Passing Over: Setting the Record Straight in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*

MICHAEL BORGSTROM

ONE OF THE PRIMARY GOALS OF RECENT SCHOLARSHIP on *Uncle Tom's Cabin* has been to reassess the novel's depictions of minority identity and thereby recuperate several of its minoritized characters. Dinah, Eva, Topsy, George, Eliza, and Uncle Tom (among others) figure prominently in contemporary discussions of racial and gender identity.[1] Ironically, however, the success of critiques centered on race and gender may unintentionally cut off other avenues for analysis, foreclosing the possibility of distinguishing other minority identities in the book—particularly those that intertwine race and gender in ways different from normative standards. Adolph, Augustine St. Clare's manservant, is a case in point: his character is almost entirely overlooked in the criticism devoted to the book, and this essay examines his scholarly fate and its implications. While a vast amount of scholarship has critiqued the novel's tendency to subdivide African American identity into readily recognizable character types like the mammy, the pickaninny, the tragic mulatto, and the figure now known as the Uncle Tom, such analysis considers Adolph's role only tangentially.[2] Given Adolph's singular characterization (and given that contemporary scholarship recuperates nearly every minority character in Stowe's text, including those that function as minstrel figures), the critical silence surrounding his character is arresting in its indifference.[3]

In considering why Adolph has never registered significantly in the criticism, this essay sketches out some of the repercussions of the book's racial and gendered schemas. My approach is twofold. I first examine Adolph's character within the book's abolitionist context, offering an interpretation that reads his ostensibly comedic role as an important commentary on the novel's gender and racial politics. I then consider some

MICHAEL BORGSTROM is lecturer in English at the University of California, Davis. This essay is part of a book-length manuscript, "Passing Fictions: Reading Identity in Nineteenth-Century America," which examines intersections among categories of race, sexuality, and gender in Hawthorne, Stowe, Douglass, Wilson, and Harper.

© 2003 BY THE MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X67983 Published online by Cambridge University Press

of the historical continuities that mark Adolph's absence from the scholarship dedicated to Stowe's work. His continued critical elision, I argue, signals the hermeneutical difficulty of recognizing nonnormative intersections among racial and gendered identities. Because he does not conform to established definitions of minority identity, his character makes no sense in the novel or the criticism. His body—metaphorically and literally—is rendered unintelligible.

Hence, Adolph's character highlights some of the analytic limitations inherent in contemporary theories of minority identity. Indeed, his treatment in the scholarship illustrates Lindon Barrett's claim that the "predominant epistemes of cultural studies, in the very gesture of attempting to foster counter-knowledges, display widespread respect for the assumed stability and independence of rubrics of identity" (6).[4] As a result, individuals who do not (or will not) adhere to such definitions may be overlooked, dismissed, erased. The critical inability to recognize Adolph's character thus highlights the need for analytic models that acknowledge identities existing outside traditional classifications.

Feminists of color have long been the vanguard in such theorizing. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, for example, analyzes the various ways identity is constructed and experienced in the world by directly addressing how the axes of race, gender, class, and sexuality might profitably be examined in relation to one another. Such thinking, she notes, presents an opportunity "to speak against internal exclusions and marginalizations" and "to call attention to how the identity of 'the group' has been centered on the intersectional identities of a few" (377). Following Crenshaw, Valerie Smith notes that intersectional analysis asks that bodies be seen as representing a multitude of subject positions, forcing an understanding that all identities are "discursively produced and never fixed, always involving negotiations of gender, sexuality, race, and class" (*Not Just Race* xv). Intersectional studies, Smith maintains, challenge "prevailing narrative conventions and constructions of cultural and literary histories and traditions. Moreover, they question the ability of master narratives to explain discourses and identities marked with the historically constructed meanings of subordinated race, sexual, gender, and class positions" (xiv).[5]

Adolph's situation calls for the frameworks Crenshaw and Smith outline, since critical inattention to his character exposes a persistent failure to recognize the intersection of the nonnormative racial and gendered concerns that mark his place in the novel. Though such oversights may be innocent, they serve as reminders of the curious durability of discrete classifications of identity.[6] The need remains, therefore, for critical paradigms that recognize the ways in which identity categories may overlap but that nevertheless acknowledge American culture's ongoing investment in distinct taxonomies. As Adolph's case demonstrates, unless we carefully (and deliberately) employ such intersectional practice in our analyses, we risk ignoring these figures altogether.

[I]

When Augustine St. Clare returns with Little Eva and Uncle Tom to his New Orleans estate, Adolph is the first inhabitant of the manor we meet. Amid the household's rush to greet the returning travelers is this "highly-dressed young mulatto man, evidently a very *distingué* personage," who is "attired in the ultra extreme of the mode." As the crowd presses to the front of the galleries surrounding the mansion's courtyard, Adolph, "gracefully waving a scented cambric handkerchief in his hand," commands the group to keep their distance and not overwhelm their master: "'Back! all of you. I am ashamed of you,' he said, in a tone of authority. 'Would you intrude on Master's domestic relations, in the first hour of his return?'" Adolph's words apparently carry some weight with the other servants in the house, since "all looked abashed at

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X67983 Published online by Cambridge University Press

this elegant speech, delivered with quite an air, and stood huddled together at a respectful distance." Adolph's "systematic arrangements" to make his master's return a pleasant one appear to hide a more personal motive, though, for when St. Clare finally turns his attention to the crowd he expects to see on his balcony, "there was nobody in view but Mr. Adolph himself, conspicuous in satin vest, gold guard-chain, and white pants, and bowing with inexpressible grace and suavity" (254).

Even in this brief introduction, Adolph is difficult to ignore. Indeed, he virtually demands attention. The significance of his dandyism should not be underestimated, particulary in relation to the book's other black characters and their attendant stereotypes. Numerous critics have pointed out how Stowe's discourse presents a kind of historical economy of racist stereotypes that first found expression on the minstrel stage and that have endured in countless stage productions, songs, books, and films.[7] Adolph thus stands in a continuum of caricatures offered as comic relief in a novel inundated with tears.

But while Adolph is meant to provide humor, his comedy differs considerably from the minstrel humor of the book's other black figures. His comedy instead rests on a series of boundary crossings along the axes of class, race, and gender: he acts as St. Clare's equal and not as his slave; he mimics the attitudes of his white masters instead of conforming to his "true" black identity; and, perhaps most compelling—because so often unremarked—he adopts strikingly effeminate postures. The humor his character supplies (for both antebellum and modern readers) is thus fundamentally different from the rough-and-tumble antics of, say, Sambo, Quimbo, and Topsy. We laugh at him not for his physical pratfalls but for his ideological missteps. His humor rests not in what his body does literally but in what it says metaphorically about minority identity.

To illuminate how Adolph functions in the novel, we must situate his character in the book's representations of minority identity. The primary spokesperson for this discourse is Dinah, St. Clare's chief cook. "[A] character in her own way," who "perfectly scorn[s] logic and reason in every shape, and always [takes] refuge in intuitive certainty" (310), Dinah is one of Stowe's most complex creations.[8] While serving primarily as a comic foil for Miss Ophelia, Dinah also demonstrates a keen intelligence and philosophical disposition. Indeed, although many of the book's black characters lament their race (because it links them to their status as slaves), Dinah is one of the few figures who actively consider what it means, epistemologically, to be black.

Her kitchen, for example, is the site of heated disagreements concerning hierarchies of race. One such discussion centers on Prue, a neighboring slave who has been severely abused. Adolph and Jane (one of the household's mulatto maids) excoriate Prue mercilessly. Jane declares that "such low creatures ought not to be allowed to go round to genteel families," while Adolph asserts that if he were master of such a "disgusting old beast," he would "cut her up worse than she is." Dinah's atypically cool response to these remarks is telling: "Ye couldn't do that ar, no ways. . . . Her back's a far sight now,—she can't never get a dress together over it" (321). For a woman who "perfectly scorn[s] logic and reason in every shape," this response seems oddly cogent, unusually sensible. Indeed, her perceptive argument (that Prue's back is too scarred to feel the sting of any further lashings) underscores Dinah's fundamentally rational character.

Dinah's pragmatism is further evident as the dialogue slides into a discussion of a ball to be held the following night for light-skinned mulattos. This conversation pointedly excludes darker-skinned blacks, who will not be allowed to attend the festivities, and as the banter continues among Adolph, Jane, and Rosa (another light-skinned maid), Dinah delivers what she intends as a stinging rebuke to the trio's air of self-importance: "Don't want none o' your light-colored balls . . . cuttin' round, makin' b'lieve you's white folks.

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X67983 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Arter all, you's niggers, much as I am" (322). Dinah's statement is particularly revealing given that during the preceding conversation we have learned that Adolph "was in the habit of adopting [St. Clare's] name and address; and that the style under which he moved, among the colored circles of New Orleans, was that of *Mr. St. Clare*" (321). Dinah's comments (and Stowe's description of Adolph) reveal a desire among the novel's light-skinned blacks to emulate white society—a desire Dinah sharply and explicitly condemns.

In this way, Dinah serves as a spokesperson for, if not essentialism, at least racial solidarity. She notes that differences within black populations (in color, in conduct) matter little within antebellum hierarchies of race. While Adolph's, Jane's, and Rosa's bodies and behavior appear to demonstrate that blackness should not be essentialized, such an understanding is ultimately superseded by the social reality of a considerably elastic prejudice—one that encompasses even those who do not appear or act "authentically" black. Dinah's commentary thus notes the extent to which hegemony disregards variances within minority populations. She is not offended by the light skin that allows the trio to attend a ball that will, presumably, exclude her. Rather, she resents their presumption that there exist no social repercussions to their too easy emulation (and celebration) of white bourgeois culture. Light skin is no guarantee of preferential treatment, Dinah suggests; antebellum social mores do not recognize (and will not admit) the hybrid as a viable racial category. Because the dominant culture collapses intracultural differences into discrete categories, no black person (regardless of skin shade or personal aspiration) can ever participate fully in hegemonic society.

Accordingly, Dinah's comments might also serve as a coded warning to blacks, voicing the dominant culture's displeasure about "uppity" slaves who attempt to emulate white society. From this perspective, racial crossing directly menaces the social order by threatening the purity of a white culture that defines itself by distancing itself from what it is not.[9] Successful racial crossing demonstrates to the dominant culture that identities and bodies are not always capable of being read as indistinguishable from one another. More empowered social positions are thus open to contamination from those who may pass into them unseen. The possibility of such boundary trespassing generates profound anxiety in the hypothetically menanced white subject, since it exposes the instability of racial categories, the capriciousness of racial identification, and the near ineffectiveness of racial self-description as a claim to cultural power. In this view, racial crossing challenges the notion of a stable and discernable white identity.

Traversing racial boundaries thus menances two related perspectives: to Dinah, it ignores the social realities of antebellum culture that necessitate a corresponding loyalty to black cultural unity; to the dominant culture, racial crossing menaces through category disruption, igniting anxiety with the threat of economic and social competition from undetected border crossers. Both perspectives indicate the ways in which antebellum culture organizes social hierarchies within specific taxonomies of identity. The consequences of crossing identity boundaries vary widely throughout the text, however—and the rewards or punishments for these transgressions seem wholly dependent on such discrete classifications, particularly in relation to categories of difference like race and gender.

In spite of Dinah's comments, boundary crossing in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* is not, in itself, much of a problem. Indeed, the text generally tolerates boundary crossing along the axes of both race and gender, even endorsing such acts if they lead slaves to freedom. For example, the book praises the resourcefulness George Harris shows when he passes for white to elude his pursuers, even comparing his quest for freedom with the founding fathers' mission for the new nation: "I'll fight for my liberty to the last breath I breathe. You say your fathers did it; if it was right for them, it is right for me!" (187).[10]

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X67983 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Here the book supports George's belief that the means to achieve freedom are necessarily subordinate to the end, since the white man to whom he addresses these lines immediately converts to the abolitionist cause. In a similar way, the text also sanctions gender passing. Eliza avoids recapture, for instance, by dressing as a boy (and dresses her son, Harry, as a girl for the same purpose). All those involved in her escape support this strategy: the Quakers, George, even the slave catcher, Tom Loker. Under these circumstances, the book endorses passing as a necessary, viable tactic for survival.

Dinah's comments to Adolph, Rosa, and Jane help explain the novel's tolerance of boundary crossing in these scenarios. In condemning their efforts to emulate white society, Dinah points out the futility of that endeavor. The trio, she claims, will always be just as black as she. The text encourages us to believe that Dinah is correct: because antebellum culture consolidates racial identity within discrete frameworks, blackness is impossible to discard. Despite their impersonation of hegemonic culture, the trio's emulation is thus understood as only a temporary transgression from an otherwise fixed identity. Likewise, their mimicry might not definitively menace the dominant culture since such instances of boundary crossing are not sustained. In these examples, what we today call passing is always figured as transient: we "know" George is black in the same way we "know" Eliza is a woman.

But if the book endorses passing in certain instances, its support of those who cross boundaries is neither reliable nor consistent. The novel's handling of Adolph, in particular, suggests his greater challenge to Stowe's theories of identity and to antebellum ideologies in general. Tellingly, the novel never considers his character with the seriousness it grants figures such as Tom, Chloe, Cassy, Dinah, George, and Eliza. Criticism that mentions Adolph follows the book's lead in this regard. Most previous assessments of Adolph's character read him as only a hyperbolic, more amusing version of St. Clare. In the rare instances when Adolph appears in the scholarship, his longing to wear St. Clare's clothes, daub on St. Clare's cologne, and affect St. Clare's genteel mannerisms is understood, primarily, as a child's yearning to be an adult. As one otherwise sympathetic critic phrases it, "[W]hen we laugh at the dandified, spoiled slave Adolph St. Clare as he tosses his head, fingers his perfumed hair, and waves his scented handkerchief, we are laughing at a boy mimicking adult affectations" (Yarborough 50–51).

As this interpretation makes clear, Adolph is read as humorous because we see him only as wanting to be like the white St. Clare. And this desire is laughable because we know he can never be St. Clare; we know he will never be able to transcend his "essential" black identity. We mock Adolph's mimicry, moreover, on moralistic grounds. He is interested solely in St. Clare's surface existence; he covets the luxurious trappings and languid attitudes of the wealthy, and he imitates his master to sample the lush life. Adolph's unabashed impersonation does not mesh well, however, with the book's conceptions of what constitutes a proper slave or with antebellum society's understanding of what constitutes a proper free subject. Because he does not evidence a similar and more important interest in St. Clare's psychology (which is Uncle Tom's domain), we dismiss the manservant's shallowness. Both the narrative and its subsequent critics render Adolph's character insignificant partly because the slave is interested less in what St. Clare might represent (a sincere, though problematic, benevolence) than in what he owns (a mansion, perfume, silk clothing).

In aspiring to become (or at least mimic) his master, Adolph blurs antebellum culture's discrete borders of identity, embracing an in-betweenness that violates the social hierarchies Dinah observes. By refusing to act like an authentic black male slave, Adolph implies that it is possible to reject such taxonomic classifications. He points to an alternative conception of

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X67983 Published online by Cambridge University Press

identity in which hybridity is a viable option—a position in which categories of race, gender, and class may exist not only in parallel relation but also in complex imbrication. While the text will ultimately disallow Adolph's innovative representation of identity, his character nevertheless indicates ways in which hybrid identities may challenge hegemonic categorization.

The book calls attention, for instance, to discrepancies between Adolph's persona and Tom's more conventional characterization. As Tom is introduced to the household, Adolph stands "negligently leaning against the banisters, examining Tom through an opera-glass, with an air that would have done credit to any dandy living" (256). Placing Tom under Adolph's care, St. Clare warns his manservant, "[M]ind you don't put on any of your airs to him. He's worth two such puppies as you" (257). Later, as St. Clare relates this conversation to his wife, Marie, he notes that Adolph was "particularly huffy" about St. Clare's instructions:

> I was obliged to let him understand explicitly that I preferred to keep *some* of my clothes for my own personal wearing; also, I put his magnificence upon an allowance of cologne-water, and actually was so cruel as to restrict him to one dozen of my cambric handkerchiefs. . . . I had to talk to him like a father, to bring him round.
>
> (270)

By talking to Adolph "like" a father, St. Clare employs here a kind of management strategy. Because Adolph resists the role of compliant slave, St. Clare must take up his own imitation (of paternity) to consolidate the differences between them. His performance of fatherhood thus operates in inverse relation to Adolph's mimicry: St. Clare attempts to create distance from his manservant, while Adolph aims to collapse such distance. St. Clare emphasizes his fatherly role, therefore, to reestablish the "natural" hierarchical bond between master and slave, which is absent from their interactions. Moreover, in detailing Adolph's affectations—his love of soft fabric and cologne—St. Clare calls attention to his manservant's dandified persona. This characterization reveals that Adolph's violation of identity categories stretches across distinct (but complementary) value systems. Not only does Adolph reject the race and class hierarchies endemic to slavery; he also rejects hegemonic definitions of conventional masculinity.

Adolph's violation of these social boundaries complicates traditional understandings of the slave system's power inequities. Given Adolph's habit of adopting St. Clare's name and address, we are led by Stowe to read him primarily in relation to his master—positioning him, in effect, as St. Clare's black double. Adolph's insubordination thus works on two levels. First, his doubling implies a fundamental equivalence with St. Clare, a condition that breaches the parental nature of the master-slave hierarchy. Second, and perhaps more significant, the effeminate content of Adolph's doubling (and its implicit resistance to definitions of conventional masculinity) forces a rereading of St. Clare's character. Adolph's refusal to accept traditional social and gender categories reflects back on his master compellingly.

If Adolph's mimicry of St. Clare is accurate, it reveals St. Clare's possible effeminacy. St. Clare's (failed) attempt to discipline Adolph thus represents an attempt to safeguard his own tenuous hold on masculine identity. The ironic effect of Adolph's dandyism, therefore, is to make St. Clare the manservant's double—a white version of the black male effeminacy he embodies. In this way, Adolph's character again violates the hierarchical inequities that are supposed to obtain between masters and slaves. In this relationship, gender insubordination inexorably complicates the accepted wisdom of racial authority.[11] By refusing to accept hegemony's discrete categorizations of identity—and by complicating their attendant social relations—Adolph reveals that the dominant culture is perhaps not entirely impervious to the kinds of ideological challenges his character poses.

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X67983 Published online by Cambridge University Press

St. Clare's inability to restrain his manservant from appropriating (and performing) his identity highlights the cultural anxieties that attend this possibility, since Adolph's indifferent response to St. Clare's admonitions seems almost to acknowledge an implicit understanding that their banter constitutes a performance in which both play a part. In this light, Adolph's scrupulous once-over of Tom seems less a matter of fey interest than a crucial opportunity to check out the new competition for St. Clare's attention. Indeed, Adolph's reaction to Tom's arrival may signal a hitch in previous arrangements to which we have not been privy, for while St. Clare literally owns Adolph, Adolph clearly considers St. Clare his property. When we take into account, as well, Marie's all-but-absent status in her marriage, St. Clare's attempts to dissociate himself from his servant suggest other reasons for his discomfort.

Though such a reading of Adolph and St. Clare's relationship represses the racial and class dimensions of slavery, it nevertheless reflects Adolph's refusal to acknowledge the discrepancies in race and class that mark him as his master's property. Despite Adolph's attempts at self-possession, however, his defiance of social norms cannot continue indefinitely. Since his insubordination is wholly dependent on St. Clare's lax benevolence, Adolph ultimately has little control over his character's definition. With St. Clare's death, the environment that has permitted the manservant some measure of autonomy vanishes. Just as Dinah had earlier predicted, differences among the household's slaves are inevitably subordinated to their common classification as chattel available for sale.

When St. Clare dies, in other words, social reality returns. Though his slaves have enjoyed some degree of insulation from antebellum social strictures, they now must confront the hierarchies that buttress hegemonic power. As Dinah implies, one of the primary ways the dominant culture safeguards its privilege is by demanding discrete classifications of identity. In its reliance on race and class disparities, therefore, the slave system will not support Adolph's boundary transgressions. Because he is first and foremost a slave, race inevitably serves as the exclusive marker of Adolph's minoritized identity. Such a requirement, however, has the unexpected effect of rendering visible some of slavery's largely unspoken dynamics. The intersection of Adolph's slave status with his racial, gender, and class insubordination ultimately reveals the latent sexual dynamics underlying slavery's power inequities.

His final scene takes place in the slave warehouse, where Adolph is once again mocked for his effeminate affectations. His disgust at being sold at auction, for example, is figured more as hygienic horror than as moral revulsion. His request to be left alone, after another slave lays a hand on his shoulder, is met with derision and scorn: "Law, now, boys! dis yer's one o' yer white niggers—kind o'cream color, ye know, scented! . . . O Lor! he'd do for a tobaccer-shop; they could keep him to scent snuff! Lor, he'd keep a whole shope agwine,—he would!" (469). Enraged by these taunts, Adolph flies at his adversary, but his efforts to defend his character merely bring laughter from the crowd of men. The color of Adolph's skin is conflated here with his effeminate bearing. Lightness (or whiteness) is implicitly equated with unmanly conduct. As this scene makes clear, the book's logics of gender are inexorably imbricated in its logics of racial identity and vice versa. Ultimately, however, the challenge Adolph poses to normative definitions of behavior and appearance is superseded by the hierarchical realities of the slave system; despite his character's liminal nature—his in-betweenness—he is still principally defined as "nigger." For Adolph, this designation colludes not only to ridicule the impossible logic his body represents but also, finally, to render that body illegible.

Our final, telling glimpse of Adolph comes just as he is to be sold. As the various slaves are lined up for inspection, we see a "young exquisite, slapping the shoulder of a sprucely-dressed

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X67983 Published online by Cambridge University Press

young man, who [is] examining Adolph through an eye-glass" (475). The scene recalls Adolph's earlier inspection of Tom through the opera glass, a kind of comeuppance, perhaps, for the insolence the manservant displayed in his treatment of Tom and in his assumption of parity with St. Clare. The buyer comments to his friend, "I was wanting a valet, and I heard that St. Clare's lot was going. I thought I'd just look at his—" (476). The lacuna at the end of this sentence is heavy with possible meaning, inviting the reader to fill in the missing noun. Because the text has hinted at the nonnormative aspects of Adolph's relationship with St. Clare, we are tempted to fill in this explanatory gap with a word that describes the latent homoerotic dimensions of their bond. Given Adolph's nontraditional gender representation, a word like *minion* or *concubine* is the expression perhaps most appropriate in naming his person here.

The effect of this substitution, however, depends on how we define authentic gender identity. As he stands for sale before the crowd, the figure Adolph most closely resembles is the tragic mulatto—a dandified complement of sorts to the scene's other primary character, Emmeline, who is also associated with sexual subservience. But while the text extends a genuine sympathy to any slave on the aution block, it appears that the term *concubine* carries different social implications based on differences in gender.[12] Here identity politics rub up against what might be called linguistic politics: though the novel explores the significant personal consequences for the slave woman forced into such an arrangement (whether actual, as with Prue, or probable, as with Emmeline), Adolph's future remains unclear. The text never provides the dropped word that defines him. We are left only with the image of Adolph enmeshed in a highly asymmetrical relationship among the buyer, his friend (the "exquisite"—a telling noun in itself), and Adolph's available male body. This relationship is cemented, we learn, as Adolph is "knocked off, at a good sum, to the young gentleman who had previously stated his intention of buying him" (478). With this transaction, Adolph passes out of the novel—the possessive noun that defines him left permanently unspoken.[13]

The temptation to emphasize the homoerotic overtones of Adolph's sale (and of his character, more generally) is frustrated by the historical anachronism of such a move.[14] Because Stowe's novel is published seventeen years before *homosexuality* becomes a codified term, to analyze Adolph's character in relation to homosexual identity may misrepresent the nature of same-sex desire in this era.[15] His effeminate characterization similarly cannot serve as a reliable index to (homo)sexual activity—in part because homosexuality is not yet "invented" but also because there is no clear sense (historically or otherwise) why effeminacy should be linked a priori to homosexual relations. Because sex between men does not hold the same meaning in antebellum America as it does in contemporary culture, the possibility of Adolph's sexual subservience ultimately seems to say less about sexuality per se than it does about the power hierarchies endemic to slavery.

Consequently, the threat of (homo)sexual concubinage operates in much the same way as the order to stand for auction—as a way to define the differences in social status between masters and slaves. Adolph's problem is that he emphatically rejects subjugation. In contrast to traditional definitions of the tragic mulatto (wherein liminality is an affliction), Adolph refuses to see his in-betweenness as tragic.[16] The book repeatedly demonstrates, though, that the slave system will not tolerate such insubordination. His sale (and unknown fate) thus functions as a kind of allegory for Stowe's readers, as an example of the cruelties perpetuated under slavery against even those who are perhaps least traditionally like slaves. Despite his resistance to degradation on the auction block, Adolph's aspirations toward self-possession ultimately are no match for slavery's social realities.

Stowe combats such realities by writing *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, rallying the nation to her

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X67983 Published online by Cambridge University Press

abolitionist agenda and proposing an alternative social vision that significantly reconfigures antebellum power inequities. This cultural reconstruction, however, relies on a set of ideological boundaries that tend to mimic the discrete classifications of identity that buttress the slave system. Thus, while abolitionism aims to remedy the nation's social disparities, the ramifications of its ideological strategies ironically replicate some of slavery's rules and exclusions. Like the slave system, Stowe's paradigm cannot tolerate Adolph's boundary crossing, albeit for an entirely different set of reasons.

As representative of her culture's gender politics, Stowe praises the power of female influence insofar as it helps men "feel right" about the issue of slavery. Though men and women may possess innate differences, certain aspects of masculine identity are nevertheless open to female persuasion. Within the abolitionist paradigm, then, essentialist frameworks do not extend wholly to definitions of gender. Unlike race (which is understood as a discrete category, marked on the body in spite of its varying visibility), gender is understood as at least partially constructed, as something to be performed and thus controlled.

Stowe's work represents men and women as having equally important but necessarily separate duties to perform in the cause of abolition.[17] While I do not wish to perpetuate anachronistic understandings of nineteenth-century culture, this dynamic ultimately seems to suggest that, for Stowe, the logic of the separate spheres is indispensable to the abolitionist movement.[18] Permitting men to cross these boundaries, therefore, would set back the abolitionist cause. As Myra Jehlen puts it, "For such women as Mrs. Shelby, Ophelia, and Rachel Halliday, taking society over would seem easy. Getting men like Mr. Shelby and St. Clare *not* to give it up is the difficult task. . . . Stowe intends [domesticity] to be the means to an individualist integrity nurtured by mothers but embodied in independent sons" (392–93).

Consequently, Adolph's sustained gender insubordination illustrates a significant threat to the logic of the separate spheres and their respective duties: if men's gendered reactions to the world were wholly immutable, then female influence would be for naught and the abolitionist project would collapse. Unlike racial versions of essentialism, though, gender *is* subject to influence in Stowe's world. If that influence depends on a relatively stable division between spheres for men and women, then it is in the book's best interest to provide some sort of bulwark against their fusion. The tolerance granted to racial crossings (since they are essentially temporary) is thus not automatically granted to gendered crossings (since we have no guarantee they will remain provisional).

In its crudest formulation, then, the book seems to posit a stipulation for gender crossing specific to men: while it is acceptable to feel like a woman, it is not acceptable not to act like a man.[19] In this context, Adolph's textual problem becomes clearer. Adolph is fundamentally different from other ostensibly feminine men in the book. Unlike Simeon Halliday, Uncle Tom, or even St. Clare, he does not just feel like a woman; he also does not act like a man. He cannot be recuperated in the text, because his dandified behavior fuses spheres that should remain separate and thereby violates the discrete gender classifications on which abolitionism relies. This is not to say that because Adolph does not act like a traditional man, he necessarily acts like a woman. Rather, his threat arises from his blurring of these categories—from his unwillingness to renounce the liminality his effeminacy implies.

Adolph's violation of gendered taxonomies also intersects with the book's racial ideologies. Karen Sánchez-Eppler has pointed out that abolitionist fiction gains much of its rhetorical force by invoking implicit comparisons between the status of slaves and the status of women in patriarchal society. "In feminist writings," she states, "the metaphoric linking of women and slaves proves ubiquitous. . . . This strategy serves to emphasize the restrictions of woman's sphere, and, despite luxuries and social civilities, to class

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X67983 Published online by Cambridge University Press

the bourgeois woman among the oppressed" (95). In this paradigm, slaves merit empathy because they occupy a level of societal disempowerment comparable with that of white women. Reciprocally, limitations to woman's sphere mimic slavery. Because patriarchal society renders slaves and white women abject, each group deserves our compassion. This view suggests an essential equivalence between racial and gendered identities, an alignment in shared victimization. As a result, the abolitionist paradigm reconfigures familiar black-white and male-female binaries to create a black-female correlation.

Adolph's character frustrates the too easy logic of this equation. If being black is like being a woman (the focus of Sánchez-Eppler's critique), Adolph disrupts this reasoning on both counts since he is neither an "authentic" black person nor a woman. In terms of race, Adolph's emulation of his master threatens hierarchies because the slave considers himself less St. Clare's servant than a peer. And in terms of gender, Adolph threatens abolitionist ideologies by blurring gendered categories and by refusing to feel womanly sympathy for the enslaved (e.g., he disregards Prue's misery).

Hence, Adolph commits a fundamental crime against the text's primary abolitionist focus: he is simply uninterested in the business of slavery. Neither slavery's personal dimensions nor its ideological ramifications register in any significant way for him. His character thus threatens the text's rubrics of identity and their supposedly instinctive sympathies. Moreover, he reveals just how thoroughly discrete understandings of race and gender are imbricated in one another. "I'm so little the race category you give me," his character seems to say, "that I'm not even the gender you assign." In this way, Adolph's dandyism acts as a refusal of slavery's obliteration of gender through race and class.[20] Because he is more interested in his master's riches than in St. Clare's inherent (though problematic) benevolence, Adolph is not truly St. Clare's double. Instead, Adolph more closely resembles his mistress, Marie. Like Marie, Adolph relishes the material luxuries available to white society, and like Marie, he demonstrates no real sympathy for enslaved blacks. His doubling of Marie, then, exposes the black-female alliance of the abolitionist paradigm as inherently false. Not all slaves feel abject. And not all white women care.

Marie and Adolph's similarities lie primarily in their relation to civic duty. In antebellum gender logics, the civic woman is at once a complement to the civic man and distinct from the patrician lady. The latter type, which Marie embodies, is "unfeminine" insofar as she is uninterested in femininity's civic (and domestic) responsibilities. Indeed, the eminently capable Miss Ophelia arrives from the North precisely to counter Marie's apathy. Because both Adolph and Marie thus abjure a commitment to civic femininity (which Tom personifies), they are not feminine in a traditionally gendered sense. They are, instead, effeminate: in embracing an aristocratic lassitude that is enervating even to proper femininity, they patently refuse Stowe's paradigms of civic obligation.

But while Marie may serve as Adolph's truest double, no ideological parallel between them translates onto the level of everyday experience. Their fates could not be more dissimilar. While the book castigates Marie's complicity with the slavocracy, she faces no real retribution for her antiabolitionist beliefs. Adolph does not enjoy a similar escape. When St. Clare's death consigns his manservant to an unknown future on the auction block, the text implies that social reality is ultimately impossible to refute. Hierarchies of race will always supersede potential alliances between genders.

In this way, Adolph's character signals both a textual and an ideological confinement of black masculinity. The book proposes only two acceptable role models for black men: one embodied in the brave and noble George, the other in the long-suffering and pious Uncle Tom. Despite clear differences between these characters, both make

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X67983 Published online by Cambridge University Press

sense within the book's abolitionist framework. Both "feel right" about the issue of slavery, and both act like men—with wives and children to authenticate their masculine identity. Adolph, however, rejects this paradigm. More concerned with clothing than with freedom, with gossip than with marriage, he simply does not register as an authentic black male presence in the novel.

Adolph's fundamental problem, therefore, is the challenge to categories he implicitly and explicitly represents. Unlike Eliza and George (who disguise themselves for specific reasons), Adolph apparently violates social boundaries for no reason other than his own pleasure. That Adolph's insubordination might represent for him the truest expression of identity ultimately matters little within his era's social hierarchies. Antebellum culture will not permit Adolph to construct an identity outside the acceptable confines for a black male slave.

Ironically, then, it is Adolph's refusal to pass (as "merely" black, male, and subservient) that dooms his character. Because he will not fulfill the stereotypes the book expects from him, he reveals significant limitations to conventional understandings of minority identity. Despite obvious differences between the slave system and abolitionism, Adolph serves in both paradigms as an example of the social limits to self-possession. Because he will not resolve his liminality, the text must forsake his body and its implicit threat to discrete identity categorization.

[II]

Scholarly inattention to Adolph often mimics the ways the character is treated in the novel. Indeed, Dinah's commentary on social reality's discrete epistemologies appears to find complementary expression in current analytic practice. The text's aversion to Adolph's hybrid character has its modern-day corollary, I would argue, in critical theory's similar inability to support his boundary crossing. Because Adolph resists acting like a black male slave, we may not see his body because it does not conform to the racial, gender, or class criteria the book (and the criticism) expects from identity categories in general and from "legitimate" minority identity in particular. Adolph's absence perhaps indicates our inability to make a spot for him on the identity terms he demands, and in this respect our critical blindnesses might reflect the novel's own exclusion of Adolph's character.

Yet by forgetting Adolph we also lose track of our announced desire for intersectional analysis, especially since his critical erasure carries particular resonance for contemporary studies of minority identity. Ultimately, it seems, we can either claim an identity for Adolph (and thus read him within a limited—and limiting—intelligibility) or position him as a deconstructor of any and all identity logics (and thus risk his erasure in the cultural discourse of both the nineteenth century and our contemporary critical moment). Neither option does full justice to the important ideological challenges his character poses.

Adolph's illegibility not only calls attention to some of the deficiencies of single-axis critical paradigms; his elision also highlights the analytic limitations of recent theories of cultural hybridity. As a figure that crosses multiple boundaries of identity, Adolph would seem an ideal model for contemporary frameworks that advocate a move away from a monocultural focus on identity and toward a more syncretic one.[21] That Adolph has not been critically recuperated despite the appeal of this approach speaks to the epistemological difficulties obstructing this goal. He may not register in the scholarship, that is, because American culture still does not recognize hybridity as a viable alternative to discrete taxonomies of identity. Because Adolph does not blend categories so much as discard them altogether, even these recent paradigms cannot properly reclaim his character—in part because theories of hybridity rely on distinct classifications for their utility.[22]

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X67983 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Attempts to move beyond binary structures of identity thus face a monumental paradox: while identities may be multifaceted and hybrid, they are rarely granted that understanding in real life.[23] Theories of hybridity tend to cast identity politics as error—as a retrograde notion of belongingness hopelessly out of touch with the realities of multicultural society. But while privileging heterogeneity may move us beyond an often limiting essentialism, that theoretical promise offers little comfort to those who continue to experience social disempowerment. As Wahneema Lubiano puts this issue, "Whether or not I am a card-carrying believer in distinctions of racial biology, I am nonetheless attacked by the hegemonic social formation's notions of racial being and the way those notions position me in the world" (64).

This problem carries particular resonance for historical studies of American culture. Attempts to affirm cultural hybridity in the nineteenth century are complicated by this era's aggressive interest in demarcating social divisions. While recent scholarship rightly takes contemporary criticism to task for its retrospective (and often artificial) application of binary ideologies to nineteenth-century culture (Davidson), it is nevertheless crucial to note that this period generated a number of social transformations whose personal ramifications we continue to feel today: the rise of industrial culture, which enforced enduring labor divisions between women and men; the increased interest in developing a scientific language to identify (and thereby police) homosexual practices and persons; and the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which placed all individuals of (perceived) African American heritage under suspicion, whether enslaved or free.

Given the stratification of antebellum (and postbellum) American culture, reconciling contemporary notions of hybridity with this period's lived realities seems a difficult endeavor, at best. As Lawrence Buell points out, "[I]t won't do to pretend to evaporate [binary categories], either historically *or* theoretically, notwithstanding that this strategy might abstractly be more defensible than reification. The biological fact that racial differences are inconsiderable at the level of DNA doesn't make them so historically or culturally" (472–73). Buell's comments point to a crucial epistemological problem: how to talk about identity without, on the one hand, resorting to the biological determinism of essentialist paradigms or, on the other, denying the experiences of those that continue to feel the social effects of identity with often banal regularity.

The dilemma Buell outlines is not necessarily irresolvable. If we are serious about analyzing and affirming difference, we might refocus our critique to address the durability of the specific distinctions we make among identities. Rather than attempt to move beyond the binaries that structure cultural difference, we might instead interrogate these binaries on their terms—but to our strategic ends. If, as Samira Kawash suggests, "the boundary has served as the mark of exclusion . . . then its effects are not challenged by effacing the boundary. . . . Instead, they are challenged from the zone of the boundary itself, as the eruptive possibility of its own (nontranscending) beyond, a beyond that recognizes the boundary as both its own limit condition and its own condition of possibility" (22). In scrutinizing these binaries, we open up space for a deconstructive analysis that nevertheless respects the real ways individuals experience cultural difference.

Perhaps by reading figures like Adolph back into the narratives from which they have been excluded we begin to critique the epistemological assumptions that render such differences illegible. Indeed, his character (and its treatment in the scholarship) suggests the need for a reconceptualization of identity that reaches beyond the limits of the visible yet does not deny that such visibility buttresses American culture's investment in hierarchical taxonomies. By thus recalibrating how we acknowledge cultural difference, we gesture toward important new narratives of

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X67983 Published online by Cambridge University Press

visibility, representation, and inclusion. The same old stories, in other words, need no longer be so.

Notes

An early version of this essay was presented at the Futures of American Studies Institute held at Dartmouth College. For important feedback there, I am grateful to the institute's participants and to its co-organizers, Donald Pease and Robyn Wiegman. For other invaluable encouragement and advice, I am indebted to Riché Richardson, Elizabeth Freeman, Anna Muraco, Linda Morris, Christopher Duke, Joanne Feit Diehl, and, especially, David Van Leer.

[1] The scholarship here is enormous. For representative examples, see Tompkins; Sundquist, *New Essays*; Carby; McDowell and Rampersad; and Samuels.

[2] I name specifically black stereotypes since their representations are immediately germane to my argument. So as not to essentialize race as always implicitly black, however, I note that white racial stereotypes exist in the novel as well and that we might profitably analyze figures like the southern belle and southern gentleman (types embodied by Marie and Augustine St. Clare).

[3] To my knowledge, only one study seriously considers Adolph's role in the novel: P. Gabrielle Foreman's probing essay, which argues "that death in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* acts as an insistent sign not of redemption but of the consequence of sexual transgression" (51). Foreman's study reads Tom and Eva as "sinners" under this rubric, and its analysis of Adolph places him as a key to understanding the homoerotic overtones of St. Clare and Tom's relationship. Foreman's insights are often striking, and while I share some of her concerns, my essay differs in significant ways from hers. Chief among these is my desire to read Adolph apart from St. Clare, to see the manservant as a problem in and of himself. This goal is crucial to circumventing another racial stereotype: that slaves are not capable of originality and thus can only be understood as facsimiles of their masters. Foreman certainly does not endorse this stereotype; in mentioning it, I am only clarifying my reluctance to examine Adolph solely in relation to his master and emphasizing my desire to read him back into the critical conversation on his own terms.

[4] Barrett rightly cites Robyn Wiegman's important work on this topic. Wiegman is primarily concerned with what she calls "feminism's own myth of integration," but her statements have far-reaching import for studies of identity in general: she states, "[T]he challenge to modernity—which characterizes the tensions within and political stakes of feminism and other political discourses in the United States today—lies in a potential resignification, not of the body as such but of the relationship between its interior and exterior domains" (191).

[5] For other significant analyses that use intersectionality as critical praxis, see Friedman; Somerville.

[6] It is not my intention to minimize the important scholarly work on Stowe's text performed under the aegis of feminist and African American studies; indeed, my analysis is indebted to the theoretical paradigms this criticism provides.

[7] Eric Sundquist provides a useful overview of some of the cultural distortions these figures have endured since the book's publication (Introduction). See also Yarborough. Popular appropriations of Stowe's characters (and the racist repercussions of these borrowings) are also analyzed in Birdoff; Bogle; Furnas; Hirsch; and Toll.

[8] The standard reading of Dinah is that of Gillian Brown, who links Dinah's kitchen with the economies of the slave market.

[9] Several studies have remarked on this dynamic, the most elegant and sophisticated articulations of which are Judith Butler's (*Bodies*) and Toni Morrison's.

[10] George's passing is an important example of a hybrid character inhabiting white masculine identity. His name becomes more significant in this respect as it echoes the original founding father, George Washington. For an excellent reading of this scene, see Stern.

[11] The term *gender insubordination* comes, of course, from Butler (*Gender Trouble*).

[12] The discrepancies between Emmeline's and Adolph's fates suggest that the character of the tragic mulatto is a gendered description with specific sexualized assumptions. As a figure, the mulatto calls attention to the sexual availability of enslaved black bodies through its literal embodiment of miscegenation. Because the light-skinned slave is an effect of heterosexual union (and because a female slaveowner's seducing male slaves is unthinkable in antebellum mores), the mulatto indicates a white male sexual aggression that is explicitly heterosexually oriented. The "tragedy" of the mulatto thus holds particular resonance for female slaves, since their light skin embodies the threat of sexual subservience their (female) ancestors also faced. The light-skinned male slave, by contrast, faces no comparable threat; antebellum ideologies (and the lack of bodily evidence) do not take into account the possibility of homosexual assault.

[13] We might also consider the curious allusion Harriet Jacobs makes to her friend Luke, a slave forced to submit to "the strangest freaks of despotism" by his bedridden master. "Some of these freaks," Jacobs tells us, "were of a nature too filthy to be repeated." Though the incident Jacobs describes carries heavy homosexual overtones (like Stowe's description of Adolph in the slave market), Jacobs (also like Stowe) refuses to comment further on this scene—leaving Luke "still chained to the bedside of this cruel and disgusting wretch" (192).

[14] For helpful discussions of the problems inherent in such anachronisms, see Halperin and the volume edited by Duberman, Vicinus, and Chauncey.

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X67983 Published online by Cambridge University Press

[15] We might usefully consider here the same-sex experiences described by Calvin Stowe. As he wrote to his wife during an extended separation, "When I get desperate, & cannot stand it any longer, I get dear, good kind hearted Br[other] Stagg to come and sleep with me, and he puts his arms round me & hugs me to my hearts' content" (qtd. in Hedrick 180).

[16] For an indispensable study of the tragic mulatto figure, see Gillman.

[17] In this respect, my argument is not unlike that of Jean Fagan Yellin, who situates *Uncle Tom's Cabin* at a kind of midpoint between the conservative domestic philosophies of Stowe's sister, Catharine Beecher, and the more overtly feminist polemics of the Grimké sisters, Angelina and Sarah. Whereas Beecher believed women should limit their abolitionist sympathies to the domestic sphere, the Grimkés advocated a movement that placed women's role in both public and private domains. Yellin notes, however, that Stowe's philosophies ultimately align her more centrally with Beecher's separate spheres (see also Tompkins). For the historical materials that inform this debate, see Beecher and Stowe; Grimké ("Appeal" and *Letters*); and Beecher.

[18] Traditionally, much criticism of nineteenth-century American literature has rested on the concept of the "separate spheres" as an explanatory model for cultural difference. Contemporary scholarship, however, has attempted to complicate (and even dismantle) this paradigm by noting the limitations of a theory that relies exclusively on gender as a marker of difference (e.g., Romero). Cathy Davidson notes that "the binaric version of nineteenth-century American history is ultimately unsatisfactory because it is simply too crude an instrument—too rigid and totalizing—for understanding the different, complicated ways that nineteenth-century American society or literary production functioned" (445). While I generally agree with this position, I believe that Stowe's novel often thinks in "rigid and totalizing" ways we find uncomfortable today.

[19] We might also consider St. Clare's character as indicative of this dynamic. His sympathy for the enslaved (understood as the result of feminine influence) does not translate into the manly act of freeing his slaves before his untimely death. Amy Schrager Lang comments on this problem with St. Clare, noting that "the two sides of his character, one feminine, the other masculine, rather than working in tandem to produce the ideal reformer, instead pull in opposite directions and immobilize him" (45–46).

[20] Eric Lott reads the black dandy as emblematic of the antislavery reformer through the figure's compression of racial and class identities. "The black dandy," Lott writes, "literally embodied the amalgamationist threat of abolitionism, and allegorically represented the class threat of those who were advocating it" (134). While Lott emphasizes the black dandy's threat to proslavery factions (and represses the role of gender), I argue that this figure equally menaces abolitionist ideologies through its complex intersection of gender, class, and racial identities.

[21] See, e.g., the collections edited by Powell and by Wonham.

[22] The limitations of hybridity—particularly in regard to Adolph's character—may also rest in the concept's reliance on a reproductive logic wherein the hybrid's component parts are imagined as a set of parents. For an important analysis of the difficulties of hybridity, see Young.

[23] Neo- and strategically essentialist critics have reminded us that specific identities (and their effects) retain a remarkable resiliency—and legibility—in contemporary culture. See Gayatri Spivak's important work on strategic essentialism ("In a Word" and "Strategy"). For comparable statements, see Mercer; Smith, "'Circling'"; Van Leer; and Duberman.

Works Cited

Barrett, Lindon. "Identities and Identity Studies: Reading Toni Cade Bambara's 'The Hammer Man.'" *Cultural Critique* 39 (1998): 5–29.

Beecher, Catharine E. *An Essay on Slavery and Abolitionism, with Reference to the Duty of American Females, Addressed to A. E. Grimké*. Philadelphia: Henry Perkins; Boston: Perkins and Marvin, 1837.

Beecher, Catharine E., and Harriet Beecher Stowe. *The American Woman's Home; or, Principles of Domestic Science*. New York: J. B. Ford, 1869. Rpt. of *A Treatise on Domestic Economy, for the Use of Young Ladies at Home, and at School*. Boston: T. H. Webb, 1841.

Birdoff, Harry. *The World's Greatest Hit:* Uncle Tom's Cabin. New York: Vanni, 1947.

Bogle, Donald. *Toms, Coons, Mulattoes, Mammies, and Bucks: An Interpretive History of Blacks in American Films*. New York: Viking, 1973.

Brown, Gillian. "Getting in the Kitchen with Dinah: Domestic Politics in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*." *American Quarterly* 36 (1984): 503–23.

Buell, Lawrence. "Circling the Spheres: A Dialogue." *American Literature* 70 (1998): 465–90.

Butler, Judith. *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex."* New York: Routledge, 1993.

———. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. New York: Routledge, 1990.

Carby, Hazel V. *Reconstructing Womanhood: The Emergence of the Afro-American Woman Novelist*. New York: Oxford UP, 1987.

Crenshaw, Kimberlé Williams. "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color." *Critical Race Theory*. Ed. Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas. New York: New, 1995. 357–83.

Davidson, Cathy N. "No More Separate Spheres!" Preface. *American Literature* 70 (1998): 443–63.

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X67983 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Duberman, Martin. "In Defense of Identity Politics." *In These Times* 9 July 2001. 5 June 2003 <http://www.inthesetimes.com/issue/25/16/duberman2516.html>.

Duberman, Martin, Martha Vicinus, and George Chauncey, Jr., eds. *Hidden from History: Reclaiming the Gay and Lesbian Past*. New York: Penguin, 1989.

Foreman, P. Gabrielle. "'This Promiscuous Housekeeping': Death, Transgression, and Homoeroticism in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*." *Representations* 43 (1993): 51–72.

Friedman, Susan Stanford. "Beyond White and Other: Relationality and Narratives of Race in Feminist Discourse." *Signs* 21 (1995): 1–49.

Furnas, J. C. *Goodbye to Uncle Tom*. New York: Sloane, 1956.

Gillman, Susan. "The Mulatto, Tragic or Triumphant? The Nineteenth-Century American Race Melodrama." Samuels 221–43.

Grimké, Angelina. "Appeal to the Christian Women of the South." *Anti-slavery Examiner* Sept. 1836: 1–36.

———. *Letters to Catharine E. Beecher, in Reply to* An Essay on Slavery and Abolitionism, Addressed to A. E. Grimké. Boston: Isaac Knapp, 1838.

Halperin, David M. "Is There a History of Sexuality?" *The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader*. Ed. Henry Abelove, Michèle Aina Barale, and Halperin. New York: Routledge, 1993. 416–31.

Hedrick, Joan D. *Harriet Beecher Stowe: A Life*. New York: Oxford UP, 1994.

Hirsch, Stephen A. "Uncle Tomitudes: The Popular Reaction to *Uncle Tom's Cabin*." *Studies in the American Renaissance*. Ed. Joel Meyerson. Boston: Twayne, 1978. 303–30.

Jacobs, Harriet A. *Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, Written by Herself*. 1861. Ed. and introd. Jean Fagan Yellin. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1987.

Jehlen, Myra. "The Family Militant: Domesticity versus Slavery in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*." *Criticism* 31 (1989): 383–400.

Kawash, Samira. *Dislocating the Color Line: Identity, Hybridity, and Singularity in African-American Literature*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997.

Lang, Amy Schrager. "Slavery and Sentimentalism: The Strange Career of Augustine St. Clare." *Women's Studies* 12 (1986): 31–54.

Lott, Eric. *Love and Theft: Blackface Minstrelsy and the American Working Class*. New York: Oxford UP, 1993.

Lubiano, Wahneema. "Like Being Mugged by a Metaphor: Multiculturalism and State Narratives." *Mapping Multiculturalism*. Ed. Avery F. Gordon and Christopher Newfield. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1996. 64–75.

McDowell, Deborah E., and Arnold Rampersad, eds. *Slavery and the Literary Imagination*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1989.

Mercer, Kobena. *Welcome to the Jungle: New Positions in Black Cultural Studies*. New York: Routledge, 1994.

Morrison, Toni. *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination*. New York: Vintage, 1992.

Powell, Timothy B., ed. *Beyond the Binary: Reconstructing Cultural Identity in a Multicultural Context*. New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1999.

Romero, Lora. *Home Fronts: Domesticity and Its Critics in the Antebellum United States*. Durham: Duke UP, 1997.

Samuels, Shirley, ed. *The Culture of Sentiment: Race, Gender, and Sentimentality in Nineteenth-Century America*. New York: Oxford UP, 1992.

Sánchez-Eppler, Karen. "Bodily Bonds: The Intersecting Rhetorics of Feminism and Abolition." Samuels 92–114.

Smith, Valerie. "'Circling the Subject': History and Narrative in *Beloved*." *Toni Morrison: Critical Perspectives Past and Present*. Ed. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., and Kwame Anthony Appiah. New York: Amistad, 1993. 342–55.

———. *Not Just Race, Not Just Gender: Black Feminist Readings*. New York: Routledge, 1998.

Somerville, Siobhan. *Queering the Color Line: Race and the Invention of Homosexuality in American Culture*. Durham: Duke UP, 2000.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. "In a Word." *Differences* 1.2 (1989): 124–56.

———. "Strategy, Identity, Writing." *The Post-colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues*. Ed. Sarah Harasym. New York: Routledge, 1990. 35–49.

Stern, Julia. "Spanish Masquerade and the Drama of Racial Identity in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*." *Passing and the Fictions of Identity*. Ed. Elaine Ginsberg. Durham: Duke UP, 1996. 103–30.

Stowe, Harriet Beecher. *Uncle Tom's Cabin; or, Life among the Lowly*. 1852. Ed. and introd. Ann Douglas. New York: Penguin, 1981.

Sundquist, Eric. Introduction. Sundquist, *New Essays* 1–44.

———, ed. *New Essays on* Uncle Tom's Cabin. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986.

Toll, Robert C. *Blacking Up: The Minstrel Show in Nineteenth-Century America*. New York: Oxford UP, 1974.

Tompkins, Jane. *Sensational Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction, 1790–1860*. New York: Oxford UP, 1985.

Van Leer, David. *The Queening of America: Gay Culture in Straight Society*. New York: Routledge, 1995.

Wiegman, Robyn. *American Anatomies: Theorizing Race and Gender*. Durham: Duke UP, 1995.

Wonham, Henry B., ed. *Criticism and the Color Line: Desegregating American Literary Studies*. New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1996.

Yarborough, Richard. "Strategies of Black Characterization in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* and the Early Afro-American Novel." Sundquist, *New Essays* 45–84.

Yellin, Jean Fagan. "Doing It Herself: *Uncle Tom's Cabin* and Woman's Role in the Slavery Crisis." Sundquist, *New Essays* 85–105.

Young, Robert. *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West*. New York: Routledge, 1990.

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X67983 Published online by Cambridge University Press