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Is Catholic faith worth having?

GREGORY R. P. STACEY

Institute of Childhood and Education, Leeds Trinity University, Horsforth, West Yorkshire, LS18 5HD, UK
e-mail: g.stacey@leedstrinity.ac.uk

Abstract: **This article defends the claim that firm belief in divine testimony ('Catholic Faith') is morally valuable, if the broad claims of Christian orthodoxy hold. I discuss Jonathan Kvanvig's recent argument that Christians should not hold that salvific faith necessarily involves belief in revelation or God's existence, because such faith is not much 'worth having', suggesting that this argument is dubious from Catholic and Protestant theological perspectives. I then examine some extant accounts of Catholic Faith's value, conceding that Kvanvig successfully highlights their flaws. I therefore offer a novel explanation of Catholic Faith's value, drawing on Miranda Fricker's account of testimonial justice.**

'O that today you would listen to his voice! Harden not your hearts . . .'
(Ps 95:7–8; Invitatory from the *Liturgy of the Hours*)

Faith, ancient and modern

Contemporary philosophers and theologians often note that 'faith', 'belief' and cognates possess a wide semantic range. Robert Audi (2011, 53ff.), for example, outlines seven meanings of faith, paralleling Avery Dulles' description of seven theological models of Christian faith (Dulles (1994), 170–180). Indeed, the discovery that faith (i.e. the English rendering of *emunah*, *pistis* or *fides*) bears multiple meanings is hardly recent. Even before Reformers debated whether faith should primarily be glossed as *fiducia*, Scholastic theologians including Aquinas had adopted the Augustinian suggestion that faith can mean belief that God exists (*credere Deum*), assent to divine revelation (*credere Deo*), and 'belief' which springs from one's desire for the God who reveals Himself (*credere in Deum*).[1] Given that 'faith' bears various meanings, it is unsurprising that analytic philosophers fail to agree upon a definition of even propositional

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faith (faith that *p*) which captures its sense across contexts. Yet while offering various analyses of faith, many modern philosophers agree that propositional faith can exist without belief (as opposed to some weaker cognitive stance such as acceptance or hope) in the relevant proposition. Proponents of this view include William Alston (1996), Daniel Howard-Snyder (2016), John Schellenberg (2005, 138–139), John Bishop (2005, 120–121), Robert Audi (2011, 68–88), and Jonathan Kvanvig (2018).

By contrast, traditional Christian theology denies that salvific faith can exist without belief. Notably, Catholic tradition typically defines faith as firm assent to divine revelation, on the basis that it is divinely revealed. The *Catechism* summarizes: 'Faith is the theological virtue by which we believe in God and believe all that he has said and revealed to us, and that Holy Church proposes for our belief, because he is truth itself' (*CCC* 1814). While Catholic theologians sometimes give 'faith' a broader sense (e.g. *CCC* 143; Dulles (1994), 274), the above usage has considerable precedent in Patristic authors (see Dulles (1994), 20–28 and Lamont (2009)) including Augustine[2] who heavily influenced Aquinas (see *ST* IIaIIae 2.1). Indeed, the view that faith involves assent to revelation is not peculiar to Catholic theology: Lutheran and Reformed orthodoxy, for example, claimed that faith consists of *fiducia*, *notitia* and *assensus* (assent to revealed propositions – see Dulles (1994), 52–53).

Where such explicit faith is possible, Catholic doctrine maintains that it is necessary for salvation (*CCC* 161), although since Vatican II many Catholic theologians have held that 'anonymous' Christian faith (i.e. a disposition to faith – see Rahner (1969), 390–398) can be possessed even by non-theists (Rahner (1972), 145–164; Bullivant (2012), 80–83). Catholic tradition further holds that the assent of faith is certain (*CCC* 57): at least normatively, it possesses a high (perhaps, perfect) degree of credence[3] and is perfectly rationally tenacious.[4] Admittedly, Catholic theologians have differed concerning faith's material object: the object to which faith is directed. While later Scholastics suggested that Catholics have faith in revealed propositions themselves (Dulles (1994), 56–57), Aquinas held that propositions are only mediately objects of faith. Thomas argues that, ultimately, faith assents to God Himself; yet before the beatific vision, our knowledge of the perfectly simple God is necessarily composite and consists of propositional assent (*ST* IIaIIa 1.2, cf. *CCC* 172).

Modern theologians might question Aquinas' assumption that humans can only believe revelation through propositional assent; even analytic epistemologists accept the existence of non-propositional knowledge, including knowledge of God (e.g. Stump (2010), 39–82; Benton (2018), 421–447). Nevertheless, recent Catholic commentators including Matthew Levering (2014, 5–27), Mats Wahlberg (2014, *passim*), and Gerald O'Collins (2016, 12–13), have argued that revelation (and thus, faith) is partly propositional. My discussion below focuses on that 'habit' of faith which consists of the supernatural disposition to believe revealed propositions – normatively, with strong certainty and rational tenacity –

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on the basis that God has testified to their truth. I term this habit 'Catholic Faith' (CF), while acknowledging that according to Catholic doctrine, faith need not solely involve propositional assent. By extension, this article defends the 'Catholic Analysis of Faith' (CAF), which is the claim that salvific faith – for those who can responsibly assent to propositional revelation – consists partially of CF.

The claim that propositional faith does not typically require belief should not itself alarm Christians who endorse CAF. Proponents of CAF can allow that there are illuminating models of propositional faith which do not characterize faith as necessarily involving firm cognitive commitment. They might note that CAF merely describes one species of faith: salvific faith possessed by those who can responsibly believe propositional revelation. However, one recent contribution to religious epistemology challenges CAF. In *Faith and Humility* (2018), Jonathan Kvanvig suggests that the best route to developing a unified analysis of faith across contexts lies not via conceptual analysis or genealogy, but by beginning from faith's traditional characterization as a virtue: a disposition 'worth having'.

While this approach does not axiomatically eliminate the possibility that CF is a species of virtuous faith, Kvanvig swiftly denies this. Writing from a Christian perspective, Kvanvig argues that neither belief in revealed doctrines nor belief in God's existence is a necessary constituent of salvific faith (Kvanvig (2018), 9–21 *et passim*). Further, he alleges that a powerful reason to reject traditional analyses of faith including CAF is that doxastic faith (faith which consists of belief) is not much worth having, even if Christianity is true. How does Kvanvig support this contention? Kvanvig suggests the aforementioned beliefs do not possess much intrinsic value. Admittedly, believing correctly or in line with evidence is *epistemically* virtuous. Still, 'the importance of faith is disproportionate to the intellectual value and virtue of believing truths supported by evidence' (*ibid.*, 11). Moreover, Kvanvig suggests that any claim that doxastic faith is valuable because God has simply stipulated that belief is necessary for salvation would not satisfy Christian intuitions about faith's value and God's justice. Rather, if some alleged requirement for salvation seems arbitrary, this constitutes reason to believe that the requirement does not hold. For instance, if it were proposed that God requires one to receive a tattoo to be saved, we should resist believing that God would determine anyone's eternal fate by such a triviality (*ibid.*, 106).

Kvanvig does not simply show what virtuous faith is *not* (i.e. neither belief in Christian doctrine nor 'trust' in God as Saviour (*ibid.*, 32–36)). He constructs a functional account of 'faith worth having' as a 'disposition to behave or respond to the circumstances of life in service of an ideal', which can give one's actions structure and coherence (*ibid.*, 16). Crucially, various doxastic and affective states can underlie dispositions to action, so Christian faith (i.e. dispositional commitment to God and His purposes) need not involve belief in God's existence or revelation. Moreover, Kvanvig urges that his understanding of faith is compatible with biblical commendations of faith, including texts such as Hebrews 11:3 and

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James 2:5 which have been used to argue that Christian faith necessarily involves or entails belief in God's existence (*ibid.*, 105–129).

Three aspects of Kvanvig's project invite response from proponents of CAF. First, his suggestion that doxastic faith is not particularly valuable if Christianity is true; second, his claim that commitment to an ideal is the broadest genus of valuable faith; and third his argument that in Scripture, 'faith' refers to commitment to God which need not involve belief in God's existence or revealed propositions. In this article, I contest the first claim by arguing that one species of doxastic faith (CF) is worth having. I also touch on Kvanvig's second claim by arguing that without at least a disposition to CF, one lacks appropriate respect for God. I do not discuss Kvanvig's third claim, which is exegetical rather than philosophical. However, this article is an exercise in philosophical *theology*. I write from within a Christian – in my case, Catholic – tradition which holds that God has revealed Himself through Christ, that this revelation is partly propositional, and that some people can responsibly assent to this propositional revelation. I aim to show that CF is virtuous if these and the broader claims of Christian orthodoxy are true.

One might wonder whether Kvanvig himself endorses these (for Christians, modest) claims; if not, this article might seem a dialectically ineffective response to his work. Yet since Kvanvig intends his argument that salvific faith is not necessarily doxastic to have broad appeal to Christians 'who place greater authority in Scripture itself [than in tradition]',[5] this article suggests that regardless of Kvanvig's personal views, his argument should fail to convince a key portion of its target audience (i.e. orthodox Protestants). Moreover, since Kvanvig's argument might not appear to rest on controversial theological premises, those who endorse CAF because of its support in Christian tradition might take Kvanvig to have developed a powerful argument that tradition has not characterized salvific faith accurately. This article reassures such readers that their wider theological commitments supply reason to reject his analysis. Naturally, this article will not move readers who reject Christian orthodoxy to conclude that CF is worth having. But it might show why Christians should value CF.

To this end, in the first section below, I analyse Kvanvig's argument that doxastic faith is insufficiently valuable to form a necessary part of salvific faith. I suggest that Kvanvig's argument need not be considered conclusive by Catholics or Protestants.[6] The following section then canvases some extant attempts to explain doxastic faith's value. I suggest that Kvanvig illustrates how these attempts plausibly fail, because they explain doxastic faith's worth instrumentally, alleging that it is necessary for the pursuit of further religious projects. As Kvanvig suggests, cognitive attitudes to God's existence or revelation weaker than belief can facilitate pursuit of these projects. In my final substantive section, therefore, I present a novel account of CF's value, arguing that if Christianity is true, CF is intrinsically valuable because through (responsible) firm belief in divine testimony, one honours God *qua* testifier.

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Kvanvig against doxastic faith

We should first examine Kvanvig's argument against salvific faith necessarily involving belief. Although Kvanvig does not outline his argument formally, it can be summarized as follows:

(1) A central pre-theoretical insight about salvific faith, consistent with secular forms of faith, is that salvific faith is a valuable virtue.[7]

So,

(2) If an attempt to analyse salvific faith cannot account for this insight by explaining how faith so analysed is a valuable virtue, it should *prima facie* be rejected.[8]

(3) Accounts of salvific faith which render belief a necessary constituent of faith cannot explain how faith so analysed is a valuable virtue.[9]

So,

(4) Accounts of salvific faith which render belief a necessary constituent of faith should *prima facie* be rejected.[10]

We can now examine these premises from an orthodox Christian perspective. (1) initially seems to have abundant support in Scripture and tradition. Omitting discussion of the Hebrew Bible, faith (*pistis*) is commended throughout the New Testament: Christ enjoins his disciples to have faith (e.g. Mark 1:15, 11:22; John 20:27), holding them culpable for its absence (e.g. Matthew 14:31; John 3:18). While the details of how faith facilitates salvation are controversial, New Testament texts also indicate that faith is necessary for salvation; at least for those appropriately presented with the gospel (e.g. Mark 16:16; John 3:36). As Kvanvig notes, faith receives extensive praise in Hebrews 11, which claims that 'without faith, it is impossible to please God' (Hebrews 11:6; cf. Kvanvig (2018), 111–115; 120–121). Moreover, Kvanvig suggests that given God's universal salvific will, it would be surprising if God were, by *fiat*, to impose any arbitrary constraint on who can be saved, which would seem to follow if faith is not a virtue or disposition required for right relationship with Him (*ibid.*, 11).

Yet (1)'s plausibility further depends upon how 'virtue' is understood. Kvanvig implies that faith is a *moral* virtue, which explains its importance and necessity for salvation.[11] On Kvanvig's account, wherein Christian faith is construed as loyalty to God or a disposition to act in His service,[12] faith is morally valuable in two ways. First, faith disposes believers to perform actions which reflect commitment to God, including loving obedience to His commands (*ibid.*, 14–15). Second, Christian faith gives unity to believers' actions, disposing them to act consistently in commitment to God (*ibid.*, 104).

Unfortunately, Kvanvig does not develop an account of (moral?) virtue, beyond noting that virtues are dispositions to action, necessary for a well-lived life (*ibid.*, 2, 9, 103). But for present purposes, we can say that a disposition is *intrinsically* morally valuable or virtuous if its possession is itself morally valuable: if its

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possession immediately contributes to an agent's moral excellence by disposing her to act well, because in exercising that disposition (responsibly, in appropriate circumstances) the agent necessarily performs a moral act. A disposition is merely *instrumentally* morally valuable or virtuous if its possession does not thus immediately contribute to an agent's moral excellence, but if it enables an agent to possess or exercise an intrinsically moral disposition, or to perform a moral act. While (1) is naturally read as claiming that salvific faith is intrinsically virtuous, we should also note that faith might contribute to an agent's moral flourishing by being instrumentally virtuous, so defined.

Moreover, we can delineate two salient ways in which dispositions typically contribute to an agent's moral excellence. First, the very possession of (intrinsically morally valuable) dispositions contributes to an agent's excellence of moral character. Second, dispositions may further contribute to an agent's moral excellence because their exercise is morally praiseworthy, accruing moral credit to the agent. Natural moral virtues (e.g. courage) both add to the excellence of one who possesses them and often merit praise when exercised, so I assume that Kvanvig imagines faith to be virtuous in both ways.[13]

The claim that exercising faith is intrinsically virtuous *qua* morally praiseworthy is complicated by Christian tradition, which emphasizes that because faith is God's gracious gift, humans cannot claim credit for (at least) its initial possession, even if they can culpably resist God's offer of faith.[14] Moreover, as Kvanvig briefly acknowledges, classical Protestant soteriology denies that Christian faith possesses much intrinsic moral value by directly contributing to one's moral excellence (Kvanvig (2018), 120). Some Reformers deny that salvific faith is an intrinsically moral disposition of much worth; or at least that its intrinsic moral value explains faith's salvific efficacy. Thus Calvin (*Institutes*, III.11.7; Calvin (1960), 733) claims that although salvific faith may be 'in itself of no dignity or value', it can nevertheless connect us with Christ, as a clay vessel may contain gold. On this understanding, faith does not have salvific potency due to its intrinsic moral value.[15] Faith is principally valuable because it (alone) facilitates a believer's justification, associating her with Christ, whose 'external' righteousness is thereby imputed to her. Faith can even be contrasted with praiseworthy actions and virtues (Wahlberg (2015), 203–204). So, some Protestants have reason to doubt (1) if it means to claim that salvific faith's possession contributes significantly to a believer's moral excellence.

But such Protestants should claim (*contra* (3)) that salvific faith is instrumentally morally valuable, in that it connects a believer to Christ, facilitating her justification and sanctification. Is God's choice to confer salvific potency upon Christian faith objectionably arbitrary on this analysis? Not entirely. There is *some* explanation for God's choice of faith as the instrument of salvation: because faith is of dubious intrinsic moral worth yet oriented towards God, it is a fitting medium for the imputation of unmerited, extrinsic righteousness to sinners. Accordingly,

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premise (3) need not appear plausible to some Protestants who claim that salvific faith necessarily involves belief.

Catholics need not deny that faith is intrinsically virtuous *qua* contributing to moral excellence.[16] Unlike Reformed soteriology, Catholic doctrine teaches that in justification, one is not merely 'reckoned', but really becomes righteous.[17] One receives justification when one is united to Christ through faith joined to the supernatural virtues of hope and charity.[18] In addition to conferring justification, hope and charity contribute directly to one's moral excellence; perhaps this partially explains their necessity for salvation. So plausibly, faith similarly bestows moral value. If Catholics allow that faith may possess significant intrinsic moral value which partly explains its salvific efficacy, they should not endorse the Reformed explanation of faith's instrumental value suggested above.

Yet should Catholics share Kvanvig's intuition that faith is in fact morally valuable? To my knowledge, nothing in Catholic doctrine necessitates this. Like Protestants, Catholics can deny (1) if it means to claim that faith is intrinsically morally valuable in that it contributes to believers' moral value by directly disposing them to perform moral actions in this life, through its exercise.[19] But Catholic doctrine clearly affirms that faith is of instrumental moral (or minimally, all-things-considered) value. It asserts that salvific faith is a supernatural virtue, which prepares us for beatitude: perfect happiness consisting of intimate knowledge of God, which surpasses the natural happiness to which we would be ordered save for grace.[20] In this state, we will love, praise, and serve God perfectly, knowing Who He is.

Since on this reading (1) is plausible by Catholic lights, we can consider whether Catholic defenders of CAF should accept (2). (2) plausibly follows from (1), because analysis of any reality should account for (justified) pre-theoretical intuitions about it. Naturally, such intuitions may be reasonably revised or abandoned in the process of theorizing; but analysis should initially seek to accommodate pre-theoretic intuitions (particularly, strong intuitions), *ceteris paribus*. Yet given (1), any analysis of salvific faith which cannot explain salvific faith's value will be unable to account for a key pre-theoretic intuition about faith. One might object that since salvific faith is a theological virtue, its moral (or, all-things-considered) value should be of peripheral concern to philosophical theologians investigating its nature. But according to Kvanvig, it is central to our theological understanding of salvific faith that faith is somehow valuable, because this explains faith's necessity for salvation (Kvanvig (2018), 105–107).

Kvanvig's argument for (2) has some force: granting (1), it is desirable that an analysis of salvific faith explains faith's value. However, if we plausibly lack the epistemic resources to discern salvific faith's value, the failure of an analysis to deliver such an explanation will be less damning. When evaluating (2), we should consider whether we would be cognitively competent to understand how faith is valuable, if we were to correctly develop an analysis of faith such as CAF. According to Catholic tradition, humans enjoy a reasonably accurate grasp of

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what constitutes natural moral (and perhaps, broader) flourishing through 'natural law' (*CCC* 1954–1960). If natural law gives humans an intuitive grasp of which actions contribute to moral excellence, we might expect that humans will reliably identify candidate dispositions as moral virtues. Thus Catholics might incline to endorse (2), holding that we should be confident of our ability to gauge CF's moral value and/or broader contribution to human flourishing.

Yet as noted above, Catholics hold that faith is not a natural but a supernatural virtue. If faith is a supernatural virtue which directs us to beatitude, we should be less confident that we are cognitively competent to understand its contribution to human flourishing. For plausibly, we should doubt our ability to understand (*sans* revelation) how humans require transformation for beatitude. As 1 John 3:2 remarks, 'We are God's children now; what we will be has not yet been revealed.' St John then claims that 'We will be like him [God], because we will see him as he really is.' This assertion further motivates scepticism about our natural capacity to discern which dispositions equip humans for beatitude. Even proponents of kataphatic natural theology recognize that our natural knowledge of God's nature is limited. Accordingly, it seems that we are not in a propitious position to assess, without revelation, how humans might become 'like God', and therefore which dispositions are necessary for beatitude.

Admittedly, Christians do possess considerable understanding of some dispositions necessary for beatitude – including faith – through revelation (see e.g. Matthew 5:3–12). Moreover, since according to Catholic theology 'grace perfects nature' (see Aquinas, *ST* Ia8.8 ad2), Catholics can have confidence that natural virtues – or minimally, their infused analogues – contribute to our flourishing even given our supernatural end.[21] But (excluding the Reformed explanation of faith's salvific potency) neither Scripture nor tradition offers any extensive, authoritative explanation of why faith is virtuous or otherwise necessary for salvation. So while one might hope that the resources of natural reason and revelation will allow us to understand how faith prepares us for beatitude – I gloss some traditional explanations below – it remains plausible that salvific faith is valuable because it contributes to beatitude in some way which we are presently ill-equipped to understand. We should therefore be cautious about our ability to accurately assess salvific faith's value, at least regarding its necessity for beatitude. Accordingly, I suggest that Catholics can doubt (2). It perhaps counts against an analysis of salvific faith if it cannot explain faith's value; but not decisively.

We have seen that given independent theological commitments, orthodox Protestants and Catholics may reasonably doubt the force of Kvanvig's argument, even if they cannot explain salvific faith's value. Yet from a Catholic perspective, it would be a virtue of CAF if we could understand CF's value. It is plausible that salvific faith possesses intelligible value in this life in addition to its (potentially mysterious) ability to prepare us for beatitude, and the fact that Catholic theologians have sometimes regarded even belief in human testimony as valuable might support this intuition (see e.g. Augustine, *Confessions*, VI.7;

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Aquinas, *In Symbolum Apostolorum*, Prol.). Accordingly, I will seek to explain why – if Christianity is true – CF is worth having.

Instrumental explanations of doxastic faith's value

I shall shortly argue that – if Christianity is true – CF is virtuous. But I should first explain how my reasons for regarding CF as valuable differ from some current and historical suggestions. Although the explanations of CF's value which I explore in this section are given by prominent theologians, I do not pretend to give an exhaustive examination of extant explanations of CF's value. Rather, I highlight these accounts of CF's value because they are representative of arguments that CF is instrumentally valuable, because it facilitates the pursuit of further religious goals.

Some authors hold that belief in salient religious propositions is necessary to motivate and regulate Christian living. The latter prepares Christians for beatitude through affectively and epistemically transformative moral and Sacramental practices which contribute to justification and sanctification. Both Augustine and Aquinas suggest that CF is necessary for this reason. Augustine, for example, asserts that without belief in God, one cannot rationally consider conversion to Christianity:

> Unless we believe both that [God] exists and that he can be invoked by the human mind, we should not even look for the true religion. What are we trying to investigate with such great effort? [. . .] Where do we want to arrive? At some place that we do not believe exists or do not believe has any relevance for ourselves? Nothing could be more perverse than a mentality like that. (Augustine, *De Utilitate Credendi*, XXIV; Augustine (2005), 140)

Aquinas similarly argues:

> It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: 'The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee' (Isaiah 64:4). But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. (*ST* Ia 1.1 *resp.*; cf. *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I.5.2)

However, Kvanvig provides a rejoinder to such explanations of doxastic faith's importance. Augustine and Aquinas fail to show that *belief* – or high and stable credence – in God's existence or revealed truth is required for Christian living. Weak belief, acceptance, hope or desire that Christian claims are true might equally motivate the relevant actions (Kvanvig (2018), 19; 128). Thus, Kvanvig notes that although Hebrews 11:8 commends Abraham's faith in leaving Ur (cf. Genesis 12), Abraham need not have believed that God's promise of future blessings was true to have had rational motivation for his journey. He might merely have hoped or desired that the promise was true. What matters, Kvanvig argues, is

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not that Abraham believed God's promise, but that he showed commitment to God in starting his journey. (*ibid*., 28–30). By parallel reasoning, arguments for CF's value which allege that belief in revelation is necessary to motivate engagement in religious practices tacitly accept that CF is only of instrumental value. They remain vulnerable to the suggestion that non-doxastic faith can equally motivate such engagement, and is therefore as valuable as CF.[22]

A reviewer objects that cognitive attitudes weaker than firm belief are insufficient to provide strong, rational motivation for action, unless their subject possesses further firm beliefs which determine their choices. Perhaps Abraham could only have been rational in setting out if he strongly believed that doing so was his best chance of securing descendants, or (if he only weakly believed this) if he firmly believed some other relevant decision-making principle (e.g. that he lacked time for further reflection). Even granting this (dubious) claim, the relevant firm beliefs necessary to motivate Christian living need not include even 'natural' belief in divine testimony, or God's existence. For example, hope for beatitude – combined with firm belief that Christian life is the most promising route to heaven – can motivate Christian living even if one has low credence that God has revealed Himself in Christ.

Another explanation of doxastic faith's value given by Catholic theologians (see also Wahlberg (2014), 25–26) asserts that belief in God's existence is necessary for a personal relationship with Him. Newman, for example, offers the following argument against those who maintain that Christian faith has 'its seat in the heart', consisting of belief (i.e. trust) *in* God as Saviour rather than belief that 'God is Saviour':

> Knowledge must ever precede the exercise of the affections. We feel gratitude and love, we feel indignation and dislike, when we have the informations actually put before us which are to kindle those several emotions. We love our parents, as our parents, when we know them to be our parents; we must know concerning God, before we can feel love, fear, hope, or trust towards Him. (Newman (1973), 120–121)

Although Newman writes of affection rather than relationship, his point might be expressed otherwise: without belief in God, humans cannot relate to God personally. Lately, John Schellenberg has propounded this claim in his 'argument from hiddenness' against God's existence (Schellenberg (2007), 204; *Idem* (2015), 56–60). However, it is noteworthy that while Christian philosophers have advanced various replies to Schellenberg's argument, many deny that one must believe that God exists to have a personal relationship with Him (e.g. Cuneo (2016), 52–65; Benton (2018), 431–433; Rea (2018)). The objects of personal relationships are *persons* rather than propositions, even granting that 'personal' relationships must be consciously experienced. Accordingly, one can plausibly relate personally to someone without holding any beliefs about her. This is particularly clear if, as Matthew Benton argues, knowledge of persons is fundamentally non-propositional (Benton (2018), 423); but even if it must be mediated by some attitude

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towards the proposition that the relevant person exists, this attitude could be weaker than belief (e.g. acceptance).

Terence Cuneo highlights Jesus' Parable of the Sheep and the Goats as an example which indicates that one need not believe that Christ is present to relate to Him personally. According to Matthew 25, we will be judged on the basis of our relationship to Christ through our treatment of others, even if we fail to recognize that our actions are directed towards Him (Cuneo (2016), 52–54). Arguably, it is even clearer that one can lovingly relate to a person whom one could certainly consciously relate to if she exists, but whose existence one currently doubts. For example, I can have a loving relationship with a relative on her deathbed, even if I am unsure whether she is still alive. *Pace* Schellenberg (2007, 208–209), there is something subjectively and objectively suboptimal about loving relationships where one party does not believe that the other exists; but belief that God exists is not necessary for a personal relationship with Him.

Even if belief in God's existence – alongside propositions concerning His nature which can only be reasonably believed on divine testimony – were necessary for a personal relationship with Him, this would not show that wider belief in revelation is virtuous. Many propositions held to be divinely revealed by Catholics (e.g. concerning Mariology) are not principally concerned with God's character. One could plausibly have a loving relationship with God without believing them. Further, even were belief in all revealed propositions necessary for a loving relationship with God, it is not obvious why the strong and rationally tenacious belief which is normatively constituent of CF would be commendable.[23]

There is doubtless more to say about the contention that belief in God or divine testimony is necessary for a personal relationship with Him. Perhaps even abstruse doctrines reveal something about God's character, allowing believers to deepen their relationship with Him. But for argument's sake, I grant Kvanvig that both explanations of CF's importance discussed above are flawed.

Catholic faith as testimonial justice

We have seen that attempts to explain CF's value in instrumental terms are vulnerable to the objection that CF is not necessary to attain the relevant external goods. This might motivate defenders of CAF to show that belief in divine testimony is *intrinsically* valuable. In doing so, one might develop suggestions to this effect which are extant in theological discussions of faith. For example, one might follow Aquinas in arguing that because humans are ordered to perfect supernatural knowledge of God in the beatific vision, CF is intrinsically valuable because it presently affords believers preparatory and anticipatory supernatural knowledge of God (see *De Veritate*, XV.11 *resp.*; *In Symbolum Apostolorum*, Prol.). Thus, in *ST* IIaIIae 2.3, Aquinas argues that it is a necessary (i.e. fitting?) part of preparation for beatitude that one is taught by God (cf. John 6:45). This involves believing God's testimony about Himself; just as those seeking

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understanding (*scientia*) in secular disciplines must begin by believing their teachers about the relevant subject. Thomists might argue that mere acceptance of revelation would not provide similar cognitive preparation for beatitude. But instead, I now offer a novel account of CF's value, drawing on work which emphasizes the intrinsically ethical nature of testimonial belief.

In her seminal *Epistemic Injustice* (2007), Miranda Fricker persuasively argues that the choice to believe testimony is ethically charged. Human testimony, which Fricker exclusively discusses, is often accepted or rejected on the basis of prejudicial stereotypes. Importantly, Fricker suggests that when receiving testimony, a hearer makes a 'credibility judgement' concerning the testifier's knowledge and sincerity, in light of which she believes or rejects the testimony. This judgement need not be reflexive or conscious, and is often the immediate perception that the testifier is in/credible.[24]

Unfortunately, negative social stereotypes about testifiers who belong to (e.g.) some race, gender or class can lead to the rejection or downplaying of testimony because the testifier is inaccurately perceived to lack knowledge or sincerity. In such cases, Fricker argues, the testifier is harmed in her role as a conveyer of knowledge: she suffers testimonial injustice (Fricker (2007), 17–29). By contrast, there is a virtue of testimonial justice. In Fricker's preferred narrow sense, testimonial justice is the virtue by which a 'hearer neutralizes the impact of prejudice in her credibility judgements', though in a broader sense it can refer to 'all the virtues relevant to receiving the word of another' (*ibid.*, 92). Both uses of 'testimonial justice' are illuminating: it is important to overcome unfair prejudices which skew our credibility judgements, and likewise to minimize the extent to which any competent and sincere testimony is ignored or downplayed (through prejudice or otherwise). We can use Fricker's account to define the virtue of testimonial justice:

> *Narrow Testimonial Justice*: the disposition to remove or correct for the cognitive impact of one's (current, or any potential) social or personal prejudices against any testifier or group of testifiers upon one's credibility judgements, so that prejudice does not prevent one's credibility judgements from reliably tracking testifiers' credibility.[25]

> *Broad Testimonial Justice*: the set of dispositions which dispose one to appropriately judge the credibility of testifiers and to form beliefs accordingly (i.e. in light of one's moral and epistemic obligations).[26]

What is wrong with testimonial injustice; or, at which good does testimonial justice aim? On Fricker's account, testimonial justice is a 'hybrid' epistemic/ethical virtue: it aims at fostering true belief/knowledge and the just treatment of testifiers (*ibid.*, 121–128). Kvanvig concedes that if Christianity is true, belief in revelation is epistemically valuable. So, with a view to arguing that CF fosters testimonial justice towards God, I focus here on Fricker's suggestion that testimonial justice is a moral virtue. Fricker notes that testimonial injustice can have malign

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consequences for individuals immediately involved and for the wider community due to the suppression of useful knowledge from disadvantaged groups, and the consequent erosion of their epistemic self-confidence (*ibid.*, 46–59). Thus, testimonial justice aims at the sharing of knowledge and the fostering of appropriate confidence in the cognitive abilities of all community members. Yet Fricker suggests that even without these effects of testimonial injustice, 'the [testifying] subject is wronged in her capacity as a knower [i.e. communicator of knowledge]' (*ibid.*, 44). Fricker (*ibid.*, 46) argues that in denying her competence and sincerity (against available evidence), one who exercises epistemic injustice towards a testifier *dishonours* her, by failing to recognize characteristics central to her moral worth (i.e. competence as a knower and sincerity as a communicator).

Fricker seems correct that when extrinsic harms do not affect a testifier who suffers testimonial injustice, she is still wronged by the failure to recognize her value as a knowing subject: she suffers disrespect. Since this harm may be extrinsic to the testifier's well-being, we might say that testimonial injustice consists of *failure* (of respect) on the hearer's part, rather than *harm* to the testifier. We can also state the essential moral good at which testimonial justice aims: the appropriate honour and recognition of a testifier as a competent knower and sincere communicator. Although I lack space to develop an extended account of 'honour' and 'recognition', I use these terms to signify the appropriate response given to a person's excellence through one's actions and reasoning about them. Intuitively, certain valuable qualities demand theoretical and practical acknowledgement. When the Queen enters, I should attend to this fact, and bow. Where testifiers are concerned, one can appropriately acknowledge or respond to their competence and sincerity by (*inter alia*) exercising testimonial justice to accurately evaluate their credibility, by paying appropriate attention to their testimony, and by making appropriate epistemic use of it.

One might wonder whether recognition of someone's valuable characteristics is *always* requisite; wouldn't this over-state the importance of respect? Still, we are plausibly (*ceteris paribus*) obliged to recognize/honour another's moral dignity at appropriate moments; particularly when that dignity is brought into question. When one is addressed with (even, alleged) testimony, one is confronted with the question of the testifier's credibility, and so one is plausibly (*ceteris paribus*) obliged to fairly evaluate and recognize their credibility. Even if such recognition is not obligatory, it seems virtuous. On this understanding, belief in testimony is not a merely epistemic matter: it is the output of a morally loaded credibility judgement. This judgement should honour the testifier's competence and sincerity to an appropriate degree. Because each token offer of testimony obliges (*ceteris paribus*) an appropriate recognition of the testifier's competence, it also allows a recognition that the testifier is acting competently and sincerely in each offer of testimony.

One might infer from this analysis that it is the judgement that a testifier is credible which renders her due recognition, rather than belief in her testimony which normally follows. But I suggest that belief in testimony further honours a

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competent and sincere testifier. This is because a testifier (usually, intentionally) offers a good to her audience: knowledge, or belief with positive epistemic status. By believing her testimony, her audience accepts the proffered good. This acceptance further honours the testifier as one who provides an epistemic good, through appropriate use of the latter. By analogy, if someone offers me a gift, it is a matter of respect that I both recognize their generosity and enjoy its intended benefits. Appropriately honouring a testifier in this way does not always involve believing testimony; one can recognize a testifier's sincerity and competence while responsibly judging that their sincerity or competence is imperfect, or while possessing evidence that their testimony is false. Rather, one honours a testifier appropriately by making appropriate epistemic use of their testimony (i.e. including it in one's evidence and forming appropriate beliefs accordingly), in light of a fair judgement of their credibility. When one is certain that a testifier is perfectly competent and sincere, however, one should believe their testimony to the extent to which one is certain that it has been successfully communicated.

We can now explore why it might be *morally* creditable to believe revelation, if one responsibly believes that God is offering testimony. When one responsibly assents to revelation, one exercises testimonial justice towards God. That is, as per Fricker's account, one appropriately judges that (i) God has revealed some proposition and (ii) God is a competent and sincere testifier. In light of this credibility judgement, one believes the revealed proposition. CF thus involves a credibility judgement which appropriately recognizes God as a knower and sincere communicator. Moreover, one who believes divine testimony further honours God by appropriately utilizing His gift of testimony. When responsibly exercised, CF thus involves giving God due honour and recognition. As Avery Dulles explains, 'In adhering to God as revealer, the believer accepts God as the one who is supremely deserving of assent, trust, and obedience' (Dulles (1994), 188). Indeed, since on some accounts worship consists in paying God appropriate respect, CF may be owed to God – by one who can responsibly believe revelation – as an act of worship (see Burling (2019)).

A reviewer wonders whether Catholics should consider acts of CF ultimately valuable (i.e. as directed to or meriting beatitude) on my analysis. According to Catholic theology, only actions performed by those possessing formed faith can be thus 'worth having'. But on my account, (the reviewer continues) the credibility judgement through which one honours God with testimonial justice precedes CF. This misunderstands my account. On my account, after honouring God through an appropriate credibility judgement, one with CF continues to honour God *qua* testifier through appropriate epistemic use of (i.e. belief in) divine testimony (to which CF is the disposition).

Further, we can see how, if God has revealed Himself as Christianity claims, believing divine testimony can involve the exercise of narrow[27] and broad testimonial justice. Firstly, as per Fricker's analysis, belief in divine testimony will involve the accurate judgement that God is a competent and sincere testifier. Philosophers

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often note that humans can be inclined to reject belief in God's existence or divine testimony because these facts challenge our moral and epistemic autonomy (see Plantinga, (2000), 208ff.; Kahane (2011)). As Newman observes, '[A] man who fancies that he can find out truth by himself, disdains revelation . . . fears that it will interfere with his own imaginary discoveries, he is unwilling to consult it' (Newman (1966), 218). Just as exercising narrow testimonial justice involves overcoming the cognitive effects of prejudice, exercising CF may involve overcoming animus against acknowledging God as a sincere and competent testifier, which disposes one to inappropriately diminish one's credence that God has given testimony, or that His testimony is accurate. Second, provided one's belief in divine testimony is morally and epistemically responsible, exercising CF will be an act of broad testimonial justice, since such testimonial justice is just the disposition to appropriately receive testimony.

Belief in divine testimony can also issue from morally or epistemically inappropriate judgements that God has given testimony and is credible. One might believe divine testimony to appear pious, or through credulity. But if one believes revelation for inappropriate reasons – particularly, if one does not intend to honour God *qua* testifier through love for Him – Catholic tradition holds that one's exercise of CF is defective. Many virtue ethicists suggest that a disposition to act well must be properly motivated to be a virtue. Accordingly, Fricker denies that someone lacking commitment to either goal of testimonial justice (i.e. the formation of true beliefs, or the fair treatment of testifiers) possesses that virtue (Fricker (2007), 127–128). Similarly, on my account, only those who exercise CF because they wish to honour God as a testifier exercise testimonial justice towards Him. The intellectually compelled faith of demons, for example, is not an exercise of testimonial justice (see James 2:19; Aquinas *ST* IIaIIae 5.2). While Catholic doctrine holds that CF can exist without its proper motivation,[28] it insists that only CF 'formed' by supernatural hope and love is salvific.[29]

With this in mind, we can see why, according to Catholic doctrine, it is fitting that propositions revealed by God are believed with strong certainty and rational tenacity. Since, according to Catholic tradition, God is a perfectly competent and sincere testifier (*CCC* 215) it is appropriate that this is recognized by perfect certainty in the believer that what God has revealed is true; at least in proportion to her rational confidence that He has revealed that proposition, and that He is perfectly competent and sincere in His testimony. Ideally, a believer will be completely confident that God has revealed a proposition (with perfect competence and sincerity), so that she can make full use of His epistemic gift. Yet when one cannot rationally be certain that God has revealed a proposition, one can still honour God as a competent and sincere testifier by believing a proposition to the extent that one is certain that it is divinely revealed.

A reviewer wonders whether this explanation of faith's normative firmness is compatible with epistemic fallibilism: the thesis that no human belief can be rationally certain. If fallibilism holds, one can never (rationally) be perfectly

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certain that God is perfectly competent and sincere and that He has testified to any proposition; so one need never believe revelation with perfect certainty to honour God as a testifier. I have two replies. First, even if fallibilism holds generally, my analysis nevertheless explains why, with sufficient evidence, one should believe divine testimony with strong (albeit imperfect) certainty. Second, perhaps – as Catholic doctrine teaches – grace can enable one to responsibly believe divine testimony with a certainty surpassing that with which one can rationally believe revelation through natural reason.[30] The reviewer further worries that since cooperation with grace is intrinsically virtuous, this latter suggestion renders otiose my explanation of CF's value as a means of honouring God *qua* testifier. But the fact that faith is a divine gift, which we can virtuously accept with supernatural assistance, does not explain why faith is itself valuable, or why God has chosen it as a necessary means of salvation. Kvanvig seeks such an explanation, and this article endeavours to provide one.

My rejoinder to Kvanvig's claim that doxastic faith is not worth having should now be evident: one who responsibly exercises CF honours God as a testifier, exercising testimonial justice towards Him. But can one honour God *qua* testifier without CF? I have argued that certain situations demand appropriate recognition of a testifier's competence and sincerity. I further suggested that when addressed with testimony, one is plausibly *prima facie* obliged to recognize the testifier's worth *qua* testifier by fairly evaluating her credibility and believing her testimony to an appropriate degree. Since according to Catholic theology CF is the virtue by which we believe divine testimony, it seems that CF is required for the appropriate recognition of God *qua* testifier.[31]

One might suggest that the disposition to believe revelation (when one can responsible do so) is fundamentally valuable, rather than actual belief in revelation. Yet this suggestion is compatible with CAF and is accepted by Catholic theologians who claim that those who non-culpably lack explicit belief in divine testimony may be saved by 'anonymous' (implicit) Christian faith. *In nuce*, I suggest that such faith is best understood as a person's disposition to believe divine revelation which is grounded in her broader ethical and cognitive practices (on implicit belief, see Audi (1994)). Besides, if CF is a virtue, its exercise is valuable. Accordingly, it would not seem unreasonable of God to make salvation conditional on the exercise of CF, if He gives all humans opportunity to responsibly exercise CF before judgement.

Moreover, one can possess faith as defined by Kvanvig – potentially non-doxastic 'commitment to the Lord' – without honouring God *qua* testifier. For example, yielding to sinful disinclination to believe divine testimony despite possessing strong evidence that God has revealed Himself in Christ, one might fail to believe that Christ is risen, even if one's broader attitudes (beliefs, desires, etc.) impel one to act as if He is risen. We can therefore see what is lacking in someone who possess the motivational faith in God's promises which Kvanvig praises, but culpably fails to believe that God's promises are true, or that He

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exists. Such a person may not exercise narrow or broad testimonial justice towards God, failing to honour Him as a testifier. Faith, on Kvanvig's account, is a 'disposition to respond in the service of an ideal'. Yet God is no ideal: He is a supremely valuable person. As such, He is entitled to recognition under certain circumstances, including when one perceives that He is offering testimony.

Conclusion

I have argued that from an orthodox Christian perspective, firm belief in divine testimony is worth having. Accordingly, Kvanvig's claim that doxastic accounts of faith cannot explain faith's value is false. Yet *pace* Kvanvig, doxastic faith may not be valuable because it is necessary to motivate religious practice or for a personal relationship with God. Rather CF is valuable (*inter alia*) because it allows one to exercise testimonial justice towards God. By judging God to be a competent and sincere testifier, and by believing His testimony, those who appropriately exercise CF honour two valuable aspects of God, foregoing temptations to reject His testimony as incompatible with human autonomy.

One might be surprised that I have used feminist epistemology to defend a traditional account of faith. Yet in Scripture, God aligns His speech and concerns with marginalized voices whose demands He, unlike perpetrators of testimonial injustice, does not ignore (e.g. Exodus 22:22–23; James 5:4). It is fitting that Christians learn something of faith's value by considering our failure to listen to such voices.[32]

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Notes

1. *Summa Theologiae* (*ST*) IIaIIae 2.2. Quotations from *ST* below are taken from Aquinas (1922–1935).
2. *Retractions*, I.14.3; *De Util. Cred.* XI.25; *De Lib. Arb.* II.2.
3. *CCC* 57 quotes Aquinas, *ST* IIaIIae 171.5.obj 3: 'the certainty that the divine light gives is greater than that which the light of natural reason gives', although Aquinas is discussing prophecy rather than faith. For Aquinas on faith's firmness, see *ST* IIaIIae 1.4; 2.1. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that the assent of supernatural faith is compatible with 'merely probable knowledge of revelation' or 'fear' that God has not revealed Himself (Denzinger, 2121).
4. That is, propositions believed with faith are rationally indefeasible for the believer. *CCC* 57 cites Newman's dictum that with faith, 'ten thousand difficulties do not make one doubt'. Innocent XI (Denzinger, 2120) and Vatican I (Denzinger, 3036) condemned the suggestion that one with supernatural faith can prudently suspend belief in divine testimony. According to Catholic tradition, faith is also a supernatural virtue (*CCC* 153) which humans embrace through free choice (*CCC* 154; 160).
5. Kvanvig (2018), 104; Kvanvig claims that his argument is consonant with 'the most right-wing, inerrantist Evangelicalism' (136).
6. Unfortunately, I lack space to evaluate Kvanvig's argument from an Eastern Christian perspective.

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7. *Ibid.*, 2: 'a basic tenet regard faith is that it is . . . a virtue and somehow central to a well-lived life'. For Christian faith as virtuous, see 105–107.
8. *Ibid.*, 12: 'So when we think of faith being . . . a virtue, it is a mark against doxastic accounts of faith that [they] . . . strain to explain how faith could be anything close to an important virtue.'
9. *Ibid.*, 11.
10. *Ibid.*, 14; 107: 'Once we . . . [seek to analyse faith on the assumption that it is an important virtue], however, the received view concerning the nature of faith, an approach that treats faith as fundamentally doctrinal, is easily seen as inadequate.'
11. See *ibid.*, 11, where he approvingly paraphrases C. S. Lewis: 'faith is a moral, or all-things-considered virtue'.
12. See e.g. *ibid.*, 14, where Christian faith is characterized as 'loyalty, commitment, and obedience to the one true God'. Kvanvig approvingly quotes biblical scholars who describe faith as loyalty (110, 123) and describes Christian faith as 'a disposition to respond in service of an ideal that involves God and His Kingdom' (117, 127).
13. Kvanvig says little about faith being praiseworthy, but approvingly quotes C. S. Lewis, who wonders how doxastic faith might accrue 'moral credit' (11).
14. The Second Council of Orange emphasized that even desire for faith is God's gracious gift rather than a natural human attainment (Canons 3–7; Denzinger, 373–377), so that grace always precedes human merit (Canon 18). Trent (Session VI, Chapter 5; Denzinger, 388) likewise affirmed that salvific faith is necessarily produced by co-operation with unmerited prevenient grace (Denzinger, 1525).
15. Barth (1956, 615) claims that faith plays a role in justification 'Not because of its intrinsic value. Not because of its particular virtue, or any particular power of its own. But because God accepts it as the human work which corresponds to His work.' Barth's analysis applies to salvific faith (*notitia*, *assensus*, and *fiducia*), even when active in love (*ibid.*, 616–617).
16. For brevity's sake, I omit discussion of whether acts of faith can be morally praiseworthy according to Catholic theology; though Catholic theologians have taught that acts of (formed) faith can merit divine reward – see Aquinas, *De Veritate* (*DV*) 14.4 ad6; *ST* IIaIIae2.9.
17. Trent, Session VI, Chapter 7 (Denzinger, 1530).
18. Trent, Session VI, Chapter 7 (Denzinger, 1530).
19. i.e. intrinsically morally valuable, aside from its present contribution to human intellectual flourishing (*pace* the Thomistic view that anything which 'completes a human capacity' is an inherent good (a reviewer cites Jensen (2018), 45).
20. *CCC* 1812–1813; Aquinas, *DV* 14.3, *resp.*, *ST* IaIIae 62.3.
21. Though the contribution of natural virtues to Christian life and beatitude is controversial in Catholic ethics.
22. One might object that Scripture indicates that belief is itself central to Christian practice (a reviewer cites John 8:24). But Kvanvig (2018, 115–126) argues that passages mandating faith (*pistis*) that *p* should be read as commanding commitment to *p* rather than belief that *p*. I will not examine his contentious exegesis here.
23. A reviewer suggests that belief in divine testimony should be firm because Christian faith sometimes requires public 'confession' of doctrine (cf. Romans 10:9; *ST* IaIIae 3.1–2). If, following Williamson (2000, 238–269), one should only assert that *p* only if one knows that *p*, and if knowledge requires firm belief, confession requires firm belief. Whilst this argument shows promise, it makes four contentious assumptions: (i) that confession is required of all/many Christians, (ii) that confession involves assertion, (iii) that knowledge (rather than e.g. rational belief) is generally the norm of assertion, and (iv) that this norm applies to assertions made in confession. Moreover, this argument does not explain confession's own value. So defenders of CAF might seek a further – perhaps, less contentious – explanation of the value of firm belief in divine testimony.
24. For credibility judgements, see Fricker (2007), 66–80. Augustine (*De Praed. Sanct.* II.5) and Aquinas (*ST* IIaIIae 1.4ad2; 2.9ad3) agree that justified belief in testimony requires a credibility judgement.
25. By stipulating that narrow testimonial justice overcomes both personal and 'systematic' social prejudice, I expand upon Fricker's account, which primarily discusses testimonial in/justice resulting from the latter (see Fricker (2007), 28–29).
26. A reviewer wonders whether one who is inculpably wholly deceived about the criteria for epistemic credibility can exercise the virtue of (broad) testimonial justice. I incline to say that if one is thus gravely

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mistaken about indicators of epistemic credibility, one cannot possess the virtue of (broad) testimonial justice, because one will lack the reliable disposition to 'appropriately evaluate the credibility of testifiers and to form beliefs accordingly'. Similarly, one thoroughly deceived about one's prejudices cannot possess narrow testimonial injustice. Alternatively, perhaps the relevant virtue/disposition is present, but it is 'masked' by one's ignorance. Either way, even such misguided efforts to responsibly evaluate a testifier's credibility and to appropriately honour them retain some moral value. By analogy, if one is always prone to underestimate danger one might not possess the Aristotelian virtue of courage, but one's efforts to act bravely remain valuable and even commendable.

27. Or some closely related virtue.
28. Trent Session VI, Canon 28 (Denzinger, 1578).
29. Trent Session VI, Chapter 7 (Denzinger, 1531).
30. Admittedly, it is difficult to explain *how* grace enables one to responsibly believe, with greater certainty than that available through natural reason, that God has (competently and sincerely) testified to a proposition. For recent interpretations of Aquinas, which suggest that grace causes a strong non-inferential 'appearance' that CF is rationally or morally appropriate, see e.g. Jenkins (1997), 187–200; Brent (2017), 414–416.
31. It is less obvious that the disposition to honour God by belief in divine testimony must be a *supernatural* virtue. This issue was debated by later Scholastic commentators; see Capreolus, *Defensiones Theologiae*, Lib. III, d.24, (Capreolus (2001), 52–81).
32. With thanks to Shyane Siriwardena, Simon Hewitt, and two anonymous reviewers for comments.

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