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Creating an Oriental *Feindbild*

Troy Paddock

One of the first things that Hans Castorp, the protagonist of Thomas Mann's *The Magic Mountain*, learned upon his arrival at Berghof Sanitarium in Davos, was that there was a "good" Russian table and a "bad" Russian table. The bad Russians were characterized as barbarians, more or less uncivilized. Even the good Russians, while more polite, were considered to be an exotic and alien presence, quite different from anything that Castorp, the model of the German bourgeois class, had ever experienced. As Larry Wolff has noted, Russia was a place connected to the rest of Europe by postal routes, but which few Germans ever visited.[1]

The differences between Russians and Germans illustrated in *Magic Mountain* were often discussed in terms of East versus West. In the worldview of Settembrini, Castorp's self-appointed teacher, these two forces were in perpetual conflict for possession of the world: force and justice, tyranny and freedom, superstition and knowledge, the law of permanence and the law of change. The first of each pair belonged to Asiatic principles, the second to European.[2] The German/Russian dichotomy described in Thomas Mann's novel reflected the German perception of Russia before the First World War and bears some striking parallels to Edward Said's 1978 work on Orientalism. Borrowing Said's notion, this essay will reconstruct the image of Russia in the German public sphere by examining the depiction of Russia in history and geography books, various political newspapers, and by two academics, one of whom was *the* recognized expert on Russia, and how the image was used for domestic

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[1]See Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).

[2]Thomas Mann, *The Magic Mountain*, trans. H.T. Lowe-Porter (New York: Vintage International, 1992), 157.

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political purposes. It will also demonstrate that the anti-Russian propaganda that occurred at the outset of World War I was not merely an impromptu attempt to provide a "liberal" justification for the war as Ludwig Dehio has asserted, but rather an intensified version of a brand of Russophobia that had been present well before August 1914.

Said notes that there are three interdependent levels of Orientalism. The first level, strictly an academic distinction, applies to anyone whose specialty deals with the Orient. The second level is "a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and (usually) the 'Occident.'"[3] The third form of Orientalism is the corporate institution that makes statements about, authorizes views of, describes, teaches, settles, or rules over the Orient. In other words, Orientalism is a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. Orientalism provides a "geopolitical awareness" that infuses other arenas of thought and at times expresses a will or intention to control.[4] Certainly, in light of Germany's war aims (in both world wars), Said's notion of Orientalism, which is used to analyze the Anglo-French understanding of the Levant, can be useful in understanding Germany's perception of Russia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[5]

Gyan Prakash has noted that the harshest critiques of Said have centered around "the relationship between political authority and authoritative discourse."[6] It must be acknowledged that in spite of cries of economic imperialism from some Russians against Germany before 1914, in spite of brief periods of occupation during World Wars I and II, Germany's relationship with Russia never reached a point where it had actual control over Russia, which makes this particular criticism of Said immaterial to the position that will be discussed here. Rather than political domination, this article is more interested in what Nathaniel Knight has aptly called a "conceptual

[3]Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Random House, 1979), 2.

[4]Ibid., 12. An argument can be made that German geopolitical "knowledge" of Russia played a role in the war aims of the Great War and, most certainly in the *Ostforschung* that occurred under the National Socialists. For a discussion of Nazi Ostforschung, see Michael Burleigh, *Germany Turns Eastwards: A Study of Ostforschung in the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). See David T. Murphy, *The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany, 1918–1933* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1997), chapter one for a discussion of the origins of geopolitical thought in Imperial Germany.

[5]Since its appearance twenty years ago, *Orientalism* has received wide attention, both positive and negative. The author is well aware of the limits of Said, but remains convinced of the validity of certain aspects of his work. The position that the conceptual dichotomy of Orient/Occident is an artificial construct and that this construct privileges the Occident over the Orient have withstood intellectual scrutiny. Richard G. Fox's *Gandhian Utopia: Experiments with Culture* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989) is one of the more insightful criticisms of Said. See also Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, for an example that points to the limits of Said, but builds upon his foundation.

[6]Gyan Prakash, "Orientalism Now," *History and Theory* 34, no. 3 (1995), 203. The most lucid critique of the limitations of Said's work in this respect comes from Richard G. Fox, *Ghandian Utopia*.

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conquest."[7] For all of Thomas Mann's brilliance, his description of Russia in *The Magic Mountain* is part of an inherited cultural legacy that reflects the first two kinds of Orientalism Said discusses and results in claims of intellectual authority over an ontologically different Other. In this case, the Other was an Asiatic Russia.[8] For it was that formidable foe that brought Castrop down the mountain and sent millions of Germans to what was characterized, during the opening days and weeks of World War I, as "Russia's War."

Admittedly, concepts such as "public sphere" or "public perception" are difficult to pin down. Thus the idea of creating a model of what the "public" or the "average German" thought is fraught with dangers.[9] Nevertheless, by identifying cultural constructs and their application in public discourse, it is possible to reconstruct how Russia was portrayed in the public sphere. Jürgen Habermas' ideas about the public sphere are useful for providing an understanding of how images are used for political purposes. Habermas' definition of the public sphere as a place where *private* persons' (people not involved with 'ruling' or the state) concerns and interests can challenge *public* (that is, having to do with the state) is useful;[10] however, the definition must be expanded to

[7]Nathaniel Knight, "Grigor'ev in Orenburg, 1851–1862: Russian Orientalism in the Service of Empire?" *Slavic Review* 59, no. 1 (2000), 81. Knight borrows the term from Francine Hirsch; see "The Soviet Union as a Work in Progress: Ethnographers and the Category *Nationality* in 1926, 1937, and 1939 Censuses," *Slavic Review* 56, no. 2 (1997). My use of the term is closer to Knight's.

[8]Russia was not the only "Asiatic other." German Orientalism, like its English and French counterparts that Said examined, also embraced the Middle East as an object of inquiry and mastery. For a discussion of this strain of German Orientalism, see Nina Berman, *Orientalismus, Kolonialismus und Moderne. Zum Bild des Orients in der deutschsprachigen Kultur um 1900* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1997); and Suzanne Marchand, "Orientalism as *Kulturpolitik*: German Archeology and Cultural Imperialism in Asia Minor," in *Volksgeist as Method and Ethic: Essays on Boasian Ethnography and the German Anthropological Tradition*, ed. George W. Stocking, Jr. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 298–336. In October 2004, Jennifer Jenkins organized a conference "Visions of the East: Orientalism and German National Culture" at the University of Toronto that focused on the Middle East. Jenkins also recently guest edited an issue of *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* (CSSAAME) on German Orientalism. See CSSAAME 24, no. 2 (2004).

[9]For a history of the understanding of the term "public opinion" in Germany, see Rüdiger vom Bruch, *Wissenschaft, Politik und öffentliche Meinung. Gelehrtenpolitik im Wilhelminischen Deutschland, 1890–1914* (Husum: Matthiesen, 1980) and Ernst Fraenkel, "Öffentliche Meinung in Deutschland," in *Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien*, 6th ed. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1974). Both Thomas Nipperdey and Hans-Ulrich Wehler concur that newspapers were a vital part of the exchange of ideas and the molding of opinion in Wilhelmine Germany. See Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1866–1918, Band 1: Arbeitswelt und Bürgergeist* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1990), 797–811, and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte Dritter Band 1849–1914* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1995), 1232–1249.

[10]See Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), especially part II, "Social Structures of the Public Sphere." Pierre Bourdieu maintains that cultural coding influences aesthetic judgments. That is, the evaluation of a work of art is more the product of cultural preferences, and is thus learned, than the result of an inherent value of the art itself. The notion of cultural valuation can be extended beyond the realm of aesthetic judgments to include all aspects of life that can come under scrutiny in the public sphere. This kind of valuation is both covert and overt and can apply varying degrees of pressure to conform. These cultural valuations form the base upon which

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include a cultural dimension that Habermas neglects. Discussion in the public sphere was not limited to politics or literary culture. Virtually every aspect of life found its way into the pages of German schoolbooks, journals, magazines, and newspapers. Although an argument certainly can be made about the commodification or commercialization of culture in the public sphere, that does not preclude the possibility of a simultaneous debate over values or cultural norms in which non-German peoples or cultures were discussed and measured. Russian policies and the image of Russia itself were used for domestic political purposes.

To understand the German perception of Russia, the depiction of Russia must be examined in light of the cultural values of Wilhelmine Germany. That is, one should investigate the framework within which the language is employed. The contention that Russia was considered in some circles to be an "Oriental" power is not a new one. Larry Wolff and Martin Malia have provided two thoughtful works exploring western European depictions of Russia, some of which included Russia as an Asiatic power.[11] Rather than focusing on the views of political and cultural elites, as Wolff and Malia do, this work attempts to determine the public image of Russia, including the views of non-elites, before the Great War. When discussing Russia (or anything else), German newspapers must use terms and employ ideas that its readership could understand. The framework for public understanding, including the intellectual framing of questions within the public sphere, is taught in schools. The educational system plays a key role in how people think about concepts (such as culture, science, and art), things (such as nation-states, political parties, and clothing) and actions (such as foreign and domestic policy, worker's movements, and various customs). In Wilhelmine Germany, the role of education in creating "good Germans" was a heatedly debated topic among both educators and politicians. Instruction in history and geography played a crucial role in the socialization process of children. During the Wilhelmine era, the number of hours devoted to history steadily increased with the hope that it could instill loyalty to Kaiser and country.[12]

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images and stereotypes of foreign cultures and peoples are built. See Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).

[11]See Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, and Martin Malia, *Russia under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

[12]The best place to start any exploration of the history of German education during this time period is Christa Berg, ed., *Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte. Band IV: 1870–1918, Von der Reichsgründung bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkriegs*, (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1991). On the politicization of German education as a means of social control, see Folkert Meyer, *Schule der Untertanen* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1977); Hartmut Titze, *Die Politisierung der Erziehung. Untersuchung über die soziale und politische Funktion der Erziehung von der Aufklärung bis zum Kapitalismus* (Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1973), and Christa Berg, *Die Okkupation der Schule* (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1973). For a dissenting view, see Kenneth Barkin, "Social Control and the Volksschule in Vormärz Prussia," *Central European History* 16,

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The Depiction of Russia in German Schoolbooks

Instruction in history taught children (ideally) how to think about their own country and, by extension, other nations. Regional and confessional differences ensured that German history was not taught in any uniform manner. The autonomy permitted to the various states in education ensured that each state could mold a curriculum that put the local authority in the most favorable light.[13] In Bavaria, for example, continuity with the medieval German Empire and the role of King Ludwig II in the creation of a united Germany were emphasized, as was the voluntary nature of the union.[14] Prussia, not surprisingly, focused on the role of the House of Hohenzollern in German unification.[15] In Braunschweig, on the other hand, history instruction usually began with Heinrich der Löwe and concentrated on the contributions of Braunschweig to German culture and history.[16]

In spite of the various starting points, all of the textbooks arrived at the conclusion that German unification was a *natural* process, the evolution from a *Kulturstaat* (cultural nation) to a *Nationalstaat* (nation-state). Thus, Bismarck's creation was an organic entity, the political expression of a common cultural yearning and an example of the proper form of historical development. The organic theory of the state influenced virtually every aspect of cultural and natural scientific study. Its pervasive character can be attributed in part to the widespread popularity of science and the attempt to legitimize disciplines by invoking the authority of science and the scientific method. The clearest manifestation of the influence and invocation of science is the popularization and widespread application of Charles Darwin's work. Popularizers of science like Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) believed that history and archeology were an

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no. 1 (1983); Thomas Nipperdey, "Mass education and modernization: the case of Germany 1780–1850," *Royal Historical Society Transactions*, 5th ser., 27 (1977), and Anthony La Vopa, *Prussian School Teachers: Profession and Office 1763–1948* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980). For works examining the link between politics and curriculum reform, see James Albisetti, *Secondary School Reform in Imperial Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) and *Schooling German Girls and Women: Secondary and Higher Education in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

[13]On the role of history in the creation of political consciousness, see Katharine D. Kennedy, "Regionalism and Nationalism in South German History Lessons, 1871–1914," *German Studies Review* 12, no. 1 (1989), 11–34, and Ernst Weymer, *Das Selbstverständnis der Deutschen. Ein Bericht über den Geist des Geschichtsunterrichts der höheren Schulen im 19. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: E. Klett, 1961).

[14]See Kennedy, "Regionalism and Nationalism."

[15]See Richard Kabisch, *Erziehender Geschichtsunterricht. Versuch einer preußisch-deutschen Staatsgeschichte für Volksschulen* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1912), and Emil Brockmann, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte für katholische höhere Mädchenschulen, Lehrerinnen-Bildungs-Anstalten und freie Fortbildungskurse.* 3. Teil: Geschichte des brandenburgisch-preußischen Staates und der Neuzeit seit dem Westfälischen Frieden, 2nd ed. (Münster: Schöningh, 1906).

[16]See F. Rehkur, *Lehrplan für die achtstufigen Bürgerschulen in Braunschweig* (Braunschweig: Appelhans & Co., 1914).

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extension of biology, and further proof of the unity of man and nature. Haeckel offered a corporatist vision of the state that lent itself to a hierarchical concept of state direction of the social organism.[17] Change was evolutionary in nature, not revolutionary. It had to come naturally, not by force, or it would disturb the equilibrium of society. This view of society rested upon the contention that the existing socio-political organization (i.e., the state) was the natural expression of the people that it governed. Implicit in this view was the notion that the proper evolution from a Kulturstaat to a Nationalstaat occurred within a relatively homogeneous group of people—the common criteria included a shared language, culture, history, land, and blood.[18] Within this *Weltanschauung*, Germany became the standard by which other nations were measured.[19]

Just how effective the educational system was in creating "good Germans"—citizens who believed that Bismarck's solution to the German question was the natural solution and were supportive of the House of Hohenzollern and its system of rule—is debatable. The growth of the Socialist party (SPD) and the development of an SPD/working-class subculture suggest that not all Germans shared the same view of the German *Reich*. Nevertheless, it is within schoolbooks that German children learned, probably for the first time, about Russia. The depiction of Russia, which can fairly be described as Orientalist, also served to reinforce support for the German government. For example, Julius Tischendorf's description of Moscow concluded with two demonstrations: The first was a religious procession; the second was a caravan of prisoners on their way to Siberia. The text explained that many of the

[17]Paul Weindling, *Health, Race, and German Politics between Unification and Nazism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 42, 47. See also Alfred Kelley, *The Descent of Darwin: The Popularization of Darwinism in Germany, 1860–1914* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1981).

[18]See Friedrich Meinecke, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, trans. R. B. Kimber (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

[19]The idea of the organic nation-state was a staple of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German historiography, sometimes referred to as the "Prussian School" of historiography. The Prussian School's interpretation of history was the result of the attempt to unite divergent tendencies within German society and to provide a history of Germany that would inspire loyalty to the state. In their attempt to do this, they created a strange union of liberal and conservative ideology. "In this Prussian-German development, the Prussian state took the role that the middle class (*Bürgertum*) played in Western Europe"—to the exclusion of foreign nations. See Bernd Faulenbach, "Die These vom deutschen Sonderweg und die Legitimation politischer Ordnung in Deutschland," *Geschichte als Legitimation? Internationale Schulbuchforschung unter den Ansprüchen von Politik, Geschichtswissenschaft und Geschichtsbedürfnis. Studien zur Internationalen Schulbuchforschung.* Schriftenreihe des Georg-Eckert-Institut, Bd. 39 (Braunschweig: Georg Eckert Institute für internationale Schulbuchforschung, 1984), 102. For an introduction to the extensive literature on this subject, see Georg Iggers, *The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present* (Wesleyan: Wesleyan University Press, 1983 revised edition), G. P. Gooch, *Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung im 19. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1964), and Thomas Kornbichler, *Deutsche Geschichtsschreibung im 19. Jahrhundert* (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1984).

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criminals were nihilists determined to overthrow the current state and would even, if necessary, murder the tsar, the "autocrat of all Russians." Tischendorf claimed that the tsar was insulated from the causes of civil discontent by a corrupt and self-serving bureaucracy. Fear for his personal safety prevented the tsar, in contrast to the German Kaiser, from going out and seeing the condition of his people for himself.[20] The Tischendorf passage is a good example of how schoolbooks could use a discussion of a foreign land to reinforce a positive representation of the German government.[21]

The textbooks that various states used may have focused on different aspects of German history, but their depiction of Russian history was remarkably uniform throughout the Reich.[22] Peter the Great was the starting point for any discussion of Russia in German history schoolbooks. Some books mentioned Ivan the Terrible in passing, but only in order to note his cruelty. The depiction of Peter's reign was revealing. As the first mention of Russia in history textbooks, it established the paradigm that would inform subsequent schoolbook commentaries on nineteenth- and twentieth-century Russian history. Issues such as Russian expansion and barbarism, and stereotypes depicting Russia as more Asiatic than European, were introduced in the sections devoted to the tsar who tried, unsuccessfully, to westernize his people. A. W. Grube's *Character Sketches from History and Myth for History Instruction* stated flatly, "Before Peter's glorious reign, the wild Russians belonged to the Asiatic peoples."[23]

Peter's goal, as noted in another textbook, was "to direct Russia on a new political and cultural course; from an eastern-oriented, half-Oriental power to the status of a European power."[24] But Peter himself had not grasped the nature of western culture and, consequently, his world remained "a confusion of European form and Asiatic practice."[25] The tsar himself was also treated critically. In a text written for a Catholic girls' school, the author interjected, "As hard as he sought to link his country to Occidental culture, he still remained a passionate,

[20]Julius Tischendorf, *Präparationen für den geographischen Unterricht an Volksschulen*, Teil IV: Die Länder Europa, 19th ed. (Leipzig: Wunderlich, 1908), 272–273.

[21]Hans-Dietrich Schultz argues that German geographers thought that their discipline could play a crucial role in instilling a love of Fatherland. See Hans-Dietrich Schultz, "'Geographische Bildung schafft politische Geltung.' Bezugspunkte, Ansprüche und Ziele der Schulgeographie im 19./20. Jahrhundert," *Berliner Geographische Arbeiten* 90 (1990), 182–212.

[22]For a more detailed analysis of the depiction of Russia in German history and geography books, see Troy R. E. Paddock, "Plenty of barbarians, but no bird's milk: The depiction of Russia in German school books, 1890–1914," in *Internationale Schulbuchforschung* 20, no. 1 (1998), 35–50.

[23]August W. Grube, ed., *Characterbild aus der Geschichte und Sage für einen propädeutischen Geschichtsunterricht*, 3. Teil: Die Neue Zeit bis zur Gegenwart, 34th ed. (Leipzig: Brandstetter, 1906), 247.

[24]Gottlob Egelhaaf, *Grundzüge der Geschichte*, 3. Teil: Die Neuzeit, 3rd ed. (Leipzig: Reisland, 1893), 151. The same quote appears in the seventh edition (Leipzig: Reisland, 1906) on the same page.

[25]Ibid.

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pleasure-seeking, and impetuous ruler."[26] Or as another summed it up, Peter the Great was "a child of his people."[27]

References to Peter I as a "passionate, pleasure-seeking, and impetuous ruler" and a "child of his people" signified him as "Asiatic." Peter I was labeled an "Oriental despot," ruling over an "Oriental or half-Oriental state." The source of this assessment lay neither in the fact that the Russian Empire spread across the Asian continent nor in that there were people of Asian descent living inside Russia; it lay in the nature of Russian culture and the Russian state. Both were deemed to have been left out of the Occidental tradition. The Russian Orthodox Church willfully kept its adherents ignorant in order to create docile followers, and brutally attacked those who were not of the same faith. Adding to the repression, the Russian state used brute force not only to expand and acquire more land, but also to suppress the myriad peoples it ruled over. Such a conglomeration of peoples could not form an organic nation. Moreover, such a creation could only be ruled in the fashion of an Oriental despot. This evaluation was mirrored in the German press.

The 1905 Revolution in the German Press

The 1905 Russian Revolution is a good opportunity to study the depiction of Russia in the German press. It is one of the rare times that Russia was a topic of interest across the entire spectrum of the German press. The revolution challenged both the monarchical principle and the position, as well as the safety, of Baltic Germans. Newspapers reinforced the German school lessons about Russia and Russian foreign policy. The Empire of the Slavs was an Asiatic, autocratic, bureaucratic, barbaric, backward, repressive, land-hungry regime. The nine newspapers examined span the political spectrum from the conservative mouthpiece of the *Junkers*, the *Neue Preussische* (*Kreuz-*)*Zeitung*, to the organ for the radical wing of the Social Democratic Party, the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*.[28] The writers for these papers seldom agreed on any aspect of German domestic policy, yet their respective analyses of Russia were remarkably similar and characterized by a certain ambivalence that reflected an attitude vacillating between static and simple, or dynamic and complex. The stasis lay in the fundamental image of a Russia that had been left out of the stream of development that carried along western Europe. Both the Russian state and the Russian

[26]Brockmann, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte für katholische höhere Mädchenschulen*, 83.

[27]W. Martens, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte für die oberen Klassen höherer Lehranstalten*, 3. Teil: Lehrstoff der Oberprima, 3rd ed. (Hannover: Manz & Lange, 1905), 72.

[28]The following newspapers were examined for this article: *Leipziger Volkszeitung, Vorwärts, Berliner Tageblatt, Frankfurter Zeitung, Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, Kölnische Zeitung, Kölnische Volkszeitung, Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, and the *Neue Preussische Zeitung*. The *Neue Preussiche Zeitung* was uniformly referred to as the *Kreuzzeitung* in reference to the Iron Cross that adorned its banner. Unless otherwise noted, all newspaper articles are on the front page.

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people were depicted with the ahistorical terms used to describe a people with a past but not a history. In 1904, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* noted that the good and bad qualities in the Russian people had not changed in a hundred years.[29] This stasis, intrinsic to the autocratic and bureaucratic nature of the tsarist government, accounted for Russia's lack of economic development.

> If a west or east wind blew, it would work in one or the other direction. If the west wind blows, one feels the need of learning, looks towards Europe, attempts to adapt their own situation to the European, and create an imitation of the latter . . . should, conversely, the wind shift, blasting deep from the east, the seat of the old Muscovite tsarist traditions, in the circles of the government, then the call will echo: The salvation of the empire lay solely in the autocratic Kaiser, the Orthodox Church, and the peasant collective property. Then one is zealously occupied with removing everything that had been created in the previous government.[30]

More often than not, the wind came from the east, and the government was depicted in conservative or reactionary terms. The poor treatment of the underclass by the regime and the repressive measures taken by the Orthodox church were considered givens in Russian life.

The backward, or at least non-western nature, of Russia and its government was not always to its detriment. For the German press, the dynamic aspect of Russia was due to its foreign expansion—or more precisely, its conquests and future intentions. Russia's expansion across Asia, its tremendous size and population, and its almost inexhaustible natural resources made it a force that could not be taken lightly. The Russo-Japanese War and subsequent revolution thrust Russia into the world spotlight. Before that time, Russia did not occupy the attention of the German press to the extent that Germany's western neighbors did. Russia usually became a topic of interest in newspapers when Russian actions conflicted with the interests of a particular newspaper. For example, two of the leading Catholic voices in the German press, the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* and the *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten*, periodically reported the plight of Catholic Poles in Russia, and both the *Berliner Tageblatt* and *Frankfurter Zeitung*, two leading liberal newspapers, noted the poor treatment of Jews in Russia. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* suggested that if Russia were to lift all the legal restrictions on Jews, it would be a tremendous benefit to Russia: "The blessing for Russia would be enormous, because the Jews as a cerebral people and members of an ancient cultural race would bring to Russia exactly the material that it lacks, an intelligent, culturally talented middle class."[31]

[29] *Frankfurter Zeitung*, August 7, 1904 (hereafter cited as *FZ*).

[30] *Kreuzzeitung*, July 13, 1905 (hereafter cited as *Kr*).

[31] *FZ*, July 24, 1904. Not all German papers shared this positive assessment of Jews in Russia. The *Kreuzzeitung* agreed that many Jews had it hard in Russia, but that it was not simply a matter of religion. One must distinguish between rich and poor Jews in Russia. For poor Jews in Russia, life was not easy; but, the conservative paper pointed out, did anyone think it was any easier for

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The socialist daily *Vorwärts* gleefully noted that the "Admiral of the Pacific Ocean"—as Wilhelm II had once named his cousin Nicholas II—had lost his Admiralty. The defeat at Port Arthur was more than a military setback. It was a repudiation of Russia:

> The Official Russia that was defeated at Port Arthur rejected the Reformation, the French Revolution, and the scientific thought of the West. The Yellow Asians will deliver the vanquished whites from their Asiatic spirit and lead them back to Europe ... In the fifty years since Sevastopol, it [Russia] had learned nothing, but indeed unlearned some things.[32]

The rejection of Occidental culture and the embrace of its "Asiatic spirit" was the cause of Russia's defeat. Instead of the spiritual, political, and intellectual progress represented by the Reformation and French and Scientific Revolutions, Russia remained tied to superstition, autocracy, and an ignorance associated with the East. The socialist daily hoped that Japan, which adopted western methods during the Meiji Restoration, would be able to lead Russia away from its Asiatic nature and toward a European path of progress. The hope did not appear to be an unreasonable one. Russia's military defeat and the increasing domestic hardships brought on by the war and a corrupt bureaucracy provided the catalyst for the 1905 Revolution.

The unfolding of this revolution reached the German political press through the wire services. Even the *Berliner Tageblatt* and *Frankfurter Zeitung*, both of which had correspondents in Russia, could not keep up with the pace of events as the revolution spread from St. Petersburg and Moscow to other major cities (e.g., Kiev and Warsaw), the border provinces, and central Russia. This resulted in vague and often conflicting reports of stunning victories or brutal repression that had to be modified daily as more information became known. Most of the day-to-day accounts of the revolution consisted of brief wire reports noting the location of the unrest, the constituency of the protesting or rioting group (farmers, workers, or students), and the response of the local government. These reports usually ended with the time that peace (*Ruhe*) was restored. Occasionally, the newspapers provided a background story on a particular situation or group. The majority of the attention focused on the activity

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poor Christians? For wealthy Jews in Russia, not only were things not bad, they were as good as possible. For example, in Odessa, Jews owned ninety percent of the homes, and thus the Christians were quite dependent on them. The anti-Jewish feeling that existed in Odessa was the result of the fact that Jews controlled the town administration and acted the role of the hard "Shylock." See *Kreuzzeitung*, June 2, 1903. Regardless of their view of the situation of Jews in Russia, both considered Jews to be a separate group of people from the Russians. For a fuller discussion of the view of Eastern European Jews, see Steven Aschheim, *Brothers and Strangers: The East European Jews in German and German-Jewish Consciousness, 1800–1923* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982).

[32] *Vorwärts*, January 5, 1905.

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in Moscow and St. Petersburg and especially on elections and the activity of the Duma.

The events on what was called "Bloody Sunday" marked the beginning of the revolution for the German press.[33] Reaction to the events of "Bloody Sunday" varied significantly from newspaper to newspaper.[34] The socialist newspapers immediately announced the beginning of the revolution. "That is the Revolution!" was the lead story line in the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*.[35] *Vorwärts* cried that the honor of humanity had been soiled by the deed in Petersburg:

> Tsarism has achieved a victory over its people . . . The snow on the frozen streets of St. Petersburg was reddened with the blood of women and children, and the soldiers who had suffered only defeat in the Far East may celebrate in the smoke, a feast of victory.[36]

The victims of this tragedy were not social democrats or other radicals, but Christians and devout followers of the tsar. How much longer could the tsar last when his soldiers were forced to such deeds of brutality?[37]

Conservative and government papers were not so quick to sound the death knell of Russian autocracy. The *Kölnische Zeitung*, the government mouthpiece for foreign policy, did not condemn the Russian government's actions. Instead, it noted that the government had shown its willingness to use the "fist" to maintain peace. Furthermore, there would be no barricades in the streets, because such efforts would be pointless.[38] Agreeing with its socialist counterparts, the Rhenish daily admitted that the majority of the workers in St. Petersburg on that Sunday were not revolutionaries; however, the bloody action of the government against innocent people had created a terrible hatred of the regime by the people.[39]

[33]"Bloody Sunday" is a reference to the events of January 22, 1905. A large group of workers, led by Father Gapon, marched to the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg, where they were met, according to various reports, by the palace guard, the military, and Cossacks.

[34]Early reports were often contradictory and every newspaper admitted that exactly what happened was not yet clear and that the wire service was their only source of information. The non-Russian wire reports estimated the casualties anywhere from seventy-six to 2,000 dead and 233 to 5,000 wounded. The low estimate came from the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, and the high came from *Vorwärts*. The Continental Telegraph Bureau estimated that there were at least 2,000 dead and 4,000 wounded. The official depiction of events from the Russian government, carried in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, claimed that no clash between military and workers occurred and that the military had no cause to use their weapons. An insignificant group stopped their work and went to St. Petersburg and left shortly afterward. See *FZ*, January 23, 1905; *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten*, January 24, 1905 (hereafter cited as *MNN*); and *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 25, 1905 (hereafter cited as *NAZ*). *Vorwärts* often used the Lassen Bureau for reports on the Russian Revolution, but whether the estimate of 2,000 dead and 5,000 wounded comes from Lassen is not clear.

[35]*Leipziger Volkszeitung*, January 23, 1905 (hereafter cited as *LV*).

[36]*Vorwärts*, January 24, 1905.

[37]Ibid.

[38]*Kölnische Zeitung*, January 26, 1905 (hereafter cited as *KZ*).

[39]Ibid.

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Although "Bloody Sunday" elicited various responses in the newspapers, none were taken by surprise by the unrest. The theme of popular discontent and unrest had already been noted in all factions of the German political press. The imminent revolt of the masses had long been a theme in the socialist press. *Vorwärts* claimed:

> Under the Russian ice palace, the breaking floes crack. And while the grapeshots signal the day of bloody consecration (*Blutweihe*) in the hall of the tsar, the mass awakens below, as out of a long spell, passionate, exotic, with a mystical trace, to a movement the like of which is not known in Russia, is not possible in cultural nations.[40]

The hope that Japan would be able to deliver Russia from its Asiatic spirit toward European ideals appeared to be realized. The rhetoric *Vorwärts* employed reflected an Orientalist perspective. The so-called Asiatic spirit included traits that suggested sensuality, magic, and the exotic "Other." The socialist daily hoped that an Asiatic Russia could be reborn or regenerated through reform, which meant adopting the Western institutions and practices that it had previously rejected. If Japan was able to shed Asiatic bonds, then Russia could as well. Implicit in this description is the inferiority of both the Orient in general and Russia in particular. Its inferiority lay in its "otherness"—that is, in the ways that it was not like Germany and the West. Just as Edward William Lane or Ernest Renan could master Said's Orient (the Levant) without letting its actors speak, writers for *Vorwärts* and other German newspapers felt perfectly at ease in analyzing the ills of their Orient (Russia) without the burden of firsthand experience or knowledge.

National liberal papers like the *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten* also noted that Russia was now fighting two enemies, a foreign one and a domestic one. The *Kölnische Zeitung*, which in the interest of good relations remained supportive of the Russian government, acknowledged that the war with Japan had no popular support and that a rising tide of resentment was occurring inside Russia.[41] Nevertheless, the Rhenish daily felt that the government would survive:

> We have repeatedly expressed our conviction that the Russian empire is still solid and flexible and can resist the assault of the revolutionary parties and improve the social condition of the fighting workers.[42]

Nicholas II and Russian absolutism might not yet break, but it was going to have to bend a little if it wanted to hold onto power.

[40] *Vorwärts*, January 22, 1905.
[41] *KZ*, January 21, 1905.
[42] Ibid.

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Nicholas II's December 1904 decree was a sign that even the autocratic regime of Russia was not entirely immune to popular sentiment. The decree announced the introduction of a variety of fundamental reforms—including freedom of speech, press, belief, and assembly, as well as local government restructuring—into the Russian Empire. A copy of the decree was published in most of the German political press.[43]

The reaction of the press varied from the enthusiastic reception of the *Kölnische Zeitung* to an unimpressed *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten*. The German government's foreign policy mouthpiece greeted the decree as a welcome step forward toward much needed reforms. The tsar had not granted a constitution, but that was not important. The statement, "a good administration is worth more than a constitution," held true for Russia.[44] Now the tsar was going to address the grievances of the people and try to curb the power and abuses of the bureaucracy.

The *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten* was unaffected by the announcement. "Russia remains an autocracy," remarked the Bavarian daily.[45] If the Manifesto had been voluntary, perhaps it would have been possible to believe in reform; but, instead of giving the people what they wanted, the tsar gave the people "poor alms."[46] The liberal papers were more cautious in their praise and condemnation of the attempted reforms in Russia. These papers noted that this was not the first time in Russian history that the tsar had attempted to reform the government. The crucial test would be if and how the tsar could overcome the entrenched power of the bureaucracy. The Russian bureaucracy, dismissed as inefficient and corrupt by the German press before the revolution, received a large part of the blame for the current situation in Russia. One way to relay the condition of the Russian bureaucracy to the German public was to compare it to the German bureaucracy.

The *Kreuzzeitung* declared that the rule of the Russian bureaucracy could never be compared to the old Prussian bureaucracy. Thanks to the work of a string of outstanding rulers who honored the law, the Prussian bureaucracy did the same.[47] There were laws in Russia, but in the last twenty-five years, their value to the authorities had diminished. This lack of respect for the law on the part of the bureaucrats was not lost on the Russian population. The *Kölnische Zeitung* claimed that the peasants, who made up just over seventy-seven percent of Russia's population, loved the tsar and the church, but hated the bureaucracy.[48] The Russian people responded in the same

[43]For example, see *NAZ*, December 28, 1904, or *MNN*, December 28, 1904.
[44]*KZ*, December 27, 1904.
[45]*MNN*, December 28, 1904.
[46]Ibid.
[47]*Kr*, April 29, 1905.
[48]*KZ*, August 20, 1905. The bureaucracy's resistance to change was the subject of a previous article. See *KZ*, June 5, 1905.

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manner in which they were treated, with force. In an article about the assassination of Graf Schumalov, who was "no better or worse than the typical Russian administrator," the *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten* observed that in most nations, citizens were protected from arbitrary acts by public officials, but not in Russia. "It is different in Russia, where it is difficult, indeed often impossible, to oppose with legal means the discretion of a high official."[49]

The Russian bureaucracy may not have been comparable to its Prussian counterpart, but that did not mean that Russia could not learn from the German model, as it had in the past:

> The Great Russian race has many sympathetic traits, but up to now, it has not proven in either war or peace to have a talent for organization and preparation, in spite of a rich opportunity that for a long time has been given to no other people in the same measure. What was in the post-Petrine Russian *Staatsordnung* was not Russian work, but originated from the "foreign races," especially the Germans, while the trait of merciless harshness and base arbitrariness, that unfortunately only too often was peculiar to the Russian bureaucracy, indeed rested on the tradition of ancient Moscow, that for its part had again come into its legacy from the Tartars of the Golden Horde.[50]

Any lasting reform in Russia would have to break the hold of Russia's Asiatic legacy.

The reaction to the tsar's announcement of the creation of a Duma was met with the same skeptical response. Both conservative and socialist newspapers noted that the newly announced Duma had absolutely no legislative power and that its function was purely advisory. A *Kreuzzeitung* contributor claimed that those who knew Russia realized that the tsar's words were an attempt to placate the masses without real reforms.[51] The socialist press concurred with the *Kreuzzeitung*'s assessment of the situation. Both newspapers considered the new "constitution" to be a joke, a parody of a constitution.[52] *Vorwärts* noted that after granting Russia a constitution on August 19, 1905, the tsar claimed that the reforms were now completed—an opinion not shared by the writer in *Vorwärts*: "This supposed constitutional outline is a grotesque joke by the tsar, a bloody mockery of Russia."[53] According to the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*,

[49] *MNN*, July 13, 1905. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* noted that Russia's lack of regard for western law extended to international law where Russia refused to ensure the safety and property of foreigners. See *FZ*, November 27, 1906.
[50] *Kr*, July 5, 1807.
[51] *Kr*, January 26, 1905.
[52] See *Vorwärts*, August 20, 1905, and *LV*, August 31, 1905.
[53] *Vorwärts*, August 20, 1905.

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this was nothing more than "*Scheinkonstitutionalismus*"[54]—a position it maintained seventeen months later.[55]

The tsar's declaration that reforms were completed effectively closed the door on further reform. It also demonstrated the tsar's conviction that any reforms that might occur were to be conferred by the tsar, and not through the Duma. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* provided a typical example of the tsar's view of reform. The newspaper reported the police closing of a meeting of trade clerks (*Handelsgehilfen*) who were legally debating the terms of working conditions (the length of the workday and sick leave) for the next work contract with the government. The paper stated that the government wished to complete the negotiations in good patriarchal fashion and that it was no concern of the clerks, who "should welcome every provision as a gift of grace (*Gnadengeschenk*)."[56] The article closed with the sarcastic observation, "Russia was once again saved."[57] The Orient's reluctance, or inability, to employ democratic institutions or to enact basic individual rights and liberties was re-emphasized.

The lack of optimism regarding the chances for reform in Russia was uniform throughout the press. The possibility of instituting a more western-style government was unlikely because of the "Asiatic" nature of the Russian nation-state. How this Asiatic nature manifested itself varied from newspaper to newspaper. Regardless of domestic agendas, the German newspapers' critiques of Russia are informative because of the shared assumptions regarding the nature of Russia and of the nation-state in general. Across the spectrum of the German political press, it was agreed that the key to Russia's difficulties lay in its "Asiatic" nature and that this nature hindered the development of the Russian nation-state. Focusing on the state half of the nation-state formula, socialist newspapers denounced Russian autocracy and maintained that any government that relied on repression could not claim to be a natural or organic development. Socialist criticism focused on the Asiatic nature of the Russian state. The autocratic tsar ruled as an "Oriental despot," expanding as far as his forces could take him and brooking no opposition to his will. As long as he maintained this position, reform was impossible.

The *Kreuzzeitung* faced the tricky task of criticizing the flaws within the Russian government without discrediting the monarchical principle. To accomplish this, the conservative paper pointed to the Asiatic nature of Russian culture. Any improvements within Russia were the result of imported ideas and methods (usually German). If the imports had less than perfect results (e.g., the corruption in Russia's bureaucracy), the fault lay not in the import,

[54]*LV*, August 31, 1905. *Vorwärts* also noted that the Duma could speak and resolve, but not make any decisions; the tsar retained all the power. See *Vorwärts*, April 25, 1906.
[55]*LV*, November 1, 1907.
[56]*FZ*, July 25, 1913.
[57]Ibid.

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but in its application. An Asiatic people was not capable of operating within an Occidental government structure. Therefore, it concluded that Russia's problems were not the result of the political system, but the product of Russia's "Asiatic" legacy. The *Kreuzzeitung* and like-minded conservative newspapers emphasized the nation side of the formula and affirmed that any problems the state might have were due to the nature of a Russian culture that was incapable of incorporating foreign ideas into its system of government.[58]

Baltic Germans and the Revolution

For the German press, the 1905 Revolution was not just an interesting political spectacle. It profoundly affected the Baltic provinces and the Germans living there, and events were followed with great interest. The *Kreuzzeitung* continually defended traditional German privileges and institutions during the 1890s and early part of the 1900s on the grounds of tradition and effectiveness. Both the agricultural and industrial sectors of the Baltic lands were more productive than their counterparts in other regions of the Russian Empire.[59] While the Baltic Provinces may have been prosperous and advanced economically, they were backward in other respects, especially in the area of legal reform. Nevertheless, the Baltic nobility defended its traditional rights and was able to stave off reform for a decade or so longer than other regions within the Russian Empire.[60] Up until the revolution, Baltic Germans attempted to use the issue of Russification as a means to convince the Baltic natives, many of whom were Lutheran, to side with them against the government; however, sensing an opportunity to break the rule of the German nobility, Estonian and Latvian peasants and workers often converted to Orthodoxy not out of conviction, but in the hope of finding a sympathetic ear for their nationalist aspirations. As it became clearer that the Russian government and its bureaucracy were even less sympathetic to the nationalist aspirations of the natives than the Germans, the indigenous population became more radical. The 1905 Revolution provided Baltic natives an opportunity to demand greater freedom from Russian centralization.

The concern here centered not only on the traditional privileges of the Baltic Germans, but also on the very order of the state. The Baltic Germans received

[58]The conservative papers were not the only ones to fall on the nation side of the nation-state formula. The liberal *Frankfurter Zeitung* criticized Russia as both a nation and a state, but ultimately concluded that the flaws in the Russian state were the product of the cultural backwardness of an Asiatic nation.

[59]An article by Otto Leonhardt in *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten* made a similar noting that much of the progress in the Baltic was the product of German efforts. See *MNN*, November 28, 1905.

[60]For a good brief overview of Russian attempts at reform in the Baltic and German responses, see Edward Thaden, ed., *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855–1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), especially pp. 54–75 and 150–183.

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special attention because they were brethren, but the anti-state intentions of the radical revolutionaries alarmed German conservatives. The *Kreuzzeitung* noted that because of the conditions in Russia, the goals of the socialists were not impossible to attain.[61] Conservatives in Germany watched the activities in Russia with great concern. Russia had not been considered a stronghold of social democracy before the revolution. The early apparent success of the radical elements of the revolution caused more than a little consternation in conservative circles in Germany.

The conservative depiction of the plight of the Baltic Germans since the advent of Russification was put in the spotlight and challenged by the socialist press. The socialist press felt that the nobility and urban bourgeoisie were paying the price for establishing social, political, and economic institutions that systematically exploited the non-German inhabitants. *Vorwärts* noted:

> Although both small peoples, the Estonians and Letts, inhabit the provinces, they are still not the real owners of their land; they still do not have the same rights as other inhabitants, but instead are the slaves of the German Junkers, German bourgeoisie, and the Russian bureaucracy.[62]

The Baltic proletariat thus fought both the German nobility and bourgeoisie and the Russian bureaucracy.[63]

The plight of the Baltic Germans put the Russian revolution in an alarming light. Accounts, some of which were surely exaggerated to enhance the dramatic effect, of the intense hatred of the Baltic Germans and the plundering of their estates, created a concrete image of the consequences of anti-German sentiments in the Baltic. These sentiments had been fueled, according to the *Kreuzzeitung*, by the pan-Slavists' intense hatred of Germans. When Russia began to assert itself once again in the Balkans, the *Kreuzzeitung* sounded the alarm of a pan-Slavist plot against Germany and could point to the events in the Baltic as evidence of what could happen when anti-German sentiments were inflamed by pan-Slavist propaganda. Regardless of political perspective, other newspapers shared the belief of Russia's intentions. Moreover, the papers could trace this belief to Russia's internal condition.

Although the socialist papers differed greatly from their conservative counterparts on the revolution in Russia, their discussion of Russia during the Russo-Japanese War and the subsequent revolution revealed significant shared assumptions. In their discussion of Russia, the socialist papers treated Russia as an Asian nation, not a European one. Accompanying that assumption was a list of characteristics that were attributed to "Asiatics." In the words of the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*: "Asia was the seat of barbarism. From Asia broke through

[61]Ibid.
[62]*Vorwärts*, September 15, 1905. See also *LV*, July 11, 1906.
[63]Ibid.

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the hordes of Huns, the Arabs, the Tartars, the Turks, who launched rapacious attacks on Occidental culture" . . . [64] Russia was "in a state of Asiatic barbarism" that threatened European cultural development.[65] Those who defended Western values and culture were persecuted in Russia as threats to the state.

The socialist and conservative critiques represented two ends of the spectrum and their respective analyses were influenced by their own domestic positions. Conservatives could be critical of Russian policies that conflicted with their interests without challenging the monarchical principle. Implicit in the socialist criticism is a reproach of German absolutism. In a thinly veiled jab at its own government, *Vorwärts* noted in an article reporting the three-hundredth anniversary of the Romanov Dynasty that Russian absolutism, like many of its other governmental institutions, was imported. The basis of Russian absolutism lay not with Michael Romanov, but rather with Catherine the Great, a German princess. [66] Socialist criticism of the government often focused on the contention that the Reich was not an organic entity in the political sense. An organic political entity would not have a three-tiered voting system designed heavily to favor the upper class, rather it would have a more democratic form of government that represented all Germans equally, including the working class.

What is noteworthy is that both socialists and conservatives agreed that the organic model of the nation-state was the ideal, and their respective criticisms of Russia reflected its distance from that ideal. But while conservatives maintained that Germany represented the standard by which all other nations should be measured, socialists felt that their own country did not fulfill the ideal, either. Another important distinction was that the conservative position did not allow for the possibility of Russia achieving the status of a western state because an Asiatic culture could not simply adopt and implement Occidental advances. Russia was destined to remain an Asiatic state—as the schoolbook noted, a confusion of European form and Asiatic practice.[67] Socialists, however, maintained that reform was possible and Russia could overcome its Asiatic traits, which were the product of cultural institutions, not biology. Both views assumed a position of authority in this evaluation of Russia. The alleged superiority of the Occident over the Orient allowed Germans to penetrate the chaos surrounding the 1905 Revolution and ascertain exactly what was wrong with Russia. Germans assumed the same position of pre-eminence that was more ontological in nature than empirical. Without necessarily having any first-hand experience, German newspapers represented a position that assumed

[64] *LV,* April 22, 1905.
[65] Ibid.
[66] See *Vorwärts*, March 6, 1913.
[67] The idea that certain peoples were fated to second-class status was not the sole purview of Germany. It served as a justification for European imperialism in Africa and played a role in German attempts to legitimize territorial claims in eastern Europe during both world wars.

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by definition the superiority of Germany over Russia. This position of intellectual authority was reiterated in the writings of German academics.

Two Academic Views of Russia: Theodor Schiemann and Max Weber

The loudest and most consistent anti-Russian voice in Germany belonged to Theodor Schiemann, a Baltic native who was forced to leave his homeland in 1887, a victim of Russification.[68] The following year, Schiemann acquired a position in the War Academy in Berlin that put him in contact with numerous members of the German General Staff, including General Field Marshalls Alfred Graf von Waldersee and Alfred von Schlieffen (two Chiefs of the German General Staff), Gen. Kurt Freiherr von Manteufel (Director of the *Kriegsakademie*), Gen. Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven, and Gen. Friedrich von Bernhardi. Later, Heinrich von Treitschke helped Schiemann gain a position at the University of Berlin. Schiemann, who would also hold the first chair in Russian history in all of western Europe, solidified his academic reputation with a four-volume study entitled *The History of Russia under Tsar Nicholas I*.[69] Schiemann could count fellow Baltic émigré and Russophobe Paul Rohrbach among his students.

Schiemann also had an active career as a journalist. As a columnist for the *Kreuzzeitung*, Schiemann would write approximately one thousand articles over a twenty-year period before the war. During the five years before the war, he was the most widely read political publicist in Berlin.[70] One of Schiemann's major themes was confrontation with Russia. He was convinced that pan-Slavism was the program of the future in Russia, a program that included the destruction of Germandom. This future conflict between the Germans and Slavs, he maintained, would naturally be decided in the former's favor. For the latter were neither physically nor spiritually the Germans' equal. In fact, he believed that Russia was quite literally a sick entity. According to

[68]On the role of Baltic émigrés and anti-Russian attitudes, see Loren Campion, *Behind the Modern Drang nach Osten: Baltic Émigrés and Russophobia in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Ph.D. diss., Indiana Univ., 1966).

[69]Theodor Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1904–1919). The four volumes are actually a study of Russia in the first half of the nineteenth century. The first volume, *Kaiser Alexander I und die Ergebnisse seiner Lebensarbeit* (1904), does not even reach Nicholas' reign. Schiemann's work was received with praise in the German press for its use of previously closed sources and for its timeliness (in explaining the long-term causes for the current domestic situation in Russia). As stated in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, "This gap would only be filled by the engaging work of one of the most knowledgeable people of Russia's situation and Russian history, the Berlin professor for East European History, Theodor Schiemann." *NAZ*, January 4, 1905. Because Schiemann's *Geschichte* did not cover Russian history in the Wilhelmine era, the focus in this article will be on his journalistic activities with only passing references to his academic work.

[70]Klaus Meyer, *Theodor Schiemann als politischer Publizist* (Frankfurt a.M.: Rütten & Loening, 1956), 9.

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Schiemann, Russia's spiritual weakness was due to "a thoroughly unhealthy inner state structure, burdened by a sick rotten administration, held together only by an absolute tsarist regime."[71] Schiemann insisted that a strong and healthy state was impossible as long as the national ideal remained unfulfilled. Reiterating a cornerstone of nineteenth-century German historical thought, Schiemann affirmed, "State and nation must grow together organically. The unification of Germany under Prussian leadership shows that we must work with our inner resources of power to achieve greatness."[72] By definition, the multinational Russian Empire did not meet this requirement. The spiritual and physical weakness that Schiemann ascribed to Russia was due to the latter's Asiatic nature and disregard for Western institutions.

One of the institutions that the Baltic native cherished most was the state. The emphasis that Schiemann puts on the state and its connection to culture were illustrated by this remark about Tolstoy:

> Tolstoy has set himself completely outside reality, not just of the Russian, but of human concerns in general, and therefore has had a destructive and dissolving effect. He negates the state as such and as a result of his *Weltanschauung*, comes to the negation of all culture.[73]

For Schiemann, the fact that Russia could produce a Tolstoy and honor him—who calls for the destruction of the state—was further proof that Russia, as a state and nation, had not developed properly.[74] Without doubt, Schiemann's quoting of the head (Obrist) of the Russian cavalry, Prince Bagration, is in part to show the consequences of an improper relationship between government and society:

> With each passing year, the Russian Army becomes physically less fit . . . one cannot expect healthy progeny from badly nourished and poorly functioning peasants who eat too little and drink too much. While our parliament and intelligentsia occupy themselves with trivialities, one does not notice that

[71]Ibid., 107.

[72]Theodor Schiemann, *Deutschland und die große Politik, 1908* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1909), 88 (henceforth *DGP* and year). *Deutschland und die große Politik* was the annual compilation of Schiemann's weekly articles for the *Kreuzzeitung*.

[73]Schiemann, *DGP 1903*, 111.

[74]This is not new ground for Schiemann, who wrote the previous year, "Bei uns, wo schwerlich jemand darauf ausgehen wird, sich nach ihren Forderungen das Leben einzurichten, werden sie mehr als literarische denn als politische Kundgebungen aufgenommen. In Rußland ist die Wirkung genau die umgekehrte. Man saugt aus ihnen den Haß gegen den Staat, als den gottwidrigen Urheber alles Bösen und verbindet das mit den trostlosen Sitten, welche die Koryphäen der russischen Literatur von Dostojewski bis zu Maxim Gorki anzumalen lieben. Man wird in dieser ganzen Literatur keine einzige Gestalt finden, an der ein junges Menschenherz sich erbauen und erheben könnte. Im Grunde ist es eine Galerie fertiger oder unfertiger, überführter oder ungestraft durch die Ungerechtigkeit dieses Lebens schreitender Verbrecher. Und diesen Maxim Gorki hat man dieser Tage zum Mitgliede der Petersberger Akademie gemacht!!" Schiemann, *DGP 1902*, 111.

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> something dreadful is imminent: the degeneration of our race, its physical transformation to a lower type.[75]

Schiemann's voice carried great influence within the German government on matters concerning Russia. In fact, in certain circles, he bore the moniker "*Russlandkenner*," or "Russian expert," and enjoyed the confidence of Wilhelm II himself. General Freytag-Loringhoven later maintained that his friend and compatriot was "the individual chiefly responsible for having encouraged and perfected the Reich's fateful underestimation of Russia before 1914."[76]

Not all voices within academia were so hostile to Russia. Max Weber was far more sympathetic to Russia, but still spoke with that same voice of authority. The events of 1905 so stirred Weber's interest that he taught himself Russian in a matter of months in order to read Russian language newspapers and follow events more closely. The results were two lengthy essays that appeared in 1906, "On the Condition of Bourgeois Democracy in Russia" and "Russia's Transition to Pseudo-Constitutionalism."[77] While interested in and sympathetic to the cause of reform in Russia, Weber did not consider Russia to be part of Europe or to have participated in the historical development of the West. When asking, what was historical in Russia?, Weber answered, "simply nothing."[78] The rule of the Tatars and tsars led to "a crumbling of each and every 'organic' structure."[79] In its place stood a caesaropapist regime that used the church as an instrument of power and relied on the bureaucracy to maintain control. To reform both the church and the state would require the liberation of

[75]Schiemann, *DGP 1909*, 360–1.

[76]Campion, *Drang nach Osten*, 414.

[77]Both "Zur Lage der bürgerlichen Demokratie in Rußland" and "Rußlands Übergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalismus" can be found in *Max Weber, Gesamtausgabe. Bd. I/10: Zur russischen Revolution von 1905*, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen (Tübingen: J. B. C. Mohr, 1984). All citations are from this edition. For an insightful commentary on Weber's two essays, see David Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974), chapter seven.

[78]Weber, "Zur Lage," in *Zur russischen Revolution von 1905*, ed. Mommsen, 110. See also 272–273.

[79]Ibid., 110. Weber's linking of the "historical" and "organic structure" challenges Beetham's analysis. Beetham correctly notes that Weber is not a chauvinist who places German culture above all others; however, as Beetham also observes, Weber's notion of "*Kultur*" was a value concept that allowed him to exercise normative judgments that established western Europe as the norm (Beetham, *Max Weber*, 127). Russia was not included. Although Weber does occasionally compare German and Russian absolutism, the role of religion and the bureaucracy are fundamentally different in the two systems. The differences highlight the Occidental/Oriental divide. Russian caesaropapism links the church and state in a way not found in modern Western Europe. (An aside that supports the contention that many Germans did not consider the orthodox church Christian: Ernst Troeltsch did not include orthodoxy when he wrote *The Social Teachings of the Christian Church*. He mentioned orthodoxy briefly, but did not discuss it in his developmental scheme.) It is also worth noting, as Beetham does, that Weber uses the term "satrapies" (Beetham, *Max Weber*, 194) when describing the Russian bureaucratic system. While Weber certainly had reservations about the "cage" of German bureaucratic absolutism, he would not have thought of comparing the German bureaucracy to the governor of a province in ancient Persia.

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the church from the state.[80] To break the power of the bureaucracy and transform Russia into a *Rechtsstaat* would take more than the guarantees of the October Manifesto.[81] The Russian constitution itself was not an object of reverence for Weber. In Heidelberg, he wrote, "We laugh at the constitution."[82] While the intentions of Nicholas II might have been good, and Weber was not entirely sure that they were, the bureaucracy would remain powerful and the Duma toothless in this new system.

> With a sort of peasant cunning (*Bauernschlauheit*), the roguish "Mongolian insidiousness" (*Mongolentucke*) of this—with all the efficiency of many individuals and with all the refinement of technology—bureaucracy, though eternally stupid *politically*, cleverly attempts to tighten up the mesh of the *legal* net, so that the parliament will get trapped and remained entangled in it.[83]

Ensuring the power of the bureaucracy was the brutal activity of the police, which betrayed the "Asiatic aspect of Russia."[84] Undoubtedly due to Asian influences, Weber claimed that the Russian peasantry was hostile to all cultural progress.[85] The key to success in Russia lay in the abandoning of many of the traditions that were a part of Russia's "Asiatic" heritage.[86]

In 1906, Weber was not optimistic about reform in Russia. Yet having a weaker neighbor did not strike Weber as a terrible state of affairs. But he concluded "Russia's Transition to Pseudo-Constitutionalism" with a warning:

> The two great neighboring nations understand each other very little. On the one hand, I have personally never met a Russian democrat who had any inner sympathy for the peculiarity of German culture. On the other hand, the pressure of an ever-expanding empire, combined with the increasing tendency to think *realpolitisch*, complicates the possibility for Germans to feel sympathetic for the tempestuous agitation and nervous nature of Russian radicalism.[87]

[80]Weber, "Zur Lage," in *Zur russischen Revolution von 1905*, ed. Mommsen, 153. Weber also notes that some within the Orthodox Church strove for self-governance and emancipation from the bureaucracy. See Weber, "Zur Lage," in *Zur russischen Revolution von 1905*, ed. Mommsen, 155.

[81]Weber, "Übergang," in *Zur russischen Revolution von 1905*, ed. Mommsen, 305.

[82]Ibid., 441. Here Weber undoubtedly is referring to the "Heidelberg russische Lesehalle."

[83]Ibid., 442. Emphasis in the original.

[84]Ibid., 318–20, 442, 676.

[85]Weber, "Zur Lage," in *Zur russischen Revolution von 1905*, ed. Mommsen, 123.

[86]The view of Russia as an, at least partially, Asiatic people is an aspect of Weber's thought that Wolfgang J. Mommsen neglects in his article "Max Weber and the Regeneration of Russia." The omission is significant because while it does not change the essence of the problems facing the 1905 revolution as Weber saw them, it puts his analysis in a different light. Weber was certainly sympathetic to the plight of the Russian populace and wanted a greater understanding between Germans and Russians, but he feared that the gap that separated the two peoples was greater than Mommsen indicated. See Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "Max Weber and the Regeneration of Russia," in *The Journal of Modern History* 69 (1997): 1–17.

[87]Weber, "Übergang," in *Zur russischen Revolution von 1905*, ed. Mommsen, 697.

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In a speech before a meeting of the National Liberal Party on November 30, 1908, Weber spoke in favor of a parliamentary monarchy, which he considered to be much more successful in its policy than the German Empire.[88] To clarify his point, Weber used Russia as an example, "If the huge Russia had a constitution, if it had a parliamentary system, then one would see something; it would be the most terrible power..."[89] A few months later, after a few Russian students were imprisoned in Saxony for their membership in a forbidden organization, a liberal Russian daily recalled Weber's statements from the previous November. Quoting Weber:

> Germany is very lucky that in Russia, the current constitution is not yet firmly anchored and that the hour of Russian renewal has not yet struck. On the support of moral opinion and enthusiasm, a renewed Russia would attain such strength and power, it would be incomparable with every other power on the continent.[90]

Upon a request from Grigorji Grossmann, the Berlin correspondent for the *Russikija Vedomosti*, for clarification of his position, Weber replied that his statement had been taken out of context.[91]

In his reply, Weber claimed that he had no "Angst" over a revitalized Russia, nor did he maintain the view that a democratic Russia would hold fewer antagonisms toward Germany. He realized that there were as many Russian democrats as conservatives who harbored hostile feelings toward Germany. The new power that a democratic Russia would possess was in comparison to the power of the current regime, whose daily executions of its citizens retained a certain popularity in some reactionary German circles.[92]

Weber claimed it would be the height of hypocrisy to be a supporter of democracy, yet fear a democratic Russia. Yet his observations at the end of "Scheinkonstitutionalismus" indicate that he favored the peaceful resolution of the differences between Germany and Russia while Germany was in a

[88]Max Weber, "Über Deutschland und das freie Russland, Editorischer Bericht," in *Zur russischen Revolution von 1905*, ed. Mommsen, 685. Mommsen offers no opinion, but it is safe to assume that Weber is referring to England when he mentions the parliamentary (constitutional) monarchy as being more successful than the current configuration of the German government.

[89]Ibid.

[90]Ibid., 685–86.

[91]Ibid., 687. The origins of this reply are still in doubt. Weber's reply was printed in the *Russikija Vedomosti*, Nr. 62, March 17, 1909. A copy of the reply, in Russian, is provided by Mommsen, ed., *Zur russischen Revolution von 1905*, 689–90. The *Neuen Badischen Nachrichten* published a translation of Weber's letter under the title "On Russia's Renewal" ("Über die Erneuerung Russlands") in its April 9, 1909 edition alongside the original Russian (in Mommsen ed., *Zur russischen Revolution von 1905*, 691–92). The paper claims that the letter is not typical of Weber's style of writing and therefore not written by him. Because no original copy exists in Weber's hand, it is not known if Weber attempted to write the letter in Russian.

[92]Weber, "Über die Erneuerung Russlands," in Mommsen ed., *Zur russischen Revolution von 1905*, 691.

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position of strength. This was entirely consistent with his realpolitisch perspective of international relations, and his willingness to use power to achieve legitimate ends.[93] Weber realized that a strong Russia posed a formidable threat to Germany if the two powers ever clashed. Unlike his Baltic countrymen, Weber did not consider this clash to be inevitable, nor did he think that Russia possessed an instinctual hostility toward Germany, but he granted that there was a lack of mutual understandings between the two countries.

In spite of his remarks, Weber and a great many of his contemporaries in Germany felt that they understood Russia, and that they understood Russia in a way that was impossible for Russians to understand Germany. He claimed that not even a Russian democrat—implying here that the Russian democrat was the most advanced kind of Russian—could fathom the unique aspects of German culture, because such knowledge could only develop from a certain understanding. This is similar to the textbook comment that Peter the Great's reforms were unsuccessful because he failed to grasp the nature of western culture. Yet, it was possible for Germans to understand Russia (even if it was hard to sympathize). Weber could simply teach himself the language, talk with a few Russian radicals in Heidelberg, and comprehend the whole of Russia's political and cultural development. Almost a decade later, the anti-Russian propaganda that appeared in the opening months of World War I reflected the assumption of authority implicit in Weber's comprehension.

Image in the Service of War

The anti-Russian propaganda, though not officially orchestrated, was not merely some improvisation to justify the position that Germany was fighting a "liberal war," as Ludwig Dehio suggested. Dehio asserted that before the war, Germany did not consider Russia to be a serious threat.[94] The twin shocks of military defeat and revolution may have temporarily diminished the potential of a Russian threat; however, the rise of influence of the pan-Slavists within Russia in 1908-09 did not escape the attention of the *Kreuzzeitung*. The conservative daily noted the activities of the pan-Slavs and their mouthpiece, *Novoe Vremda*, as they strove to push Russia to a confrontation with Austria-Hungary over the Balkans. The *Kölnische Zeitung* noted the following year the pro-pan-Slav/anti-German position of *Novoe Vremda*, but it was not until the

[93]Weber may well have been critical of the "politics of national vanity," as Beetham asserts (Beetham, *Max Weber*, 138). But it is equally clear that Weber did not object to the use of force to assure Germany's status as a great power and favored settling differences with Russia while Germany was dealing from a position of strength.

[94]Ludwig Dehio, "Thoughts on Germany's Mission 1900–1918," in *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century*, trans. Dieter Pevsner (New York: W. W. Norton, 1954), 105.

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Balkan Wars that other German newspapers picked up on the growing threat in the east. As the German papers wrestled with the possibility of war, they recalled the myriad of problems facing Russia and weighed them against the pan-Slavist pressures for action in the Balkans. Wolfgang Mommsen contended that the extremist views of people like Gen. Friedrich von Bernhardi, whose anti-Russian polemic *Germany and the Coming War* went through six editions in 1912-13, had begun "to harden into an accepted notion, which took on the quality of a self-fulfilling prophesy."[95] Bernhardi's extremism, as well as the virulent views of German nationalists (e.g., pan-Germans), were indeed prevalent in the few years before the war, often to the consternation of the German government.[96] The state of German-Russian relations, in the opinion of the German press, was capsulated in the controversy around an article published by the *Kölnische Zeitung* in March 1914.[97]

What is interesting about the opening phase of the Great War, when Russia was still the focus of attention within the German press, was the unity of the German press not only in supporting the war, but also in its depiction of Russia and its analysis of Russian motives. Now, the former is not all that shocking, as the Wilhelmine government shut down any newspaper or magazine that openly criticized the war or challenged the government's position; the *Vorwärts* was closed down for three days on two separate occasions during autumn 1914. But the latter point is revealing, because at the outbreak of the war, the government did not have any official propaganda organization at its disposal to try to sway public opinion. The importance of this lack of official apparatus at the outbreak of the war is underappreciated.[98] Official censorship functioned in a largely negative fashion, in that it determined what could not be printed, as

[95]Wolfgang Mommsen, "Nationalism, Imperialism and Official Press" in *Opinion Publique et Politique Extérieure I: 1870–1914* (Rome: École Français de Rome, 1981), 379–80.

[96]See Roger Chickering, *We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan-German League, 1886–1914* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984).

[97]On March 2, 1914, the mid-day edition of *Kölnische Zeitung* printed an article entitled "Rußland und Deutschland." The *Frankfurter Zeitung* noted that the title might as well have been "The Coming War with Russia;" *FZ*, March 4, 1914. The resulting fallout from the article caused the German government to sever its ties to the newspaper, which had been a government mouthpiece for foreign policy issues.

[98]I have argued elsewhere that Fritz Fischer, among others, has treated public opinion as entirely malleable and at the disposal of the government. But there is little evidence to support his position of the government successfully manipulating public opinion. For a fuller discussion of the limits of Fischer's position, see Troy R. E. Paddock, ed., *A Call to Arms: Propaganda, Public Opinion, and Newspapers in the Great War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 6–7. For Fischer's position, see Fritz Fischer, *War of Illusions: German Politics from 1911 to 1914* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1975); published in German as *Krieg der Illusion* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1969). For a good introduction to the controversy that Fischer's work started, see John A. Moses, *The Politics of Illusion: The Fischer Controversy in German Historiography* (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1975). The best recent overview of the war from a German perspective is Roger Chickering's *Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

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opposed to sending a coherent message as to what could or should be relayed to the public.[99]

In spite of the lack of official organization of propaganda, the characterization of Russia in the German press was remarkably consistent. The *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten* called the battle against Russia a war of "European civilization against despotism and barbarism."[100] The *Berliner Tageblatt* simply claimed, "A war on behalf of Russia is a war against civilization."[101] In addition to being depicted as the aggressor, Russia was characterized as an Asiatic nation, possessing all of the traits inherent in such a characterization. The Russian state was both backward and barbaric, based on the autocratic power of the tsar and a repressive bureaucracy that was more interested in maintaining its own power than in helping its people. Depicted as sincerely religious and devoted to the tsar, but also docile, ignorant, lazy, and prone to sensual excesses during times of peace, the Russian people were transformed into barbaric Huns once the war began.[102] The theme of Russian barbarism and its link to the "Asiatic" nature of Russia was a staple of accounts about the fighting in the newspapers. While all the newspapers examined relayed reports of Russian barbarism, the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* appeared to relish relating particularly despicable events. The Catholic daily had more detailed examples of Russian atrocities than the other papers examined.[103] One *Kölnische* report claimed that priests were shot for complaining about the quartering of Russian troops in civilian homes.[104]

[99]David Welch has argued that German propaganda efforts were much more coordinated and effective than has been previously asserted. See David Welch, *Germany, Propaganda, and Total War, 1914–1918* (London: Routledge, 2000). This is certainly true for the last half of the war; however, in the opening months of the war, there were five different government agencies that had a hand in the creation and control of information. These branches were encouraged to cooperate, but often did not. It was not until August 1915, when a Cabinet Order authorized the creation of a War Press Office (*Kriegspresseamt*), that the basic prerequisites for a positive press policy by the government were created. For an account of the confusion surrounding the coordination of press policy in Germany during World War I, see Kurt Koszyk, *Deutsche Pressepolitik im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Düsseldorf: Droeste, 1968). For an inside (and biased but informative) account, see Walter Nicolai, *Nachrichtendienst, Presse und Volksstimmung* (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1920). Nicolai was the *Chef der Nachrichtenabteilung* (III B) (Head of the News Department) and was theoretically responsible for the press policy of the military.

[100]*MNN*, August 1, 1914.

[101]*Berliner Tageblatt*, August 7, 1914 (hereafter cited as *BT*).

[102]Rolf Brandt, a reporter who was granted permission to travel with the military and sent reports to several newspapers, often used the term "Hun" or invoked Russia's Mongolian heritage in his reports describing the results of the Russian army's brief occupation of East Prussia. See Rolf Brandt, *Fünf Monate an der Ostfront . . . Kriegsberichte* (Berlin: E. Fleischel & Co., 1915).

[103]For example, see *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, August 6, 1914; August 24, 1914; September 3, 1914; September 22, 1914; and September 27, 1914 (hereafter cited as *KV*). For a more detailed discussion of the German press's depiction of Russia during the opening months of the war, see Troy R. E. Paddock "Still Stuck in Sevastopol: The Depiction of Russia during the Russo-Japanese War and the Beginning of the First World War in the German Press," in *German History* 16, no. 3 (1998): 358–376.

[104]*KV*, August 6, 1914.

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German academics also put their pens in the service of newspapers. Theodore Schiemann and Paul Rohrbach were perhaps the two most active anti-Russian propagandists during the war. The August 5 and August 12 editions of the *Kreuzzeitung* have Schiemann furiously condemning Russia. "All Russian Slavs always lie," Schiemann boldly exclaims.[105] The Baltic émigré maintained that Russia's plan entailed defeating Germany in order to rule eastern Europe, after which it would return to the Orient and finish its conquest of Asia. Schiemann continued his anti-Russian diatribes until October 1914, when he was removed from his position.[106] Schiemann's fall from official grace did not stop his production,[107] nor did it silence those who held similar views within the press and academia.[108] The attacks leveled against Otto Hoetzsch, a Schiemann student and his replacement at the *Kreuzzeitung*, reveal the staying power of the Baltic émigré's anti-Russian views. The most prominent attack came from the historian Johannes Haller, a medievalist who wrote a ninety-four-page pamphlet in response to the second edition of Hoetzsch's *Russland. Eine Einführung auf Grund seiner Geschichte von 1904 bis 1912* (1st ed. 1913, 2nd ed. 1915).[109] Haller attempted to discredit Hoetzsch as a scholar by systematically "refuting" all of Hoetzsch's *Russland*. In addition to characterizing his intellectual personality as one of "*geistlosen Betriebsamkeit*" (spiritless activity), Haller claimed that Hoetzsch simply does not know his material. He criticized Hoetzsch's theoretical assumptions that one can talk about a European Russia and an Asian Russia.[110]

[105]*Kr*, August 5, 1914.

[106]In his *Theodor Schiemann als politischer Publizist*, Klaus Meyer does not offer a concrete explanation for Schiemann's departure from the *Kreuzzeitung*. Leo Loewensen claims that Schiemann's virulent anti-Russian sentiment became too extreme for his conservative *Junker* readership, which was more inclined to view England as the main villain—which Loewensen calls the "*Gott strafe England* spirit"—and that led to his disappearance from the *Kreuzzeitung*. Loewensen offers no documentary proof for this position; however, the ideological position of Schiemann's replacement, Otto Hoetzsch, lends considerable weight to Loewensen's position. See Leo Loewensen, "Karl Stahlin: 1865–1939," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 28 (1949), 154. For an account of Schiemann's relationship with the Kaiser, see Wilhelm II, *My Memoirs, 1878–1918* (New York: Harper 7 brothers, 1922), 194, 195–196.

[107]For just one example, see Theodor Schiemann, "Ein Überblick über die Geschichte der deutschen Kolonie an der Ostsee," in *Die deutschen Ostseeprovinzen. Rußlands geschichtlich, kulturell und wirtschaftlich dargestellt von Kennern der baltischen Provinzen* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1915), 1.

[108]The economist Werner Sombart wrote two pieces for the *Berliner Tageblatt* that proclaimed that England was Germany's main threat. In the second article, the editorial staff took the unusual stance of stating explicitly their disagreement with Sombart's analysis and maintained that Russia was the main threat to Germany. The disclaimer appears in the first article; see *BT*, November 2, 1914. The second article appears on November 21, 1914. See Paddock, *A Call to Arms*, 135.

[109]Otto Hoetzsch, *Russland. Eine Einführung auf Grund seiner Geschichte von 1904 bis 1912* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1913, 2nd ed. 1915).

[110]Johannes Haller also criticized Hoetzsche's scholarly omissions. Hoetzsch did not refer to Weber's "Einführung des Scheinkonstitutionalismus in Russland" [Haller is probably referring to "Russlands Übergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalismus"], and his historical analysis of the origins of Russia as a whole. Hoetzsch claimed that the Tatar invasions pushed the center of Russia from

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Paul Rohrbach, a student of Schiemann's and another Baltic émigré,[111] contributed the following observation to the *Frankfurter Zeitung*:

> We need only to look around us to let the experience of our splendid inner unity, of our moral and material performance, the order and composure, and military confidence work on us, that goes through the nation—and without hearing what occurs beyond our eastern border, we may assume in every instance the opposite from us.[112]

The contribution to the *Frankfurter Zeitung* aptly summarizes the conservative anti-Russian view. It was, however, just the tip of Rohrbach's war-time efforts.[113] Russia and Germany were opposites. The former was Asiatic, barbaric, and autocratic; the latter was European and civilized, and believed in the rule of law. Thus, the defeat of Russia was not only a military necessity, but also a moral imperative.

The image of Russia that was employed to support war met the reality of the Russian army on the eastern front. The experiences of August 1914 appeared to

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Kiev to Moscow. Conversely, Haller contended that Moscow was a colony of Kiev, but tore itself from Kiev and gained power itself. In other words, the Muscovite state was not the continuation of the Kievian state, but a distinctly separate state. Ultimately, Haller denied that Russia was a nation-state in the modern sense of the term. Haller also attacked Hoetzsch personally, questioning his motives for advocating reconciliation with Russia. In the foreword to the pamphlet, Paul Rohrbach thanked Haller for writing this pamphlet and correcting the dangerous perception that Hoetzsch's was an informed opinion. The difficulty arising from how a historian like Haller, whose life-long focus had been medieval history, could correct a Russian historian (who had studied under Schiemann) in Russian history was a detail that Rohrbach chose to ignore. Weber also felt that Hoetzsch's analysis was weak. After lauding Haller's work, Weber writes in a footnote, "It is indeed astonishing that a man who has frequently been to Russia [Hoetzsch], and whose book makes considerable claims for itself, should demonstrate such complete ignorance of decisive political party groupings as in fact is the case in this book, which is shallow in every respect and cannot be taken seriously as a source of political information." Max Weber, *The Russian Revolutions*, ed. and trans. Gordon C. Wells and Peter Baehr (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 257, n. 6. The quote comes from a 1917 essay by Weber entitled "Russia's Transition to Pseudo-Democracy."

[111]For the contribution of Baltic émigrés to Russophobia in Germany, see Campion, *Drang nach Osten*.

[112]*FZ*, August 18, 1914.

[113]For further examples, see P. Rohrbach, *Russland und wir* (Stuttgart: J. Engelhorns, 1915); P. Rohrbach, *Bismarck und wir* (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1915); P. Rohrbach, "Der Kampf um Livland: Deutsch-Russisches Ringen durch sieben Jahrhunderte," vol. 11 in *Weltkultur und Weltpolitik. Deutsche und österreichische Schriftenfolge*, ed. Ernst Jäckh and Institut für Kulturforschung in Wien (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1917); P. Rohrbach, ed., *Das Baltenbuch* (Dachau: Blumtritt, 1917), and *Die russische Gefahr. Beiträge und Urkunden zur Zeitgeschichte* (Stuttgart: J. Engelhorns, 1916), a series that he edited and to which he contributed the fourth volume, "Russische Selbstzeugnisse." For a discussion of Rohrbach's *Russlandbild* before the war, see Troy Paddock, "Historiker als Politiker," in *Russen und Rußland aus deutscher Sicht. Bd 4: 19/20. Jahrhundert, Von der Bismarckzeit bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg* in the series *West-östliche Spiegelungen*, ed. Lew Kopelew (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2000), 321–327. This article is reprinted in *Zauber und Abwehr. Zur Kulturgeschichte der deutsch-russischen Bezeihungen*, ed. Dagmar Hermann and Mechthild Keller (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2003).

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confirm much of what had been assumed before any actual contact had been made. Russian soldiers were considered inferior, and the officers were corrupt.[114] Russian logistical and technological support was substandard and its employment ineffective; the *Berliner Tageblatt* published a report of a Russian pilot who threw bombs from his airplane that did not explode.[115] Rolf Brandt's reports from the eastern front corroborated the Orientalist paradigm of Russians as Asiatic and barbaric. In a report published on September 19, Brandt wrote, "In order to describe the Russian conduct correctly, our rich German language must invent new words, our stock is not sufficient to describe the vulgarity and bestiality. We Europeans and Germans could not yet imagine these things until now."[116]

The "Asiatic" nature of Russia made it, in the eyes of the German press, the most feared opponent. The German view of Russia bears striking parallels to the American view of Japan during World War II. In *War Without Mercy*, John W. Dower noted that the racial divide made the Japanese the more hated enemy of the Axis powers.[117] There is a similar aspect to the German view of Russia in relation to its other enemies. Just as the war in the Pacific was considered more brutal than the European war, fighting on the German Eastern Front was deemed harsher than the Western Front during World War I for similar reasons: harsher climate and the ferocity of the opponent. Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius argues that the German experience on the Eastern Front was so searing that its influence could be seen in German conduct in the east during World War II.[118]

The intellectual mastery or cultural conquest of Russia by Schiemann and Weber represents a remarkably Orientalist attitude. Russia was deemed an Asiatic Other that in important ways was left out of the historical process. Settembrini's disdain for Russian frivolity with time, Castorps distaste for their "bad manners," Weber's assertion of their lack of understanding of German culture, and Schiemann's condemnation of Russian culture are all cut from Orientalist cloth. Castorp and Settembrini could dismiss Russia without having been there or even being able to understand the language because as an Asiatic culture, Russia was, by definition, inferior. Larry Wolff is correct in noting that the

[114]*NAZ*, August 12, 1914; *KV*, August 15, 1914; and *Kr*, August 15, 1914.

[115]*BT*, August 20, 1914. See also *LZ*, August 11, 1914; *FZ*, August 9, 1914; and *VZ*, July 30, 1914.

[116]The original articled appeared in *NAZ*, August 19, 1914. A translation of the article can be found in Paddock, *A Call to Arms*, 144–145.

[117]See John Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 8.

[118]See V. G. Liulevicius, *Land War on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). For a discussion of Nazi *Ostforschung*, see Burleigh, *Germany Turns Eastwards*. See also Murphy, *The Heroic Earth*. For the image of Russia in Germany under the Nazis, see Hans-Erich Volkmann, ed., *Das Russlandbild im Dritten Reich* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1998).

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invention of Eastern Europe was in part an attempt to build a bridge between civilized Europe and barbaric Asia, but for many Germans, even in the late nineteenth century, entering Russia meant leaving Europe and entering Asia.

The negative image of Russia in Germany was inextricably bound with its view of Russia as an Asiatic nation as well as the image that Germans had of their own nation. The backward nature of the Russian government, culture, and people were considered inherent in the Asiatic race and made it impossible for Russia to understand the complexities of German culture. Wilhelmine Germans assumed an intellectual authority when examining Russia that is extremely similar in style and substance to the Anglo-French analysis of the Levant discussed in Said's work on Orientalism. Both the position of authority and the negative stereotype of Russia present in the propaganda of World War I were products of cultural assumptions that existed long before the outbreak of hostilities. Various political parties could adapt an Orientalist view of Russia in order to promote their domestic agenda in Germany. Socialists, Catholics, liberals, and conservatives may have disagreed about the reasons why Russia was "Asiatic," but there was no disagreement over the "fact" that it was. When relations with Russia worsened to the point of war, parties across the political spectrum were able to unite to defend Germany from the "Russian peril" that threatened Germany. Occidental Germany assumed a position of intellectual and cultural superiority over Oriental Russia and attempted to extend that superiority to political and military control over its inferior neighbor, with disastrous results.

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