Forms) that was devised to deal with first-order perplexities. Yet another kind of perplexity is suggested in the *Theaetetus* by the comparison of Socrates with a midwife. Whereas the stingray image was used to indicate a 'paralysis that undermines one's confidence that one even knows how to use the language' (p. 91), the task of the philosophical midwife is to deliver viable theories and test for nonviable ones. In this way, M. suggests, Plato has found 'a way to honour Socrates and his philosophical barrenness without suggesting that the rôle of Socrates exhausts philosophy' (p. 92). In the *Sophist*, however, the puzzles about false belief are themselves the main object of investigation. Plato here 'retires Socrates so that he can present a way of doing philosophy quite distinct from midwiferic cross-examination'. He develops 'a philosophical method that defines *aporiai*, not just as obstacles to understanding the matter under investigation, but as themselves part of what needs to be investigated' (p. 107). This points to Aristotle's use of perplexity. For him, *aporia* is not a state of mental confusion but means 'problem' or 'puzzle'. He makes collecting perplexities an important step in organizing and directing an inquiry, and broadens the scope of perplexity to include puzzles in cosmology and biology. At the same time he brands some perplexities (for example, 'How do we know we aren't dreaming?') as illegitimate or spurious. The final chapter again criticizes interpretations of Plato's early dialogues which ignore or play down the rôle of *aporiai* and argues for the importance of perplexity in philosophy even today. Philosophy departments need teachers who can play the midwife rôle, even though they may do little for their departments' research ratings.

In many ways this is an admirable book which will certainly stimulate discussion. M. is clearly right to argue that perplexity plays an important part in Plato's dialogues, that there are different kinds of perplexity, and that interpretations, particularly of the early dialogues, which ignore perplexity cannot be regarded as adequate. One can also sympathize with his claims about the rôle of perplexity in the practice of philosophy. However, it is difficult to see quite what audience M. has in mind. The book is written in a simple and readable way, but it requires more familiarity with Plato and Platonic scholarship than one could expect in a general reader or beginning student. On the other hand, scholars and more advanced students may well complain that its interpretations of the dialogues need to be worked out in much more detail and that more attention needs to be paid to philosophical problems about perplexity. What distinguishes genuine perplexities from spurious ones? Are they just the result of linguistic confusions? If not, how do they arise?

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PLATO'S IMAGES

E. E. PENDER: *Images of Persons Unseen. Plato's Metaphors for the Gods and the Soul*. (International Plato Studies 11.) Pp. xi + 278. Sankt Augustin: Akademia Verlag, 2000. Cased, DM 88. ISBN: 3-89655-006-8.

Students of Plato know well that the study of Plato's linguistic devices is crucial for elucidating his philosophical insights. Metaphors in particular are especially valuable in this regard, as they abound in Plato's work and often are the only way in which he

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expresses a philosophical theory. Pender undertakes the laudable task of determining the rôle of metaphors for the Gods and the soul in the exposition of Plato's relevant philosophical theories (p. 2). Given the number of those metaphors and the importance and complexity of the relevant theories, P.'s book, which is the revised form of her doctoral thesis, has quite an ambitious scope. Yet this scope becomes somewhat less clear when P. later on in her book claims that her theme 'will not just be Plato's metaphors, but the whole class of verbal comparisons for the Gods and the soul' (p. 7). It is undoubtedly difficult to distinguish metaphors from related verbal imagery, but this very distinction is partly the aim of her first chapter. Her second chapter discusses Plato's conception and use of images and myths, to end with a review of the literature on the rôle of Plato's myths. The remaining four chapters constitute the main contribution of the book, as they examine in detail Plato's metaphors for the Gods (Chapter 3), how these metaphors work together (Chapter 4), Plato's metaphors for the soul and body (Chapter 5), and those concerning what P. calls the inner soul, that is, the rational part of the soul (Chapter 6). P. appends detailed lists of all metaphors concerning the Gods and the soul in Plato's work, and closes with a bibliography.

P. tries to specify the rôle of metaphors for the Gods and the soul in Plato's work in the light of modern theories of metaphor, among which she distinguishes three main views, called 'epistemic', 'emotive', and 'illustrative'. The first suggests that metaphors provide us with knowledge that other forms of discourse cannot provide; on the second view, metaphors do not convey knowledge but evoke emotional response, while on the third, metaphors are a rhetorical tool to convey knowledge which might have been expressed to literal terms. P. rejects the emotive thesis and oscillates between the other two. Indeed, throughout her book P. is seriously concerned with the question of whether Plato's particular groups of metaphors can be reduced to literal or abstract terms (pp. 114–17,187–95, 223–32). But this seems to me to be the wrong question to ask in this regard, and the whole investigation, as P. herself seems to realize (p. 194), is fruitless, and this for many reasons. First, there is simply no secure way to establish whether a Platonic metaphor could be translated into a Platonic philosophical argument. P. argues that Plato's metaphors for the soul as being harmed by the body can be reduced to abstract terms (like those for the Gods, p. 30), but the same metaphors are 'cognitively irreplaceable, if one contends that, when the body hinders the soul's rational activity, the soul is consequently harmed in some way' (p. 192). Yet P. does not demonstrate why this is so, but only claims that Greek has no literal or abstract terminology to express the damage done by the material body on the immaterial soul, and she concludes that Plato does not have any other means to express his ideas on this point, which implies that Plato sometimes used metaphors only because of the limitations of his contemporary language. But how persuasive is this? We know that Plato coined several abstract terms, and probably was able to create more, a possibility which P. mentions later on (p. 228), but does not examine seriously. Secondly, it is often difficult to specify what counts as literal and abstract language (one wonders, for instance, why the very factual language in *Phaedo* 105C counts as abstract, p. 189). Thirdly, it is highly questionable in general whether metaphors (or indeed any figure of speech) can be entirely reduced to literal or abstract terms. Several theorists among those cited by P. suggest that in such a reduction something is lost (e.g. J. Searle, 'Metaphor', in A. Ortony [ed.], *Metaphor and Thought* [Cambridge, 1993], pp. 87–111), in which case we should rather be concerned with what Plato gains by using metaphors, no matter whether they could have been replaced by some kind of abstract or literal language.

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Nevertheless, P. offers an interesting analysis of many renowned Platonic metaphors, paying close attention to the language used, as is the case with the metaphors of the *Politicus* (pp. 123–39), the *Republic* (pp. 206–19), or the *Phaedrus* (pp. 155–62, 219–23). Particularly welcome is her reference to similar imagery used in earlier Greek literature (esp. pp. 91–100), while most valuable is P.'s attention to how metaphors are linked with each other and how they work together (pp. 111–48). Yet P.'s analysis of Platonic metaphors is marred by some serious flaws. The most important one is that P. often talks about the 'deficiency' of this or that metaphor (e.g. pp. 112–13), because they reveal only one aspect of the Gods or the soul. But is this a sense in which metaphors are deficient? If the metaphor of the Gods as craftsmen reveals one aspect of their nature and that of the Gods as fathers another, this does not mean that either of them is deficient or 'breaks down', as P. says (pp. 118, 165); it is rather our expectation that they will work as philosophical accounts which makes them appear 'deficient'. Indeed, concerning the metaphor of the soul in the *Phaedrus*, P. claims that 'the metaphor of the wings of the soul provides an account of how soul and body are first joined together' and 'the idea of wings explains (at the metaphorical level) how good souls can leave the body at death' (p. 162). But clearly a metaphor is not an account, let alone an exhaustive one, as P. first observed (Chapter 1), so, strictly speaking, it does not explain anything, but rather suggests certain things.

P.'s conception of Plato's metaphors as equal to philosophical accounts is evident in her formulations about their rôle in Plato's work. She says, for instance, that the 'closeness of the father/child relationship accounts for the creator's care for the universe' (p. 104). But clearly this is the other way round; roughly speaking, Plato uses this particular metaphor to suggest the exercise of divine providence over the universe. Concerning the metaphors of the soul's relation to the body, P. says that the 'imagery of union and separation works to confirm that in Plato's view, although the soul is joined with the body in life, it still has some control over the extent of the union' (p. 179). But this formulation suggests that Plato's view is available from another source, while in fact metaphors are Plato's only linguistic means to express his ideas on this topic, as P. herself argues later (p. 193). Yet, while P. admits that metaphors are vehicles of certain views and thus philosophically significant, she often claims that metaphors 'are used very much for rhetorical purposes' (p. 147; cf. p. 182), but nowhere does she explain what she exactly means by 'rhetorical' and how metaphors can play both rôles.

P. shows an impressive erudition both in Platonic scholarship and in modern theoretical discussions on metaphor, but she is often guided by these scholarly views (G. E. R. Lloyd in particular) instead of arguing for a point. A more serious problem is her use of translations of Plato's works without modifying them. Waterfield's translation of *ψυχή* by 'mind' in particular is especially misleading when P. discusses the metaphors for the entire soul (p. 176).

Nevertheless, despite its shortcomings, the book maps out the territory of Plato's metaphors for the Gods and the soul, raises questions, offers insights, and, most importantly, approaches Plato's work by looking closely at short passages instead of theorizing. I detected some misprints, some of them unnecessary divisions of Greek words (pp. 39, 58, 68, 129, 132, 135, 163, 179, 199, 203, 212, 221). The lack of any indexes is a drawback which counterbalances the usefulness of the tables of all metaphors for the Gods and the soul.

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