concludes that human fallibility lies at the root of the regents' poor choice of successors and of the constitutional change that flows from it.

So, does any serious purpose underlie the Muses' speech? B. takes Socrates' introduction, and his warning of the Muses' playfulness, more or less at face value as Plato's warning not to take them too seriously. But Plato elsewhere (especially in the *Phaedrus*) uses the conventions of Muse invocation and inspiration to sophisticated ends in establishing the truth value, partial or otherwise, of what is being said. B. broaches the issue of the Muses and fiction (pp. 92–6), but the discussion would have benefited from closer engagement with recent work on the subject of lies and fiction in the ancient world. He stresses (pp. 8, 142) the requirement on the reader to use critical judgement in assessing what the Muses are saying (and finds Glaucon, as a dialogue character, guilty of high credulity for his acquiescence in their analysis). He might have developed this approach further, for the reader is at liberty to interrogate the text for intertextual (and intratextual) allusion and to work out its significance for him/herself. It would be interesting, for example, to have an assessment of the wider relevance of Socrates' closing reference to a Homeric speech, by Glaucus (!), that contains the comparison of the birth and passing of generations of men to the sprouting and withering of leaves (*Il.* 6.146–9), and leads to the exchange of Glaucus' gold armour for Diomedes' bronze outfit (cf. the Muses' extraordinary conflation of Hesiodic ages, juxtaposing 'bronze' with 'gold', 547a). But B. does not show much interest in the (inter)textual third dimension, and he is generally less assured in assessing literary issues than the logical coherence of its philosophical content. He follows Hellwig in arguing that the speech is a pastiche of sophistic rhetorical showmanship (pp. 134–43), a judgement that places much emphasis on stylistic features lying on the surface of the text but does not account satisfactorily for (*inter alia*) the riddling character that B. himself identifies (pp. 64–5). Recent work on the Muses, including the use of question and answer exchanges with them (A. Harder, *Prometheus* 14 [1988], 1–14, is basic), has extended understanding of the conventions of 'inspiration' and their manipulation. Fourth-century sophistication in these matters was quite sufficient to allow for the presence, underneath the banter, of serious, 'inspired' content, intended as such by Plato if not necessarily by the dramatic character Socrates. Relevant though it is to B.'s. central interest in dramatic dynamics, this area remains largely unexplored. Likewise, the Muses' association with political harmony, evident in Hesiod (cf. pp. 141–2) and germane to Plato's purposes, might have received more space.

B. has given a masterly synthesis of the mathematical problem, and he has posed pertinent questions about the relevance and coherence of the Muses' speech; but the book does not bring to bear the full arsenal of analytical firepower now at the critic's disposal, and as a literary reading it misses its target.

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ANDREIA IN PLATO

A. HOBBS: *Plato and the Hero: Courage, Manliness and the Impersonal Good*. Pp. xvii + 280. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Cased, £37.50. ISBN: 0-521-41733-3.

The basis of this book is a re-examination of the status of *thumos* or the thumoeidic element in the ethical psychology of Plato's work. Hobbs's central interest is in Plato's

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critical engagement with traditional Greek thinking about *andreia* and his attempt to reconfigure this concept for new philosophical purposes.

Chapter 1 charts the issues arising from the position of *thumos* as a major psychological component in the *Republic*. *Thumos*, H. contends, is not just a raw drive, though it may approximate to one when still in its more 'animal', least educated state. It is responsive to an education in *mousikê* (H. takes it, indeed, to be the main target of the educational programme in Books 2–3), and its susceptibility to shame, as in the famous example of Leontius and the corpses, enmeshes it both in a person's self-image and in sensitivity to social pressures. It is these pressures, when detached from the guidance of reason, that generate the obsessively timocratic (*thumoeidic*) life depicted in *Republic* 8. All in all, H. argues, *thumos* is a 'part' of the soul (*qua* 'motivational set') that centres on 'the need to believe that one counts for something' (p. 30) and hence manifests itself both in a capacity for anger and shame and in a need for rôle-models that embody one's aspirant self-image. *Thumos* connects with matters of abiding psychological importance, as H. stresses by tracing its adapted reappearance in Aristotle, Nietzsche (especially the will-to-power), Adler, and Freud (in notions of the ego-ideal and, later, the superego).

In coming to assign *thumos* an essential place in the idea of human goodness as harmony of soul, Plato not only saw the importance of rôle-models for the ethical shape of individual lives but himself wrote works that, as H. suggests in Chapter 2, partly address the reader's *thumos* (pp. 57–9). But what function does this leave the traditionally masculinist concept of *andreia* (the principal virtue of the *thumos*) within Plato's own philosophical ideals, including his inheritance of the apparently Socratic conviction of gender-neutral virtue? Chapters 3 and 4 tackle the roots of Plato's pre-*Republic* approaches to *andreia* in the *Laches* (where its importance for philosophy is hinted at, 194a) and *Protagoras*. Both these works, H. thinks, broach issues which their surface argumentation cannot satisfy: *Laches* prefigures the need for a model of *andreia* that combines cognitive and non-cognitive elements; *Protagoras* implicitly urges a radical rethinking of the relationship between pleasure, goodness, and the *kalon*. *Gorgias*, treated in Chapter 5, dramatizes the danger of an ungoverned *thumos* through the figure of Callicles, who anticipates the timocratic man of *Republic* 8 (and is far, on this account, from a pure hedonist); but H. also finds in *Gorgias* (as in the encounter with Thrasymachus in *Republic* 1) intimations of the problem of how philosophy can fashion a new type of *andreia* that might exercise appeal for those reared on traditional images of manliness.

Those images owed much to heroic mythology. In Chapters 6 and 7 H. traces Plato's evaluation of one particular hero, Achilles. Despite ostensible analogies between himself and Socrates in (for example) *Apology* and *Crito*, H. maintains that Achilles, thumoeidic person *par excellence*, is a problematic model for a philosophical 'hero'—hence his prominence in the critique of poetic characters in *Republic* 2–3. The Homeric Achilles, moreover, represents a tragic world-view that threatens to sever *aretê* from *eudaimonia*; he is thus emblematic of the challenge which the *Republic* as a whole attempts to meet by its new 'unification of values'. Chapter 8 returns to a final appraisal of the place of *thumos* in the *Republic*'s moral psychology. Having suggested that the Forms of Beauty and Good are identical in reference, and that all Forms exhibit 'proportion', H. argues that the educational use of beauty works on the *thumos* in a way that prepares the ground for the deeper planting of fully rational goodness. The subjection of *thumos* to reason, within a new model of virtue as psychic harmony, pulls *andreia* (now somewhat assimilated to *sôphrosunê*) further away from traditional warlike excellence (though the Auxiliaries still need some of that too) and opens up the

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possibility, revealed in Book 5, of a gender-neutral philosophical 'courage'. This possibility does not, however, eliminate all masculine associations from the new philosophical *andreia*: a residual ambivalence may reflect a situation in which Plato was torn between a fully gender-free concept of human goodness and an educational image of philosophy that could appeal to young males in his culture. Plato's views never hardened: H.'s book ends with a short chapter on the *Symposium* (where *thumos* appears, she thinks, in the guise of both erotic aspiration and Alcibiades' dangerous passions) and an epilogue on the complex relationship between *andreia* and *sôphrosunê* in *Politicus* and *Laws*, a relationship indicative of lingering doubts about the educability of *thumos*.

This interesting book is lucidly written and refreshingly free of obfuscation, but its structure depends on some subtle cross-weaving of themes, hence my relatively full description of its main arguments. H. reads Plato in an open-minded manner (though her programmatic principle on p. xiii is sometimes belied by claims about Plato's 'beliefs' *vel sim.*), taking the dialogues to contain prompts and problems for readers, rather than fixed positions; formal analysis alone will often miss the point (pp. 117, 119 n. 19). This allows her to explore the implications of Platonic arguments critically but generously, without always pressing for definitive solutions. Some parts of the work are thinner than others—the slightly patchy treatment of the two *Hippias* dialogues in Chapter 6, for instance. But the overall interpretation of *thumos* sustains itself well, even if the dialogues' shifting perspectives on *thumos* leave room for further argument over, for example, its relation to epithumetic desires, its 'animal' quality (Plato's own text and vocabulary make so much of this), or even its relevance to the Platonic Socrates (the most non-thumoeidic of persons, one might suppose). H. is right to see Homeric antecedents as a crucial influence on and target for Plato's reworking of courage; her discussion of Achilles is illuminating (a reference to D. Tarrant, *CQ* 44 [1951], 60, would have been *à propos* here). No doubt H. is right that Plato could not altogether escape from masculinist preconceptions, but I am unconvinced that the need to recruit young males to philosophy was a key factor: anyhow, surely the evidence for female students in the Academy deserved a mention? H.'s book contains much stimulating analysis. Her scholarship is mostly dependable, though it is false (p. 245) that *Republic* 5, on which H. is skimpy, makes no distinction between auxiliaries and rulers (see e.g. 458b–c—with 460b for female rulers). The bibliography contains some items that are nowhere cited.

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PLATO'S POLITICAL PASSIONS

W. R. NEWELL: *Ruling Passion. The Erotics of Statecraft in Platonic Political Philosophy*. Pp. vii + 205. Lanham, Boulder, New York, and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. Paper, £20.95. ISBN: 0-8476-9727-4.

Ruling Passion can (and does) claim originality in tracing its subject through Plato's *Gorgias*, *Symposium*, and *Republic*. Its thesis, however, lies in the distinctive tradition of Leo Strauss: for the statesman whose erotics N. has in mind is, first and foremost, the tyrant, not the philosopher king, and Eros is the god of his *hubris*. Desire, which in simpler accounts of Plato's psychology is characterized as an irreducible attraction

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