac's definition of allegory, from a strictly textual practice to one encompassing "every element of the liturgy, from the vestments of the priest to the thurible and candles used at lauds and vespers."[52] He offered one example in his analysis of Durand's choice of title:

On "animism," see, for example, Chidester 2018, 23–29. Bynum has explored "how God acts through matter" in Bynum 2011, here at 33.

[47] See, for example, Christian Kiening's "Introduction," Dauven-van Knippenberg, Herberichs, and Kiening 2009, 7–20.

[48] In this, my use differs from that proposed by Engelke 2011, 227–229; Meyer 2015; and Meyer 2020. Meyer, for example, "approach[es] religion as a set of human ideas and practices with regard to another, non-empirical sphere – a beyond – which can only be rendered tangible through mediation, and thus requires some sort of media" Meyer 2020, 6. Meyer's term of choice for referring to an ontological other is "transcendence" (19–28), a sense she shares with Engelke, who studies modern Friday Apostolic in Zimbabwe.

[49] Strier 2007.

[50] Prologue, 12, RDOE1, 5; "Similiter Ierusalem intelligitur ystorice ciuitas illa terrestris quam peregrini petunt; allegorice ecclesia militans; tropologice quelibet fidelis anima; anagogice celestis Ierusalem siue patria," RDOL1, 8. "An example which is constantly given in the Middle Ages is the word Jerusalem: historically, it is a city on earth; allegorically, it is the church; tropologically, it is the soul of the believer; anagogically, it is God's heavenly city," Ohly 2005a, 17.

[51] De Lubac 1959–1964.

[52] Thibodeau 1993, 78.

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> Even the unusual and hitherto unused title of his work, the *Rationale*, reveals Durand's preoccupation with making manifest the hidden or deeper meaning of the divine offices. The ornate pectoral to which Durand compared his commentary is described in Exod 28:15–30, and in Jerome's Vulgate translation it is called the rationale iudicii (Exod 28:15). Aaron wore this pectoral over his priestly vestments; attached to it was a pouch or burse containing two circular stones, the Urim and Thummim – literally, "lights" and "integrity," translated as *doctrina* and *veritas* by Jerome (Exod 28:30) – which the ancient Israelites used as an oracle for determining God's will.[53]

Thibodeau shared both Luther's and Lubac's sense that allegory is a system of hermeneutics, while for Durand it was one of four modes of discerning divine communication. Thibodeau also shared the preeminence Luther and Lubac gave the text of Scripture, but he offered the kind of densely layered analysis, an ongoing interweaving of Scripture and matter, that one finds throughout the *Rationale*. His one example points toward something of Durand's dialectical hermeneutic, Scripture leading to discernment in Creation, Creation leading to other places in Scripture, which in turn accrued more layers of meaning to both text and matter.

READING REVELATION

Reading the made world was, as Durand made clear in his opening paragraph, a question of what any one person brought to acts of looking, touching, smelling, listening, and tasting. If we set aside the editorial interventions, the italics and the brackets, Durand modeled a kind of living familiarity with Scripture such as Carruthers delineated for monastic orthopraxis: not a sense of chapter and verse, which postdates Durand, but of embodying and being able to recollect at will those ways of speaking that in turn acquire new referents in each person's experience.[54]

Durand's intended readership was clergy, both the religious who would live the rhythms of the Divine Office and the celebrants of the Mass, monks, canons, friars, deacons, and priests. But the sense of the interreferentiality of Scripture and the made world articulated in the *Rationale* was not restricted to those who had taken vows, those who were ordained, those who preached, or even those who could read. The "diligent observer" suggests another relationship, of attentiveness to divine communication. The liturgy, for Durand, did not parse between text and thing, word and *materia*, but was itself an orthopraxis teaching a way of discerning divine communication and its multilayered meanings, its complex composition of the world. Perhaps the most unintended consequence of Reformation was the abstracting of the liturgy from Europeans' experience of time and space: "liturgy" became something one attended on Sundays, not an orthopraxis for discerning God's design in the world.

Carruthers opened her study of monastic meditative practices and rhetoric, *The Craft of Thought*, with a definition of orthopraxis she adopted from Paul Gehl, who had developed it as an analytic concept for considering the monastic practice of silence.[55]

[53] Thibodeau 1993, 70.

[54] On orthopraxis, see, Carruthers 1998, 1–2; Gehl 1987, 157–160.

[55] "In an essay of 1967 [Raimundo] Panikkar outlined a distinction between Buddhist *orthopraxis* and Christian *orthodoxy* and suggested that this represents a fundamental difference between the two traditions

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For Carruthers and Gehl, "orthopraxis" offered a particularly fertile way to conceptualize monastic rhetorical practices. In Gehl's words,

> certain individuals and groups within the church have tended to create for themselves an orthopraxis, that is, one or another Christian experience which, though never independent of orthodox teaching, is essentially a reaching out for immanent experience of God without necessary or direct reference to the teaching of Christ embodied in Scripture, liturgy, and orthodox theology.[56]

Gehl and Carruthers did not take up liturgy in their conceptualizations of orthopraxis. The sense each developed, however, of an ongoing embodied praxis, a discipline, "a reaching out for immanent experience of God," which deepens understanding over time, brings us very close to Durand's conception of the liturgy in dynamic with the made world, both as ongoing and dialectical and also as a process of ever greater discernment and illumination. Gehl's and Carruthers' conceptualizations of orthopraxis help us to see the made world as present over time, in ongoing dynamic with the liturgy. The concept of orthopraxis helps us to conceive of the liturgy, not as recurring or repeating, but as a *process* of potentially infinite discernment of revelation. For Durand, in other words, revelation was never instantaneous but ongoing and protean. Meaning was not fixed but constantly acquiring newly discerned layers, dimensions, allusions, associations, and connotations. Perhaps most critically, a concept of orthopraxis moves us from any notion that the liturgy was, as in modern conceptions of ritual, repetitious, to a sense that it was progressive and cumulative, an accrual over time of an ever-increasing discernment of the sheer magnitude and complexity of revelation. As we shall see, this particular way of conceptualizing the temporality of liturgy also helps us to discern more fully the different kinds of time that the missal, the altar, vestments, and the person of the priest brought to the liturgy.

From the opening of the *Rationale*, Durand emphasized attentiveness, that is, the orientation of the participant in the liturgy to it and to its matter. As we now know, he wrote at a time when other theories of optics were at play, and also when other conceptions of "vision" and "sense" informed thinking about what we now call "perception."[57] "Species" has come to be a category of organization, one tier in the modern construction of the relationships among animals or plants. In medieval Europe, however, the term was at the center of debates on the relationship among the made world, the human eye, and the human mind.[58] As with "prime matter," "species" had no one universally accepted definition, no consensus as to what it referred. As with

insofar as each defines itself. Very briefly, Panikkar distinguishes between religions of orthodoxy in which the normative element is the teaching of a founder, and religions of orthopraxis in which religious experiences are normative," Gehl 1987, 157.

[56] Gehl 1987, 158. See also, Gehl 2002.

[57] Medieval "perception" is a protean field. In addition to work on theories of optics and cognition, see Hatfield and Epstein 1979; Baltuta 2020.

[58] Katherine H. Tachau most fully explores the connection between "species" and cognition, Tachau 1988. "Despite the strength of Olivi's and Ockham's arguments, few Scholastics were persuaded to follow them in giving up the doctrine of species. The dogma of inner representations as objects of apprehension lived on throughout the fourteenth century; consequently, there was no countervailing medieval tradition strong enough to influence early modern treatments," Pasnau 1997, 291. See also Pasnau 2014, vol. 1, Part IV. On the eye, see foremost Lindberg 1976; Smith 1981; Camille 1996 and 2000; Simon 2003. On Renaissance theories of vision, see, for example, Hendrix and Carman 2010. For a succinct

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prima materia, the word marks a way of thinking at once alien to us and endemic in late medieval Europe. Critically for our purposes, species was at the center of debates which took as their predicates: (1) that light is the medium of sight; (2) that light is material; and therefore (3) that the made world is materially connected to the human eye and, with it, the human mind. Those debates did not agree on the nature of mind or of senses, but they all held a radically different relationship between the made world and the mind.[59] The eye and the seen object were linked either, on the one hand, through a mathematical line or a continuous ray or, on the other, through a series of multiplications or "species" that traversed the distance between eye and object.[60] Not until Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) would light be construed as nonmaterial and therefore the eye as physically autonomous from the made world.

Throughout the period this book covers, Europeans broadly held that the made world was itself a participant in visual cognition – connected through the materiality of light, which traversed what we now hold to be a cognitive as well as spatial distance between "object" and eye and mind.[61] Even more critically important for our purposes, as A. Mark Smith summarized it, "concepts are immanent in objective reality."[62] Not until René Descartes (1596–1650) would the made world be construed as both fully external to us and receiving its meaning from us, "objects" in the more common modern sense.[63]

Durand's focus was not the eye itself, perception, or cognition. As the opening paragraph suggests, his focus was an orientation, a preparedness to see God's communication in stone and linen, gold and sapphires. In the *Rationale*, and especially in the first three books of it, he traced interplays of matter and Scripture which were woven into the liturgy, at times, as in the case of vestments, in the regularity of the liturgy, at times, as in the stone of altars, in the ongoing presence of specific kinds of matter within the space of the liturgy. But, in keeping with medieval theories, in the plural, of perception, Durand never treated the matter of the liturgy as objects.[64] They did not receive meaning from their human observers; they revealed it to them.[65] The permeability that is at the center

introduction to the concept of "visuality," see Nelson 2000b. On the "distinction between what appears and what exists," I have found especially helpful Denery 2005.

[59] "There must, in short, be a mediating formal cause – the so-called physical *species*, consisting of *lumen* and illuminated color – to link the object and the visible *species* in the eye," Smith 1981, 587. See also, Camile 2000; and Nelson 2000b.

[60] Smith 1981 provides a succinct summary of this, 579–580.

[61] For a thoughtful discussion of the shifting constellation of referents for "object" and "subject," see Denery 2005. On the disconnect between medieval optics and, say, Martin Jay's concept of "optic regimes," see Biernoff 2002. For an introduction to "objects" in early modern culture, see the first volume of the research group, "Premodern Objects: An Archaeology of Experience," Cordez, Kaske, Saviello, and Thürigen 2018.

[62] Smith 1981, 571.

[63] The chronologies are those of Robert Pasnau on theories of matter and David C. Lindberg on optics, Pasnau 2011; Lindberg 1976. For a brief history of conceptions of matter, see Mainzer 1996.

[64] Recent work of historians of medieval art has interrogated "matter" and "materiality." For an introduction to matter/"materiality" and medieval art history, see Kessler 2000; Kessler 2004; Kumler 2019. For a brief history of work on the matter of art, see Raff 2008, 13–17. "The present volume . . .explicitly addresses materials as active components in the conception, production and interpretation of artworks," Lehmann 2013, 7.

[65] Christopher Nygren, for example, acknowledges "the artist recognized incipient 'images' embedded in the stone and conscripted these mineral formations into his pictorial composition," but he then construes that

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of medieval theories of perception also operates implicitly in Durand's discussion of the matter of the liturgy: The revelation of meaning occurred in dialogue with each person's specific familiarity with Scripture, within the orthopraxis of liturgy, and with the sense of complex layers he sets forth in the example of Jerusalem.

Durand directed his reader to look *at* the matter of the liturgy – at the stone of churches and altars, at the linen and silk of vestments. He did not direct them to look beyond the matter. He directed his reader to look at it, as itself a site of divine communication, to which the same approach as to Scripture can be applied. For him, there was no boundary between the made world and revelation, and that changed not only the nature of the made world but also Scripture.

INCARNATION

> Thus liturgical objects and images are not to be considered solely as participant in the ritual from the point of view of their concrete function in the liturgy and their possible general theological and historical significance, but as essential elements of the liturgy destined to be activated by the five senses in order to render really present in the ritual the Incarnation of the Word according to different modalities.
>
> Éric Palazzo, *L'invention chrétienne des cinq sens dans la liturgie et l'art au Moyen Âge*[66]

Martin Luther not only lumped the *Rationale* among the "allegorical studies" he excoriated. He reconceived the matter of the liturgy as adiaphora, things indifferent, to which human beings gave such meaning as was accorded them.[67] In rejecting the matter of the liturgy as itself a mode of divine communication, he offered a radically different conception of Incarnation, centered on the printed word of Scripture and materially discrete from human experience. "Liturgy" became speaking and singing and listening; the Incarnation was no longer to be a mystery engaging all the senses. Liturgy and Incarnation were realigned.

The *Rationale* invites us to ask not only what liturgy is or what the relationship between Scripture and matter is. It invites us to ask what the relationship of Incarnation to the world is. The insistence of so many modern scholars that Incarnation is a thing apart from matter is perhaps the most compelling evidence of just how completely Evangelicals separated God from the materialities of late medieval Christianity.

At the center of this book is a shift from a sense that God communicates through the made world and in the cadences of the liturgy to one which locates that communication almost exclusively in a codex, a physically bounded and bound thing, a text. At its center, in other words, is a fundamental reconceptualization of revelation. Both Luther

as "invention," not discernment of a design, intentional and communicative, originating outside the artist's mind, Nygren 2019b, 91.

[66] "Ainsi les objets liturgiques et les images ne sont pas uniquement considérés comme participant au ritual du point de vue de leur fonction concrete dans la liturgie et de leur éventuelle signification théologique et historique au sens large, mais comme des éléments essentiels de la définition de la liturgie destinés à être activés par les cinq sens afin de rendre réellement présente dans la ritual l'incarnation du Verbe selon différentes modalités," Palazzo 2014, 26.

[67] Luther, "Vom Abendmahl Christi, Bekenntnis, 1528," 514.

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and Durand shared the "foundational tenet" of pre-modern Christian thinkers: God had brought everything, time as well as matter, into being.[68] For Durand, however, God communicated not only through words but also through matter and in time. Revelation was not restricted to Scripture, nor was Scripture a thing apart from Creation – as the following chapters show, the interplay of the matter of the liturgy and Scripture was richly complex, multivalent, and dynamic. Those signs and mysteries were not "clear": Their interreferentiality was ongoing, a dialectic rather than a closed loop, generative of new insights through the orthopraxis of liturgy.

For Durand, meaning originated in God, that is, entirely outside of human imagination or intellection: It was external to and exceeded the capacity of any one viewer. The human viewer, for Durand, was not an active participant in meaning-making, in contradistinction, say, to reader response theory or hermeneutics.[69] Durand wrote of an "observer"; mysteries "overflow." That sense of the made world was lost in the sixteenth century.

This book seeks to excavate the sense of the matter of the liturgy for which Durand is the fullest source. Chapters on churches, altars, and vestments explore different ways that stone, marble, relics, linen, colors, and the human body materialized sacred mysteries. The chapter on missals takes up time and Creation; while Durand did not write about missals, they are the most concise access to the thinking about time that informed the medieval liturgy and that one can find throughout the *Rationale*. Each chapter explores specific ways particular kinds of matter served as media of divine mysteries. This book seeks to bring to the liturgy not "objects" or "things" in the modern sense of them – however complex and rich that sense might be – but the active participation of diverse media. In so doing, this book also seeks to delineate a fundamentally different sense of "liturgy": not as essentially words and sound but as enacted within Creation and in dynamic with all that human hands fashioned using matter God had created. Once we have these in place, we turn in Part II to Reformation and the many ways Evangelicals rejected those ways of thinking, reconceived worship, and with it the relationship among the Bible, Creation, human hands, and human minds. This second part charts how Evangelical repudiations of medieval understandings of the Mass altered the relationship between the made world and revelation for all Churches, Catholic as well as Evangelical. Only with an archaeology of late medieval understandings of the liturgy can we then see just how radical a rethinking of the liturgy the sixteenth century witnessed, such that one of the most sympathetic readers of Durand would typographically distinguish the text of Scripture from *rebus ac ornamentis*.

[68] Kukkonen 2014, 232.

[69] On reader response theory, see, for example, Iser 1978. Most influential for my thinking about hermeneutics has been Gadamer 1990 and 1993.

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