argued, however, that the fundamental cause of the failure of the movement was not these factors but the accidental murders right at the beginning of the operation and the resulting unwillingness of President Sukarno to endorse the movement. If the generals had been successfully arrested and brought to Sukarno, the outcome of the movement could have been very different.

Roosa's account shows that senior Indonesian generals were not confident enough simply to attack the PKI, which enjoyed the protection of the president. They were, therefore, looking for ways to induce the PKI to take action that would justify retaliation and the military's own ascension to power. Roosa, however, rejects the speculation that the movement was a result of military manipulation and concludes that the "pretext for mass murder" was the PKI leader's own work. However, this conclusion might place too much of the blame on Aidit and Syam alone. Even if the decision to launch the movement was made by them, the fear of a pending military coup was shared by many party members who, under the circumstances, could hardly have expected the party leader to risk compromising his planned response by asking for their approval in advance.

Roosa acknowledges that his book is unable to explain all the remaining gray areas in the story. His "only claim . . . is that events *probably* happened in this way" (202–3). However, his stimulating and thoroughly researched book provides solid evidence to support interpretations that had previously been based only on speculation. It is an important addition to Indonesia coup literature.

–Harold Crouch

SECRET MEANS

William J. Daugherty: *Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2006. Pp. xxvii, 223. $19.95, paper.)

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William J. Daugherty, a former senior officer in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), has written a provocative and timely book describing how all U.S. presidents since Harry S Truman—even those like Jimmy Carter who had publicly disdained covert action—have employed covert action as a "tool for presidential statecraft" (3).

Yet in the public eye and in the groves of academe, the CIA has been successfully depicted as a rogue agency staffed by wild-eyed, out-of-control operatives and self-serving bureaucrats who seek to assassinate any and all enemies of the United States. That caricature, Daugherty assures us, exists only in movies and espionage novels. Most covert actions are designed for the achievement of long-term goals: political action such as the secret funding of political parties, support for civic and political organizations

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and for individual leaders, and sponsorship of propaganda such as radio broadcasts. Paramilitary operations associated with the undermining and overthrowing of governments, while sexy sounding, "are the least utilized" of all covert activities (84).

Daugherty successfully dispels a number of published myths surrounding the use of covert actions (Bob Woodward, *Veil*; Christopher Hitchens, "Unlawful, Unelected and Unchecked"; John Jacob Nutter, *The CIA's Black Ops*, and numerous television, magazine, and newspaper stories) and successfully strips them of their "romance." (23–45) Covert actions, he shows, can be authorized only with the express approval of U.S. presidents and, since 1974, Congress. Daugherty's book, therefore, belongs on that small shelf of important works on U.S. intelligence activities such as Christopher Andrew's *For the President's Eyes Only* and John Prados's *Presidents' Secret Wars*.

Daugherty's experiences on the Evaluation and Plans Staff of the Agency's Directorate of Operations (DO) in the late 1980s and on the White House's Interagency Working Group on covert actions during the mid-1990s give him a unique perspective on the functioning of covert activities. Thus, the first half of the book is part memoir and part institutional analysis and history, as Daugherty demonstrates how covert activities are authorized and monitored.

Daugherty painstakingly documents all the legalities with which a president must comply in order to begin a covert action. First, the action being contemplated must be approved by an interagency committee. This practice has been the case since the CIA's founding, when an interagency working group consisting of representatives from the CIA, the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of State (DOS), and the Department of Defense (DOD) approved all covert actions. During the Truman administration, covert action consisted of propaganda broadcasts on Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America and financial support for pro-U.S. political parties during the 1948 Italian elections. In later years the Committee—named the "303" and then the "40" Committee—approved such covert activities as financial support for political and civic parties in Italy and Greece in the 1960s, the arming of anticommunist forces in Chile and Angola in the 1970s, and the targeting of transnational threats such as drug cartels, terrorism, and organized crime after the Cold War. Thus from its inception, the CIA served as "the 'instrument of [presidential] policy, not the initiator' [of policy]." (122)

As Daugherty explains, since 1974 (near the end of the Vietnam War), Congress must also approve any covert action. In 1975 the Church Committee's investigation into the CIA's excesses in Chile, Cuba, and elsewhere further strengthened the oversight of Congress. Under 1981's Executive Order 12333, *all* covert actions must be subject to a presidential "finding" and must serve valid "foreign policy objectives" (94–95). In 1988, in the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal, Congress passed the Intelligence Oversight Act, which required the president to notify Congress within 48

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hours of a contemplated covert action. Thus claims by presidents, NSC staff, and even some congressmen and senators who sit on intelligence committees that they were "out of the loop" on covert actions should, at the very least, be received with some skepticism.

In the second half of the book, Daugherty briefly describes covert activities undertaken by U.S. presidents since 1947. One particular problem Daugherty highlights is the propensity of some presidents to view covert operations as a course of action to be employed when all other diplomatic activities have failed. (50–51) In particular, he disparages Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton for failing to understand that covert action cannot serve as a substitute for a well-conceived and well-executed overt policy. For example, Daugherty argues that President Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, at best ignored Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms, and at worst circumvented the 40 Committee and pursued covert operations in Iraq over the objections of CIA case officers.

The public record—not to mention recent documentary releases—shows that Daugherty is mistaken. Nixon would never have appointed Helms ambassador to one of Washington's most valuable allies, Iran, in 1973, had he distrusted and disdained Helms's advice. *Foreign Relations of the United States* (*FRUS*) releases in 2006 on Vietnam (1969–1970) and China (1969–1972) show that Helms was a valued member of the administration's entire foreign policy-making process. Helms or a subordinate attended nearly all NSC, Senior Review Group, and Washington Special Actions Group Meetings. In the case of Iraq, documents 322 and 325 of *FRUS Volume E-4, Iran-Iraq 1969-72* (available only at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e4/c17628.htm) show, respectively, that the White House notified the 40 Committee of the decision to support the Kurdish resistance in Iraq in 1972 as well as Helms's direct communication with Kissinger regarding that covert action. Perhaps the real problem was between *Helms* and his own case officers.

Daugherty seems to be on firmer ground, however, in his condemnation of President Clinton, colored no doubt by Daugherty's personal involvement in covert action deliberations. While he acknowledges some successful covert operations against money laundering and weapons proliferation, he indicts Clinton for failing to follow up with a serious antiterrorism program, overt or covert, on terrorist incidents such as the Africa Embassy bombings in 1998 and the bombing of the U.S.S. *Cole* in 2000 (219–20) To be fair to President Clinton, of course, the documentary record has not been released (and will not be for at least another decade). It will be interesting to see whose story is the more accurate, Daugherty or Clinton administration officials.

Covert action, Daugherty stresses, must, therefore, be integrated into a president's overall policy. For example, since President Dwight D. Eisenhower believed that Soviet threats derived more from subversion than military action, he used covert action in Iran and Guatemala in 1953 and 1954 to

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overthrow governments he deemed sympathetic to the Soviet Union. President Ronald Reagan covertly supported Solidarity in Poland and the *mujahideen* rebels in Afghanistan in the 1980s as part of a larger program designed to bring down the Soviet Union without a shooting war. Daugherty does, however, criticize Eisenhower and Reagan for pursuing covert actions in Guatemala and Nicaragua, respectively, that proved to be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy.

A minor quibble concerns one item out of Daugherty's control: the fact that he had to submit his manuscript to the CIA for review in early 2003 prevented him from examining the *FRUS* Retrospective volume Guatemala 1951–1954, which DOS published in June 2003. Documents that DOS and CIA released in this volume show the genesis of, the plans for, and even the exact date when Eisenhower approved the use of covert action against the Arbenz government (on page 138 Daugherty laments the lack of available documentation). The manuscript has a few typographical errors, too. On page xix of the preface, paragraph two begins "In the 1990s, CIA covert action programs assisted in the capture of international terrorists such as Che Guevara." Since Che was captured in Bolivia with the CIA's assistance in 1967, perhaps Daugherty meant to write "By the 1990s." On page 42, Daugherty writes "there was no intervention in Italy in 1940." I assume he means 1948. On page 127 Daugherty is referring to Undersecretary David K. E. Bruce, not K. G. These aside, *Executive Secrets* is a crisply written introduction to the importance of covert action in presidential policymaking and a significant contribution to the literature of U.S. intelligence activities.

–Chris Tudda

Note: The views presented here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of State or the United States government. I would like to thank my colleague Douglas Kraft for his helpful comments and suggestions.

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INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami: *The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. ix, 302. $29.99, paper.)

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The "English School" and its American rivals in theorizing about international relations, as these authors rightly point out, have long since gone their separate

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