Jason and Hypsipyle can be seen as a model of how the Dido–Aeneas episode could have ended sadly, but not tragically—perhaps if Aeneas had had as ready a supply of wheedling words as did Jason. Further, when Dido says at 327 that she wishes she had a child by Aeneas, a *parvulus Aeneas*, we should think not only of *Torquatus . . . parvulus* at Catullus 61.209, but also of how Hypsipyle at *Arg.* 1.897–8 mentions the possibility of having a child by Jason—and in fact she does (pp. 161, 181). This kind of recognition of multiple, sometimes contradictory models enriches our reading of the text. Hypsipyle's child is not mentioned in the recent treatment of J. S. C. Eidinow, 'Dido, Aeneas, and Iulus: Heirship and Obligation in *Aeneid* 4', *CQ* 53 (2003), 260–7, whose discussion of what is being suggested about heirs to Aeneas and to Caesar is thus impoverished: complex intertextuality of the type produced by N.'s detailed research at times gives us a much less stable text than some scholars want to find in the *Aeneid*.

This is not to claim that N. breaks much new ground theoretically. Apart from the basic claims of Apollonian influence, N.'s own views of the significance of Virgil's use of Apollonius and the consequences it should have for intepretation of the poem are fairly cautious, in a way that is probably appropriate, as I noted above, for a work designed to be useful for a long time to scholars of varying assumptions about the poems and poets involved. Time has not been kind, after all, to some of Knauer's more general theories about the way Homeric models function in the *Aeneid*: it is the vast quantity of judiciously presented information that has proved uniquely valuable. And N.'s book should certainly be a stimulus for future research, as Knauer was. Some of this research can be more adventurous in analyzing the literary and cultural siginificance of Virgil's debt to Apollonius. But even in matters of detail, for all its thoroughness, N.'s book leaves considerable room for discussion and development. The reference to heavy wagons in Homer, Apollonius, and Virgil, with which I began this review, is listed in N.'s 'Tables of Correspondence', but not discussed in his text; nor was it treated by Clausen, whose *Virgil's Aeneid and the Tradition of Hellenistic Poetry* (Berkeley, 1987) has now been revised and expanded as *Vergil's Aeneid: Decorum, Allusion and Ideology* (Munich and Leipzig, 2002), and who discusses many of the nearby passages in Virgil but not this one.

Many Virgilians will read this book with the disturbing sense that after having gotten used to the dominance of Homer and the choice contributions of Callimachus and Apollonius, we have to change the way we view the poem. The scholar is almost like a sailor or fisherman who has carefully learned the tides, only to look up and see a second moon in the sky (perhaps one that we can only see dimly, through the clouds) exerting its pull on the world's waters. This would mean, of course, that everything has changed.

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DIDO THE EPICUREAN?

E. ADLER: *Vergil's Empire. Political Thought in the* Aeneid. Pp. xviii + 345. Lanham, Boulder, New York, and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. Paper, £22.95. ISBN: 0-7425-2167-2.

More than almost any other Greek or Latin poem, the *Aeneid* has tempted generations of scholars into the belief that an allegorical 'key' is needed to unlock its

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secret message. There was at one time a fashion for Pythagorean and other mystical or quasi-philosophical readings; Eve Adler has now revived this tradition, with the new twist that the poem's hidden message revolves around the philosophy of Epicurus and its usefulness (or otherwise) as a guide to the best kind of life for individuals and communities. The poem as a whole is said to dramatize the rival claims of Rome and Carthage to be 'the well-founded city'; the two cities stand, in turn, for traditional piety and Epicurean 'science' respectively.

The idea that Dido 'is', in some sense, an Epicurean is not a new one, though A. fails to cite some important recent discussions (e.g. R. O. A. M. Lyne, *G&R* 41 [1994], 187–204, J. Dyson, *ClAnt* 15 [1996], 203–21, and especially Pamela Gordon's excellent treatment in *ClAnt* 17 [1998], 188–211). (A.'s use of earlier scholarship is, in general, very patchy, and a number of key items—Don Fowler's well-known 'Lucretius and Politics', in M. Griffin and J. Barnes [edd.], *Philosophia Togata* [Oxford, 1989], 120–50, for instance—are missing from the bibliography; though she makes good use of Servius and the work of older commentators such as Conington and Pease, she often fails to respond adequately to more recent developments.) A.'s starting point (9–16) is the novel and interesting suggestion that the Carthaginian bard Iopas—regarded here, though without any real argument, as Dido's mentor—is a figure for Lucretius. The language of Iopas' song in *Aen.* 1.742–6 is clearly Lucretian, and A. adds the further point that his teacher, Atlas, who was sometimes credited with the invention of astronomy, might be regarded as a kind of emblem of philosophical rationalism; Atlas, Iopas, and Dido can thus be seen as analogous to Epicurus, Lucretius, and the latter's dedicatee, Memmius. The scene immediately preceding Iopas' performance, where Dido sips from the wine cup with which she has toasted her guests, recalls the Lucretian image of the honeyed cup of philosophical poetry (*DRN* 1.936–50 = 4.11–25); A. lays considerable weight on the fact that Dido does not drink deeply from the cup, arguing that this implies that her Epicureanism is only superficial, and has not been fully absorbed.

So far, so good. From this point, however, A.'s argument becomes progressively less convincing. Even in the opening chapters, a certain tendentiousness is evident (the connexions between Iopas' song and Lucretius, for example, while undeniable, must surely be complicated by the presence of other models, notably the Homeric Demodocus and Apollonius' Orpheus), and this becomes much more pronounced as the argument proceeds. A. seems determined to make the poem fit her theory, however partial or contorted an interpretation of the text that may involve. Thus, the Dido-narrative in Books 1 and 4 is interpreted as a story of unsuccessful conversion, in which the queen is supposed to play the part of the failed Epicurean disciple whose superficial rationalism soon gives way, under pressure of her attraction to Aeneas, to renewed superstition and passionate emotion. This interpretation is based on the flimsiest of arguments and the most outrageous distortions of Virgil's text. Dido must, for A., be an atheist (*sic*—and this is only the most egregious of A.'s misunderstandings or misrepresentations of the fundamental principles of Epicurean philosophy) before Aeneas' arrival: the fact that she prays on several occasions to Juno and other deities and has built an enormous temple to Juno in the middle of her new city are apparently no obstacle to this view (indeed, A. somehow manages to argue that the temple is an indication of Dido's irreligion). Far too much weight is placed on the verb *loquuntur* in Dido's prayer to Jupiter at 1.731–3, which can scarcely be taken to mean that she does not herself believe that Jupiter presides over the laws of hospitality. And A. has to shift her ground in the most implausible way in order to fit—for example—Dido's very Epicurean-sounding dismissal of the idea that the gods take any

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interest in Aeneas' actions (4.379–80) and her immediately subsequent threat to haunt him after her death (4.382–7) into the overarching narrative of progressive decline from initial rationalism to renewed superstition which she posits.

Also highly problematic are the claims—both central to A.'s argument—that (i) only 'philosophers' could be expected to attain a full understanding of atomism, while the ordinary run of people would have to rely on 'authority' to guarantee the truth of Epicurus' teaching; and (ii) the ultimate sanction on which the Roman piety eventually adopted by Aeneas rests is the prospect of reward or punishment in the afterlife. I know of no ancient evidence (nor does A. cite any) for the first claim; the second seems fundamentally un-Roman, and is in any case scarcely borne out by Aeneas' (notoriously problematic and inconsistent) experience of the underworld in Book 6—discussion of which is relegated to a perfunctory final chapter.

The second half of the book deals with Aeneas' 'education'. Again, there are potentially interesting ideas here (the discussion on pp. 282–5 of the Polydorus episode at the beginning of Book 3 is especially striking), but the entire argument is once again vitiated by its basis in some highly dubious assumptions and by A.'s failure to consider possible objections to her interpretation. Aeneas, for example, is supposed, as a result of his experiences in Books 2–4, to become temporarily attracted to the Epicurean view of the relationship between the gods and the world; it is hard to see, however, how the son of Venus could be supposed seriously to doubt that the gods play any part in human affairs! (In general, A. fails to distinguish properly between what we might call an internal and an external interpretation of the events of the poem: while Venus might be understood by the reader as a symbolic figure, it is hard to see how Aeneas could be imagined to doubt her reality.) The discussion of heroism in Chapter 13 relies on the curious notion that Homer 'intended' his heroes as models for emulation; and I find it hard to believe that Virgil aimed 'to *replace* Homer as the poetic teacher of the best life for men' (p. 77; my italics).

In short, though A. deserves some credit for attempting to say something really new about the *Aeneid*, a hypothesis which rests on such fundamental misconceptions about Epicurean philosophy and Augustan culture is likely to find few adherents. Indeed, so very unappetizing is the 'message' which A. attributes to Virgil—essentially, that rationalism is accessible to only a few, and that, since a little learning is a dangerous thing, political authoritarianism sanctioned by fear of the gods is the only route to the good life—that it is almost a relief to find that her supporting arguments carry so little conviction.

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POETIC COLOURING

J. CLARKE: *Imagery of Colour & Shining in Catullus, Propertius, & Horace*. (Lang Classical Studies 13.) Pp. xii + 337. New York, etc.: Peter Lang, 2003. Cased, €78.90. ISBN: 0-8204-5672-1.

Many books now written on Latin poetry make use of one or other of the multiple forms of theory, and have advanced our knowledge of that poetry to a considerable extent. However, there is still room for more traditional approaches to the study of

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