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Working through the issues: how issue diversity and ideological disagreement influence coalition duration

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Issue salience and diversity direct a range of outcomes such as voting behavior and public policy. Studies, however, have yet to fully integrate theoretical or empirical expectations for the effect of issue salience on coalition stability. By focusing on the mechanism linking parties' preferences to policy-making, I propose that parties with more diverse platforms provide coalitions greater room to negotiate, whereas parties focusing on a small number of issues exacerbate ideological tensions. Issue diversity becomes important once parties exhaust opportunities to make the initial, easy policy compromises. Using evidence from 299 coalitions in 24 European countries, I find that issue diversity in parties' platforms moderates the effect of disagreement. Using a non-proportional hazard analysis, I find that the effect of issue diversity varies over the coalition's lifecycle. Governments with parties willing to negotiate over a larger range of issues decrease the risk that disagreements will result in coalition termination.

Keywords: issue attention; issue diversity; coalition duration; ideological disagreement; policy change

Introduction

Issue salience directs a range of political outcomes: parties selectively campaign on issues to attract votes (Petrocik, 1996; De Vries and Hobolt, 2012), coalition negotiations for ministries depend on parties' preferences for specific topics (Bäck *et al.*, 2011; Dandoy, 2014; Falcó-Gimeno, 2014), and governments distribute public policies consistent with their expressed issue priorities (Bevan *et al.*, 2011). Parties prioritize important issues by dedicating their resources to them in government. In coalition settings, however, policy negotiations and broad disagreements between parties limit each individual party's ability to unilaterally dictate policy on each issue. Instead, parties must find policy compromises.

Despite evidence of issue salience's importance for a range of outcomes, little theoretical or empirical work explores its implications on coalition stability and duration. Popular accounts of coalition termination, however, emphasize that not only disagreement, but also the salience of an issue matter to the stability of governing coalitions. News reports often explain that coalition governments in

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Belgium, for example, fall apart due to disagreement on issues of regional autonomy, an extremely salient issue for most parties (for instance, see Traynor, 2010).[1] Extending this perspective further, I propose that the distribution of parties' attention to issues in statements of preferences influences coalition stability. Like the Belgian anecdote, I predict that the presence of cabinet parties dedicating the majority of their emphasis to a small number of issues increase the chance that disagreements end the coalition prematurely. In contrast, cabinets that include parties that distribute their attention to a wider range of issues decrease the risk that disagreement leads to early dissolution; these parties are more open to negotiating policy on a wider range of topics.

I demonstrate support for this perspective by predicting coalition duration using a Cox proportional hazards model with data from the *European Representative Democracy Database* for 299 coalition governments in 24 European Democracies from 1945 to 2010 (Andersson *et al*., 2014). To this data, I add a measure of issue diversity in parties' election campaigns, the Effective Number of Manifesto Issues (ENMI). Like measures used to study issue diversity in public opinion (McCombs and Zhu, 1995), election campaigns (Greene, 2015), ideological dimensionality (Stoll, 2011), attention in parliament (e.g. Bevan *et al*., 2011; Jennings *et al*., 2011), or policy change (Boydstun *et al*., 2014), this variable captures the relative concentration in each party's platform to a small or large number of issues. The results demonstrate that higher levels of ideological disagreement between coalition members increase the risk of termination when coupled with parties that emphasize only a small number of issues. Consistent with the theory, coalition parties' ENMI moderates the effect of ideological disagreement. Furthermore, the discovery of non-proportional hazards (NPH) in the analysis also provides broad evidence in support of the causal mechanism: the effect of the key variables change over time as coalition parties reevaluate the current value of staying in office. This effect is consistent with a story in which coalitions dedicate resources and time to topics that facilitate easy collaboration before shifting to more divisive issues.

These results hold important implications for research on party and coalition behavior as well as our broad conceptions of democratic accountability. Like recent findings related to manifesto construction and government participation (e.g. Dandoy, 2014), these results help connect studies of parliamentary behavior to research on election strategy, policy agendas, and coalition negotiations. The evidence is consistent with an explanation in which parties' priorities for policy on issues work in tandem with ideological disagreement to determine a range of outcomes. While the specific issues in parties' platforms may reflect their electoral motivations, the distribution of their attention to these issues in office reflects their attempts to pursue policy consistent with their electoral pledges. Furthermore, the results suggest that policy compromise may be more easily facilitated among parties

[1] According to the ERDDA, Belgian coalitions last approximately 1 year 8 months in the sample.

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that are not only ideologically close, but also among parties campaigning on a wide range of topics.

Coalitions and party preferences

A multitude of factors influence the length of time coalition governments stay together (Laver, 2003; Saalfeld, 2008).[2] Scholars show that ideological preferences play a key role in explaining coalition duration (e.g. Laver and Shepsle, 1996; Tsebelis, 2002; Laver, 2003; Saalfeld, 2008; Maoz and Somer-Topçu, 2010). Warwick (1994), for example, shows that the relative preferences of coalition members influence the cabinet's ability to generate policy outputs. Tsebelis (2002) adds that greater ideological distance between partisan veto players limits the coalition's ability to produce policy changes. Broadly, these theories predict that ideologically diverse coalitions have a limited range of policies on which they can agree to develop policies. These coalitions end earlier than ideologically compact coalitions because they will have difficulty responding to changing world events.

Party preferences also influence cabinet stability by impacting parties' alternate coalition options. Ideologically connected coalitions – those where all parties represented in parliament holding preferences falling between the most ideologically extreme coalition partners are included – increase coalition stability because few possible alternative coalition configurations would be more preferred by coalition parties (de Swaan, 1973; Warwick, 1979, 1992, 1994; Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999). The relative location of parties' preferences also matters. Moderate or 'centrist' parties increase cabinets' stability (Van Roozendaal, 1997). Laver and Shepsle (1996) add that the participation of parties that hold the median seat on the primary dimensions of conflict in parliament (and the corresponding cabinet portfolios) increase the coalition's stability. These parties gain little benefit from alternate coalition arrangements. Alternatively, some evidence indicates that ideologically central parties may increase the likelihood of failure because they possess greater options for different coalition partners and make fewer policy plans in advance (Maoz and Somer-Topçu, 2010).

Altogether, these studies find that preferences play an important role in coalition duration. An underlying theme in this research shows that preferences limit parties' options for alternate coalition configurations or constrain coalitions' abilities to negotiate policy compromises. Despite these advances, few studies consider the combined influence of party preferences and issue salience for coalition behavior.

[2] Following Laver, I define coalition duration as the 'elapsed time between the formation of a government and its termination' (2003: 24). I consider government terminations from the following causes: 'There is an election; the Prime Minister changes; the partisan composition of the cabinet changes; the government voluntarily or involuntarily resigns and the head of state subsequently accepts this resignation' (Laver, 2003: 26).

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However, research on coalition formation and policy change highlights the role of issue salience. There is evidence that both issue priorities and preferences influence government formation and behavior. Coalition negotiations, for instance, take longer between more ideologically distant parties (Martin and Vanberg, 2003). Future cabinet parties prioritize salient issues in their negotiations for cabinet portfolios (Bäck *et al.*, 2011). Ideologically divisive coalitions often face delegation problems when issues become salient, although parliamentary rules provide governments with the tools to overcome many disagreements (Martin and Vanberg, 2005, 2011, 2014). For example, coalition parties appoint oversight 'watchdog' junior ministers to portfolios with jurisdictions covering salient issues to monitor their coalition partners. Issue salience is particularly important for ministers from ideologically distant parties (Thies, 2001; Martin and Vanberg, 2011; Greene and Jensen, 2014). Parties are less likely to engage in oversight activities on portfolios, however, when the issue is tangential to their own issue priorities (Falcó-Gimeno, 2014). More broadly, principal-agent perspectives show that policies often represent a compromise between coalition parties' preferences and priorities (Martin and Vanberg, 2011, 2014).

There is evidence that ideological disagreement and issue salience in coalition settings hold further consequences for government policies. Parties' issue priorities, for example, often lead to changes in policy (see e.g. Hibbs, 1977; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010; Bevan *et al.*, 2011; Bevan and Greene, 2016). Bevan *et al.* (2011) show that the distribution of issues within parties' agenda leads to consistent policy changes, although world events and economic conditions constrain governments' ability to focus solely on partisan goals (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010). Research from a veto player perspective adds that the relative distance between parties limits the range of potential changes to *status quo* policies (Tsebelis, 2002).

Altogether, studies of coalition behavior, party preferences, and issue salience illustrate a complex relationship. Like this research, I propose that issue salience and disagreement jointly constrain parties' abilities to govern effectively. Coalitions incapable of maintaining and developing broad compromises due to disagreements on *salient* issues end prematurely. Governments prepared to negotiate their resources on a wide range of issues can last longer in the face of disagreement.

Hypotheses on the consequences of issue diversity and party preferences

In this section, I outline the logic for hypotheses linking issue diversity and policy disagreement to coalition duration. I propose that coalitions composed of parties willing to compromise on a greater diversity of issues will be more stable than coalitions containing parties compromising on a narrower range of topics. Issue diversity and salience moderate the effect ideological disagreements have on coalition parties' ability to negotiate policy compromise. Coalitions unable to respond to policy demands on important issues will be forced to end sooner than

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more flexible coalitions able to pursue policy change on a diverse set of issues. Consequently, the effect of issue diversity will be greatest later in the coalition's term.

Issue salience and diversity are important for policy change and coalition stability because they indicate the breadth of parties' policy goals and motivation to develop policies. Following from electoral accountability and issue attention perspectives, parties in a coalition government will be unwilling to consider policy compromises on issues they excluded from their election campaigns. Addressing these issues will make the parties appear unaccountable for the issues they emphasized in their election campaigns (e.g. Downs, 1957; Carey, 2008; Kam, 2009).[3] Furthermore, the issues parties did not include in their campaigns are likely to be those that coalition parties sought to avoid in the last election due to their historic policy reputations, the rise of issue focused competitors, or because they hold relatively unpopular positions on those issues (e.g. Petrocik, 1996; Meguid, 2005, 2008; de Vries and Hobolt, 2012; Greene, 2015).

Past research indicates that focused attention on issues guides parties' behavior in government. Parties gain cabinet portfolios consistent with their most salient issues (e.g. Bäck *et al.*, 2011), use oversight mechanisms on portfolios containing salient issues controlled by their coalition partners (e.g. Martin and Vanberg, 2011; Greene and Jensen, 2014), and even implement policies relating to their most salient issues (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010; Bevan *et al.*, 2011). The logic follows that an overly narrow issue focus ties the hands of parties if they intend to foster an image of accountability.

Instead, parties that distribute their attention to a wide range of topics are likely freer to develop policies in the face of ideological disagreement. From this perspective, parties campaign broadly across issues to attract support, but avoid perceptions of incompetence or a lack of accountability. Disagreements over any single issue become less important, as coalition parties have more discretion to develop policies across a range of topics.[4] Furthermore, by spreading attention across numerous issues, parties' positions on individual issues likely become ambiguous or blurred (e.g. Shepsle, 1972; Rovny, 2012, 2013; Somer-Topcu, 2015;

[3] Parties value policy accountability either because they are policy motivated or instrumentally in order to avoid being labeled as lacking accountability (Strøm, 1990).

[4] This framework fits well with the logic of Kirchheimer's (1990) concept of the catch-all party. Kirchheimer (1990) argues that catch-all parties decrease their dependence on traditional ideological constituents by appealing to all constituencies in society. These parties address more diverse policies because they seek to maintain broad electoral support (Kirchheimer, 1990). For example, socialist parties across Europe seeking to widen their electoral appeal decreased their policy focus on labor issues and increased the breadth of issues in their platforms (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986). However, more issue or policy-focused parties such as green or anti-immigrant parties tend to be motivated by a specific, limited set of issues such as the environment or immigration. Although these parties also consider their electoral success, they historically tend to be motivated more by their policy goals than socialist or conservative parties that offer more comprehensive electoral platforms (Adams *et al.*, 2006; Spoon, 2011; Meyer and Wagner, 2013; Meyer and Miller, 2015).

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Greene, 2015).[5] Log rolls or policy trades on relatively unimportant issues they addressed in their platforms become possible because the parties do not fear appearing unaccountable.

Issue salience also plays an important role in contexts with little disagreement. When cabinet preferences are relatively close, parties allow greater discretion to their coalition partners. The risk of policy disagreements on an issue decreases when parties hold similar preferences. Coalition parties, for example, are less likely to engage in policy oversight using tools such as junior ministers to monitor ideologically close coalition partners (Thies, 2001; Lipsmeyer and Pierce, 2011; Martin and Vanberg, 2011; Greene and Jensen, 2014). More broadly, legislative involvement in the implementation of policies increases along with the degree of conflict between the minister and coalition parties to reduce the likelihood of ministerial drift (Franchino and Høyland, 2009). Parties receive cabinet portfolios (Bäck *et al.*, 2011) and use junior ministers on the issues most salient to them (Greene and Jensen, 2014). Because they dedicate greater relative attention to those issues, parties that only emphasize a small number of issues in an otherwise ideological cohesive coalition, therefore, likely earn more policy discretion on these issues.[6] From this perspective, ideologically close parties allow each other discretion to oversee the policy implementation of their most salient issues.

The effect of disagreement will be strongest on issues that the partners hold most salient. Ideological disagreement decreases the range of acceptable changes to the *status quo* (Tsebelis, 2002). Parties overly focused on a small number of issues signal their unwillingness to negotiate or compromise on policies addressing those topics.[7] To these parties, deviation from their limited set of salient issues redirects

[5] Scholars dedicate substantial attention to the role of parties' preferences and issue salience in election campaigns. See for example, Adams (1999), Ezrow (2007), Green and Hobolt (2008), Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009), Somer-Topcu (2009), Ezrow *et al.* (2011), Green (2011), Spoon (2011), de Vries and Hobolt (2012), and Greene (2015).

[6] In this context, coalition ministers may have greater autonomy akin to Laver and Shepsle's (1996) portfolio dictatorships.

[7] Unlike Laver and Shepsle (1996), this perspective assumes that ministers do not hold complete dictatorships over policy-making in their respective issue jurisdictions, but instead engage in compromise on each issue. Laver and Shepsle's (1996) approach might suggest that instead of perceiving coalitions as a series of issue-based compromises, parties are given complete discretion on the portfolios under their control. From their perspective, ENMI might matter differently, as parties with greater attention to a small number of issues would focus their policy resources on those issues. This would suggest that issue focused parties could engage in log rolls or policy trades that might instead increase the coalition's stability. Parties dedicating their attention to a smaller number of issues would provide coalitions with the opportunity to use log rolls between coalition partners to arrive at agreements. This approach would then suggest that parties focused intensely on a small number of issues might actually stabilize coalitions in the face of strong ideological disagreements by allowing for policy swaps across issues. There is substantial evidence, however, that coalitions use numerous tools to oversee the policy behaviors of coalition partners, particularly when they are ideologically distant and hold the portfolio's issues highly salient (e.g. Saalfeld, 2000; Thies, 2001; Lipsmeyer and Pierce, 2011; Martin and Vanberg, 2011; Greene and Jensen, 2014). Coalition oversight suggests that parties attempt to constrain the behaviors of ministers from other parties. This evidence is inconsistent with Laver and Sheplse's (1996) perspective of ministers as policy dictators.

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time and resources to issues other than those on which they campaigned. Attention to issues they excluded from their platforms increases the risk of appearing unaccountable and unfocused on their policy priorities. Given parliaments' limited resources (e.g. Döring, 2003), parties avoid attaching resources to issues they hold unimportant, particularly if the policy change would require greater compromise away from the party' position on that issue.

Although coalitions develop agreements on which issues they will compromise prior to forming a coalition (e.g. Golder, 2006; Bäck *et al.*, 2011; Eichorst, 2014; Greene and Jensen, 2014; Ibenskas, 2015), exogenous events cause other issues to become important. For example, changing economic conditions and world events necessitate that responsive cabinets address unforeseen topics (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010). The regular use of control mechanisms in coalition settings, such as junior ministers or parliamentary scrutiny, to monitor and oversee policies in coalition governance may even exacerbate policy-making tensions as ministers lack the discretion and flexibility to unilaterally determine policy (e.g. Saalfeld, 2000; Martin and Vanberg, 2011).[8] Like previous studies of coalition duration (e.g. Warwick, 1994), I assume that coalitions failing to deliver policies in response to unforeseen changes will terminate prematurely.

Altogether, I argue that the relative salience of issues in coalition parties' agendas moderates the effect of disagreement on government survival. Coalition parties emphasizing a large range of issues can work together more easily in the context of high disagreement, but coalitions of parties with strong emphasis on a small number of issues will be unwilling to negotiate policies in the face of large disagreements. At lower levels of disagreement, issue salience becomes less important as parties allow greater discretion to ministers or deliberate on policies broadly in advance. This logic leads to the first hypothesis.

HYPOTHESIS 1: Coalitions containing parties with a larger diversity of issues in their platforms reduce the effect of ideological disagreement, increasing the coalition's duration.

Policy compromise links the breadth and salience of parties' agendas to coalition duration. Coalitions consisting of parties incapable of collaborating and responding to world events will end prematurely (e.g. Warwick, 1994). Policy disagreements, however, take on different importance throughout the coalition's term in office. For example, the inability to agree on policy compromise might be less important immediately before a constitutionally mandated election than immediately following the coalition's formation (see e.g. Strøm and Swindle, 2002). Studies of

[8] The usage of tools such as junior ministers and parliamentary scrutiny on salient issues by coalition partners (e.g. Martin and Vanberg, 2011; Greene and Jensen, 2014), likely provides the mechanism for parties to monitor their coalition partners' policy drift (Thies, 2001). Other mechanisms for parliamentary oversight such as committees or resignation rules mean that salient divisions will likely cause coalitions to terminate more quickly as divisions have stronger consequences for coalition parties' policy images and ability to control government (Saalfeld, 2000).

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parliamentary behavior and policy often emphasize a link between parliamentary behavior, policy, and the timing of elections (Huber, 1996; Döring, 2003; Smith, 2003; Bevan and Greene, 2016). For example, coalitions work through easy policy compromises early in the legislative cycle before turning to more difficult policy areas (Martin and Vanberg, 2008). Likewise, governments are more likely to use parliamentary procedures to contrast individual MPs' differences with their own leadership leading up to elections (Huber, 1996).

Connecting this research to coalition behavior, I hypothesize that issue salience and disagreement will take on greater importance later in the legislative cycle. Policies agreed upon in coalition negotiations require time for governments to implement. Coalitions will need to develop solutions to large ideological disagreements prior to forming a government (Maoz and Somer-Topçu, 2010). The benefits to staying involved in a coalition government also decrease as new constitutionally mandated elections approach. Disagreements, therefore, become more important as the value of staying in office decreases and unanticipated issues arise later in the coalition cycle.

This perspective implies that the effect of issue salience is not immediate. Being capable of compromising on a wide range of issues only becomes important once the initially agreed upon policies are implemented or new, unexpected policy demands are placed on the government. Based on this logic, I predict that the moderating effect of issue diversity will only become important later in the legislative cycle (once initial compromises have been completed).

HYPOTHESIS 2: The moderating effect of issue diversity will be stronger later in the legislative cycle (as the next constitutionally mandated election nears).

Data and methods

I operationalize the dependent variable as the coalition's number of days in office before it terminates into a new coalition that contains a different set of parties or an election is held. Similar to Saalfeld (2008) and Diermeier and Stevenson (1999), I analyze the joint risk of coalition terminations in a competing risk framework to test for the alternate logics leading to each type of failure: a new cabinet or a new election.[9] For the combined risk, I pool together all failures and right-censor terminations occurring for technical reasons such as the death of the prime minister or to regularly scheduled elections. The data on coalition duration and composition comes from the *European Representative Democracy Data Archive* (ERDDA) (Andersson *et al*., 2014).[10] I only include coalition governments or those cabinets

[9] Like Strøm and Swindle (2002), I count early elections as those held more than 90 days before the next mandatory election.

[10] I present the results from analyses using only the sample (15 countries up to 1999) from the *Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive* (PDDA) in the Appendix (Strøm *et al*., 2008).

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Table 1. Descriptive statistics

	Mean	Std. dev.	Minimum	Maximum	Count
Duration in days	737	518	11	1935	299
Ideological disagreement	0.488	0.356	0	1.73	299
ENMI	17.1	4.4	5.5	26.3	299
Surplus majority coalition	0.298	0.458	0	1	299
Minimum winning coalition	0.475	0.5	0	1	299
Ideologically connected coalition	0.522	0.5	0	1	299
Dimension by dimension median	0.308	0.462	0	1	299
Parliamentary range	1.11	0.526	0.0919	3.03	299
Presidentialism	0.144	0.351	0	1	299
Bicameralism	0.181	0.385	0	1	299
Absolute majority confidence	0.197	0.399	0	1	299
Constructive confidence	0.147	0.355	0	1	299
Unemployment rate	6.88	4.24	0.1	19.6	267
Inflation	10.1	23.4	−3	210	287
Days to next election	1228	418	39	1935	299

ENMI = Effective Number of Manifesto Issues.

containing more than one party according to the ERDDA because the hypotheses do not directly predict the ability of a single-party government to maintain parliamentary support. The resulting sample includes 299 coalition governments in 24 European Democracies from 1945 to 2010.[11] On average, coalitions last approximately 737 days with a std. dev. of 518 days. Descriptive statistics for the dependent and primary independent variables are presented in Table 1.

While a substantial literature discusses the measurement of government survival as a dependent variable, the operationalization of salience and breadth, namely issue diversity, of issues in parties' agendas is less clear. However, public policy and media scholars have long been interested in studying the size of the government or media policy agenda (see e.g. McCombs and Zhu, 1995; John and Jennings, 2010; Jennings *et al.*, 2011; Boydstun *et al.*, 2014). Like these scholars I convert a measure of entropy, Shannon's H, to a measure of diversity (see the Appendix) to characterize both the overall number of topics and their relative salience in parties' platforms using data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (Volkens *et al.*, 2015). In particular, I measure the effective number of issues in parties' platforms (ENMI).[12]

[11] The sample includes observations from all coalition governments in Austria (1949–2008), Belgium (1946–2007), Bulgaria(2005), Czech Republic (1992–2010), Denmark (1950–2007), Estonia (1995–2009), Finland (1945–2007), France (1959–99), Germany (1949–2009), Greece (1989), Iceland (1946–2009), Ireland (1948–2007), Italy (1946–2006), Latvia (1998–2006), Lithuania (2000–01), Luxembourg (1945–2009), the Netherlands (1946–2010), Norway (1963–2009), Poland (1991–2007), Portugal (1978–85), Romania (1991–2009), Slovakia (1998–2010), Slovenia (1990–2008), and Sweden (1951–2006).

[12] For similar measures of issue salience and party politics, see Nyblade (2004), Stoll (2011), or Greene (2015).

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


Figure 1 Coalition's average Effective Number of Manifesto Issues (C-ENMI) over time.

For the main analysis, I aggregate this variable to the coalition level by finding the average coalition ENMI. I refer to this variable as C-ENMI or the coalition's average ENMI.[13] Figure 1 presents C-ENMI over the course of the sample with selective country labels. Like individual parties' ENMI (e.g. Greene, 2015), there is an upward trend overall, as parties and consequently cabinets now discuss more issues in the past.[14] See the Appendix for additional discussion of the primary independent variable.

Using the coalition's average ENMI as a general measure of their priority for detailed policy goals or collaboration on a larger number of issues, I then create an interaction between the C-ENMI and the level of ideological disagreement in the coalition.[15] I measure ideological disagreement as the distance between the coalition's most extreme parties using Lowe *et al.*'s (2011)

[13] See the Online Appendix for a more detailed discussion of ENMI.

[14] Intriguingly, C-ENMI is only weakly associated with coalition duration in the full sample (Pearson's correlation coefficient 0.19). ENMI does more than capture the difference between party size. The variables only weakly correlate (0.1). For additional information on the construction and distribution of ENMI, see the Appendix.

[15] Results are similar for models that use the coalition-party as the unit of analysis, although the effect of nearly all the independent variables becomes non-proportional, suggesting that the effect of these variables on parties' strategies is likely different depending on the point in the coalition's lifecycle. As an alternate strategy, I also ran the analysis using multiple measures of ENMI to account for the party with the lowest and the highest levels of ENMI in the coalition. Intriguingly, mean coalition ENMI performs the best as it integrates information from each of the coalition parties. For additional information and the results of these replications, see the Appendix.

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log scale.[16] I operationalize coalition disagreement as the absolute value of this difference. Larger values indicate greater disagreement, whereas smaller values indicate a more ideologically cohesive coalition.

In addition to the primary independent variables included in this analysis, I account for a number of theoretically important variables to control for the coalition's initial bargaining conditions. I control for the coalition type using dummy variables for minimum winning coalitions and surplus majority coalitions as measures from the ERDDA. Both types of coalitions likely last longer than the alternative: a minority coalition. I include a measure of ideologically connected coalitions using the measure from the ERDDA. The variable equals one when all the parties in parliament that hold preferences on the primary dimension of conflict within the range of the most extreme coalition parties are members of the coalition (e.g. Warwick, 1979; Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999). In addition, I include a dummy variable that is equal to one if the coalition includes a party holding the median position on the most important and second most important ideological dimensions as measured by the ERDDA. Dimension by dimension median parties may increase the risk of termination as they potentially have a larger number of ideologically close coalition partners.[17] To control for the relative preferences of the greater legislative body and the potential for alternative coalition partners (Maoz and Somer-Topçu, 2010), I measure the amount of polarization in the larger legislative body. I measure polarization as the difference between the left-right positions of the most extreme parties in the legislature using Lowe *et al.*'s (2011) logged left-right scale.

I also control for institutional factors by including dummy variables for whether there is a powerful upper house in a parliament, if the government requires an absolute majority confidence vote or a constructive vote of confidence, and whether there is a popularly elected president who can disband the cabinet (Müller and Strøm, 1999, 2003; Saalfeld, 2008; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, 2009; Elgie, 2011). I include a variable counting the days to the next mandatory election to account for differences in the Constitutional inter-election period (e.g. Lupia and Strøm, 1995). Finally, I control for electoral conditions at the end of the coalition by including the inflation and unemployment data from the ERDDA. Positive inflation and low unemployment both increase the risk of an early election as coalition parties expect voters to reward them for the economy (Saalfeld, 2008, 2013). I run the models with and without economic variables because these data are limited for earlier periods.

[16] While many scholars cite the shortcomings of the Comparative Manifestos Project left-right scale, they suggest improvements to this scale to make its estimates more reliable. In particular, Lowe *et al.* (2011) use a logged scale to more accurately measure the distribution of parties' preferences. This is slightly different than Saalfeld's (2008) analysis, which uses the original left-right scale.

[17] Data on pre- and post-electoral agreement and a count of the number of policies included in the coalition agreement are included in a sub-sample analysis of the data from the PDDA in the Appendix (Golder, 2006; Eichorst, 2014; Ibenskas, 2015). More expansive coalition agreements should suggest a more durable coalition. The results are substantively similar to those presented in the main analysis.

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Following from methodological advancements in the study of coalitions, I test the primary hypotheses using an event history framework. Event history models are more appropriate for longitudinal and comparative analysis than traditional cross-sectional time series regression techniques because event history analysis directly models the effect of the important variables on time in an essentially comparative framework rather than seeking to limit the impact of time on the analysis (King *et al.*, 1990; Warwick, 1992; Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004; Saalfeld, 2008). Like Saalfeld (2008), I adopt Diermeier and Stevenson's (1999) approach to estimating cabinet termination from a competing risks framework. This entails estimating three separate models of cabinet termination that account for right censoring in the dependent variable to analyze specific subsets of termination hazards (all terminations, replacement coalitions, and early elections). In addition, I account for right censoring in the data from a number of different sources unrelated to my theoretical perspective including terminations (the death of the Prime Minister or a regularly scheduled election). In the replacement and early election models, the estimates predict the risk of termination for coalitions that are replaced by new coalitions vs. coalitions that end in elections prior to the final constitutionally mandated date. I cluster the standard errors for all cabinets that follow an election to account for heterogeneity caused by the inclusion of multiple coalitions following the same election.[18]

Finally, the theory expects a violation in a key assumption inherent to most event history models, the proportional hazards assumption; I predict that the moderating effect of C-ENMI will change depending on the value of the dependent variable. Like previous analyses using NPH (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004; Licht, 2011), I include an interaction of the theoretically offending variables with the natural log of time.[19] This specification allows me to directly test whether the moderating effect of C-ENMI becomes more important later in a coalition's term in office. I present the results from the primary analyses in Tables 2–4. In each table, I first show the results of a simple analysis with only the key independent variables and the interaction with the log of time,[20] before presenting two sets of models without the time interaction and two models accounting for the non-proportionality.

[18] To account for potential confounding heterogeneity from country or period effects, I have run a series of robustness checks that include fixed effects for country and decades in a Weibull model, and shared frailty (random effects) for election date effects. These results are largely consistent with the theory and are presented in the Online Appendix.

[19] The models presented in Table 3 only include interactions with the variables proposed to violate the assumption. Robustness checks accounting for all variables that violate the proportional hazards assumption fail to converge in most cases. In an analysis that selectively controls for these violations to account for the strongest levels of significance, I find results substantively similar to those presented in the main analysis, although high levels of multicollinearity lead many models to not converge.

[20] Given the theoretical expectation for the violation of the Proportional Hazard Assumption, it is unsurprising that no variables are significant in a simple version of the model without the interaction of time.

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Table 2. Cox hazards analysis of the combined risk of coalition termination

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Simple	Not economic	Full	Not economic × ln(*t*)	Full × ln(*t*)
Ideological disagreement	1.301 (0.564)*	2.404 (0.519)***	2.466 (0.535)***	2.774 (0.574)***	2.723 (0.605)***
Ideological disagreement × C-ENMI	0.629 (0.089)***	−0.121 (0.029)***	−0.135 (0.030)***	0.636 (0.073)***	0.639 (0.077)***
Ideological disagreement × C-ENMI × ln(*t*)	−0.106 (0.011)***			−0.116 (0.010)***	−0.117 (0.010)***
C-ENMI	0.008 (0.023)	0.066 (0.023)**	0.081 (0.024)***	0.084 (0.027)**	0.091 (0.028)**
Surplus majority coalition		−0.592 (0.185)**	−0.578 (0.187)**	−0.831 (0.186)***	−0.804 (0.190)***
Minimum winning coalition		−1.017 (0.175)***	−0.962 (0.182)***	−1.134 (0.171)***	−1.059 (0.188)***
Ideologically connected coalition		0.164 (0.126)	0.148 (0.132)	0.186 (0.128)	0.184 (0.137)
Dimension by dimension median		0.009 (0.164)	0.045 (0.175)	0.004 (0.146)	0.041 (0.151)
Parliamentary range		−0.315 (0.138)*	−0.320 (0.143)*	−0.606 (0.146)***	−0.589 (0.157)***
Presidentialism		0.627 (0.210)**	0.453 (0.241)$^{+}$	0.592 (0.214)**	0.367 (0.255)
Bicameralism		0.657 (0.218)**	0.692 (0.203)***	0.589 (0.193)**	0.602 (0.184)**
Absolute majority confidence		0.236 (0.197)	0.326 (0.224)	0.047 (0.201)	0.158 (0.227)
Constructive confidence		−0.032 (0.175)	−0.214 (0.210)	−0.094 (0.210)	−0.263 (0.243)
Unemployment rate			0.047 (0.015)**		0.051 (0.016)**
Inflation			0.008 (0.002)***		0.005 (0.002)**
Days to next election		−0.002 (0.000)***	−0.002 (0.000)***	−0.002 (0.000)***	−0.002 (0.000)***
AIC	2329.555	2386.520	2060.424	2200.033	1893.052
BIC	2344.357	2434.626	2114.232	2251.839	1950.448
χ^2	114.350	189.145	185.638	435.760	441.190
Log likelihood	−1160.777	−1180.260	−1015.212	−1086.016	−930.526
Observations	299	299	267	299	267

C-ENMI = coalition's average Effective Number of Manifesto Issues; AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion. Results are from a Cox proportional hazards model of coalition duration. Coefficients represent the change in the baseline hazard of termination. Standard errors are clustered on the election date. *P*-values are presented in parentheses. A model including the economic variables and interactions with time do not converge.

All significance tests are two-tailed: $^{+}P < 0.10$, $^{*}P < 0.05$, $^{**}P < 0.01$, $^{***}P < 0.001$.

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Table 3. Cox hazards analysis of the risk of a replacement cabinet

	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Simple	Not economic	Full	Not economic × ln(*t*)	Full × ln(*t*)
Ideological disagreement	2.574 (0.743)***	2.843 (0.717)***	3.018 (0.801)***	3.391 (0.960)***	3.628 (1.028)***
Ideological disagreement × C-ENMI	1.068 (0.245)***	−0.170 (0.048)***	−0.182 (0.055)***	1.090 (0.261)***	1.005 (0.217)***
Ideological disagreement × C-ENMI × ln(*t*)	−0.185 (0.033)***			−0.191 (0.033)***	−0.181 (0.028)***
C-ENMI	0.039 (0.032)	0.087 (0.037)*	0.095 (0.042)*	0.116 (0.042)**	0.124 (0.046)**
Surplus majority coalition		0.103 (0.378)	0.010 (0.431)	−0.158 (0.385)	−0.275 (0.436)
Minimum winning coalition		−0.852 (0.360)*	−0.933 (0.396)*	−0.770 (0.409)$^{+}$	−0.906 (0.451)*
Ideologically connected coalition		0.231 (0.265)	0.101 (0.272)	0.250 (0.260)	0.163 (0.272)
Dimension by dimension median		−0.158 (0.284)	−0.139 (0.303)	−0.288 (0.325)	−0.322 (0.349)
Parliamentary range		−0.608 (0.297)*	−0.677 (0.321)*	−1.001 (0.359)**	−1.112 (0.378)**
Presidentialism		0.666 (0.285)*	0.587 (0.411)	0.662 (0.273)*	0.578 (0.407)
Bicameralism		0.451 (0.327)	0.610 (0.352)$^{+}$	0.135 (0.410)	0.389 (0.380)
Absolute majority confidence		0.405 (0.339)	0.743 (0.382)$^{+}$	0.182 (0.372)	0.486 (0.427)
Constructive confidence		0.018 (0.401)	−0.333 (0.454)	−0.097 (0.495)	−0.391 (0.540)
Unemployment rate			0.012 (0.028)		0.007 (0.031)
Inflation			0.011 (0.003)***		0.007 (0.003)*
Days to next election		0.001 (0.000)*	0.001 (0.000)**	0.001 (0.000)**	0.002 (0.000)***
AIC	705.207	793.320	671.707	695.574	587.925
BIC	720.009	841.425	725.515	747.381	645.321
χ^2	71.058	57.209	74.396	114.478	123.127
Log likelihood	−348.604	−383.660	−320.853	−333.787	−277.963
Observations	299	299	267	299	267

C-ENMI = coalition's average Effective Number of Manifesto Issues; AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion. Results are from a Cox non-proportional hazards model of coalition duration. Coefficients represent the change in the baseline hazard of termination. Standard errors are clustered on the election date. *P*-values are presented in parentheses.
All significance tests are two-tailed: $^{+}P < 0.10$, $^{*}P < 0.05$, $^{**}P < 0.01$, $^{***}P < 0.001$.

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Table 4. Cox hazards analysis of the risk of a cabinet ending in new elections

	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
	Simple	Not economic	Full	Not economic × ln(*t*)	Full × ln(*t*)
Ideological disagreement	1.545 (1.299)	2.989 (1.732)$^{+}$	1.543 (1.736)	3.937 (1.726)*	2.127 (1.845)
Ideological disagreement × C-ENMI	0.653 (0.116)***	−0.137 (0.092)	−0.083 (0.092)	0.536 (0.183)**	0.550 (0.195)**
Ideological disagreement × C-ENMI × ln(*t*)	−0.126 (0.020)***			−0.118 (0.026)***	−0.108 (0.027)***
C-ENMI	−0.002 (0.042)	0.049 (0.059)	0.052 (0.055)	0.055 (0.058)	0.046 (0.055)
Surplus majority coalition		−0.470 (0.390)	−0.732 (0.433)$^{+}$	−0.538 (0.417)	−0.779 (0.461)$^{+}$
Minimum winning coalition		−0.771 (0.338)*	−0.675 (0.390)$^{+}$	−0.919 (0.381)*	−0.791 (0.435)$^{+}$
Ideologically connected coalition		−0.079 (0.268)	−0.135 (0.325)	−0.066 (0.311)	−0.128 (0.378)
Dimension by dimension median		−0.411 (0.348)	−0.127 (0.382)	−0.399 (0.369)	−0.086 (0.392)
Parliamentary range		−0.129 (0.249)	−0.104 (0.271)	−0.309 (0.300)	−0.314 (0.341)
Presidentialism		0.257 (0.404)	0.420 (0.402)	0.171 (0.372)	0.262 (0.414)
Bicameralism		0.856 (0.383)*	0.844 (0.394)*	0.858 (0.391)*	0.765 (0.411)$^{+}$
Absolute majority confidence		−0.061 (0.453)	−0.041 (0.477)	−0.169 (0.441)	−0.210 (0.485)
Constructive confidence		−0.042 (0.317)	−0.224 (0.342)	0.018 (0.327)	−0.199 (0.395)
Unemployment rate			0.056 (0.037)		0.060 (0.036)$^{+}$
Inflation			0.013 (0.004)**		0.010 (0.004)*
Days to next election		−0.006 (0.001)***	−0.006 (0.001)***	−0.005 (0.001)***	−0.005 (0.001)***
AIC	553.332	424.445	378.465	398.071	356.904
BIC	568.134	472.551	432.274	449.877	414.300
χ^2	43.299	120.320	111.250	172.772	207.484
Log likelihood	−272.666	−199.223	−174.233	−185.035	−162.452
Observations	299	299	267	299	267

C-ENMI = coalition's average Effective Number of Manifesto Issues; AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion. Results are from a Cox hazards model of coalition duration. Coefficients represent the change in the baseline hazard of termination. Standard errors are clustered on the election date. *P*-values are presented in parentheses.
All significance tests are two-tailed: $^{+}P < 0.10$, $^{*}P < 0.05$, $^{**}P < 0.01$, $^{***}P < 0.001$.

Results

The results from the Cox hazards model in each table provide evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1; the coefficient for C-ENMI and its interaction with ideological disagreement is negative in the models that do not include the interaction of time. Coalitions with larger coalition C-ENMI reduce the risk of failure caused by ideological disagreement. These coefficients are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level for the combined risk and replacement risk models. The coefficients are in the correct direction in the election risk models, but not significantly different from 0.

To show this effect for replacement cabinets, Figure 2 predicts the hazard rate for cabinets at risk of replacement at high levels of disagreement (1 std. dev. above the mean) for two levels of C-ENMI (1 std. dev. below and above the mean level of C-ENMI).[21] For coalitions above the mean level of disagreement, C-ENMI decreases the risk of a new coalition caused by ideological disagreement. C-ENMI provides a stabilizing impact as predicted by Hypothesis 1.

In general, the results for the combined risk and replacement risk of termination support the first hypothesis. The results for cabinets ending in new elections are inconsistent with the first hypothesis in Table 4. The second hypothesis, however, predicts a more complicated relationship. The estimated coefficients are likely biased if the proportional hazards assumption is violated.

Empirically, a test of the residuals based in each of the models testing only the first hypothesis provide some evidence of a more complicated relationship. In contrast to many studies of government duration,[22] a test of the proportional hazards assumption using the Schoenfeld residuals indicates that the estimates in many of the models fail global tests of proportionality.[23] Stated differently, the effect of one or more independent variables relative to the baseline hazard rate of coalition termination is not consistent across the length of observed coalitions.

This non-proportionality may explain the inconsistent effect of ideological disagreement and C-ENMI for new elections in Table 4. To directly test the hypotheses in the non-proportional framework, I re-estimate the models, but allow

[21] The predicted hazard rates are based on the estimates in Model 8. The Wald test of the joint significance of the coefficients for C-ENMI, ideological disagreement, and their interaction is significant at the 99.9% level in both Models 7 and 8.

[22] While previous studies have not revealed statistically significant non-proportionalities (Warwick, 1994; Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999), strategic bargaining contexts such as coalition governance make the presence of non-proportionalities unsurprising (Licht, 2011). Statistically, the non-proportionalities can be directly modeled by including an interaction of the variables violating the assumption with a function of time to allow the effect of the variable to change (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004; Licht, 2011). Models in which each variable violating the proportional hazards assumption is interacted with time fail to converge. Therefore, I only present models with the variable that the theory predicts a violation interacted with time. The results are largely consistent when other violating variables are also included, although many of these models fail to converge due to multicollinearity.

[23] The combined risk and the risk of new elections fail the proportional hazards assumption (PHA) at the 95 and 99.9% levels, but global tests of the Schoenfeld residuals do not show evidence that the PHA is violated in the primary models at standard levels of significance.

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


Figure 2 Hazard rates for multiple levels of coalition's average Effective Number of Manifesto Issues (C-ENMI) at high disagreement. The predicted hazard of replacement is for coalitions with 1 std. dev. below and above the mean ENMI at high levels of disagreement (Mean + 1 std. dev.). Estimates are based on the results from Model 8.

the moderating effect of C-ENMI on ideological disagreement to change over time by including an interaction of it with the natural log of time.[24]

The results from the non-proportional analysis demonstrate clearer support for the second hypothesis for all non-proportional models.[25] Consistent with the theory, the coefficients indicate that the effect of C-ENMI is non-proportional, although the coefficients for the interaction of coalition mean ENMI and disagreement (not interacted with time) are in the wrong direction. These coefficients imply that on the 1st day of the coalition, disagreement and C-ENMI together increase the risk of early termination. However, coalition ENMI and its interaction of disagreement when interacted with time are negative and statistically different from 0 for each type of coalition termination. This suggests that the long-term effect of both coalition C-ENMI and the interaction stabilizes the coalition, although it might initially increase the risk of termination.

Given the large number of interactions, the combined effect of C-ENMI in each of the models is difficult to interpret using coefficients alone (Licht, 2011). To demonstrate the non-proportional impact of C-ENMI and ideological disagreement, I present the first difference percentage change in the baseline hazard rate for cabinets at risk of replacement and new elections in Figures 3 and 4 for coalitions at low disagreement and high disagreement (1 std. dev. below and above the mean).[26]

[24] Many of the residuals are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Analyses with interactions for the log of time with C-ENMI, C-ENMI × ideological disagreement, and a number of the control variables fail to converge.

[25] Direct interpretation of the coefficients deserves caution due to the large number of interactions (for further discussion of non-proportionalities and their interpretation see Licht, 2011).

[26] I exclude low and high values of the dependent variable from the prediction for graphical clarity. The confidence intervals in the 1st year are sufficiently large to make all differences following that time difficult to visually interpret. The first difference percentage predicted change to the hazard rate is for a change from

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


Figure 3 First difference change in the non-proportional risk of a replacement cabinet from coalition's average Effective Number of Manifesto Issues (C-ENMI).

Figures 3 and 4 show support for the second hypothesis. In both figures, the results greatly differ according to the degree of ideological disagreement. Indeed, the moderating effect of ENMI actually increases the risk of termination at low levels of disagreement. For higher levels of disagreement, however, ENMI decreases the effect of disagreement later in the coalition's lifecycle. Consistent with a moderating effect of ENMI (as predicted by Hypothesis 2), immediately following the formation of a new cabinet C-ENMI actually increases the risk of a cabinet being replaced in the 1st years of a coalition. This effect is significant for the 1st year of the cabinet.[27] However, the effect of C-ENMI decreases and eventually changes to become a stabilizing force. C-ENMI decreases the risk of termination after the coalition has lasted for approximately 2 years, although the exact point the effect switches depends on the level of disagreement. By around the end of the 3rd year of a coalition with disagreement at 1 std. dev. above the mean, C-ENMI reduces the risk of a replacement cabinet relative and early elections relative to the baseline hazard by just over 50%. Broadly, this finding is consistent with the explanation that C-ENMI reduces the effect of ideological disagreement once easy policy

1 std. dev. below the mean C-ENMI to 1 std. dev. above the mean C-ENMI holding disagreement at the minimum value and at 2 std. dev. above the mean; 95% confidence intervals around the median calculated change are based on a draw of 1000 estimates from the variance-covariance matrix of a NPH Cox model. Estimates are from Models 9 to 14 using Licht's (2011) method of calculating first differences for COX NPH models. Predicted effects are smoothed using lowess.

[27] The strong increase in risk across the models might be overstated given that the baseline hazard of failure for either type is extremely low in the 1st year of the coalition.

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


Figure 4 First difference change in the non-proportional risk of an election from coalition's average Effective Number of Manifesto Issues (C-ENMI).

compromises have been reached for the risk of both replacement cabinets and early elections.

Finally, the controls generally perform as the previous literature expects in Tables 2 and 3. Many of these variables also exhibit previously unexplored non-proportional effects for the risk of new elections. Surplus majority coalitions increase the risk of replacement in some models, but decrease the risk of new elections. Minimum winning coalitions generally are at a decreased risk of termination. Ideologically connected coalitions have no statistically significant effect. Requirements for an absolute majority of parliament or constructive confidence rules generally do not impact the coalition's tenure. Institutions such as presidentialism and bicameralism increase the risk of termination in the combined models, only bicameralism consistently shows a statistically significant effect in the competing risks analysis. These coefficients imply that alternate veto points that can delay or block legislation decrease governments' ability to implement policy (e.g. Strøm and Swindle, 2002). Lack of concurrent majorities for coalitions in bicameral countries may also limit the ability to negotiate policy compromises (e.g. Druckman and Thies, 2002). The coefficients for coalitions that include parties at the parliament's dimension by dimension median ideological position generally decrease the risk of termination, but are not statistically different from 0; this might indicate that other measures of ideology better capture parties' outside options. As Maoz and Somer-Topçu (2010) may have predicted, parliaments with larger ideological ranges generally have a slightly decreased risk of being replaced, but the effect is not statistically significant for the risk of new elections. Coalitions with longer constitutionally mandated inter-election periods or days until the next mandatory election face a reduced risk of both forms of

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termination as Lupia and Strøm (1995) would predict. Finally, the coefficients for inflation and unemployment are statistically significant in most of the models, although inflation has a more consistent effect across specifications.

Discussion

The theory presented here seeks to directly consider the relationship and identify the mechanism connecting ideological disagreement, issue salience, and coalition behavior over time. Provided that electoral platforms reflect a balance of the party's policy and electoral goals, issue diversity in party platforms provide a window into the party's relative priority for detailed policy goals or a broader willingness to negotiate their policy goals on a large number of issues. Parties with a large number of issues stabilize ideologically contentious coalitions through their willingness to work on a range of topics once the initial easy policy agreements have been completed. Coalitions of ideologically distant parties have a chance at long-term survival if the parties are willing to work on a range of issues to stay in office. However, parties that only prioritize a small number of issues, such as language and regional issues in Belgium, exacerbate ideological tensions once the coalition accounts for its initial compromises. Parties with greater issue diversity mitigate ideological tensions. The results imply that the high levels of disagreement in the Belgian five party-cabinet led by Martens in 1988, for example, was stabilized by comparably high levels of C-ENMI.[28] Based on this perspective, a coalition government designed to maximize stability with high levels of ideological disagreement would include coalition parties that campaign on a large diversity of issues.

This article tests the theory using an event history analysis of coalition duration in 24 European democracies using a new measure from party manifestos, the coalition mean ENMI. Using both proportional and NPH competing risk analysis, I show that issue diversity in party platforms mediates the relationship between ideological disagreement and coalition duration. C-ENMI moderates the extent to which ideological disagreement increases the risk that a coalition will break up. Second, I perform a thorough test of the theory using a NPH analysis for coalitions at risk of new elections. I demonstrate that parties with more comprehensive platforms significantly decrease the risk of breaking up later in the coalition's term. Ideologically diverse coalitions may initially increase the risk of a replacement cabinet or new election, but stabilize cabinets in the long term. These results are robust to a range of modeling choices as presented in the Appendix.

The empirical tests confirm a theoretical and methodological explanation for the weak findings connecting disagreement to coalition duration (Warwick, 1994; Tsebelis, 2002; Saalfeld, 2008). The analyses are consistent with the explanation

[28] The 1988 five party-cabinet led by Marten included five parties with a coalition average ENMI of nearly 20 (nearly half a standard deviation above the mean sample coalition ENMI) and lasted 1238 days, despite over a standard deviation above mean disagreement (0.963).

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that the inability to negotiate policy leads coalitions to terminate early. Each additional issue parties include in their platforms may provide coalition partners with greater room to negotiate policy compromises and engage in log rolls. Parties that include substantial detail on a small number of issues may view compromise as too far outside their range of acceptability even if they constitute a relative improvement over the *status quo*. This evidence indicates that studies of parliamentary behavior would benefit by incorporating parties' willingness to negotiate across a range of issues. Current models of public policy and parliamentary behavior may under predict the effect of ideological disagreement because they do not incorporate parties' willingness to forego policy details as a bargaining tool.

Finally, by accounting for non-proportional effects, I add that issue diversity can influence parties' strategic decision-making at different points in the parliamentary schedule in different ways. Although previous research found limited evidence of non-proportionalities (Warwick, 1994; Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999), strategic bargaining contexts such as cabinet formation and termination generally face competing strategies that change over time as legislation and other factors influence the payoffs from bargaining (Licht, 2011). The results here indicate that ideological disagreements leading to coalition termination arise within the first 1–2 years following a coalition's formation. This links well with Martin and Vanberg's (2008) contention that easy agreements are dealt with quickly in coalition settings. However, the finding that higher levels of ENMI decrease the risk of early election terminations toward the end of the coalition's potential duration may indicate that they are more strategic about the timing of the next election than parties with fewer issues (Strøm and Swindle, 2002; Smith, 2003). Strategic bargaining contexts require accounting for non-proportional effects at both the theoretical and empirical stages. These results connect to other recent perspectives such as Druckman's (2008) call for dynamic studies of coalition behavior by suggesting a more dynamic approach to studying coalitions from a temporal perspective.

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Supplementary material

To view supplementary material for this article, please visit http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1755773916000114

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