a new type of comedy called *Maeson* (but see the Latin original: *Maeson persona comica appellatur . . . , dici ab inventore eius Maesone comoedo, ut ait Aristophanes grammaticus*). On p. 325, she seriously misunderstands Sopatros' characterization of the style of Aelius Aristides: Sopatros says that Aristides 'gives more to thinking than to wording' (*τῆς λέξεως πλείονα διδοὺς τῷ νοεῖν*), but for M.-R. this means that Sopatros 'betont dessen Konzentration auf den Stil'—which is quite the opposite of what Sopatros says. On p. 491 she wrongly paraphrases the word *ἀνάπτυξις* (used in Procl. *In Tim.* I p. 129.19) as 'in die Form des Mythos gekleidete Darlegung', whereas it clearly means 'explanation'.

Typographical errors are too frequent to be enumerated here in detail; in most cases they will not hamper the reader's understanding, but they indicate hasty revision and proof-reading, as do some infelicitous phrasings; for example, on p. 105, we read that Longinus has '18 Bücher Chronik in 228 Olympiaden zusammengefaßt'; it should be the other way round. On p. 112 M.-R. produces the sentence 'Ein Zusammenhang . . . könnte . . . zusammenhängen'. At the bottom of p. 149, the sentence should read '. . . Begebenheit, in der [instead of 'nach welcher'] der Rhetor Diophanes eine rhetorisch stilisierte [instead of 'mit einer . . . stilisierten'] Apologie vorgelesen . . . habe'. On p. 279 she confuses the Alexandrian scholar Lysimachus ('des bereits erwähnten'—but he has not been mentioned before) with Lycophron (who indeed is mentioned on the preceding page). More infelicities of this kind could be added.

The biggest flaw of the book, however, may be its bulk. As I said, M.-R.'s interpretations are often excellent, providing all the information a reader might wish for; nevertheless the paraphrases of the quoted texts might have been more succinct, insights and results are too often repeated with slight variation, and the overall structure of the book (see above) encourages repetitiveness. Some digressions could be missed without great loss; why, for example, must we get a full history of Palmyra before Longinus' time, almost four pages long (pp. 115–18)? A few months (or perhaps only weeks) of additional work on the structure of this book and more rigorous editing of its contents, shedding, say, 150–200 pages, might have given us the definitive publication on Longinus for a long time to come; the book now published represents only a step—though a major one—in that direction.

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THE SCEPTICISM OF SEXTUS

A. BAILEY: *Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism*. Pp. xvi + 302. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. Cased. ISBN: 0-19-823852-5.

Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism sets out to show that Pyrrhonism is a form of global scepticism about rationally justified belief which is consistent and immune to standard self-refutation arguments. Bailey argues that the Pyrrhonist has 'the view that no claim is ever rationally preferable to its contradictory' (p. 9); and that the Pyrrhonist can have this view, and also act in the world, because he has (involuntary) beliefs about his own impressions, but also about the world, which he does not consider to be rationally justified (Chapter 11). This seems a promising variant of a familiar, if controversial, view, and worth further elaboration than it receives.

The book has three parts: Chapters 1, 6, 10, and 11 sketch B.'s positive view; Chapters 2–5 give a historical outline of ancient scepticism; and Chapters 7–9

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challenge three dissenting interpretations of Sextus. The whole is completed by a 'select bibliography' (pp. 291–6)—which is too short and dated to be of much use—and a brief index (pp. 297–302).

The historical section (pp. 21–118) sets out the standard modern view of the evolution of Pyrrhonism, and its relation to Academic scepticism (Chapters 3–4) and medical Empiricism (Chapter 5.3). The exposition is vitiated by errors, its reliance on misleading translations, and a dispiriting lack of generosity to its modern sources. Minor errors include passages such as those on Philo on p. 32 and Dionysius of Aegae on p. 86, the latter presumably relying on the mistaken authority cited in p. 87 n. 44 (cf. Deichgräber, *Die Griechische Empirikerschule* [Berlin, 1965], p. 336). The superseded Loeb translation by Bury seems to be responsible for several confusions about the meaning of Sextus' Greek (see below on Chapter 7); more depressing is the apparent misreading of an ellipse in Long & Sedley with the result that B.'s Cyrenaics 'suspend judgement about everything' (p. 42) in Plutarch *Adv. Col*. 1120c (= *The Hellenistic Philosophers* [Cambridge, 1987] i.440, misconstrued). These flaws are perhaps venial; but it is sad to read, in a section on medical Empiricism which seems to derive almost entirely from the work of Michael Frede, that 'Even if Frede is right to claim . . . [P], it seems that . . . [Q]' (p. 91), when Frede argued precisely P & Q ('The Ancient Empiricists', *Essays in Ancient Philosophy* [Oxford, 1987], pp. 243–60, at pp. 246–50 and 251–7, respectively).

A more original suggestion is that the Academics' universal suspension of judgement is compatible with holding views about—i.e. assenting to—the (phenomenal) content of their own impressions. B. supports this, without appeal to any relevant evidence, by claiming that the Stoics must have taken assent to mean having a belief about something that 'exists in a way that is independent of anyone's psychological state' (p. 48). But this arbitrary supposition falsely implies that, according to the Stoics, one cannot have beliefs about one's own or others' psychological states (*contra* Cicero *Ac*. 2.51–3); and it also contradicts B.'s central argument in Chapter 7.

The polemical section of the book (pp. 147–255) takes on the views that the Pyrrhonist has no beliefs (Chapter 7), no philosophical beliefs but only ordinary beliefs like everyone else (Chapter 8), and only (rationally justified) beliefs about his own impressions (Chapter 9). Many of the arguments here are, understandably, familiar, but some are new and provocative. First up is the view that the sceptic has no beliefs because the 'appearance statements' to which he assents were not considered to be true or false in antiquity. B.'s principal counter-argument is the fact that the Cyrenaics clearly did think that such statements were susceptible of truth-ascriptions (Chapter 7.4). An interesting supporting argument to the effect that Sextus is also committed to this possibility is flawed by B.'s philological methods. His case depends on two claims: first, plausibly, that such a commitment might be shown by linguistic practices that imply that there are facts about appearances; and secondly, that Sextus has such linguistic practices—because Bury's Loeb translation offers, for example, 'the fact that' to render the Greek *hoti*, the marker for indirect speech (p. 159).

Chapter 8 deals with the position that the sceptic has ordinary beliefs. B. rightly reiterates *inter alia* the objection that Sextus' apparent support for 'ordinary life' is undermined by his use of 'ordinary views' to support one side of a sceptical antithesis (leading to the suspension of judgement about the issue)—for example, on the existence of motion (*PH* 3.65, discussed at pp. 200–8). But B.'s focus on the philosophically undeveloped variants of the 'ordinary belief' view leads him to miss the difficulties which are most relevant to his own interpretation (see below).

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The third polemical chapter launches a battery of arguments against the 'proto-phenomenalist' view of Pyrrhonism. B.'s strongest argument is that Sextus' five modes undermine all claims to self-evidence, and hence also the alleged self-evidence of one's own impressions that would rationally justify the phenomenalist position (Chapter 9.5). This is supported by an argument against the phenomenalists' reliance on induction to underwrite expectations about their own future impressions—though B. rather oddly appeals to Hume's famous argument, as if that warranted Sextus' primitive versions (Chapter 9.4). The chapter is weakened, however, by two feeble attempts to show that phenomenalist interpretations are inconsistent with Sextus' text: first, an overlong and anachronistic appeal to 'our' linguistic intuitions about a claim supporters of this position do not endorse (pp. 221–8); and, secondly, the suggestion that Sextus' use of *ad hominem* arguments presupposes that he has beliefs about his opponents' minds. If this works against the phenomenalist view, so would citing any doxographical passage, e.g. *PH* 1.1–3.

The principal evidence for B.'s positive interpretation is set out in the relatively non-controversial Chapters 6, 10, and 11.2: Sextus allows that the Pyrrhonist is constrained to assent to some impressions, and thus has 'beliefs' (in some sense) which can guide his action. Since Sextus' arguments also rule out rational justification for any beliefs, B. infers that the only consistent interpretation of Pyrrhonism is one that allows it 'constrained' beliefs which are explicitly considered not to be rationally justified. Unfortunately, he does not elaborate on this view: Chapter 11.3 merely reiterates his interpretation of Sextus' anti-rationalist endorsement of 'commemorative signs' (cf. Chapters 6.2, 8.2, and 9.4); Chapter 11.4 just notes that it is inconsistent with some of Sextus' characterizations of the Pyrrhonist's appearances (e.g. *M* 11.8; B. is apparently unaware of the controversy surrounding these non-epistemic locutions); and the concluding section merely reaffirms some old errors about Pyrrhonists—that the Pyrrhonist is not very interested in the discovery of truths (p. 285) and is 'not a philosopher' (p. 288)—which are patently rejected by Sextus in *PH* 1.1–10.

Still, B.'s view that the Pyrrhonist accepts (explicitly) rationally unjustified beliefs about 'matters of objective fact'—e.g. that other people exist (p. 282)—as well as about his own impressions, seems promising, because it leaves room to explain how the sceptic can follow his ancestral customs and laws, and benefit from the teaching of crafts (*PH* 1.23–4). But a fuller explanation of the sceptic's ordinary life, e.g. as an Empiricist doctor, like Sextus, will have to do more than merely assert that the sceptic suspends judgement on whether motion or the gods etc. exist, but non-rationally believes that they do. Most examples of the doctor's 'rationally unjustified' practical beliefs will be the products of his medical training and of following established intellectual procedures in medicine: he will tell people to walk to the temple's healing sanctuary *because* that has helped others with similar symptoms, in his experience. His 'rationally unjustified' beliefs will therefore look just like anyone else's contextual knowledge; and one might think that the only sense in which they are not rationally justified will be that he does not pretend that they meet contextually irrelevant philosophical criteria.

An elaboration along these lines would align B. with the more philosophically developed 'ordinary belief' interpretations he failed to discuss, e.g. Frede's ('The Skeptic's two kinds of assent and the possibility of knowledge', op. cit., pp. 201–22). At any rate, an elaboration is needed to supplement the borrowed history and lengthy polemic of this book.

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