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BOOK REVIEWS

Place and Politics: Local Identity, Civic Culture, and German Nationalism in North Germany during the Revolutionary Era. By Katherine Aaslestad. Leiden and Boston: Brill Academic Press. 2005. Pp. xiv + 384. $213.00. ISBN 0-391-04228-9.

Katherine Aaslestad's book is the latest in Brill's series, *Studies in Central European Histories*. Hamburg's location and size—its population numbered up to 130,000 by 1800—made it a player on the international stage. Aaslestad provides a fluent and detailed account of Hamburg's ultimately successful navigation of the treacherous waters of this period, and its re-emergence as an independent state at the Congress of Vienna. Initially, the city benefited, as did many neutrals, from the struggle between Britain and France that erupted in 1793. As the conflict moved inexorably closer, however, Hamburg's neutral status became increasingly unsustainable. Prussia's catastrophic defeat in 1806 resulted in the city falling within the French orbit. This coincided closely with Napoleon's escalation of the economic war against Britain announced in his Berlin Decrees of November 21, two days after French troops occupied Hamburg. The city remained independent, notionally, and struggled to survive by smuggling British wares into Napoleonic Europe. This phase ended in December 1810 with Napoleon's decision to annex the entire Hanseatic region to the French Empire. A few inhabitants deluded themselves that this might lessen the brutal exploitation, yet hopes that incorporation would bring Hamburg the same rights as the rest of France were quickly dashed. Aaslestad is keen, in her final chapter, to highlight the distortions introduced in the commemoration of the Napoleonic episode subsequently, and especially during the great celebrations marking the centenary of the Wars of Liberation held in 1913. In their denigration of French rule, however, the commemorations of 1913 were essentially correct.

Mercifully, direct Napoleonic rule only lasted three years. Though in certain respects pivotal, the episode does not occupy center place in Aaslestad's study. This position is taken by an analysis of the evolving *mentalité* of Hamburgers, and in particular, the development of identity and concepts of republican morality. Hamburgers, according to Aaslestad, did not see themselves primarily as Germans, and certainly not if this meant incorporation into a centralized state. This aversion was reinforced rather than undermined by French rule. Rather, a greater sense of regional (Hanseatic) sentiment arose, which was in harmony with Hamburg's own traditions. Central to these traditions was republicanism. This evolved from

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a concept that stressed the work ethic, frugality, and paternalism, and which manifested itself in institutional form through semi-official societies that provided for the needs of the least fortunate. This value system was replaced at the end of the eighteenth century by a brash, selfish consumer culture that extended from the wealthy elite down toward the lower tiers of the social pyramid, occupied by laborers and servants. It is in charting this process that Aaslestad deploys the significant number of illustrations (including eight from the fashion journal *Hamburgisches Journal der Moden und Eleganz*, whose appearance from 1801 to 1803 reflected the new spirit) to especially good effect.

There were those who lamented these developments and who contrasted the frivolity of the new generation with the republican virtues of the old. Of course, here the reader has the suspicion that one can always unearth evidence of such sentiment for any place and time. Aaslestad herself makes this point, though that in itself does not overcome the methodological problem it presents. How can the scholar abstract those cases where such perceptions reflected reality, as she argues was the case in Hamburg? The disappearance or re-orientation of the city's philanthropic associations of the eighteenth century represents some proof. The short period of French despoliation hastened this process. Of course, it is a sign of hypocrisy that those in charge of Hamburg's destiny during the Restoration period blocked calls for political reform with the argument that this was adopting French principles and that it was better to return to Hamburg's old constitution, while at the same time preserving the *laissez-faire* attitude of the Napoleonic administration to social issues.

One institution that presumably opposed the trend toward consumerism devoid of social responsibility was the Lutheran Church. At one point, Aaslestad refers to the Lutheran authorities complaining about non-observance on Sundays because people were instead frequenting theaters, balls, and wine cellars; however, the sense one gets from this book as a whole is that the Lutheran Church was marginal in shaping Hamburgers' mentalités, despite the fact that it functioned as the official religion until 1860 and was given a prominent place in public ceremonies. This goes against recent historiography, which questions both the secular credentials of the Enlightenment (at least outside France) and the notion that the nineteenth century was distinguished by secularization. To back up a finding that if true is of some consequence, Aaslestad needs to go into more detail and enter into a greater degree of elaboration to undermine—at least, insofar as Hamburg is concerned—the new orthodoxy.

It would be wrong to end this review on a negative note; however, there is one more criticism that is due before concluding more positively: the price of this book. It is difficult to see how $200-plus can be justified, even taking into account the numerous illustrations. Certainly, this is in excess of similarly high-quality monographs available from other presses, and must be of a level to be prohibitive for many libraries, let alone individuals.

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What might tempt them nonetheless to invest in this book? It is well written and finely presented. It is based upon original research in German, Danish, and French archives, as well as extensive reading of a long list of primary sources. For the historian of Napoleon's empire, it adds yet another geographical piece to the jigsaw puzzle, though there is some way to go before the picture of this surprisingly diverse polity is complete. For the historian of Germany, who might be more accustomed to dealing with territorial peculiarities and regional distinctiveness, it convincingly charts the evolution of political culture in that increasingly rare polity—the city-republic—in a period of extraordinary change.

MICHAEL ROWE
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Sensationalizing the Jewish Question: Anti-Semitic Trials and the Press in the Early German Empire. By Barnet Hartston. Studies in Central European Histories. Edited by Thomas A. Brady and Roger Chickering. Vol. 39. Leiden: Brill Academic Press. 2005. Pp. 335. $238.45. ISBN 90-04-14645-7.

Readers of German-Jewish newspapers of the Kaiserreich will immediately recognize the importance of Barnet Hartston's book. Those newspapers were full with reports concerning the latest libels, the most outrageous defamation charges, and the ceaseless attempts of anti-Semites to transform the judicial courts into a forum for their religious and racial prejudice. Hartston has brought these cases together, analyzing the famous, the infamous, and the long forgotten among them; in the process he has illuminated a central but overlooked aspect of anti-Semitism in the Kaiserreich. Anti-Semites did not merely give speeches and write pamphlets, they also used the courts as a way to test the system and make their views known. Their attempt was not altogether successful, hardly arresting their political descent into obscurity in the decade before World War I. But as Hartston suggests, the continuous "drumbeat" of these cases did much to keep "the Jewish question" in the public mind. The courts, even when not anti-Semitic, served as amplifiers for anti-Semites who sensationalized the "Jewish question" and in this way tore at the fabric of the public sphere—perhaps causing more damage than all the lectures of Treitschke and theories of Lagarde combined.

The attempt to sensationalize accompanied the rise of political anti-Semitism from the start, as almost all the major figures of the early years spent a significant amount of energy on the defense or prosecution of libel and defamation charges. Otto Glagau, the editor of the *Kulturkämpfer*; Adolf Stöcker, the court chaplain;

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Bernhard Förster, an author of the anti-Semitic Petition of 1880 and future husband of Nietzsche's sister; August Rohling, self-proclaimed Catholic expert on the Talmud; and Herman Ahlwardt, shrill, deranged anti-Semitic Reichstag deputy—all of these men, and there were others, faced court battles about the veracity of their views or the honor of their actions, usually to their own detriment. In the "Kantorowicz affair," for example, a Jewish merchant from Posen, upon overhearing an intentionally loud anti-Semitic conversation in a tram in 1880, slapped Bernhard Förster (actually Förster's colleague); the protagonists appeared before court, where Kantorowicz was fined and Förster stylized into a "brave anti-Semitic fighter," even though that is precisely what he did not do. While not altogether neutral, the courts nevertheless proved a risky arena—especially in an age when honor remained an important component of political reputation. The trip to the courts helped ruin Glagau, Stöcker, and Ahlwardt, and they proved the undoing of August Rohling—who paid with his dismissal from his position at the Karl Ferdinand University in Prague. Förster won his case, but the Prussian Army, according to Hartston, relieved him of officer status.

Libel and defamation were not the only sorts of court dramas. There were also the sensational crimes Jews allegedly committed—ranging from the Neustettin synagogue fire of 1881 (in which Jews were said to have set their synagogue ablaze) to the spate of ritual murder trials, from Tisza-Eszlar to Skurcz, Lutscha, Breslau, Korfu, Xanten, and Konitz. Even when they did not take place in the German Empire, these crimes and the trials that followed nevertheless received a great deal of press, with many of the court proceedings published in German newspapers. Hartston delineates how the anti-Semites used these cases in an attempt to generate a German Dreyfus case. As is well known, none of the German trials unleashed the widespread violence occasioned by the Dreyfus Affair, and this fact is often cited to show how, in 1900, France, not Germany, contained the more volatile mix of unstable politics and anti-Semitic sentiment. Yet, as Hartston argues, the constant presence in the German press of sensational cases did much to unsettle popular opinion of the Jews and their practices. This is even true, Hartston argues, if the anti-Semites lost most of the cases, as they in fact did, and if their political fortunes and personal reputations declined. Between the ritual murder cases and the libel and defamation trials, the public had become inured to the public use of anti-Semitic rhetoric in an arena, the courts, where only truth was supposedly spoken. Even as the anti-Semites slid to the political margins, the broad sense that a genuine "Jewish question" existed moved increasingly to the center. Anti-Semitism, not as a political program but as a useful and acceptable medium of politics, became, in Hartston's words, a "culturally common form of expression" (p. 268). In this sense the reliance on the courts also posed peculiar dilemmas for Jewish defense strategies. Some Jews, like Hirsch

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Hildesheimer in the German Empire and Joseph Bloch in the Habsburg Monarchy, used defamation laws to go after the especially fraudulent claims of the anti-Semites. Yet precisely because it kept Jews in the public eye, the strategy proved a double-edged sword. Conversely, when anti-Semites were convicted, they often used the verdict to trumpet what had become a favorite anti-Semitic theme: that the courts themselves were in the hands of the Jews.

Hartston has written a fine book. Graced with clear prose and balanced judgment, it guides the reader through a maze of cases that, if now forgotten, were very much a part of the public vocabulary of late nineteenth-century Germany. He has also added a very useful appendix, detailing the range of newspapers, Jewish and non-Jewish, that discussed "the Jewish question." And he has set his contribution in the context of the considerable new literature on anti-Semitism in the German Empire—a literature that has significantly broadened our sense that electoral politics hardly exhausted the byways of prejudice.

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Impossible Missions: German Economic, Military, & Humanitarian Efforts in Africa. By Nina Berman. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press. 2004. Pp. x + 271. $50.00. ISBN 0-8032-1334-4.

In the past decade, Imperial Germany's colonial empire has regained the attention of scholars. An earlier generation focused on and categorized the colonies under the rubric of diplomatic or administrative history. Given the recent popularity of postcolonial theory, historians and the practitioners of German Studies have concentrated on race. Thus, new questions are being posed and this is to be applauded; however, we all must keep in mind that the German Empire was modest in size and short in duration. The only conceivable settler colony was Southwest Africa, and even there Germans numbered only in the thousands and not the hundreds of thousands.

In *Impossible Missions*, a well-written and well-researched book, Nina Berman argues that an inordinate amount of attention is being paid to race, ethnicity, and culture by contemporary scholars. She seeks to redirect our attention toward political oppression and economic modernization, since it is her view that "the modernizing and the racist frameworks ... are intrinsically related" (p. 2). Approvingly, she cites Achille Mbembe's insight that "discourses and representations have materiality" (p. 6). Berman finds the belated wave of post-colonial books have been obsessed with fantasies rather than action, or one might simply say reality.

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Looking at the reality of the German-African empire, Berman makes some very interesting points. There were no anti-miscegination laws in German colonies until the rebellions in both Southwest and East Africa. Also, conditions in German colonies varied greatly, depending on the local German administrators. In Togo, for instance, the emphasis was on education. In East Africa peasants continued to farm their plots rather than the land being seized for Spanish-style latifundia. While one may agree that the dynamics of Germany's involvement in Africa did not end with the German defeat in World War I, I was surprised to learn that "millions of volumes are printed annually on various subjects that attend to the persistence of Germany's interest and presence in Africa" (p. 17).

Impossible Missions is a study of four Germans who went to Africa between the 1860s and 1993. None of the four went on a mission for the German government. Bernhard Dernburg, the minister for colonies in Imperial Berlin is mentioned once, while Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, the commander of German military forces in East Africa, receives somewhat more attention, but is still a marginal figure in the book. There are four central protagonists beginning with Max Eyth, an engineer and popular writer, who worked for an Egyptian aristocrat in the 1860s, seeking to modernize cotton farming on his lands. Eyth is followed by Albert Schweitzer, the famous Alsatian doctor and theologian, who spent decades in Gabon, healing the ill and serving as an unofficial missionary. Ernst Udet, a flying ace in World War I, who visited Kenya several times in the 1930s to take photographs from an airplane and also starred in movies about East Africa, is the third figure. Lastly, there is Bodo Kirchoff, a German writer who spent two weeks in Somalia in 1993 with a German military force that was engaged in peace-keeping. A final chapter deals with German repeat visitors or tourists to Kenya, not a former German colony, as Berman recognizes. This arrangement makes sense if one accepts Berman's belief that certain continuities mark German attitudes toward Africa from the mid-nineteenth century to the present.

She views Eyth and Schweitzer as "modernizers" who were not "biological racists" (pp.18, 19). They both sought to introduce Western culture and technology to underdeveloped areas of the world. Eyth compared the Egyptian farm laborers' reaction to modern steam plows to that of German peasants; both wanted to continue traditional methods of plowing and both sought to resist change. He was employed by a Western-orientated aristocratic landowner in Egypt whose ruler wanted to introduce western technology to Egyptian agriculture. Eyth was clearly a benevolent soul who, as an engineer, was committed to new technologies, as was the Egyptian government that sanctioned his task. There is a problem, however: as Berman knows, Egypt was not a colony at the time but a sovereign state, and although it was on the northern tip of the African continent, it belonged more to the Muslim and Arab Middle East than to

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sub-Saharan Africa. She does not think these factors are important enough to disqualify Eyth from comparisons with the above-mentioned trio who spent their time south of the Sahara. I am not so sure.

Schweitzer, however, fits neatly into her concern about Germans in Africa. Highly educated at the University of Strassburg, Schweitzer was brutal with the Africans, using corporal punishment frequently and showing no respect for any African language or culture. To the end he was a supporter of apartheid in South Africa and colonial rule by the West on the African continent. At times I felt that Schweitzer's classification as a "modernizer," rather than a racist, was questionable. He had no curiosity regarding Africa or Africans. His religious calling was one that considered western civilization to be the apex of what was possible, and African cultures were designated to be at a more or less adolescent level. Berman includes a wonderful quotation about Schweitzer by W. E. B. Du Bois that is worth repeating: "One wished he had set out to heal the souls of white Europe rather than the bodies of black Africa" (p. 97). She seeks to convince the reader that the "modernizers" had the same negative impact that racists did. Their purchase of western technology through loans made Africans dependent on the West with scant possibility of freeing themselves from the cycle of foreign debt that continues until the present.

Like Eyth, Udet the pilot appears to have been a well-meaning individual who portrays the Masai of Kenya at work "in respected activities" (p. 115) that were non-threatening and demonstrated the humanity of those being depicted. He saw no conflict between western technology and pre-modern culture. In his writings and films, Africans are presented as having character, grace, and remarkable cultural traditions, particularly in the sphere of dance. Indeed, Berman admits that the film *Fliehende Schatten* (1932), with Udet in the main role, presents Africans as having the qualities of "Pride, strength, friendliness, genuineness, naturalness, and modesty, all of which were highly priced [sic] values in German society at the time" (p. 129). When I think of Germany in 1932, Berman's description of German values are not the ones that come to my mind. Throughout the book Berman is extremely critical of German attitudes toward the Africans, quite rightly in my view, but in this case I must admit her list of German qualities surprised me. Berman concludes that Udet, like Eyth and Schweitzer, was not informed by "biological racism," which in the same paragraph is attributed to certain currents in the Enlightenment tradition. Surprisingly, she then informs us that Udet aligned himself in 1935 with the "new ideology" (p. 135). One wonders if he had immersed himself in Enlightenment thought during the intervening three years. Support for the Führer of "the new ideology" evidently does not count as "biological racism." Udet, in fact, comes off as the most admirable of the four German protagonists in the book.

The last of the four sojourners to Africa is Bodo Kirchoff, a journalist who spent fourteen days in Somalia in 1993 with the intention of writing about

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German soldiers abroad rather than the Somalians. In this chapter, the most passionate in the book, Berman finally latches on to a biological racist, who is also seen as a representative of thought patterns that characterize a significant percentage of the German intelligentsia. She views his two weeks in Africa as "a promotional piece for the German military" (p. 155). Basically, Kirchoff's coverage concentrates on the enormous differences between European and Somali culture. In choosing this as a theme he is condemned for "reproducing stereotypes that have been the standard tropes of racist literature about Africa" (p. 163). One would have expected someone like Berman, who considers certain currents in the European Enlightenment as a step on the road to "biological racism," to be more sympathetic to a writer who stresses differences rather than sameness among human cultures; however, she rejects the seemingly Herder-like tone of Kirchoff's writings as a "liberal disguise" for a "racist frame of mind" (p. 164). Since Kirchoff only spent two weeks in Africa (and was recuperating from hernia surgery during those weeks), one can only ask why he was chosen to represent German racism regarding Africa, particularly since his purpose was to write about the German military abroad.

Are there no other German racists who visited or stayed in Africa for a longer period of time? Like the selection of Eyth early in the book, it is difficult to understand Berman's choices. In the age of European colonialism and racism, she writes about three modernizers. In post-unification Germany, she deals with the racist Kirchoff. She seems to recognize that Kirchoff was not a good choice when she condemns that his "subjective report in [*Der Spiegel*] was based solely on a fortnight in a country that up to that point was entirely foreign to the witness" (p. 169). The chapter lacks coherence. On page 167, Berman approvingly quotes Aballa Omar Mansur, as writing "international aid worsened the political, economic, and social situation [in Somalia]" (p. 167), and three pages later Kirchoff is condemned as one of those Germans who opposed aid to Africa. Actually, the epigram on page one of *Impossible Missions* is a passage from Richard Dooling's book *White Man's Grave* in which the author wrote, "But when white people come in with a lot of money or know-how and try to make things better, that's when things really go to hell. Why can't white people just visit? Why must they meddle?" (p. 1). I had thought the author put this on page one because she sympathized with the point; however, by the end of the book I was not sure why it was included.

The last chapter, on German repeat tourism to East Africa, is the most original in the book. Berman has done statistical surveys of tourists who spend much of their travel budget on trips to Kenya, a former British colony, which they seem to prefer to Tanzania, a former Germany colony. Berman's focus is on a beach south of Mombasa. She finds many German tourists are involved in a variety of relationships with Kenyans. Some actually purchase houses there, others donate money for the children of Kenyans they befriend, and still

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others offer loans. Berman ponders whether some of the assistance is a result of German feelings of guilt about racism in their nation's past. It could be; however, would it not have been more sensible to come to the aid of Namibia, where the population actually suffered at the brutal hands of an oppressive German military? In the late nineties, about two hundred Germans married Kenyans each year. In a little more than fifty percent of these marriages, the German is more than ten years older than the Kenyan. Berman sees hope in these tourists of a new German relationship with Africans. The book ends on a positive note. Repeat tourists are seen as breaking with the century-old racist view of Germans toward Africa.

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Inszenierter Stolz. Stadtrepräsentationen in drei deutschen Gesellschaften (1935–1975). Edited by Adelheid von Saldern. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. 2005. Pp. 498. €80.00. ISBN 3-515-08300-6.

In this volume, theoretical and methodological overviews by the editor, a leading scholar of the social and cultural history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany, both introduce and synthesize eight case studies by five other authors. Ranging from the small city of Guben, with a current population only a little more than 20,000, through several others that number approximately 80–100,000, to the much larger cities of Rostock, Leipzig, and Hanover, they all elucidate the theme of urban pride as expressed in celebratory ceremonies. Saldern and the other historians whom she has brought together (three of whom contributed to an earlier volume, also edited by Saldern, that dealt just with representations of cities in the German Democratic Republic) show here that civic self-esteem manifested itself in a variety of cities, none of which enjoyed the fame of Berlin, Hamburg, or Munich, under a variety of regimes. Far from having disappeared at the end of the great period of urban improvement, which reached its apogee in the years leading up to the outbreak of the First World War, self-congratulatory declarations and gestures by city governments and city dwellers recurred repeatedly, as a result both of initiatives by local officials and of enthusiastic participation by members of local associations. It is the achievement of Saldern and her collaborators both to have documented this phenomenon in great detail and to have discussed convincingly its wider significance.

Between the essays by Saldern, the volume is divided into three parts. The first focuses on the early years of the National Socialist period. It consists of

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essays by Alice von Plato on the commemoration of the 700th anniversary of Gera, by Elfie Rembold on a *Reichsbachfest* held in Leipzig, and by Lu Seegers on a series of annual *Kulturwochen* held in Rostock. The second consists of repeat performances by Seegers and Rembold, each of which compares celebrations of city history at two times: in the case of Zwickau, in 1935 and 1968; in the case Guben, in 1935 and 1960. Since both of these cities are located in the east, the essays on events there appear under a rubric that conjoins the Third Reich and its authoritarian successor. The third concentrates on West Germany between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s. Uta Schmidt examines the 700th anniversary of the founding of Lüdenscheid in 1968, and Thomas Siemon looks at the 100th anniversary of the founding of Wilhelmshaven a year later, in the one essay that points clearly to dissonance rather than harmony (controversy having arisen as a result of unwelcome attention to the city's military significance). Seegers returns once again, this time with a chapter on the presentation of plans for and the festivities that occurred in connection with completion of the subway system in Hannover, between 1965 and 1975. More limited in scope than the earlier chapters, it has the advantage of delineating urban consciousness that focused less on hallowed traditions than on recent achievements. Fostered more generally by the overall project of urban reconstruction after the Second World War, the sensibility explored here pointed clearly in the direction of a better future.

Each of these contributions is solidly based on intensive research in local sources. The authors make extensive use of the records of municipal administrators, of contemporary reports in local newspapers, travel guides, and various brochures used for publicity. They also include thirty illustrations, most of which depict events recounted in the essays, although several reproduce posters from the period, and they refer in several cases to films as well. The media through which consciousness was articulated and disseminated thus occupy central positions in all of the essays.

Two overall themes run through the book as a whole. One pertains to ways in which images of cities reflected broader developments in three different states. How, the authors ask, did civic ceremonies reveal the imprint of prevailing values in the societies in which they took place? By way of answering this question, the essay on Gera points clearly to an emphasis on the city's military virtues that was quite congruent with National Socialism, while the essays on Zwickau and Guben point out the significance of political contexts even more effectively. In contrast, because the essays in the final section deal with civic life in a democracy, ideological imperatives imposed from without inevitably assume less significance. The other theme pertains not to change but to persistence. Below the level of (albeit not always without reference to) the nation or the state, city dwellers sought to maintain a sense of continuity during a period of tumultuous change in an affirmative attitude toward local surroundings and

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institutions. More easily visualized and thus grasped cognitively than the larger entities to which they belonged as citizens, cities constituted concrete places with which their inhabitants could identify, regardless of regime changes at higher levels. It is thus with good reason that Saldern titles one of the last sections of her concluding essay "Zur *longue durée* der (Volks-) Gemeinschaftsidee."

Although the authors offer a great deal and although it is admittedly somewhat unfair to express any regret that they did not offer more, it does seem to this reviewer that there is one glaring omission. Berlin belongs in this volume not only because of its size and significance, but also because it experienced major anniversaries within the frameworks of all three of the regimes that are featured here. It celebrated its 700th birthday in 1937, and each part of the city celebrated its 750th in 1987. A comparative investigation of all three sets of events, bringing the discussion almost to the end of the period of postwar division, would have constituted a fascinating section in its own right and would have enabled Saldern to make her point about the connections between localities and states even more effectively.

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Nazis in Pre-War London 1930–1939: The Fate and Role of German Party Members and British Sympathizers. By James J. Barnes and Patience P. Barnes. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press. 2005. Pp. x + 283. $67.50. ISBN 1-84519-053-X.

This volume is, as its authors point out, "not just another book about Fascism in Britain" (p.vi) but an original study of a specific group of Nazis who previously aroused little interest from historians. The focus here is not on homegrown fascists but on those German citizens who were members of the NSDAP and resident in London between 1930 and 1939. Thanks to James and Patience Barnes, the forgotten story of these Nazis in pre-war London can now be told.

Their account starts in 1930 with the arrival in London of Dr. Hans Wilhelm Thost, a correspondent from the NSDAP newspaper, the *Völkischer Beobachter*. It was Thost who, along with a handful of other Nazis, established the first London *Ortsgruppe* (local group) of the NSDAP in October 1931. According to the authors, the London group dominated the activities of the NSDAP in Britain. Having only nine original members in 1931, the group expanded its membership to 244 by 1939. In a particularly valuable chapter, the authors reconstruct the composition of the group, which for the most part comprised businesspersons, diplomats, journalists, clerical workers, artisans, and domestic servants.

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The majority of its members were aged less than forty and some seventeen percent were female (which reflected the large number of domestic servants).

As the authors reveal, the center of the group's attention was not cloak-and-dagger espionage and subversion but recruiting German citizens resident in the capital to National Socialism. The group provided party members with a base from which they could offer each other mutual support, socialize, and be educated in the values of National Socialism. This process did not involve provocative public rallies or demonstrations (which might have invited the curiosity and antagonism of British subjects) but lower profile events such as lectures, dances, concerts, exhibitions, and the like. Moreover, since entrance to these functions was typically by German passport only, British subjects whether fascist or anti-fascist, were excluded. This reduced the possibility of violent anti-fascist opposition and therefore, hostile press coverage was kept to a minimum. As the authors point out, the Nazis in London were careful not to alienate the British authorities by interfering in the arena of domestic politics. There was little contact with domestic fascists, and while Mosley's British Union of Fascists did receive financial support from the Italians, the authors conclude that there is little evidence that the Nazis in London financed British fascism.

All of this points toward a rather anodyne story. But to their credit the authors widen the scope beyond the London Ortsgruppe and offer their readers a multi-faceted account. Consequently, there are chapters that cover Nazi influence over the larger German community, such as business and labor, the churches, and Nazi intimidation of German refugees. There is a particularly interesting chapter on Nazi influence over the British Legion that includes a fascinating account of a visit by a group of British Legionnaires to Dachau concentration camp—SS guards were dressed as prisoners in order to give their overseas visitors a good impression. Also taken in hand by the authors are the issues of espionage and the responses of the British government. While the British authorities saw NSDAP organizations in Britain as a potential home for spies and saboteurs, the government was reluctant to close these organizations down. Despite pressure from the security services, the cabinet thought that proscription might have a further deleterious effect on Anglo-German relations. As the authors show, the British government responded by weeding out suspect individuals on a case-by-case basis. The first targets were German journalists. Their numbers—around eighty compared to only some twelve British journalists in Germany—raised serious doubts about whether they were all genuine. The next to invite attention from the British authorities were those deemed guilty of harassing German refugees, and a number of high-ranking Nazi officials were expelled in 1939 as a result, including the former London *Ortsgruppenleiter* Otto Karlowa who, in 1937 had been made *Landesgruppenleiter* for Great Britain and Ireland.

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James and Patience Barnes have certainly undertaken their detective work with forensic meticulousness. This volume is rich in its informative detail. What is more, the authors should be congratulated for including an appendix that lists the names, addresses, birth dates, occupations, years spent in England, and dates of joining the NSDAP for some 400 Germans who lived in Britain during the 1930s and who became members of the NSDAP. This is an original and well-researched volume, and it will surely fill a gap in current historiography. Nevertheless, this book is not without some limitations. In the first place, the authors should have taken more time to reflect on the wider historical significance of their subject and regrettably, there is no overarching conclusion. There is also little comparison with comparable Nazi groups elsewhere (NSDAP organizations in the U.S. for instance) and in the interests of further comparison, some engagement with recent scholarship on Italian fascist groups in London would have been welcome.

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Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews. By Shlomo Aronson. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 2004. Pp. xxiii + 382. $85.00. ISBN 0-521-83877-0.

In this superbly researched study based on a variety of new sources, particularly from Western intelligence records, the Israeli historian, Shlomo Aronson, does for the Holocaust what Gerhard Weinberg did a decade ago for World War II. Whereas the latter's monumental history of the war presented the conflict, for the first time, in its truly global and regional dimensions, Aronson illustrates—also for the first time—how similar aspects of the war set in motion from all sides "a sort of doomsday machine" (p. xi) that caught the Jews of Europe in a fateful multiple trap, leaving them with no way out of the Nazi persecution and, ultimately, of the Final Solution.

The initial trap unfolded even before the war. Between 1933 and 1939, Hitler's Germany degraded its own Jewish citizens to the level of persecuted subjects and sought forcibly to deport them to foreign lands. If the Nazis aimed at spreading Jews throughout the West, with the intention of fanning anti-Semitism in the host countries and thus serving the German interest and possibly weakening such countries' ability to resist German expansionism, however, the Western nations refused to play the Nazi game. Herein existed what the author terms "the double trap," in which Western nations failed to accept many Jewish immigrants, in part because of growing anti-Semitism in their countries. Officials and the populace feared that more Jewish refugees

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and Jewish interests at home would drive their countries to war abroad. Such nations, therefore, instead of showing sympathy for the plight of the German and Austrian Jews, collaborated unwittingly in the Nazis' persecution of them. The trap widened when Britain restricted radically the entry of Jews into Palestine, bowing to Arab demands and violence on the issue.

Once the war began, Hitler justified "countermeasures" against the Jews by blaming them for the Western proclamation of war against Germany and for early British efforts, begun in 1940, to mount a bombing campaign against Germany. Aronson notes that the Nazis' "territorial plans" for Jews falling under German rule, such as concentrating them in a Polish "reservation" or sending them to Madagascar, "already entailed clear-cut murderous dimensions since the living conditions of the deportees would have been insufferable" (p. 27). The entrapment of the Jews deepened still further when the British remained in the war and the United States assisted Britain's military effort; Hitler viewed both the British and Americans as tools at the hands of the Jews.

Once Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, intending to expand Germany's *Lebensraum* and to destroy a potential British ally, and a few months later, following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, declared war on the United States, Europe's Jews found themselves caught in a massive global struggle, the doors of escape closed nearly everywhere. This created the basis for the Final Solution, the decision for which, according to Aronson, Hitler made in October or November 1941 and that originated in "a radicalized German policy toward the Jews in the context of the behavior of third parties toward the Third Reich as it affected Hitler after the 'Battle of Britain'" (p. 36).

The Arabs and Muslims provided yet another party in the trap. Along with widespread anti-Semitism in Anglo-American government, military, and intelligence circles, the fear of trouble with Arabs and Muslims in the Middle East led both British and American officials to oppose Zionists in Palestine and elsewhere or limit severely cooperation with them. In Aronson's view, the Arab rebellion of the late 1930s, despite its military failure, succeeded politically. Not only did it halt a growing wave of Jewish refugees from entering Palestine legally, but it also mobilized British power to curb illegal immigration during the war. Therefore, as Aronson emphasizes, when the Nazis forbade Jewish emigration in 1941, the victims faced a terrible vicious cycle, dominated by the German refusal to let them out of Europe as well as by the British refusal to let them into Palestine.

As for the Western Allies, their fear of the perception among anti-Semites and others that they were fighting a "Jews' war," instead of, as they stressed, opposing Hitler, victimized the Jews even more. This attitude played out in several significant instances. First, while the British government obtained information by the fall of 1941 about the mass shootings of Soviet Jews, and while Washington learned of the Final Solution in the summer of 1942, Anglo-American politicians sought not to make the issue of the systematic murder of the Jews public.

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Moreover, the Western Allies refused to involve themselves in active efforts to rescue Jews or to reduce the number of Jews transported to the killing centers, such as by bombing the rail lines leading into Auschwitz-Birkenau. The official policy of "unconditional surrender" not only forbade Allied bargaining with Hitler, but also the Allies perceived such activity as a dangerous and self-defeating matter easily exploited by the Germans for their own purposes, such as providing them with evidence that the war was indeed a "Jews' war." The Germans could use the claim at any given moment, such as during the planned D-Day invasion.

According to Aronson, the efforts of the Zionist leadership, including Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, were too late and ineffective to lessen or stop the Final Solution. Yet, as the author illustrates so well throughout the study, the claim by anti-Semites in Germany and elsewhere that Jews controlled the world represented a colossal myth. Instead, the opposite existed. Jews nearly everywhere in Europe found themselves entrapped in a massive killing machine, while many others remained helpless in assisting their doomed brethren.

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U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis. By Richard Breitman, Norman Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolf. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. 499. Cloth $70. ISBN 0-521-85268-4. Paper $24.99. ISBN 0-521-61794-4.

This book has a complicated provenance. Its origin is "the largest targeted declassification in American history" (p.4): a huge interagency project to carry out the provisions of the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act (1998). This act provided for the declassification of an estimated eight million pages held by various government agencies: Office of Strategic Services, FBI, U.S. Army Intelligence (mainly the Counterintelligence Corps, or CIC), State Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, National Security Agency, and "some other agencies" (p. 5).

The book itself is the work of four outside historians, consultants to the collaborative (known as the Interagency Working Group, or IWG), which actually did the declassification work. The historians were called in by the IWG to contextualize the newly declassified material. It was thought they might be more objective than the government employees who had done the actual declassification. Their report, the fruit of five years' work, was originally published for limited circulation by the National Archives Trust Fund. Cambridge University Press commissioned the book in hand, after anonymous reviewers concluded that it was not an official history, but instead an introduction to new primary sources now available. So we have here a commentary and sampling from the

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eight million declassified pages, with a lucid introduction and an incisive, useful conclusion, organized around three questions: What did American intelligence agencies know about the Nazis?; did American corporations benefit from Nazi activities?; and which American agencies used former Nazis during the Cold War?

What percentage of the documents was sampled? It is difficult to be sure: the authors say they "looked closely at hundreds of thousands of pages" of OSS reports and "a good portion" of FBI stuff, "drew more selectively" from U.S. Army Intelligence records, "used" documents from the CIA, and "were able to work with" NSA and Naval Intelligence collections (pp. 4–5). Only nineteen "record groups" are listed specifically; however, that is not all.

There are complete and excellent notes for each chapter, a broad range of secondary sources and continuous citations to specific documents within the newly declassified record groups. In reality what we have here is an update on the status of research in each of the three areas: nestling newly declassified primary sources within their surrounding secondary literature. For example, Chapter 15, "Manhunts: The Official Search for Notorious Nazis," deals with Martin Bormann, Klaus Barbie, and Josef Mengele. The first and last had died, the second was brought to trial in France; however, the "how" of each case is well told and fully documented, revealing each case inextricably tied up with Cold War diplomacy, European political complexities, and South American power politics. More than a hundred notes support the discussion.

Based upon the sampling, what are the conclusions? The authors both confirm and provide fascinating new evidence to support generalizations fairly well laid out by others. There was a war on, and the Final Solution and its components were known but never actively studied. Some American corporations did benefit from Nazi activities. Substantial numbers of Nazi intelligence and policy officials remade their reputations late in the war or immediately thereafter and worked for western intelligence agencies during the Cold War.

One is reminded that much of this research is so dependent on corroboration from other sources that these declassified documents are often only a hint or suggestion that must be pursued in other archives. For example, the authors write that OSS and CIC records continue to raise questions about the Vatican that can only be validated or put to rest by greater access to the Vatican archives.

In closing, the authors remind us that it is not through attempts to correct the past, but rather through reckoning with the past, that human nature and its mistakes can best be understood. Both intelligence mistakes and intelligence successes must be studied and that is the purpose of the book and the disclosure law that made it possible. One of the last sealed archives anywhere, the International Tracing Service, whose holdings on 17.5 million Holocaust victims remain closed in buildings that stretch for more than fifteen miles in Bad Arolsen, Germany, has only recently acceded to pressure to open up.

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Whether all of these documents will change the historical image remains to be seen; however, their value for continuing research is unmistakable.

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Confronting Captivity: Britain and the United States and their POWs in Nazi Germany. By Arieh J. Kochavi. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2005. Pp. 382. $45.00. ISBN 0-8078-2940-4.

By the end of World War II, Nazi Germany held about two million Allied soldiers as prisoners of war. About 200,000 of them belonged to the British Commonwealth while another 95,000 were American. The fate of these prisoners is the main subject of Arieh Kochavi's book. Yet Kochavi is less interested in documenting how the soldiers dealt with their own captivity than in the ways in which the British and American political leadership dealt with German authorities. To be sure, the book contains detailed information about the conditions in various camps throughout the war, yet its main focus is the diplomatic negotiations between the two western Allies and Nazi Germany over the treatment and release of POWs throughout the war.

Kochavi's title is ironic, because for much of the war, the Anglo-American approach to Germany concerning POWs was anything but confrontational. British and American officials adhered to this unobtrusive approach even when concerns over possible German reprisals against the Allied bombing of German civilian targets increased during the final phase of the war. For both British and American officials, military considerations consistently took precedence over concerns for the safety of their POWs. They took, in Kochavi's words, "a calculated risk." This risk paid off since throughout the war, German officials appeared to adhere to the Geneva Convention in their treatment of U.S. and British captives. Even during the Allied bombing campaign against major German cities in the last two years of the war, neutral observers found no evidence of German infractions. Although conditions in the camps deteriorated toward the end of the war, Kochavi attributes this to the rapid increase in the prisoner population (especially during the Battle of the Bulge) and the general deterioration of conditions within Germany.

Drawing on extensive research in British and American diplomatic archives, Kochavi pieces together a detailed account of the negotiations between the enemies. While the issue of prisoners of war never rose to high prominence in either British or American war planning, military and political officials constantly monitored the treatment of their compatriots in German camps.

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They relied primarily on the International Committee of the Red Cross and Swiss officials who succeeded the Americans as the protective power under the Geneva Convention after the latter entered the war in December 1941. Kochavi's assessment of the British leadership is not kind. He chides Churchill, in particular, for turning a seemingly minor quarrel in 1942 into a major "power game with Berlin" (p. 52). The dispute arose over the shackling of prisoners of war, a practice prohibited under the Geneva Convention. German officials had found an order on captured British officers demanding that German prisoners' hands be tied so they "cannot destroy their papers" (p. 40). This incident and a similar one a month later, when Germans found shackles on dead German soldiers who had been taken prisoner by the British, led to a year-long stand-off between Britain and Germany during which thousands of prisoners on both sides were routinely shackled for extended periods. This episode captures well the fragile balance between the hostile powers. Even the perception of mistreatment could have serious consequences for prisoners in the opposing camp. In light of this mutual mistrust, it appears all the more remarkable that the shackle dispute remained the only breach of the Geneva Convention on either side.

Germany's adherence to the Convention concerning the western Allies stands in marked contrast to its treatment of Soviet soldiers and its annihilationist brutality in the concentration camps. Kochavi is well aware of this contrast but does not offer an adequate explanation. His analysis of the German treatment of the western POWs rests solely on reports presented to the Americans and British by the International Red Cross and the neutral Swiss observers. Because neither of the two agencies offered any indication of the motivations behind the German actions, Kochavi is left to speculate about the glaring discrepancy. He assumes racial considerations: Germans placed Anglo-Saxons on a higher scale in their racial hierarchy than Eastern Europeans and Jews (p. 221). However plausible, Kochavi offers little tangible evidence in support of this theory. His argument would have been strengthened significantly had he consulted German sources on POW management. These sources might have shed more light on the precise relationship among cultural, ideological, and pragmatic considerations in the decision-making process on the German side. After all, the practical considerations that Kochavi raises concerning the western Allies—the reciprocity of prisoner treatment on both sides—should have applied to the Eastern front as well. This is, of course, precisely what happened. The fate of German POWs on the Eastern front was far more deadly than in the West. The different fate of POWs on the eastern and western fronts mirrored the different fates of prisoners in the European and Pacific theaters: Americans were far more likely to abuse and kill Japanese prisoners than Germans. In turn, American prisoners of the Japanese fared far worse than American prisoners of the Germans.

Regardless of Kochavi's speculative arguments concerning the motivations for Germany's conduct, this book offers an important glimpse into a neglected

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aspect of wartime diplomacy. What remains puzzling about Kochavi's story is that the German military and political command could be as pragmatic and fair-minded in the treatment of American and British prisoners as it was brutal, fanatic, and ideological in its treatment of Eastern European, Jewish, and political prisoners. When he reaches that contradiction, Kochavi's methodology—the time-honored approach in foreign relations history of scrutinizing diplomatic correspondence—shows its limitations. To understand why Germany expected fair treatment of its prisoners in the West and extended that privilege to Anglo-American prisoners, while regarding these rules with contempt in the East, just as Americans expected Germans but not the Japanese to honor the Geneva Convention, demands more extensive attention to the cultural context of policy decisions.

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Die Krim unter deutscher Herrschaft (1941–1944). Germanisierungsutopie und Besatzungsrealität. By Norbert Kunz. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftlichte Buchgesellschaft. 2005. Pp. 448. €74.90. ISBN 3-534-18813-6.

For many years, those interested in the Crimea during World War II had little to turn to. Besides unreliable Soviet studies and memoirs, there was Michel Luther's seventy-page survey dating back to 1956. Recently, Andrej Angrick and Manfred Oldenburg published important studies that did not go beyond the first year of the German occupation. Now, in a slightly revised doctoral dissertation, Norbert Kunz offers an eminently readable survey of the entire period of the German occupation, based on very extensive research in local and German archives.

Some 1.1 million people inhabited the Crimea in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in 1939. About seventy-five percent of these Soviet citizens encountered the Wehrmacht as it occupied the peninsula in November 1941. The Red Army perhaps could have recaptured the Crimea early the next year, had its commanders made better decisions. In the fall of 1943, a stubborn Hitler insisted on postponing the German retreat. Thus it came to pass that Nazi Germany controlled all or part of the Crimea until April 1944. The region never made the transition to civilian Nazi rule, but had its own SS and police leader. Hitler and the Nazis initially considered the Crimea of little military significance, and one week before the start of Operation Barbarossa still had no concrete plans for the economic use of the peninsula. But Hitler knew one

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thing: he wanted to germanize the place and rename it *Gotenland*. He was enthusiastic about a suggestion made by the designated general commissar Alfred Frauenfeld to import German speakers forcibly from Italy's South Tyrol region.

The June 1942 version of the *Generalplan Ost* implied that half a million non-Germans in the Crimea were superfluous. The German task was to "diminish" (*abzubauen*) these people within fifteen years. In one of the most striking sections of the book, Kunz describes how this ruthless plan secretly was set in motion. On July 3, 1942, the local Wehrmacht command (Erich von Mannstein) was ordered to plan the implementation of a *Führerbefehl* to deport "all Russians, Armenians, and other Bolsheviks" and to leave only Tatars and ethnic Germans behind. Mannstein replied that the proximity of the Red Army and the fierce fighting for Sevastopol necessitated a strong German military presence, undisturbed by refugees and partisans. As a result, the deportation order was withdrawn the next day. Kunz is a little too modest about his finding that the fate of hundreds of thousands of people hung in the balance for twenty-four hours and that the Crimea was the first Soviet region subject to a Nazi deportation and Germanization order. It was not the end of Nazi Germanization, however: in October 1942, Himmler ordered his Crimean subordinate Ludolf-Hermann von Alvensleben to do everything necessary for "planning and subsequent settlement of the Crimea with German people" (p. 220). Hundreds of ethnic Germans were forcibly concentrated in city districts and villages.

The book has something to say about a host of topics, such as agricultural and forced labor policies. In general, it conforms to the existing historiography in concluding that overall, German policies in the Crimea were more moderate than in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Mannstein and his successors, Kunz finds, above all acted in the interest of warfare, not ideology. At the same time, he makes clear that the population suffered immensely. There was, of course, the Holocaust, discussed thoroughly. (Jews were shot, gassed in vans, and killed by drowning.) But there was more, such as an attempt to root out the partisans through a policy of "dead zones"—deportation and scorched earth.

Particularly innovative is the discussion of what Kunz calls Crimea's *Hungerkatastrophe* in the winter of 1941–1942, in which hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians and prisoners of war starved to death. Kunz sees little planning behind that famine, but the Wehrmacht comes out badly. Initially expecting—seemingly without qualms—that far more (hundreds of thousands) would starve to death in the region, the military falsely prided itself on having averted "serious" starvation.

The Crimea stood out in Nazi-ruled eastern Europe for its tremendous ethnic diversity. There were not just Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Krimchaks, and Karaites. In the Crimea there were also Bulgarians, Romanians, Italians, and Muslim Crimean Tatars; among these peoples, in Kunz's cautious wording,

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resentment against Jews, Slavs, and Soviet officials was "not rare" (p. 207). The ethnic diversity makes one understand the author's decision generally to provide a narrative from the German occupants' perspective. But on occasion, in my view, Kunz goes too far. Was the battle of Stalingrad really a "catastrophe" (p. 14)? Were regions on the verge of recapture by the Red Army really "endangered" (p. 226)? Whereas the actions undertaken or stimulated by Moscow do get attention—for instance, the bloodbaths by Soviet agencies at Kerch, Feodosiia, and Ievpatoriia in late 1941 against German prisoners and alleged collaborators—the local Crimean perspective is hard to find. Kunz hardly quotes survivors' memoirs and interviewed only two people from the Crimea. More interviews were impossible, he writes, but the reason remains unclear. (He does cite Russian-language materials.)

Critical readers could also complain about the lack of comparison with the German occupation during World War I; about the odd brevity of Chapter 4 (just nine pages); about the absence of photographs; about the endnotes, which are overloaded with additional information; and about the sparse index. But this book fills a void and already feels indispensable. One can only hope that Crimean and other historians will use Kunz's remarkable book.

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National Cleansing: Retribution Against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia. By Benjamin Frommer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. xv + 387. Paper $27.99. ISBN 0-521-00896-4.

Benjamin Frommer's important book examines the purge that took place in postwar Czechoslovakia targeting German civilians and Czech collaborators of the Nazi regime. It is a timely and significant contribution to the field of modern central European history.

Serious historians had been unable to deal with the postwar purge for decades after the war. When it finally became possible to study it in the 1990s, it came out of obscurity as a tangle of nationalistic, ethical, and moral concerns. Worse still, it became an instrument of political power games that swept across the Czechoslovak domestic scene in the aftermath of the Velvet Revolution. Although the Prague archives became accessible, the themes of postwar expulsions and Czech collaboration remained as politicized, and hence closed to objective inquiry, as ever. This makes Frommer's book all the more welcome.

As sovereign Czechoslovakia began to reemerge in the spring of 1945, it had to deal with the causes of its collapse in 1938–1939, the behavior of many

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Sudeten Germans from 1938 to the end of the war, and the issue of Czech collaboration. To do this fairly and without resort to collective punishment was bound to be a difficult undertaking for several reasons. First, attacks on German civilians and Czech collaborators had started taking place spontaneously, before the government established control over the liberated territory. Second, the purge was taking place in a country that came out of the war polarized between the democrats, who hoped to return to a modified *status quo ante bellum*, and the communists determined to prevent it. Finally, the electorates supporting the democratic and communist parties, divided as they were ideologically, were united in their fear and loathing of Germany.

This is what transformed the *legal* question regarding the status of the Sudeten German minority in 1945 and the issue of Czech collaboration into *political* tools in the domestic contest for power. Thus Frommer addresses a process that was launched without firm legal guidelines and in a polarized country dangling between the two emerging blocs. It was bound to go wrong, and it did.

Frommer starts with a chapter on "wild retribution," acts of vigilantism that gripped the country in the first moments of freedom. He quotes George Kennan who, having watched the Nazis goose-stepping into Prague in 1939, predicted that one day the Czechs' retaliation might be "fearful to contemplate" (p. 33). Kennan was right. Some Czechs, brutalized by the war, treated detained Germans and Czechs charged with collaboration sadistically. Beatings of Czech detainees were not uncommon and SS and Gestapo prisoners of war feared worse. In one case, forty-five were murdered by lethal injection in the (formerly Nazi-run) concentration camp Theresienstadt (p. 45). Frommer quotes the finding of a government study that "utterly innocent people" had been subjected to methods previously employed by the Gestapo (p. 55). To make matters worse, Soviet NKVD officers were free to visit detention camps, interview the German and Czech inmates, and simply depart with their quarry for destinations unknown (pp. 55–7).

It was previously assumed that this sort of extralegal violence might have been an unavoidable by-product of the war. Frommer provides evidence that it "was more violent and lasted far longer that it need have" and that much blame rests on the London-based government-in-exile that "established the objective conditions necessary for anarchy to spread unchecked" (p. 35).

The book examines the so-called Great Decree (no. 16/1945) that established special courts to deal with "Nazi criminals, traitors, and their accomplices." It finds that the Czechs executed more individuals per capita after the war than any other country in central and western Europe. Much of the supporting evidence is compiled in a useful table on page 91: the French sentenced 7,037 individuals to death, but only 791 were executed, whereas out of 723 death sentences imposed in the Czech lands, 686 were carried out. Other countries had had their share of Quislings during the war, but only a fraction of the

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Czech total was executed: Belgium (242), Hungary (189), Denmark (46), Netherlands (36), and Norway (22).

Frommer unearthed remarkable appeals by the authorities of Marianske Lazne and Frantiskovy Lazne to Prague; they cautioned that carrying out executions was bad for "our spa business." Foreign guests, seeking a relaxing and wholesome environment, might "avoid a spa resort where executions are taking place" (p. 100).

The book deals with the expulsions of the Sudeten Germans and all other German civilians who found themselves at the end of the war in a Hobbesian state of nature. The Czechs placed them in one legal category. Once in it, they were found collectively guilty and expelled. This plan was supported by all political parties, without regard to their ideology. Few would now, in contrast to 1945–47, disagree with Frommer's point that "justice can only be individual" (p. 265). Ironically, those who had managed to avoid being deported after the war would try to leave on their own, often by desperate measures, once the Iron Curtain came down. Nothing—neither Heydrich nor Lidice—can justify the expulsions. But their outcome was far better for the expellees than for their tormenters. From the 1950s onward, the "vanquished" got to enjoy West German democracy, freedom, and prosperity while the "victors" got four decades of communism, police spies, and shortages.

In an attempt to draw a lesson from the postwar expulsions, Frommer suggests that "lists of names are no basis for fair punishment. Perhaps if this lesson had been learned, the pitfalls of post-Communist Czechoslovakia's 'lustration' program could have been avoided" (pp. 265–66). I disagree. If the "lustration law" had been properly implemented in the 1990s, no lists of names would have become public. The law attempted to limit access to certain political jobs to those who could receive proper security clearances. It was a mild version of the kind of "vetting" that is common in Europe and the United States of anyone seeking certain government positions.

As the Nuremberg Trials demonstrated, bringing to justice even the most obvious war criminals was not free of legal and moral concerns. It is therefore not surprising that attempts to apply the law to individuals charged with the much murkier category of crimes, such as "acts against national honor," was bound to become a prolific source of ethical concerns. Countless cases of wartime behavior in German-occupied Czechoslovakia belonged in a gray area, on the edges of implied ethical standards and far beyond the well-defined norms of written law. Too often attempts to punish Czech collaborators became politicized: the Communists postured as defenders of national honor and accused their democratic rivals of cuddling up to traitors.

In chapter five, Frommer provides much evidence illustrating how the "Small Decree" (no. 138/1945) attempted and failed to impose legal consequences for the behavior of some Czechs during the war. Frommer's wide range of archival

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sources, comprising such often ignored places as Zamrsk, Lovosice, and Opava, is impressive.

The cruel postwar era in Czech history is a morally complex matter. We have a solid moral compass that guides us when bad things happen to good people. But we are less certain what to think when odious or simply unheroic individuals are subjected to an imperfect legal system. This is what makes writing about the postwar purge in Czechoslovakia so difficult. Unlike most writers to date, Frommer has succeeded in giving us a straightforward and objective treatment of the challenging topic.

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The World Hitler Never Made. By Gavriel D. Rosenfeld. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. xii + 524. $30.00. ISBN 0-521-84706-0.

To fasten at this point on any fundamentally new dimension of Nazism and the Holocaust is itself an achievement. By this raw measure, Gavriel Rosenfeld's *The World Hitler Never Made* is a great success. The wildly inventive book explores "alternative histories" of Nazism—works of fiction, film, and television that imagine that the Nazis somehow won, or that Hitler was killed before seizing power, or any number of other counter-factual scenarios. To have taken on a novel subject with such authority, conscientiousness, and depth as Rosenfeld has adds to the book's triumph.

No historical subject has provoked so much anxiety over how it can and should be represented as the Nazi past. And yet no subject has given rise to a greater number of "what if" speculations that challenge representational rules. Conscious of this tension, Rosenfeld takes as his first task accounting for and defending the close study of alternative history. Though likely as old as historical narration itself, alternative history has greatly proliferated in recent decades for reasons ranging from the waning of deterministic ideologies, to postmodernism's erosion of distinctions between reality and fiction, to market pressures that reward shock value over sober and familiar facts. Amounting to a "significant trend" that may nonetheless rile traditional historians, alternative history is supremely valuable, according to Rosenfeld, for its ability to "shed light on the subject of historical memory" (p. 3).

Rosenfeld's specific task is to discern what alternative history says about "the evolving place of the Nazi past in Western memory" (p. 3). He offers a vast cataloging of the timing, number, and kind of alternative histories of

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Nazism in the three societies that produced the great store of them: Great Britain, the United States, and, to a lesser extent, Germany. In Rosenfeld's telling, these seamlessly fall into a coherent trajectory. The early postwar period mostly saw highly moralistic fantasies that demonized the Nazis and reinforced the virtue of their opponents by imagining, for example, the expanding hell of a Nazi victory in England or America. Such tales largely sought to defend the decisions to engage Germany in war, or to bolster, in a spirit of postwar triumphalism, national myths of "the good war" and the "finest hour." Starting in the early 1960s, however, alternative histories took on a more self-critical function, born of national pessimism or anxiety. Stories of Allied capitulation could underscore fascistic tendencies in the "free world." Scenarios in which the world is better served by *peace* with Hitler could variously support neo-isolationism (such stories often assumed the German conquest of Soviet communism), express nostalgia for Britain's pre-war empire, or indict U.S. intervention in Vietnam and other places. Recent German stories, by projecting disastrous results from Allied efforts to punish the Germans much more harshly than was the case, lash out at the perceived tyranny of guilt-laden memory. Whatever the political ends, this new breed of alternative history has the relative virtue of rejecting simplistic oppositions of good and evil in favor of more nuanced views of national identity and power relations. Not surprisingly, critics and popular audiences have generally been more receptive to the early, moralistic versions that leave national myths intact.

Rosenfeld's grandest theme, however, is the "normalization" of Nazism and the Holocaust. Aided by time but often also a function of intent, normalization entails lessening the moral charge of a tragic or controversial past and viewing it, dispassionately, like any other past. Recent alternative histories—like many conventional histories and other cultural treatments—have contributed to the normalization of the Nazi past chiefly by relativizing the Nazis' crimes and aestheticizing fascination with the mentality and "style" of the perpetrators. Alternative histories have also trivialized that past by mining it for material for humor and other demoralized and depoliticized entertainment. For Rosenfeld, the new kind and sheer proliferation of alternative histories are certain signs of the domestication of memory.

Rosenfeld's profound ambivalence about normalization frames his ambivalence about alternative history and gives the book its signal tension. In one voice, Rosenfeld lauds alternative history for transcending reductive dichotomies and promoting a more uninhibited relationship to the Nazi past. This clearly appeals to Rosenfeld's methodological and interpretive pluralism. At the same time, Rosenfeld concedes that there are good reasons why representations of Nazism and the Holocaust should still be guided by an ethical-political imperative and framed partly in moralizing terms. He worries, "by viewing the Nazi past as a past like any other, the injunction to remember its distinctive

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features has diminished in urgency. The long road to normalization, thus, may well point to indifference, if not amnesia, as its ultimate destination" (p. 22). Alternative history, particularly as it focuses less and less on the experiences of the victims, is clearly a culprit in this disturbing trend.

In making the case for the value of alternative history, Rosenfeld occasionally overreaches, unsettling his usually steady analytic hand. Chiefly, he claims that alternative history possesses a "unique ability to offer insights into the dynamics of remembrance" (p. 4). Yet the conclusion from his exhaustive survey of alternative histories is that acts of memory often say more about who is doing the remembering—and in what context—than they do about the thing being remembered. One could draw a similar conclusion from memory acts aspiring to realism, not fantasy. In addition, Rosenfeld tends to read his alternative history texts somewhat mechanically, determining for each its "message" based on its content and the nationality, religious affiliation, and political leanings of its author. Literature thus becomes a rather transparent medium for the expression of political positions; lost, or minimized, is attention to *formal* provocations and textual effects beyond "ideology" (simply understood) and authorial intent. These limitations, however, hardly compromise Rosenfeld's ambitious treatment of an entire genre and cogent, at times even moving, speculations on the future of the past.

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