It is obviously aimed at the Italian market; its chief interest outside may be its quite extensive contributions to discussions of the text. The work is based on Hall's Teubner text, but it certainly does not follow Hall slavishly. Eleanor Dickey's *Latin Forms of Address from Plautus to Apuleius*[19] is a most welcome sequel to her *Greek Forms of Address* which was very well received, not least in this journal (*G&R* 44 [1997], 249). It is a truly learned work which must become the standard work on the topic. After a very thorough introduction which outlines and defends the strategy to be adopted in lucid and persuasive language the book goes on to cover the whole of the four centuries indicated by its title. This is a book to refer to, not to read through, and it is well organized to facilitate consultation on particular issues. For instance, a reader who wants to know whether *puella* has the same insulting sense as *puer* will first consult the index on those words to be directed to the appropriate discussion. On the other hand, a reader who wants to learn about 'Addresses between Relatives' or 'Terms of Endearment, Affection, and Esteem' will consult the appropriate chapter – and there are thirteen such chapters on a very wide range of topics. Any reader who consults in either way will quickly be drawn into reading on and discovering all sorts of fascinating information. The only possible improvement that I can think of would be to furnish the index with information on the topic discussed on each of the pages indicated.

D. E. HILL

[19] *Latin Forms of Address from Plautus to Apuleius*. By Eleanor Dickey. Oxford U.P., 2002. Pp. xii + 414. £45.

Greek History

'Greed is good', Michael Douglas famously said in the film *Wall Street*, but of course things are not so simple, as the actor will have been reminded when he signed his pre-nuptial agreement with Catherine Zeta Jones. There is usually a fine line between wanting too much and not wanting enough, and a large grey area between legitimate and illegitimate means of satisfying the desire for more. This is certainly true of ancient Greece, and it was high time that someone studied Greek attitudes towards greed, as Ryan Balot has now done in *Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens*.[1] Beginning with an analysis of the place of greed in Aristotle's philosophy, then tracing back its antecedents from Homer and Hesiod (briefly), via Solon, Herodotus, Thucydides, the oligarchic juntas of 411 and 404, and finally Plato's *Republic*, Balot offers an impressively wide-ranging treatment. His interest is not in actual forms of acquisition and exploitation but in the development of concepts of greed – *pleonexia* ('grabbiness', as it is aptly translated at one point, 109), *philochrematia*, and the like. This neglected dimension of the history of Greek political thought is certainly worth exploring, and Balot takes us on an interesting tour, offering many an acute observation along the way. His general conclusions, however, tend to be rather conventional. As so often, the degree to which Solon's political ideas are innovative is overstated. Solon's conceit of greed and injustice as a 'communal evil' which will climb over every courtyard wall and penetrate into the furthest corners of every house to affect every member of the community (F 4 West) is colourful, but not essentially different from Homer's and Hesiod's notion that

[1] *Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens*. By Ryan K. Balot. Princeton U.P., Princeton and Oxford, 2001. Pp. xi + 291. Hardback £27.95.

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the misdeeds of a few individuals cause suffering for the entire community. In Homer, the punishment is inflicted by Zeus (*Iliad* 16.384–92); in Hesiod, Zeus is assisted by personified Justice (*Works and Days* 213–64); in Solon, Justice acts alone. The difference is intriguing, but hardly justifies the claim that 'with the appearance of this poem, the individual is no longer defined simply as an individual, but rather, first and foremost, as a citizen' (94–5). The contrast between Herodotus' and Thucydides' attitudes to empire is also exaggerated, primarily by adopting the now common view that 'for Herodotus, imperialism is imprudent and immoral because it is unjust and dangerous to take something that belongs to another', whereas for Thucydides empires are fine, provided they are 'managed by capable, energetic leaders' (178). This interpretation relies on such questionable claims as that Herodotus' praise for Athens is 'richly ironic' (117), that his stories about Themistocles' greed are meant to represent 'a defining characteristic of Athens as a whole' (118), and that stories which ostensibly highlight the gullibility of the Athenian masses are indictments of their greed (121–4). For what it is worth, it seems to me that there are three constants in archaic and classical attitudes towards the desire for more: first, a man must always claim his fair share of wealth, status, and influence, by force if necessary; secondly, a 'fair' distribution is not one in which everyone gets the same amount but one in which the 'good' get a larger share than the 'bad'; thirdly, the rich, famous, and powerful are by definition 'better' than the poor, obscure, and vulnerable. Together these three notions form a recipe for a culture of greed and ambition, since those who have the most feel that their superiority entitles them to still more and that they must forcibly claim this ever-greater share if it is not freely given. Each of Balot's authors expresses his own particular 'ethics of greed', but these are all variations on the same theme. Balot raises the important issue of the extent to which ideas influence action, and he must be right that, say, oligarchic plotters 'did not act *unreflectively* in accordance with class interest' (216; emphasis added). But it may be going too far to imagine that 'the philosophical justifications found in the literature of the preceding decades enabled and *inspired* the grand-scale depredations of the Thirty' (223 n.103; emphasis added). Or maybe Critias, weary after a hard day's executing metics and tempted to sit down and enjoy his ill-gotten gains, really did drive himself on with the thought that philosophy commanded him to kill some more. The ferocity of the Thirty and the restraint exercised by the victims of their terror inverted all the usual Greek notions about self-controlled élites and irascible masses – commonplaces which are among the vast array of ancient ideas about anger surveyed by William V. Harris in *Restraining Rage*.[2] Harris does not stop at Aristotle but carries straight on to Augustine, sweeping through more than a millennium in just over 400 eminently readable pages which investigate the development of anger control among Greeks and Romans. Drawing on Norbert Elias' *The Civilising Process*, Harris posits a link between state-formation and archaic Greek efforts to control one's emotions, and goes on to suggest that a 'new focus on inner experience' in the classical period 'arose gradually, in a specifically Athenian environment of prosperity, slave-owning, and intellectual self-confidence' (360). In Hellenistic and Roman worlds, the control of anger remained a major philosophical issue and gave rise, as a very good chapter on 'anger therapy' shows, to much earnest advice on how to a cure a hot temper. Self-help was the rule, but Galen stands out as an early

[2] *Restraining Rage*. The ideology of anger control in classical antiquity. By William V. Harris. Harvard U.P. Cambridge MA and London, 2001. Pp. xii + 468. Hardback £34.50.

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advocate of counselling (385–6). Harris is properly concerned to place the expression of anger in its historical context, and rightly demands an end to 'universal pontifications about anger founded on questionnaires administered to well-fed middle-class American and British twenty-year olds' (409). Amongst other things, he suggests that 'relatively hostile relations between the sexes, combined with pederastic ties which were normally short-lived, can be imagined to have left most adult Greeks emotionally isolated, and irascible' (295). As for the role of anger control, he stresses that it is in the interests of rulers, masters and men to deny their subjects, slaves and women 'the right to rage' ('one of the foundations of an independent personality', 282; cf. 275, 407). At the same time, he argues that dominant groups, especially in a slave-owning society 'had so much moral liberty that they had to create some rules with which to limit it', and that self-restraint helped to reinforce 'the upper order's belief in its own rationality and decency' (357, 406–7). Precisely how these two lines of argument are meant to relate to one another, or to the theory of state-formation, is not entirely clear to me. Perhaps Harris might have dug a little deeper in these fundamental questions, even if that meant wearing his learning and theoretical sophistication a little less lightly than he normally does in this engaging and important book. The ancient equivalent of counting to ten, by the way, was 'repeating to yourself the twenty-four letters of the alphabet' (245), which means, I suppose, that the ancients were an average 2.4 times as irritable as we are.

Continuing the themes of greed, injustice and anger, a letter arrives from the printers of Rosemary B. Stevenson's *Persica*[3] to explain that they produced this small volume five years ago for the Scottish Academic Press, but 'despite lengthy litigation . . . never received payment for our work', so that they have now decided to distribute it themselves. Pity the poor author, stuck in the middle, who first wrote her book as a D.Phil thesis in 1985, revised it in 1988 and 1989, then updated it in 1995 (vi), only to have to wait until 2002 to see the result in print. As the title suggests, this is a study of the fourth-century works called *Persica* by Ctesias of Cnidus, Heracleides of Cyme, and Deinon of somewhere or other (perhaps Colophon, 10–11). None of these has much of a reputation for reliability, but Stevenson sets out to demonstrate by meticulous comparison of the three works with one another and with the accounts of Herodotus, Xenophon, and others that they are not as fanciful or as selective as we thought. Ctesias' work emerges as similar to Xenophon's *Hellenica*, insofar as it 'centres on events of which he had personal experience and his own role', although 'he does not distort or even necessarily exaggerate' his part in events (160). Deinon's range was wider, but his account was unduly influenced by stories slanted in favour of the Persian noble Tiribazus (12–13), while, the reader is told at regular intervals, 'we have insufficient evidence to comment on Heracleides' (41; cf. 81, 111, 161). The latter comment conveys rather well not only the painstaking thoroughness and fairness of the discussion, but also a certain lack of excitement. It is left to the cover artist to inject an element of fun with a couple of charming drawings, adapted – loosely adapted – from two *lekythoi* by the Edinburgh Painter, which appear to feature a reclining Achilles wearing Priam's white beard, and a goddess sporting a goatee.

The *Life of Artaxerxes*, another key contribution to the historiography of Persia, barely rates a

[3] *Persica*. Greek writing about Persia in the fourth century BC. By Rosemary B. Stevenson. Scottish Classical Studies 5. Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh 1997. Pp. xiv + 167. (Available only direct from J. W. Arrowsmith Ltd, Winterstoke Road, Bristol, for £6 plus 50p postage.)

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mention in Robert Lamberton's monograph on *Plutarch*.[4] Nor does the essay *On The Control of Anger* or, for that matter, the bulk of that prolific author's work. Lamberton's strategy is to employ illustrative examples rather than aim for comprehensive coverage. Almost half of the book is taken up with a long chapter on the *Parallel Lives* which consists largely of discursive summaries of six of the twenty-two surviving pairs (Theseus and Romulus, Lycurgus and Numa, 'conquerors' Lysander and Sulla and Alexander and Caesar, 'heroes' Phocion and Cato, 'villains' Demetrius and Antony), while the shorter discussion of *Moralia* is even more exclusive and outlines only five of the dialogues among the ninety-three surviving essays. My impression, unfortunately, was of an idiosyncratic selection of favourite texts rather than set of well-chosen illustrations. Like so many modern readers, Lamberton is ambivalent about Plutarch: he dislikes 'the pedagogical moralising', but admires 'the wonderfully theatrical manipulation of anecdote'. Moreover, he is keen to find 'the anarchic, unstated second level beyond the two' (142). Anarchy in Plutarch? No wonder that Lamberton finds the deeply straightforward comparisons which link most *Lives* 'often tedious and uncomfortable reading. We feel patronised . . ., betrayed by the author, who . . . now returns as the pushy pedant . . . dictating our response' to his text (115). These frustrations drive him to rejoice at the disappearance of some of his subject's work: 'perhaps the loss of the *Comparison* in the *Alexander and Caesar* has a positive side. The *Lives* of these two men . . . develop a complexity of judgment that is not analytically reduced in the end. Contradictions and tensions are left, and we can, after all, formulate our own questions and conclusions' (ibid.). If only someone had told Plutarch about the death of the author, the multivalence of meanings, and the joys of deconstruction. Despite the conclusion, simultaneously over-the-top and backhanded, that Plutarch is 'the most palatable – no, the most enjoyable – of all the ancient authors on the history of Greece and Rome' (195), it is difficult to escape the feeling that Lamberton does not actually like Plutarch very much and chose to concentrate on the pieces which best lend themselves to treatment in the post-modern manner, skipping those essays and biographies which all-too-helpfully and boringly spell out exactly what messages its target audience of 'stuffy, ambitious teenage students of rhetoric' (142) is meant to take away from their reading. The day will come when someone takes the tools of literary criticism to Aeneas Tacticus. Stripping away surface layers of handy hints for setting fire to siege engines and practical advice on how to outwit traitors, we will discover an underlying trenchant critique of class society or perhaps a subversive 'reading' of the experience of being 'under siege'. For now, we must be content with a second edition of David Whitehead's clear translation of, and helpful commentary on, *Aineias The Tactician: How To Survive Under Siege*.[5] Not much is new in this edition, other than a few pages of bibliographical addenda which are quite full for the first few years after publication of the original, but then peter out and contain nothing more recent than 1996. The main thing, however, is that this extremely useful work is in print again, in paperback and at a reasonable price. I have sometimes wondered whether, with a bit of tweaking, one might market Aeneas for a broader audience, along the lines

[4] *Plutarch*. By Robert Lamberton. Yale U.P., New Haven and London, 2001. Pp. xx + 218. Paperback.

[5] *Aineias The Tactician: How To Survive Under Siege*. A historical commentary, with translation and introduction. Second edition. By David Whitehead. Bristol Classical Press, London, 2001. Pp. xix + 218. Paperback £ 12.99.

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of many another military classic revamped for a business readership – Sun Tzu's *Art of War* for middle managers, Clausewitz for caterers, that sort of thing. Having read the text again, I think I may have spotted an even more lucrative scam. Airbags used to cushion the blows of battering rams (32.3), attackers caught with lassos cast from above and hoisted bodily up against the city walls (39.6–7), bees and wasps released into enemy tunnels to drive out sappers (37.4), not to mention the running gag about stupid dogs upsetting carefully laid plans by barking at soldiers who sneak out for night sorties (23.2), howling at secret whistle signals (24.18), and getting under the feet of defenders as they run towards the battlements (38.2–3) – all this slapstick violence suggests that Aeneas could be a big hit in what is clearly his natural medium, the animated cartoon. That's all, folks.

HANS VAN WEES

Roman History

Works on Late Antiquity ended the previous review, just as more arrived. Surely it is time for historians of the period to stop apologizing for it? (*Qui excuse son sujet . . .*) There are events, ideologies, writings, buildings, and art enough for any historian not put off by literary snobbery. (The present reviewer will contribute a mite by ending segregation, even to the head of the review.) However, G. W. Bowersock and the other editors of *Interpreting Late Antiquity*,[1] essays drawn from the reference work *Late Antiquity: a Guide to the Postclassical World*, have a particular point to make, that it is from this period that there comes much of what still runs in our blood, notably in religion and law. Further, the essays are 'meant to provoke thought'. The alphabetical first half of the authors, along with the editors, shows that this aim is likely to have been achieved: Averil Cameron, B. Caseau, H. Chadwick, G. Fowden, P. J. Geary. Few passages seem to be saying, but more elaborately, what one thought one knew, or to be sacrificing too much to a survey. Perhaps the essay that will break most new ground for classicists is H. Kennedy's on Islam, but R. Lim offers insights into Christianity's controversies after its triumph. The index is rather brief, the illustrations subdued, but richness in ideas puts that out of mind. J. Banaji, in *Agrarian Change in Late Antiquity*,[2] is also putting forward a defence, but it is one that is integral to the entire fine work, that is, to a polemic against the thesis, derived from M. Weber, of a regression in Late Antiquity to a localized natural economy away from such monetization as had already been achieved. The importance of this endeavour, in itself and for earlier epochs too, is obvious. In a series of demanding and admirably documented chapters, Banaji makes his case. First, surveys of the rural landscape and of the earlier views (G. Mickwitz is prominent), then the toughest chapter, on the *expanding* monetary economy based on gold. What follows, with a useful glossary, but only one map, are chapters on accounts of Byzantine large estates, the changing balance of rural power and the late antique aristocracy, estates, and wage labour (especially interesting for students of earlier

[1] *Interpreting Late Antiquity*. Essays on the Postclassical World. Edited by G. W. Bowersock, Peter Brown, and Oleg Grabar. The Belknap Press of Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, 2001. Pp. xviii + 280, with two maps, 43 plates in text.

[2] *Agrarian Change in Late Antiquity*. Gold, Labour, and Aristocratic Dominance. By Jairus Banaji. Oxford U.P., 2001. Pp. xviii + 286, with map in text. £50.

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