that he poses for the volume is whether environmental equity has indeed become a core consideration in federal decision making. More specifically, he asks, "have the EPA and other deferral agencies moved to make environmental justice a core component of their decision-making in permitting, standard setting, economic analysis, enforcement and other arenas?" (p. 5).

In the 20-plus years since EO 12898, there has been a veritable explosion of academic research and policy development at the federal and state levels, but almost no serious policy assessments at the federal level. The short answer to the author's question, therefore, is not so much. But the achievement in this volume is to come to that conclusion through serious policy analysis, which will, with time, also serve as an exemplary historical account of the contested environmental politics in relationship to race and class over the last two decades. It is easy for environmental justice social movement actors to charge federal agencies with inaction and ineffectiveness. It is much harder to document exactly how, and with that analysis to offer a possibly different road map for the future. As he writes in the introduction, the purpose of this volume is to determine "whether the policies put in place to address such violations—past, present, and future—have been effective" (p. 16). In answering such an important question, he has assembled key scholars from diverse fields (political science, law, environmental policy, criminology, and economics) who have authored key chapters that stand on their own, while retaining a coherence in the volume itself.

The thematic framework that structures *Failed Promises* is around three approaches to justice: distributive, procedural, and corrective. The first focuses on the equitable distribution of environmental burdens and benefits, the second on procedural and decision-making processes, and the last on how lawbreaking is resolved (p. 16). While the division of tripartite approaches to justice makes analytic sense, the chapters do not clearly align with these categories. Rather, they focus on different topics. Eileen Guana's chapter examines the actions of the Environmental Protection Agency body that adjudicates administrative appeals of permitting decisions to argue that environmental justice challenges to new permits have been largely unsuccessful. The next two chapters focus on environmental rulemaking and standard setting. Another chapter focuses on participation, while the last two focus on corrective justice—on empirical data in one and legal decisions in the other. Each of these chapters is tightly focused on a specific topic and makes its argument very clearly. One of the strengths of the volume is the clear writing within each chapter, although the major weakness is tying the individual chapters to the overall thematic framework of distributive/procedural/corrective.

The strength of this volume is that speaks explicitly to the fields of environmental policy implementation, as well as to regulators, policy analysts, lawyers/practitioners, and so on (as well as those training in those fields as undergraduates and graduates). The downside of such an approach is that some of the chapters are so grounded in their specific fields that interdisciplinary orientations to the same topic are not included in the analysis. For example, several important works in sociology (Jill Harrison) and political philosophy (Davis Schlosberg) explicitly address environmental justice from the competing notions of justice that Konisky uses as the overall framework for the volume. Also, there is an important question of whether state-level analyses are relevant, since certain places like California have embarked upon aggressive state-level environmental justice policy (several scholars have written at length on California's environmental justice policies in pesticide drift, climate change, and water policy, for example).

As Konisky writes, however, *Failed Promises* cannot cover all dimensions of environmental justice but chooses as its focus "the regulatory activity at the heart of the environmental protection system" (p. 17). On this vitally important topic, he has successfully assembled an impressive array of authors in spelling out how environmental justice matters in federal policy. It is a vital contribution to several fields, particularly where environmental policy meets practice.

Subsidizing Democracy. By Michael G. Miller. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013. 201p. $39.95.
doi:10.1017/S1537592716004849

— Jonathan Mendilow, *Rider University*

This is one of the first book-length examinations of the ways in which (partial or full) public funding of state-level campaigns have altered the "strategies, behavior, and emotions of candidates and voters alike" (p. 8). *Subsidizing Democracy*, is not solely a historical analysis, however, for it serves to assess whether public funding could present an alternative to the political finance regime established by the Supreme Court in *Citizens' United* (2010) and attendant verdicts. The underlying premise is that reforms are required "to restore fairness, opportunity, and integrity to American elections" (p. 12). This tacitly assumes a concept of "fairness" different from the "market approach" adopted by the *Citizens' United* ruling.

In the words of Justice Anthony Kennedy, all who participate in the public exchange of ideas use money to fund speech. Such speech is motivated by the hope "that the candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes [that] the supporter favors." Large-scale donors "may have influence over or access to elected officials," but the ability of money to purchase "ingratiation and access" is a beneficial proof that "democracy is premised on responsiveness." The outcome, according to Michael Miller, exacerbated and gave ideological cover to problems that Clean Elections reforms sought to overcome: a) the

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flow of large, unregulated contributions that became "a necessary tool in the new campaign finance landscape" (p. 2); b) the resulting benefit to incumbents that helped produce the situation where "the majority of legislators at both the state and federal level can bank on keeping their jobs for as long as they want" (p. 3); c) the uncompetitive environment and growing voter apathy that result once strong potential challengers stay away, while weaker ones must expend "considerable time and effort on fundraising that more often than not fails to place them on par with incumbents" (p. 3); and d) the possibility that incumbents will act to satisfy the goals of their financial supporters rather than the interests of their constituents (p. 4).

The general question that directs Miller's analysis —"Does [state-level public campaign funding] work?"— should, therefore, be understood both backwards and forwards in time. The introduction and first chapter set the question in its past and future contexts, and explain the main goals behind public campaign funding. Chapter 2 moves the analysis to the impact on the costs of campaigns as seen through the eyes of the rivals, and the strategic decisions that these make as adjustments (beginning with the choice of whether or not to accept Clean Election subsidies).

A series of chapters follow the effects of such decisions on the campaign itself. Chapter 3 takes up the question of time. Public funding reduces the need to devote time for fund-raising and thereby facilitates enhanced interaction between candidates and constituents. The effect on voting behavior is analyzed in Chapter 4. Essentially, it enables the casting of "more informed preferences, raising the probability of election results that reflects the true will of the district" (p. 79). The impact on candidate quality is examined next. Subsidies allow challengers to wage well-run campaigns regardless of their fund-raising prowess. This "may not attract high-quality candidates, [but] appears to manufacture them " (p. 106). Taken together, these results lead to more competitive contests. This, however, is not to say that the benefits are equally shared. The ideological cost, discussed in Chapter 6, is incurred mainly by fiscally conservative candidates who must confront the incongruence between public subsidies and their own ideological views. The possible unintended consequence is therefore a competitive advantage to Democratic challengers. While survey data do not support the notion of systemic Republican disadvantage, the uneven cost may bear on candidates' participation in the program and their subsequent campaign strategies.

The final two chapters return to the present and the future. In 2011, the Supreme Court struck down the matching-funds provision of the Arizona Election Act as unconstitutional, raising the question of whether programs based on public subsidies could serve as viable future reforms. The conclusion is that once the ability to wage a reasonable campaign is assured, the amount of money per se does not determine the results. Clean Elections could therefor still serve, but will need to change in a manner that would take the Supreme Court's verdict into account. The concluding chapter offers two illustrations of such shifts through the analysis of New York's System of Consolidated Funding Application (CFA) and the Fair Elections Now Act introduced by Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) and cosponsored significantly by Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT).

The book flows well, and the argument is soundly constructed. Nevertheless, the opening statement in the first chapter raises concern: "In American politics, money matters." In my opinion, this is a cliché that seems to establish a difference that does not exist between the United States and most other democracies. The provision of public subsidies to support electoral campaigns has been widely adopted since the mid-twentieth century. As in the United States, the common rationalization was the need to address the budgetary problems that resulted from the growth of modern communication techniques, the need to reach wide publics, and the inability to raise commensurate funds from ordinary party members and supporters. Public funding was the alternative to outright corruption, or the type of plutocracy that was defined by the U.S. Supreme Court as "responsive government." All systems differ, yet all share basic similarities, and the examination by a vast literature of the question "Did such reforms work?" may well serve to raise hypotheses to be studied in the U.S. context.

An illustration is the possibility of another unintended consequence. Rather than enhancing meaningful electoral communication, the ability to detach themselves from specific electorates may lead candidates to appeal to all and sundry on the bases of broad unelaborated generalizations. A similar concern appears in the specific literature on public campaign funding in the United States itself. An illustration is the finding that public campaign funding has "an MSG effect" of enhancing marketing tendencies and undifferentiated appeals where they already exist, but discouraging them where they do not. Another example is studies that point to the possibility that the effects of Clean Elections are likely to be eroded in time by candidates' strategic adjustments, coupled with the continued pivotal role of traditional factors.

Despite these shortcomings, I encourage scholars of political finance to pay attention to *Subsidizing Democracy*. Not only does it address questions that were insufficiently examined (e.g., the comparison between the results of partially funded and fully funded campaigns, or the problem of ideological price), or simply taken for granted (e.g., what candidates do precisely when relieved of much of the burden of fundraising), but it also employs a mixture of methodologies and data to examine them. Especially interesting is the view of public campaign funding through the eyes of candidates as drawn from

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survey data and interview testimonies. These supplement and give flavor to the system-level data on which most studies are based. The final chapters are of special interest. Reform schemes, such as the voucher program practiced in Seattle (on the ballot in 2016 in Washington State and South Dakota), are too new to be studied here, but current dissatisfaction with the arrangements of plutocratic funding in both the Democratic (see Sanders) and Republican (see Donald Trump) parties ensures that the principles of public funding and the assessment of their results will stay with us for the foreseeable future.

Sailing the Water's Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy. By Helen V. Milner and Dustin Tingley. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. 352p. $35.00 cloth, $27.95 paper.
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— Linda Fowler, *Dartmouth College*

In their book, Helen V. Milner and Dustin Tingley examine the effect of domestic politics on the capacity of American presidents to conduct diplomatic and military affairs. They develop a theory of distributive politics to explain domestic mobilization around executive policies and provide extensive empirical analysis of key influences, which include interest group lobbying, congressional appropriations and roll calls, bureaucratic structure, and public opinion. They demonstrate that political activity and public attitudes vary in predictable ways across diverse policy instruments in response to the economic and ideological interests arising under each approach. The authors succeed admirably in overturning conventional wisdom that the president enjoys a relatively free hand in foreign affairs, a feat that earned *Sailing the Water's Edge* the American Political Science Association's 2016 Gladys M. Kammerer Award. Milner and Tingley fall short, however, in proving their contention that domestic constraints lead to the militarization of U.S. foreign policy.

The study of domestic politics is not new to international relations. Theorists have focused on audience costs as restraints on conflict initiation and have identified institutions as fostering cooperation among democracies. Researchers also have looked at influences on specific U.S. foreign policy events, such as public opinion, congressional oversight, media coverage, interest-group activity, and bureaucratic behavior. Milner and Tingley's contribution is to integrate theory and observation in a project that is unprecedented in scope.

The authors contend that presidents enjoy multiple instruments to promote U.S. security abroad and favor those involving the least interference from domestic actors. The greatest domestic pushback, they argue, arises from policies with visible, concentrated, economic costs and benefits or ideological differences, which include trade, economic aid, immigration, and domestic military spending and, to a lesser extent, sanctions. Milner and Tingley further posit that political actors have fewer incentives to engage the executive about geopolitical aid and troop deployments, because such instruments have the characteristics of collective goods and also offer less information about likely impacts (pp. 36–38). Four empirical chapters, one each for interest groups, members of Congress, federal agencies, and citizens, analyze the level of political activity for each policy type.

The array of data the authors bring to the task of deconstructing the domestic politics of U.S. foreign policy is extraordinary. In Chapter 4, for example, they show how distributional instruments affect support for the president's position on all foreign policy votes from 1953 to 2008, as well as on roll calls by individual lawmakers on a subset of policy votes between 1979 and 2008. In Chapter 6, the authors provide experimental evidence that the public credits Congress with having better information than the president about policy instruments with distributive consequences, such as trade, immigration, and economic aid. In Chapter 5, they repurpose data on bureaucratic structure to reveal greater congressional control over foreign policy programs with distributive outcomes from 1946 to 2012. In Chapter 3, they examine hundreds of thousands of observations for lobbying efforts between 2007 and 2014 from the digitized reports filed by groups under the Lobbying Disclosure Act in order to discern which policy tools are targeted by various groups. Taken together, these chapters reveal striking similarities in the patterns of political activity: instruments with strong distributional characteristics stimulate the greatest level of political engagement.

Comparison across categories of actors is limited, however, because many of the data sets do not match up with the seven policy instruments. Chapter 3 on lobbying considers witness testimony on trade, economic aid, geopolitical aid, troop deployments, and sanctions, but not immigration or domestic military spending. It examines whether groups bypass the White House, but only with four of the seven categories. In Chapter 6 on public opinion, the authors' own survey about which branch controls a policy tool omits sanctions, while several of the Cooperative Congressional Election Studies about citizens' priorities among economic aid, geopolitical aid, and military deployments leave out trade, immigration, sanctions, and domestic military spending. Consequently, Milner and Tingley are unable to ascertain which political actors are most effective in constraining the president, whether they augment their influence by targeting similar instruments, or when they alter White House policy.

The lack of comparability poses a more difficult challenge for the authors' contention that meddling by domestic actors induces presidents to adopt military

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