ANTIPHON

M. GAGARIN: *Antiphon the Athenian. Oratory, Law, and Justice in the Age of the Sophists*. Pp. xi + 222. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002. Cased, $40. ISBN: 0-292-72841-7.

A. HOURCADE: *Antiphon d'Athènes. Une pensée de l'individu*. Pp. 182. Paris: Editions OUSIA, 2001. Paper. ISBN: 2-87060-091-7.

At last, Antiphon is made whole! Two elegant new books argue that Antiphon the Orator (author of *Against the Stepmother*, *On the Murder of Herodes*, and the *Tetralogies*) and Antiphon the Sophist (author of *On Concord* and *On Truth*) are one and the same. Both these Antiphons are also the same as a third: Antiphon, the dream interpreter. And let us not forget: Antiphon the orator was also Antiphon the oligarch, executed for his lead rôle in the coup of 411. Rather than facing a late fifth-century corpus with multiple Antiphons, scholars now have an Antiphon who harbored multiplicity in his own soul. Or did he? Michael Gagarin and Annie Hourcade offer varying accounts of Antiphon's intellectual life. Although they both explore his ideas about law and nature in detail, they finally yield two quite different sorts of thinker-politician.

The publication in 1915 and 1922 of two substantial new sections of *On Truth* gave twentieth-century scholars the chance to compare the ideas of Antiphon the Sophist to those of Antiphon the Orator for compatibility. But the result was that the author of *On Truth* was generally taken to have a 'radical, even anarchical, view of human society' (G., p. 7) in no way compatible with the political conservatism one assumes would motivate the head of an oligarchic coup. On what basis can one claim that Antiphon the Sophist and Antiphon the Orator are the same? The testimonia that have been the basis for the 'separatist' view are actually fairly weak, so both G. and H. can and do rest their 'unitarian' case on the argument that the combined corpus in fact reveals remarkable intellectual consistency. They offer deft new readings of *On Truth*, *On Concord*, and also, in G.'s case, of the forensic oratory and *Tetralogies*, that draw all these texts together. But then there is the question of what sort of Antiphon emerges.

For G., 'Antiphon the Athenian' was a public intellectual who mediated relationships between the theoretical world of the sophists and the practical world of forensic oratory. Adopting a sophistic concern for the relation between law and nature and between likelihoods and facts, he made theory the basis of the sound rhetorical techniques on display in his speeches. The *Tetralogies* are the middle term in Antiphon's corpus. They are theoretical—and hints of their antilogical structure show up in *On Truth*—but, cast as court speeches, they are also already oriented toward the practical world of the courts. G.'s Antiphon does not take much note of the problem of multiplicity, or internal struggle, within the human soul. He is, really, a smart but practical guy, capable of converting insights from the intellectual circles of his day into technical expertise. He should be considered the fountainhead of fourth-century oratory.

H.'s Antiphon is a more serious thinker (or sophist or philosopher—as you like). He was a pessimist, almost a Nietzschean 'avant l'heure' who saw an atomist multiplicity within every individual human soul, struggled with this multiplicity within himself, and expressed it in his encyclopedic writings and diverse actions—for a time working within a legal system against which he chafed but in the end struggling to overturn it. H.'s account of how Antiphon's key terms and ideas (*nomos*, *physis*, *gnome*, *homonoia*,

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psyche, *soma*, pleasure, pain, and cause and effect) fit together is by far the more satisfying. She mines the Presocratic tradition for parallels between Antiphon and earlier thinkers, the most important connection being with Democritus, to reveal an Antiphon who was the first theorist of radical individuality, hence her title. There are several steps to the argument, and they provide Antiphon with an epistemology and metaphysics before finally leading to his ethics and politics (which are what we want to get to, since what we really want to know is why he initiated the coup).

She argues convincingly that Antiphon held, *contra* an earlier generation of sophists, that what our senses perceive as existing does exist, but judgement (*gnome*) is better than the senses at understanding what is (which is to say, nature), including dreams. Dreams are not stories put into our heads by the gods who have ordained, somehow, what dream symbols mean; they are a primitive form of thought whose content judgement can discern. If a runner dreams that he is riding in a chariot, it is not the case that he will win his race because chariots signify victory in some predetermined lexicon of divine signs. Rather, his own mind is expressing worry about being behind other runners, and his mind represents that fear to himself in terms of his being behind four horses. In the same manner, *gnome* can explain all of nature.

Rational investigations reveal no life beyond this one, so life is an end in itself. Pleasure is a sign of that which advances life, pain of what hinders it, so H.'s Antiphon is a theorist of interest. Anything that advances pleasure and, so, life is in accord with nature. The hard part of life is that, whenever we act, we involve ourselves in chains of causality that cannot be undone, and unless we are cautious, we are likely to get ourselves in situations where, having provoked harm to others—even over lengthy chains of causality—we are likely to be harmed ourselves in return. We are especially likely to bring harm onto our own heads if we accept the law's injunction to pursue the collective good rather than our own. Thus, a witness who testifies against someone he does not know and who has never harmed him specifically helps the city but also opens himself up to revenge from the defendant or the defendant's associates. (Witness protection programs are the best evidence of the type of conflict between the good of the individual and the good of the state that Antiphon cares about.)

Unfortunately, the law regularly makes us do things that are neither for our own good nor to our pleasure, so it is best that we obey it only when there are witnesses around—for to have to endure violence at the hands of the majority through punishment is also against nature—but in private we should do as nature tends. True concord, both for the individual and the city, is a life equilibrated to nature. The city's laws *could* be in accord with nature, but most often they are not. Concord in the city is achieved not through decrees or oaths, but only when all the individuals living together are able to live each of them with internal concord, avoiding the sorts of chains of causality that would put one individual's interests at odds with the interests of another. And for any individual to achieve concord in her own soul requires that she manage the internal multiplicity that is analogous to the tension between the whole individual and the laws of the city. Antiphon's arguments against law, his anarchic positions, that is, are not so much against law *per se* as against majoritarianism. The sophist's arguments are anti-democratic, in this sense. Orator and sophist are thus brought back together again.

At no point in her analysis of Antiphon does H. overread. On the contrary, she does an exceptionally subtle job of unpacking the conceptual implications even of phrase-length fragments, frequently supporting her interpretations with parallels from Democritus and elsewhere in the Presocratic corpus. She offers convincing, substantive readings of many passages that G. either overlooks or brushes off as superficial irony

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or polemic. She does not, however, do more than gesture at analyzing the forensic oratory. While she makes a couple of brilliant points about how Antiphon's view that the soul affects the body's qualities (and not vice versa as the Hippocratics thought) surfaces in his forensic oratory, one needs to turn to G. for analysis of the speeches. In fact, his excellent readings of the *Tetralogies* and of Antiphon's views of the usefulness and meaning of probability arguments take on even more power against the backdrop of H.'s larger arguments about Antiphon on causality.

Anyone interested in Antiphon should read both books. Were one to read one only, one would by the end of that book have the feeling that Humpty-Dumpty had not quite been put back together again: a philosopher emerges from one book and a legal theorist from the other. To have a single, whole Antiphon, finally, we have to put H. and G. together, too. Start with H., then read G., and then one can see how the person who wrote *On Truth*, the *Tetralogies*, and *Against the Stepmother*, could also have been a renowned dream interpreter and the head of an oligarchic coup.

A man whose philosophically grounded political caution gave him a long life with many and diverse opportunities finally threw his caution to the wind. As H. writes: 'L'engagement final d'Antiphon, à près de soixante-dix ans, dans ce coup d'État extrêmement risqué ayant eu les conséquences que l'on sait, laisse augurer de sa part une précipitation dont il s'est pourtant gardé toute sa vie. Sans aucun doute a-t-il fini, en voulant pourtant le combattre, par être lui-même la victime du *nomos*' (p. 141).

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NEAIRA'S STORY

D. HAMEL: *Trying Neaira. The True Story of a Courtesan's Scandalous Life in Ancient Greece*. Pp. xxiii + 200, maps, ills. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003. Cased, £16.95. ISBN: 0-300-09431-0.

On the dust jacket of *Trying Neaira: the True Story of a Courtesan's Scandalous Life in Ancient Greece* is a detail from Jean-Léon Gérôme's mid-nineteenth-century painting 'Phryne before the Areopagus' in which a woman stands white and naked before a jury of dark faced and leering men. The choice of both illustration and subtitle are puzzling—given that the main argument of the book itself challenges the veracity of the portrait of Neaira and her 'family' presented to the Athenian jury by the notoriously litigious Apollodorus, son of the wealthy ex-slave Pasion and bitter enemy of the man with whom Neaira lived. In his speech charging Neaira with *xenia* (fraudulent claim to citizenship), Apollodorus does his best (or worst) to show Neaira to be a woman of 'scandalous' sexual promiscuity, which she has thoroughly taught to her (alleged) daughter Phano, whose performance of sacred rights in behalf of the city is the most egregious scandal of all. H.'s argument seems to be that Apollodorus is an out and out 'mud-slinger', and that although Neaira was in fact raised as a slave prostitute, at the time of the trial she had been living for some thirty years as a free woman in a respectable domestic arrangement with an Athenian man who already had legitimate sons—and probably also a legitimate daughter (i.e. Phano

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