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The grammar, meaning, and referential functions of *else*[1]

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Although *else* is recognized as a cohesive device (e.g. Halliday & Hasan, 1976: 76), it has received relatively little attention in the literature. To help remedy the situation, this article investigates how native speakers use *else* in both written and spoken discourse. We first review the literature for a description of the meaning(s) of *else*, then identify its most common meaning as reflected in its frequency of use in American English native-speaker discourse. More specifically, we undertake a quantitative analysis of the frequency and distribution of different types of *else* constructions, as well as a qualitative analysis of how *else* functions as a referential and cohesive marker. The unique referential role of *else* is then highlighted by contrasting it with its closest synonym, namely *other*. It is shown that these two referential and cohesive markers complement each other, with *else* playing a less specified semantic role than *other*.

1 Introduction

For a word that falls well within the 1,000 most frequent words in English – 569th most frequent in the Brown Corpus (Francis & Kučera, 1982: 471) and 530th most frequent in the British National Corpus[2] – *else* has received relatively little attention in the literature from linguists and grammarians alike.[3] One reason for this neglect is perhaps the fact that *else* often functions beyond the sentence-internal level. That is, it often operates across sentence or utterance boundaries, as illustrated in (1) below:

[1] We would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers of this article and editor Bas Aarts for their invaluable comments. Any remaining deficiencies are our responsibility. An earlier version was presented at a colloquium entitled 'Cohesion and Beyond' at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Association for Applied Linguistics, Orlando, FL, 11 March. Portions of this article were also presented at the 1999 TESOL Conference in New York, 19 March, and at the 1999 International Cognitive Linguistics Conference in Stockholm, 22 July. We would like to thank those who attended these conferences for their helpful comments, in particular Peter Fries. We are also grateful to Asif Agha for reading and commenting on an earlier version of this article, and to Hong Yin Tao and Aaron Lawson for technical assistance with the use of the British National Corpus and the Brown Corpus on ICAME. We are, above all, greatly indebted to all those who have kindly provided us with access to their databases, without which this corpus-based study would not have been possible.

[2] The Brown Corpus is based on written texts, and 'consists of approximately 1,014,000 graphic words of running text' (Francis & Kučera, 1982: 4). The British National Corpus is much larger, consisting of 100 million words, with samples of both written and spoken language 'from a wide range of sources, designed to represent a wide cross-section of current British English' (introduction to the BNC at website http: //info.ox.ac.uk/bnc/). The two frequency rankings cited here are for written American and British English respectively. For the spoken corpus of the BNC, the frequency ranking for *else* is much higher – the 248th most frequent word (i.e. 4,751 tokens or 0.05% from approximately 10 million words). Based on the spoken corpus used for this study, we also believe that *else* occurs much more frequently in spoken American English than it does in the written Brown Corpus.

[3] But see Culicover & Jackendoff (1995) for a notable exception. We briefly discuss their observations in section 3.3.3.

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(1) A: Sue and Bob came to the party.
B: *Who else* came?

In such an exchange we must interpret *else* anaphorically, by going back to the first speaker's utterance, which tells us that *who else* in (B) means 'who else other than Sue and Bob'. Given that *else* is not a typical sentence-level feature of English, it has been neglected in sentence-level treatments of English grammar, whether they be structural, formal, or functional in orientation.

Halliday & Hasan (1976) were among the first to propose a substantive description of the 'grammar' of English discourse, i.e. the ties between structure and meaning that cross clause or sentence boundaries and contribute to what they refer to as 'cohesion' in discourse (see also Grimes, 1975 and Werlich, 1976 among others). In their discussion of reference in English, Halliday & Hasan (1976: 76) posit the following three types – personal reference, demonstrative reference, and comparative reference – and they list *else* under the category of comparative reference, along with *other* and *different*, as forms that express 'difference' (rather than 'identity' or 'similarity'). Halliday & Hasan also note that *else* can occur only with indefinite compound pronouns and adverbs (e.g. *someone, nothing, everywhere*)[4] or corresponding interrogatives (e.g. *who, what, where*) (1976: 80). In more recent work, Halliday (1994) further notes that unlike personals and demonstratives, which establish 'a relation of co-reference, whereby the same entity is referred to over again' when used anaphorically, comparatives set up instead 'a relation of contrast' by means of a frame of reference against which something can be talked about as being either 'the same or different, like or unlike, equal or unequal, more or less' (1994: 316). Halliday identifies *else* as a comparative reference marker with adjunctive and sub-modifying functions, but does not elaborate any further on these formal and functional properties.

We feel that an in-depth study of *else* can provide useful information for those interested in the interaction of grammar and discourse in English. In this article we attempt to fill the gap that now exists in the literature by focusing on the meaning of *else*, its grammatical distribution in spoken and written discourse, and its referential and cohesive functions. Finally, we compare and contrast *else* with its closest synonym, *other*, to better characterize the special role that *else* plays in English.

[4] Halliday & Hasan (1976: 80) once referred to this class of pronouns and adverbs as 'general nouns'. Elsewhere in their book (1976: 274), however, general nouns are identified as 'a small set of nouns having generalized reference within the major noun classes, those such as ''human noun'', ''place noun'', ''fact noun'' and the like'. Examples cited include *people, person, man, woman, child, thing, stuff, matter, move* (in the sense of 'action'), *place, question,* and *idea.* Halliday & Hasan identify the cohesive functions of these general nouns as being 'borderline between grammatical and lexical cohesion … because a general noun is itself a borderline case between a lexical item (member of an open set) and a grammatical item (member of a closed system)' (1976: 274). This observation is useful for our analysis of the grammatical and collocational distribution of *other* in contrast to *else* in sections 4.1 and 4.2.

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2 What dictionaries and reference grammars tell us about *else*

2.1 *Common interpretations of* else

According to *Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language* (1981: 737), the origin of *else* can be traced to *elles,* a word in both Old and Middle English meaning 'other', as seen in contemporary usage in utterances such as *Nothing else but the best will do,* which is easily paraphrasable as 'Nothing other than the best will do.' Webster's also links *else* to Old High German *elles* and Old Nordic *elligai,* both of which mean 'otherwise', and to Gothic *aljis,* Latin *alius,* Greek *allos,* and Armenian *ail,* all of which are translated into English as 'other'. Barnhart (1988: 322) notes that *elles* was attested in Old English with the meaning 'other', 'otherwise', and 'different', and thereafter had undergone the following orthographic changes in Middle English: *elles* > *ells* > *els* > *else.* Evidently, *else* has a very strong 'other' reading, both etymologically and crosslinguistically (from an Indo-European perspective).

Webster's (1981: 737) further identifies the use of *else* with two other more specific interpretations: 'different(ly)' as in *How else could he act under the circumstances?* and 'more' or 'additional(ly)' as in *Where else can gold be found?* Alexander (1988: 87) also offers similar interpretations for *else.*

Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech, & Svartvik (1985: 932) further point out that when *else* combines with the conjunction *or,* it readily takes on an 'alternative' reading. Although it could be argued that the 'alternative' reading is strongly influenced by the presence of the conjunction *or,* Quirk et al. maintain that the presence of *else* nevertheless provides 'a more explicit orientation' to the basic conjunctive reading, in the sense that it emphasizes the alternativeness suggested by *or,* and for this reason the presence of *else* cannot be regarded as a tautology (1985: 642). Indeed, the emphatic effect of *else* is indispensable in sentences that suggest urgency or intense emotion as in the case of unelaborated or implied threats where the conjunction is in final position and the implied following clause is omitted, as in (2) and (3) below:

(2) You'd better stop hitting my little brother, *or else!* (Swan, 1980: 200)
(3) Don't talk to me like that again, *or else.* (*Collins COBUILD*, 1987: 458)

In sum, the most common interpretations of *else* found in dictionaries and reference grammars are: 'other', 'different', 'additional', and 'alternative'. In section 3.3.1 we will examine the frequency and distribution patterns of these interpretations (and others, if any) in American English native-speaker discourse, both written and spoken, to determine the most common interpretation (and thus possibly the basic meaning) of *else.*

2.2 *Grammatical distribution of* else

Else is known to occur in three distinct positions: (i) independently, (ii) as a premodifier, and (iii) as a postmodifier. Independently, *else* functions as a pronom-

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inal, as in *He cannot do else* (Celce-Murcia, 1990: 29) and *What did he say else?* (Fowler, 1996: 246), though such constructions are now considered archaic. *Else* also occurs independently as a quasi-conjunctive adverb, in which case it can appear in either clause-initial, clause-medial, or clause-final position, as illustrated in (4), (5), and (6) respectively.

(4) Fortunately it [sc. a staircase] was not spiral, *else* I would have succumbed to vertigo. (B. Reubens, 1985, cited in Fowler, 1996: 246)
(5) No one would tolerate the proposal to devote some years of a boy's time to getting such information, at the cost of much valuable information which he might *else* have got. (Spenc., Educ., ch. I, 12a, cited in Poutsma, 1928: 443)
(6) Well, I'll do it, if the beadle follows in his cocked hat, not *else.* (Dick., Chuz., ch. XXV, 206a, cited in Poutsma, 1928: 443)

In premodifier position, as noted in *Webster's* (1981: 737–8), *else* once thrived in Old and Middle English within a class of adverbs that previously included *elseways, elsewise, elsewhence, elsewhither* and *elsewhere(s).* Of these adverbs, only *elsewhere* has survived, and as pointed out in Swan (1980: 200), it often occurs as the more formal equivalent of *somewhere else.*

As discussed in Quirk et al. (1985: 454), in postmodifier position, *else* occurs: (i) after indefinite compound pronouns and adverbs (e.g. *nobody, anyone, something, someplace, everywhere*), (ii) after interrogative pronouns (e.g. *who, what, where, when, how,* but not *which*), and (iii) after quantifiers (e.g. *all, (not) much, (not) a great deal, little*).

Else also takes a genitive form, though for a period of time there appeared to be some variability as to the form it should take. Earlier this century, for example, Fowler (1965: 154) had observed that the genitive form *whose else* was maintained as correct though pedantic, while *who else's* was regarded as somewhat colloquial. More recently, however, Quirk et al. (1985: 454) have questioned the acceptability of *whose else,* while Alexander (1988: 263) rejects the form altogether. Both sources instead identify the preferred form as *who else's.*

The examples used in Fowler (1965: 154) and Quirk et al. (1985: 454) are reproduced below as (7) and (8) respectively. It appears that *whose else* is more acceptable when used as a compound pronominal, as in Fowler's example in (7b), but is less acceptable when followed by a noun, as in Quirk et al.'s example in (8b).

(7) (a) *Who else's* should it be? (colloquial)
(b) *Whose else* should it be? (maintained as correct, though pedantic)
(c) *Whose* should it be *else*? (suggested as ideal) (Fowler, 1965: 154)

(8) (a) *Who else's* fault could it be?
(b) *?Whose else* fault could it be? (Quirk et al., 1985: 454)

Examples from Jespersen (1954: 289) likewise indicate that genitive marking is typically assigned to *else,* as in (9), though some speakers prefer to attach the genitive marking to the pronoun when the referent is clearly understood, as in (10).

(9) Yes, *who else's* daughter should I be?
(translation of Ibsen's *Master Builder*, cited in Jespersen, 1954: 289)

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(10) . . . my only daughter, my Kate, *whose else* should she be?
(from Goldsmith 675, cited in Jespersen, 1954: 289)

Interestingly, Jespersen also provides a number of archaic examples where the genitive marking was found on both the pronoun and *else* at the same time, as in (11) below. Such examples, according to Jespersen, are 'unusual' (1954: 289). Nevertheless we see in them some evidence (from an earlier period of Modern English) of either *variability* or *instability* in the use of genitive *else.*

(11) 'Don't drop that oil upon the blankets, now.'
'His blankets?' asked Joe.
'*Whose else's* do you think?' (from Di X59, cited in Jespersen, 1954: 289)

By and large, however, as noted in a later edition of Fowler (1996: 246), when *else* is combined with an indefinite or interrogative pronoun, possessive marking is now assigned to *else,* rather than to the preceding pronoun as was the case up till the mid-nineteenth century; thus in contemporary English we see examples such as *someone else's* but no longer *someone's else,* and increasingly *who else's* rather than *whose else.* This development appears to be part of a larger phenomenon in which the possessive marker *'s* is generally assigned to the last element of a genitive group, e.g. *my sister-in-law's house,* and not *my sister's-in-law house* (see also Zandvoort, 1966: 91).

While grammarians of the English language have provided us with a fairly detailed description of the collocational and grammatical patterns of *else,* no study has yet analyzed the frequency and distribution of these patterns. In the next section, we will examine these patterns based on a corpus analysis of present-day American English, both spoken and written. Such an analysis will provide us with an indication of the range and frequency of *else* constructions in contemporary native-speaker discourse, and will also provide us with indications of the basic meaning of *else.* This more comprehensive description of the forms and functions of *else* will prove useful as we attempt an analysis of the subtle semantic opposition that obtains between *else* and its closest synonym, *other.*

3 What native-speaker discourse reveals about *else*

One of the advantages of a corpus-based analysis of native-speaker discourse is that it can easily provide us with both a *quantitative* and *qualitative* means of investigating the basic meaning as well as the distributional patterns and functions of linguistic forms – in this particular instance, the comparative reference marker *else.* In this section we will first describe the methodology, then report the findings of our study.

3.1 Data description

Both written and spoken corpora representing a variety of native-speaker discourse types were examined. Samples for the written corpus came from ten different genres

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from the Brown Corpus, a database representing a wide range of prose writings in present-day American English that was compiled at Brown University in 1963–64 (see Francis & Kučera, 1982: 4–6 for a more detailed description). A breakdown of the ten genres represented in this study is provided in table 1. Samples for the spoken corpus came from five different oral databases from research undertaken at the University of California, Los Angeles, from the 1970s to the early 1990s, and include transcriptions of radio call-in programs, conversations among friends, informal interviews, class lectures, and academic counseling sessions. A breakdown of these different oral databases is provided in table 2. Word counts for the written and spoken corpora are approximately 442,314 words and 188,439 words respectively, as shown in tables 1 and 2.

It is worth repeating here that Francis & Kučera (1982) rank *else* as the 569th most frequent English word in the entire Brown Corpus, a database of approximately one million words. No frequency ranking for *else* was attempted for the spoken corpus, because the oral databases have not been systematically prepared for computer analysis. Celce-Murcia (1984), however, has used hand counts of oral corpora to determine that *else* is much more frequent in speech than in writing in American English. The results of the present study reveal a similar finding: there are 63 tokens of *else* in our written corpus of 442,314 words (see table 1 below), but a much higher total of 92 tokens for the far smaller spoken corpus of 188,439 words (see table 2). In terms of number of *else* tokens per 10,000 words, the written corpus averages only 1.42 against the much higher 4.88 in the spoken corpus. Likewise, in British English as represented in the British National Corpus, *else* ranks as 248th in spoken discourse, against 530th in written discourse (see footnote 2).

3.2 Methodology

For the first part of the study, tokens of *else* were extracted with their surrounding context (ranging anywhere from a few lines before and after, to several pages worth of text preceding the referential marker *else*).[5] Each *else* token was then analyzed for its meaning. A best-fit paraphrase for each *else* construction was determined on the basis of trying out synonymous expressions such as 'other', 'additional', 'different', and 'alternative'. No attempt was made to force these interpretations upon the tokens, since one of the purposes of this study was to determine whether other readings of *else* occur in contemporary native-speaker discourse. This particular

[5] For the written corpus (i.e. selected samples from the Brown Corpus), *else* tokens were extracted via the mainframe computer at UCLA, with each token appearing with a predefined context of 25 words prior and 25 words after. This fairly small 'contextual window' proved adequate for interpreting the functions of most of the *else* tokens from the Brown Corpus. For tokens requiring more context, we turned to the ICAME CD-version of the Brown Corpus, courtesy of Cornell University. For the spoken corpus, *else* tokens were identified and extracted manually, since we did not have access to computer-diskette versions of the oral databases when we began this study. Although manual extraction was much more laborious, we at least were able to interpret the *else* tokens using a variable 'contextual window' from the outset.

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Table 1. *Frequency counts of* else *tokens from selected genres of the Brown Corpus that form the written corpus of the present study*

Genre	Total no. of words	No. of *else* tokens	Tokens per 10,000 words
Letters to the editor	14,228	1	0.70
Political reportage	28,510	2	0.70
Press/culture	14,236	1	0.70
Sports	14,145	2	1.41
Hobbies	72,892	6	0.82
Popular lore	97,801	17	1.74
Belles lettres/books	77,133	12	1.56
General fiction	58,565	15	2.56
Humanities	36,452	5	1.37
Social science	28,352	2	2.39
Sum total:	442,314	63	1.42 (Average)

Table 2. *Frequency counts of* else *tokens from transcriptions of conversations (grouped according to database) that form the spoken corpus of the present study*

Database	Total no. of words	No. of *else* tokens	Tokens per 10,000 words
UCLA Oral Corpus (selected):			
Radio call-in: Garden Lady	12,266	4	3.26
Koch's history lesson	6,706	6	8.95
Radio call-in: Toni Grant	8,379	8	9.55
Crandall database:			
Radio call-in: Brad Crandall	31,226	10	3.20
Schegloff database:			
Conversations among friends	21,775	11	5.05
Weinstein database:			
Informal interviews	44,150	21	4.76
Class lectures	30,405	17	5.59
He database			
Counseling sessions	33,532	15	4.47
Sum total:	188,439	92	4.88 (Average)

approach is referred to as 'contextual analysis' (Celce-Murcia, 1980, 1990). The results of these best-fit paraphrases were then tabulated to highlight the distribution of the different uses of *else.* These results are reported in section 3.3.1.

In the second part of the study, each *else* token was further classified according to the grammatical form of its adjacent constituent (e.g. indefinite pronoun, interrogative pronoun, quantifier, etc.) to determine the frequency and distribution of the different *else* constructions. The results of this analysis are reported in section 3.3.2.

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For the third part of the study, we further coded each *else* token for the availability of referential functions such as the following: 'anaphoric' (backward-looking), 'cataphoric' (forward-looking), and 'exophoric' (situationally-cued). More importantly, the referential and cohesive functions of *else* were examined qualitatively from a contextual and discourse perspective to determine how *else* differs from other referential forms, in particular personal pronouns such as *I, you, they, it,* etc. The findings of this qualitative analysis are reported in section 3.3.3.

3.3 Results and discussion

3.3.1 Meaning(s) of else

The results of the first part of the study reveal that native speakers and writers of English use *else* in at least four semantically distinguishable ways. This is consistent with earlier observations in the literature. As shown in tables 3 and 4, the most frequent interpretation is 'other' (62% in written discourse; 66% in spoken discourse), with a fair representation of three other interpretations: 'more' or 'additional' (13% written; 17% spoken), 'different' (11% written; 9% spoken), and 'alternative' (14% written; 8% spoken). There is also considerable similarity between the results for both the written and spoken modalities.

In our data samples, tokens of *else* with an 'alternative' interpretation appear with a slightly higher frequency in the written data. However, a chi-square test shows that this difference is not significant (*chi square* = 2.49 for 3 *df* at $p < 0.05$).

There is also a slight difference in distribution for the 'more' or 'additional' interpretation (13% written; 17% spoken), but as highlighted in figure 1, this difference can be attributed to the high incidence of *what else* tokens in spoken

Table 3. *Frequency distribution of the meanings of* else *in written native-speaker discourse*

Interpretations of *else*:	'other'	'more'	'different'	'alternative'
Brown Corpus (selected):				
Letters to the editor	1			
Political reportage	2			
Press/culture				1
Sports	2			
Hobbies	3	2		1
Popular lore	12	2	2	1
Belles lettres/books	6	2	2	2
General fiction	9	1	2	3
Humanities	3	1		1
Social science	1		1	
N=63	39 (**62%**)	8 (13%)	7 (11%)	9 (14%)

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Table 4. *Frequency distribution of the meanings of* else *in spoken native-speaker discourse*

Interpretations of *else*:	'other'	'more'	'different'	'alternative'
UCLA Oral Corpus (selected):				
Radio call-in: Garden Lady	4			
Koch's history lesson	2	4		
Radio call-in: Toni Grant	5	1	2	
Crandall database:				
Radio call-in: Brad Crandall	8	1		1
Schegloff database:				
Conversations among friends	5	2	1	3
Weinstein database:				
Informal interviews	16	2	1	2
Class lectures	16		1	
He database				
Counseling sessions	5	6	3	1
N=92	61 **(66%)**	16 (17%)	8 (9%)	7 (8%)

discourse to convey expressions that are paraphrasable as 'what more', as illustrated by the two tokens in segment 1 below.

Segment 1 (excerpt from a history lecture)

Koch: Why would the war – the North win this battle of industrial production?
Student: xxx *(inaudible response)*
Koch: Don't know??
Student: It had more resources.
Koch: Dan, what?
Student: It had more resources.
⟶ Koch: O.k. It had more resources and **what else** did they have? Maria? Why did – well, they had what – we're talking about industrial production. Ya know, they produced . . .
Student: Industry xxx ya know, they had people . . .
⟶ Koch: Alright . . . they had agriculture, diversified agriculture; they had people, or labor force, an obvious supply. And do you know **what else** they had? HMMM?

(UCLA Oral Corpus 04488–04508)

A closer analysis of all 155 *else* tokens in this study reveals that the distinctions between the four possible interpretations of *else* are often *gradient* rather than categorical. That is, in many instances, more than one interpretation can be associated with a given token. Table 5 highlights our gradient breakdown for the interpretations of the *else* tokens in this study.

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Discourse type:	Interpretations of *else*:			
	'Other'	**'Additional'**	**'Different'**	**'Alternative'**
Written	all else (2) anybody else (3) anyone else (4) anything else (5) anywhere else (2) everybody else (3) everyone else (2) everything else (6) everywhere else no one else (2) nothing else somebody else (2) someone else something else (2) somewhere else whatever else wherever else	(not) much else (2) nothing else (5) something else	someone else (2) something else (4) what else	little else but do Y nothing else to do/X could do (2) what else can/could X do (3) or else do Y/action Y (3)
Spoken	anybody else anyone else (5) anyplace else anything else (7) anywhere else (2) elsewhere everybody else (7) everyone else (2) everything else (6) no one else nothing else (2) somebody else (7) somebody else's someone else (6) someplace else (3) something else (7) somewhere else whatever else who else	anything else (4) nothing else something else what else (10)	elsewhere (2) somebody else (2) someone else someplace else something else (2)	nothing else to do (3) (do) something else what else can X do (2) or else do Y
	BASIC MEANING	*inclusive reading*	*exclusive reading*	*exclusive reading*

Figure 1. Types of *else* tokens in written and spoken discourse

Table 5. *Interpretations of* else*: distribution patterns and percentages*

	No. of tokens	Percentage	Category percentage
Other	100	64.5%	
			64.5%
Other / More	16	10.3%	
Other / **More**	8	5.2%	
			15.5%
Other / Different	4	2.6%	
Other / Different	8	5.2%	
Other / **Different**	3	1.9%	
			9.7%
or else **Alternative** (=*otherwise*)	4	2.6%	
Other / Alternative	1	0.6%	
Other / Negative Alternative	11	7.1%	
			10.3%
Total no. of tokens	155	100.0%	100.0%

Note: Bold fonts indicate the more dominant meaning.

It is important to note that *all* tokens of *else* analyzed for this study have 'other' as their underlying meaning. To illustrate, an utterance such as *What* ELSE *do you want?* is often used to convey a meaning equivalent to the utterance *What* MORE *do you want?* Yet at the same time, when *else* is used, the utterance still retains the basic meaning of *What* OTHER *thing(s) do you want?* Similarly, when an utterance such as *I'd like something* ELSE is used to express the meaning *I'd like something* DIFFERENT, there still remains the more basic sense of *I'd like some* OTHER *thing.* Likewise, when *else* is used to highlight alternativeness – as in *Be quiet,* OR ELSE *leave the room* – the use of *else* in this type of context is but a special instantiation of the notion 'other' – as can be attested by the ease with which *(or) else* is paraphrasable with the conjunctive expression *otherwise.* In sum, as highlighted in table 5 above, *else* essentially conveys a sense of 'otherness' as its basic meaning.

Our analysis based on table 5 above, which posits 'other' as the basic meaning of *else,* is also supported by the results shown earlier in figure 1. Although figure 1 classifies the interpretations of the *else* tokens in this study in a categorical fashion for convenience, it is noteworthy that the *else* tokens interpreted as 'other' dominate the chart not only in terms of frequency, but also in terms of variety of grammatical forms. This is consistent with our observation in table 5 that *else* has 'other' as its basic meaning.

Our analysis further reveals that *else* tokens with a 'more' or 'additional' interpretation indicate *an inclusive reading,* while those tokens that incorporate the meaning of 'different' are associated with *an exclusive reading.* For example, in an utterance such as *Who else is coming?, else* highlights an additional referent in a manner that paves the way for this new referent to join the ranks of other referents

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Table 6. *Token counts for inclusive versus exclusive orientation for the four* else *categories*

	'other'-basic	'more'	'different'	'alternative'
Inclusive reading	NA	24	0	0
Exclusive reading	NA	0	15	16

Note: NA means 'not applicable'.

that are already known or given, either through prior mention in discourse, or through shared information among interlocutors, or even through situational inference on the part of the speaker. The focus is on increment rather than replacement. In such a context, *else* clearly serves an 'inclusive' function. On the other hand, in an utterance such as *Coffee doesn't quite agree with me. Could I have something else?, else* highlights contrast and difference, and hence dissociates the newly introduced referent from other prior-mentioned (or otherwise easily retrievable) referents. In such a context, *else* serves an 'exclusive' function instead. *Else* tokens which take the 'alternative' interpretation also convey *an exclusive reading.* Table 6 above highlights the inclusive versus exclusive readings associated with each type of *else* interpretation. Note that the inclusive versus exclusive distinction is not expressed in the case of *else* tokens that essentially convey only the basic 'other' interpretation.

We now illustrate and elaborate on these observations by comparing four examples of *something else* that reflect the four different interpretations we have presented. We begin with an example in which *something else* conveys the basic meaning 'other'.

Segment 2 'other'

M: So maybe you talk to a full-time counselor on Monday and think about what you want to do, and then why don't you come back and see me we can talk more about like other options. Would you major in pharmacy: and pre-med and (.2) [stuff.

S: [Hun. So I still do these=

⟶ M: =Sure you can. Absolutely. Once you know your major, we can make a better (.) we can make really (.3) a pl- a plan for you know which classes to take which classes satisfy **something else**. (He Melody2: 4/5/91 720–731)

In segment 2, an academic counselor (M) is advising a student (S) who needs to know what courses she should plan to take to fulfill her degree requirements. The expression *something else* used by the counselor is paraphrasable as 'some other requirement(s) or prerequisite(s)'. In this sense, *else* here focuses on 'non-equivalence of identity', but not 'non-equivalence of kind'. Simply put, the focus is merely on substitutability, highlighting a difference in token but similarity in type or category. The focus of *else* here is thus essentially just on 'otherness'.

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Segment 3 'other'/'more' (inclusive reading)

⟶ They were better trained, better looking, better built, better disciplined and **something else** – they were better dancers. Our athletes are only just beginning to learn that they must study dance. The Russians are all trained as dancers . . .
(Brown Corpus – hobbies 40 3 RB)

In segment 3, *something else* appears in a list of descriptors about Russian athletes. Here we see a 'piling-up' effect of a series of descriptors, and the result is an inclusive reading with an additive interpretation. In a sense, we see the novelty associated with a particular token as a plus for a previously established category – in this case, positive traits associated with the Russian athletes. We thus see evidence of context shaping meaning, such that the meaning of *else* moves beyond its basic interpretation of 'other' to incorporate the meaning of 'additional' or 'more'.

Segment 4 'other'/'different' (exclusive reading)

⟶ C: Uh: (.8) Rather than just going with the straight Econ maybe you WANT **something ELSE**. I think the best bet is (.) for you to go 'n talk to Helen Wilken,
S: Uhun, (He Cecilia2: 8/22/91 166–75)

In segment 4, which once again involves academic counseling, *something else* is being used in a comparative context, in the form 'Rather than X, maybe you want Y.' *Else* here focuses on 'non-equivalence of identity', and 'non-equivalence of kind' as well. The reading thus tends to be exclusive in terms of membership within a certain type of defining category, in the sense that Y equals 'not X'. Again we see evidence of context shaping meaning: in this case, the meaning of *else* extends beyond its basic interpretation of 'other' to incorporate the meaning of 'different' as well.

Segment 5 'other'/'alternative' (exclusive reading)

C: Why do you think yer- Mom is probably just
V: Jealous
K: Eh h [eh]
C: [Well] I mean pr- maybe that too but she she just can't handle: (0.2)
V: [Reality] .
C: [People] close to her being in pa: in =
= ya kno [w she wants ta]
K: [i- it] doesn't sound like- I donno it- it- it seems weirder that that. More insidious or something. [Cause]
C: [Really?]
K: All the stuff that Vickie's told me that she- that she pulls an that- ya know wantin ta claim all the misery in the family [fer]
C: [Yeah.]
K: herself [a]
C: [Yeah.]
K: n stuff like that? (0.3) It just seems like maybe ther-sis- this is so real that she ca: n't. (0.3)
So she's [gotta]
C: [hmm]
⟶ K: do **something else**. Ya know stir people up some other way=
C: =Yeah: h (Schegloff – data transcribed by C. Ford lines 263–88)

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Table 7. *Distribution of different interpretations of* else *used with reference to person, thing (including fact, concept, idea, etc.), place, attribute, and action*

	'other'-basic	'more'	'different'	'alternative'
Person	49	0	5	0
Thing	34	17	6	0
Place	13	0	3	0
Attribute[6]	3	1	1	0
Action	**1**	**5**	**1**	**16**
Total no. of *else* tokens	100	23	16	16 = 155

In segment 5, *something else* can be paraphrased as 'some other thing', indicating once again that *else* has 'other' as its underlying meaning. In addition to this, the use of *else* here appears in the context of an activity, more specifically a contrast between an action X (*handling the reality of people close to her being in pain*) and another action Y (*stirring people up some other way*). It is this contrastive focus that gives this *else* its 'alternative' interpretation.

Interestingly, *all* sixteen tokens of *else* that are assigned to the 'alternative' category have something to do with actions (see table 7). More specifically, as in the case of segment 5 above, these 'alternative' *else* tokens highlight a contrast between two possible actions (or options), or between an action and the unavailability of any other course of action. The latter type is further coded under the subcategory 'negative alternative' (see table 5 above), and frequently takes the form *what else, nothing else,* or *little else,* as illustrated in (12), (13), and (14) below.

(12) *What else* c'n they do, but accept welfare.
(Schegloff – Brad Crandall Show data pp. 102–3)

(13) . . . there was *nothing else* to do. (Brown Corpus – general fiction 20 6 RB)

(14) his mother could do *little else* but get him started on the study of music
(Brown Corpus – belles lettres/books 340 1 RB)

Note, however, that not all *else* tokens that refer to actions are assigned an 'alternative' interpretation. In five cases, they were identified with the meaning of 'more' or 'additional'. Such tokens, however, do not highlight a choice between actions. Instead, they occur in the context of a series or list of actions, as illustrated in segment 6 below.

Segment 6 'other'/'more' (inclusive reading)
R: She musta hitchu awfully ha:rd.
M: She did I think. I-I don't-I wz really drunk et th' time but I (went intuh) the bathroom all this (blood was) comin' down m'face= °hhh//hh

[6] Below is an example of the use of *else* to refer to an attribute:

It's a nice imitation of those Queen Anne chairs I inherited from Grandmother's Delancy. These trumps were more touching than they were *anything else,* and seemed to imply that the nights were long, and her children ungrateful, and her marriage bewilderingly threadbare.
(Brown Corpus – general fiction 210 11 RB)

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S: [Are//n't yih (glad)] it wz in yer eye thet she hit you?
(K): [(Yih haftuh-)] (0.8)
S: [°hh hhh/hh]
R: [heh HOH // HOH Ha ha °hhhah]
M: Yes:-
S: [heh-heh-heh-he he] °hh//ihh °ihhhh
M: [yes dear ez a // matter a fect]
S: °hhih (0.7)
→ M: **Somethin el-** I: hurt my back a:lso? // slammed it against the water be:d?
((door squeaks))
(Schegloff – data transcribed by Frankel/Girton/Taylor draft lines 117–50)

Else tokens that refer to action can also be identified with the basic meaning 'other' and also with the meaning 'different', as illustrated in segments 7 and 8 respectively. In segment 7, we see *else* used in the context of a shift from an ongoing experience to a subsequent new development. In segment 8, *else* is used in the context of a shift from one topic to another, with an implication that the subsequent topic is desired to be different from the preceding one. Both tokens deal with shifts (and hence focus on nonidentity) of referents. However, segment 7, with its 'other' interpretation, does not focus on contrastiveness, while segment 8, with its 'different' interpretation, does.

Segment 7 'other'
Instructor: Uh, it's typical of Ismael that he will find symbolism in whatever he is experiencing in his daily life, but it's also typical that once he goes off on one of these tangents and once he begins to think about the
→ possible symbolic meanings of something, **something else** will happen then in the narrative to shake him out of this uh way in which he's kind of hypnotized himself almost with uh his own thoughts . . .
(Weinstein – class lectures tape 4 p. 6 lines 1–13)

Segment 8 'other'/'different' (exclusive reading)
Instructor: . . . Okay, we need to shift gears here. What's that bumper sticker, uh, 'so little time, so many women'. Well, we have the same problem here, excuse the sexist remark. We have – we have the same problem with theories. Those of you who are (on hiatus) because we – we covered
→ Freud and uh, you're anxious to move on to **something else**, uh I want to talk about Jung, at least in terms of contrast, uh, uh, today, and, uh, see how quickly we can – we can, uh move beyond him.
(Weinstein – class lectures tape 1 p. 15 lines 2–10)

One might ask how actions that are identified with the categories 'more', 'other' and 'different' (as in segments 6, 7 and 8 above) are to be distinguished from the category 'alternative' (as illustrated in segment 5 earlier). In the present study, 'alternative' interpretations are identified with tokens of *else* that highlight a choice (or lack thereof) between courses of actions, while 'nonalternative' interpretations are identified with tokens of *else* that emphasize primarily either the nonidentity of referents, or the additive or contrastive nuances of particular referents.

To briefly summarize, our analyses indicate that the basic meaning of *else* in

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native speaker discourse is 'other', with nuances such as 'additional(ly)', 'different(ly)' and 'alternative(ly)' often emerging, given the appropriate context. In addition, we also noted that *else* with an 'alternative' interpretation emerges as a distinct category that is strongly associated with contexts that highlight a contrast or choice between two competing courses of action, or between a course of action versus no action at all. For obvious reasons, this latter type of alternative is referred to as the 'negative alternative'.

3.3.2 Grammatical distribution of else *in written and spoken discourse*

As pointed out earlier, a quantitative analysis of the frequency and distribution of the grammatical forms of *else* can help us address questions such as the following: (a) What type(s) of syntactic environments does *else* occur in? (b) What is the frequency of *else* in each of these environments? Answers to these questions will be useful in helping us to better understand the special role that *else* serves as a reference marker, in particular when we later contrast its semantic role with that of its closest synonym, *other* (see section 4).

As indicated in tables 8 and 9 below, the results of the quantitative analyses that form the second part of this study indicate that native speakers tend to use a high percentage of *else* tokens as postmodifiers of indefinite compound pronouns and adverbs (77.8% in written discourse; 79.3% in spoken discourse). Next in frequency come tokens of *else* as a postmodifier of interrogative pronouns (9.5% written; 15.2% spoken), with *what else* being most frequent. *Else* tokens tend to occur with quantifiers much less frequently, with a 7.9% frequency in written discourse and no such tokens found in the spoken samples used in this study, indicating perhaps that this is a rather formal option.

The results in tables 8 and 9 also reveal that *or else* constructions occur rather infrequently (4.8% written; 1.1% spoken). This, of course, need not come as a surprise since 'alternative options' can easily be expressed with the conjunct *or* alone (particularly when an emphatic reading is not required), or with other conjunctives such as *otherwise, if not, alternatively,* etc. The higher incidence of *or else* constructions in written discourse compared to spoken discourse, however slight, could also be due in part to the fact that in speech, intonationally marked uses of the *or* conjunct occurring alone can easily yield the same effect as an emphatic *or else* construction. This in fact is consistent with Halliday & Hasan's (1976: 271) observation that intonation also serves a cohesive function, with certain types of tonic (i.e. maximally prominent) intonation indicating contrast, in particular the falling–rising tone.

The results also indicate a very low frequency for the linguistic form *elsewhere* in both written and spoken discourse. Although *elsewhere* is generally considered to be the more formal equivalent of *somewhere else* (e.g. Swan, 1980: 200), no tokens of *elsewhere* were found in the written samples, while in the spoken samples, three tokens occurred (i.e. 3.3% frequency when compared with the other environments for *else*). It should be noted here, however, that we did encounter the use of

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Table 8. *Frequency and distribution of* else *in written native-speaker discourse*

Indefinite pronoun/adverb + *else*:							
	-thing	*-one*	*-body*	*-place*	*-where*		
every	6	2	3	0	1	= 12	
some	6	3	3	0	1	= 13	
any	5	4	3	0	2	= 14	
no	8	2	0	0	0	= 10	
	25	11	9	0	4	= 49	(77.8%)
Interrogative pronoun + *else*:							
	what else			4			
	whatever else			1			
	wherever else			1		= 6	(9.5%)
Quantifier + *else*:							
	all else			2			
	little else			1			
	(not) much else			2		= 5	(7.9%)
'*or else*' alternative:				3		= 3	(4.8%)
elsewhere:				0		= 0	(0.0%)
Genitive *else*:				0		= 0	(0.0%)
Total						63	100.0%

Table 9. *Frequency and distribution of* else *in spoken native-speaker discourse*

Indefinite pronoun/adverb + *else*:							
	-thing	*-one*	*-body*	*-place*	*-where*		
every	6	2	7	0	0	= 15	
some	12	7	8	4	1	= 32	
any	11	5	1	1	2	= 20	
no	5	1	0	0	0	= 6	
	34	15	16	5	3	= 73	(79.3%)
Interrogative pronoun + *else*:							
	who else			1			
	what else			12			
	whatever else			1		= 14	(15.2%)
Quantifier + *else*:				0		= 0	(0.0%)
'*or else*' alternative:				1		= 1	(1.1%)
elsewhere:				3		= 3	(3.3%)
Genitive *else*:	*somebody else's*			1		= 1	(1.1%)
Total						92	100.0%

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elsewhere in formal written genres such as academic texts and theses, though these genres had not been included in our database. In the spoken samples, the three tokens of *elsewhere* occurred in counseling or 'advice-giving' situations. These situations were sometimes semi-formal (as in the case of the academic counseling sessions) and sometimes quite informal (as in the chatty radio talkshows and the more intimate conversations between friends). In the latter contexts, it is worth noting that even though the nature of the interaction was quite informal, the use of *elsewhere* appeared in contexts where the topic being discussed tended to be serious, and this could easily have facilitated a shift to the use of more formal vocabulary, including the use of *elsewhere.*

Not found in the written corpus but present in the spoken corpus is a single token of genitive *else* used with the indefinite pronoun *somebody.* Consistent with observations in the literature, and as illustrated in segment 9 below, genitive marking in this particular example is assigned to *else,* and not to the accompanying pronoun.

Segment 9

	Female:	There are a lot of workshops now for writers on how to get in touch with your right brain and how to
	Male:	I know.
→	Female:	how to achieve, (and) I think, it was in **somebody else's** class, they talked about a mandala
	Male:	Uh huh. (Weinstein – informal interview 12969–19193)

It is important to emphasize here that, except for the quasi-conjunctive *or else* constructions, all tokens of *else* in the present study occur with pronouns, adverbs, and quantifiers that are associated with indefiniteness, which in simple terms can be defined as 'the failure to clearly identify a referent'. This is not surprising since, as noted in Chafe (1994: 104), the semantics of universal pronouns (e.g. *everybody*) and negative pronouns (e.g. *no one*) is such that the former inherently lack a clear referent while the latter intrinsically 'have no referent' at all, and likewise interrogative pronouns (e.g. *who* and *what*) are designed to request for referents rather than verbalize them. Lyons (1999: 37–9) points out that the use of indefinite pronouns such as *anyone* and *anything* conveys a sense of 'extreme non-specificity' in the sense that the speaker does not have a particular referent in mind, and moreover does not care to restrict the set of referents that should apply to the given situation. Lyons further notes that pronouns such as *someone* and *something* are also indefinite, though they could be either specific or nonspecific. Two examples from Lyons (1999: 39) are reproduced in (15) below to illustrate this complex phenomenon. Note that (15a) is an example of *a specific indefinite referent,* while (15b) is an example of *a nonspecific indefinite referent* (terminology adapted from Lambrecht, 1994: 81). Lambrecht makes the following pragmatic distinction between these two types of indefinite reference: 'a ''specific indefinite NP'' is one whose referent is identifiable to the speaker but not to the addressee, while a ''non-specific NP'' is one whose referent neither the speaker nor the addressee can identify at the time of utterance' (ibid.). Lambrecht goes on to point out that it is therefore possible for a

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nonspecific referent to have no referent at all (ibid.). This certainly is a possible interpretation for (15b).

(15) (a) I'm looking for someone/something – but she/it doesn't seem to be here.
(b) I'm looking for someone/something – but I can't find anyone/anything I like.
(Lyons, 1999: 39)

What is interesting to consider is how *else* interacts with these indefinite forms, and how these interactions affect or define its role as a referential marker. We turn to this in the following section.

3.3.3 Referential and cohesive functions of else

In analyzing how *else* functions as a cohesive marker, we found that *else* behaves very differently from many other referential expressions. For example, unlike pronominals such as *he, she, it, they, you, I,* etc. which directly index referents that are identifiable from the text or the context, either via anaphoric or cataphoric or exophoric referencing, *else* first identifies a mediating referent which then serves as a foil to the true referent. We will illustrate this interesting referential and cohesive property of *else* using one example each for anaphoric, cataphoric, and exophoric reference. Let us first consider segment 10, which illustrates an anaphoric use of *else.*

Segment 10 'other' (anaphoric reference)
Hudson knew he had to use these men as long as he remained *an explorer*. And
⟶ he refused to be **anything else**. (Brown Corpus – popular lore 850 6 RB)

In segment 10, the textually identifiable referent for the referring term *anything else* is the noun phrase *an explorer.* This referent is identifiable via anaphoric reference (i.e. a look-back strategy). The true referent for *anything else,* however, is 'anything *other* than an explorer'. What *else* does here, then, is to exploit the availability of an easily identifiable mediating referent, namely *an explorer,* and use it as a foil or a pointer that allows us to identify the intended or true referent, which is 'anything *other* than an explorer'. *Else* thus has an obviative function, i.e. it is 'other-oriented'. Or as Culicover and Jackendoff (1995: 272) explain it, *else* expresses the meaning of 'other than α', where α is an anaphoric element that is coreferential with a referent that is *sometimes* identifiable in syntax, but which is *always* identifiable at a semantic-pragmatic level, which they term 'conceptual structure'.

We illustrate this more complex referential strategy encoded through *else* via the schematic representation in figure 2 below. Note that *else* relies on the mediation of the accompanying indefinite pronoun *anything* to anchor onto a preceding referent in the text – namely, *an explorer* – as a point of reference, and from there to bounce off in an obviative fashion to identify the intended and true referent, which is 'other than an explorer'. Given that the clause is to be interpreted as having negative polarity (primed by the lexical verb *refuse*), the ultimate meaning of the whole utterance is, of course, that Hudson wishes to be nothing other than an explorer.

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e.g. Hudson knew he had to use these men as long as he remained an explorer. And he refused to be anything else.




Figure 2. Schema highlighting *else* as an indirect referring term

Let us consider next segment 11, which illustrates a cataphoric use of *else.*

Segment 11 'other'/'different' (cataphoric reference)
He was the guy what always goofed at Question Time. Why couldn't they have
⟶ dumped him off on **someone else**? Why me? Why didn't the damn reactionaries
bump him off? (Brown Corpus – general fiction 960 7 RB)

In segment 11, the mediating referent is identified cataphorically (i.e. via a look-forward strategy) as *me,* i.e. the narrator himself. Here, the cataphoric referent *me* serves as the reference point and foil through which we can determine the identity of *someone else* as 'someone other than me', i.e. someone other than the narrator.

It is worth noting here that cataphoric reference involving *else* follows the same pattern observed elsewhere with regard to the use of cataphora in general – i.e. the scope of cohesion is usually very local, in that cataphoric referents typically appear very soon after mention of the referring term (in this case, *else*), and often within the same sentence. This is understandable, since *else* as a referential form relies on the tacit assumption that there must be some *easily* identifiable referent that serves as a foil which allows us to reconstruct the true referent for *else.* Clearly, the local nature of cataphoric reference facilitates cognitive processing. The constraints on cognitive

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Table 10. *Reference strategies used for identifying the true referent of* else

Reference strategy	No. of *else* tokens	Percentage
Single strategy:		
Anaphoric	**119**	**76.8%**
Cataphoric	2	1.3%
Exophoric	5	3.2%
Structurally anaphoric[7]	3	1.9%
Structurally cataphoric	4	2.6%
Combined strategies:		
Anaphoric plus cataphoric[8]	17	11.0%
Anaphoric plus exophoric	5	3.2%
Total	155	100.0%

processing also explain why *anaphoric reference,* rather than *cataphoric reference,* accounts for no less than 76.8% of the *else* tokens in this study, as indicated in table 10.

In segment 12, we see an example of exophoric reference, where the mediating referent is contextually (and in this case, also deictically) identified.

Segment 12 'other' (exophoric reference)
Koch: OK I saw part of it also. Uhh had to do with problems of military uh health care. OK? And the point of the program was that in too many

[7] The terms 'structural anaphora' and 'structural cataphora' refer to special cases of anaphora and cataphora respectively where both the *else* token and its mediating referent occur within the same clause, with the result being a tight, often idiom-like, expression. As such, structural anaphora and structural cataphora are generally not considered to be textually cohesive in the Hallidayan sense, where cohesion is often defined as an inter-clausal rather than intra-clausal phenomenon. An example of each structural type is shown below.

(i) Structural anaphora:
Neither Mantle nor Maris is totally devoted to *baseball above all else*. If laying ties on a railroad track, which he once did for $1 an hour, paid more than playing right field for the Yankees, Maris would lay ties . . . (Brown Corpus – sports 1430 11 RB)

(ii) Structural cataphora:
She had *no place else* to run *but home*. And the road she took led her to the love she had forgotten and a holiday homecoming to remember.
(USA Network advertisement for the film *Lily in White*, *Ebony*, Dec. 1994, p. 121)

[8] Below are examples of *else* tokens with combined referential strategies. The first example involves both anaphoric and cataphoric reference. The referring term *whatever else* is interpretable anaphorically as 'whatever other than her own ammo'. This is then identified cataphorically as 'poison gas'.

(i) . . . if they were hit[,] the John Harvey [=a ship] would likely be blown up with her own ammo and *whatever else* it was that she carried. Which was poison gas.
(Brown Corpus – popular lore 140 2 RB)

The second example involves both anaphoric and exophoric reference, where *elsewhere* is interpreted as 'other than here', and the location 'here' is not only textually cued, but also deictically cued with respect to the place where the conversation takes place.

(ii) . . . when we are done here we will go becus I'll get the form *elsewhere*=
(He database – Peter1: 3/1/91 668–70)

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cases military personnel may not receive good medical care. I think that they did make the point that in most cases they do, but in too many cases they don't, they do not. OK. That – that's, OK that goes along with what we were saying. There was another case recently …
⟶ did **anyone else** hear about that? I don't know … I can't tell you exactly what it was … But local individual here in San Diego had been charged with – well, in this case, I think, – stealing government uh supplies and goods and selling them to military surplus places and things like that. (UCLA Oral Corpus 04660–04672)

The mediating referent in segment 12, which serves as the foil for the referring term *anyone else,* is the speaker himself, i.e. Koch (the history teacher). The identity of *anyone else,* then, must be inferred from the speaker's role and be identified as 'anyone other than the speaker', i.e. anyone other than Koch. In effect, *anyone else* therefore refers to any student(s)/listener(s) in Koch's class. Thus, in exophoric reference involving *else*, the mediating referent may be *implied rather than stated*, and this pragmatic inference is often facilitated through the use of situational cues such as speaker roles and the physical context (in this case the classroom and the people in it).

To briefly sum up our observations thus far, we have seen that *else* functions as *an indirect* referring term. That is, the identity of *else* is inferrable via the mediation of some other more easily identifiable referent, which is either stated or implied. In this sense, *else* is cohesive in that it establishes its referent *indirectly* by first pointing to something (or someone, or someplace, etc.), either through textual or situational cues, and from there to its true referent by means of its inherent semantics, through the notion of 'other'.

As an indirect referring term, *else* can also be used in contexts involving multiple embeddings of referents, as shown in segment 13 below. The scenario involves a radio talkshow host (T) responding to a female caller (C) on the question of how the caller might deal with her husband's extramarital affair.

Segment 13 'other' (anaphoric and exophoric reference)
'voicing for another'
T: The fact is that he had a commitment which has not been honored.
C: Yeh.
T: And I think you have to just sort of sit down an + y'know think about it and feel about it + and NOT gather this evidence and attack and jus- in fact, I wouldn't even TALK about 'THEE evidence'.
C: mmhmm.
⟶ T: I wouldn't mention anything; I'd just say ++ 'It's clear to me that you've been with **someone else** + and that-that our commitment has been broken and I want to know + y'know what this means.'
C: Yes. (UCLA Oral Corpus – Toni Grant Show 05200– 5211)

The identity of *someone else* in segment 13 above is interpretable as 'someone other than the female caller', and this inference is made on the basis of multiple converging cues, among them (i) prior information in preceding discourse, (ii) world knowledge about extramarital affairs, and (iii) shared deictic information about speaker roles.

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The greater complexity seen in this example is to a large extent the product of the talkshow host 'voicing for another' – in this case, voicing for the female caller.

How *else* functions as an indirect referring term within a multiply embedded context can be made more visually transparent if we reinterpret it within the framework of 'mental spaces' and 'alternate ground phenomena' *à la* Fauconnier (1985) and Rubba (1996).[9] Within this framework, as shown in figure 3, the referent for *someone else* in segment 13 can be traced through a number of crucial links to a perceived problem-source, otherwise known as 'the other woman'. From a temporally dynamic perspective – which is a perspective that is congruent with discourse flow in real time – we first see the default setting of a real world with identifiable entities such as a talkshow host as speaker, a female caller as hearer, and the caller's husband and 'the other woman' in the husband's life as subjects being discussed. Within this real world, we see the setting up of a nested world, a mental space known as the world of direct speech, where the deictic pronoun 'I' can be traced back to the talkshow host as speaker on the basis of situational cues in the form of speaker roles. Within this speech world is nested yet another world or mental space, namely a hypothetical world where the speaker voices for another. In segment 13 above, this world of 'voicing for another' is set up through the use of the space builder *I'd just say.* Once this mental space is built up, we can trace the deictic pronoun *me* (used by the talkshow host) and thereby identify the female caller as the intended referent. From there, the deictic pronoun *you* becomes identified as the caller's husband, via the host mimicking the female caller dialoguing with her husband. Once the female caller is established as the antecedent of *me,* and thus as the transparent foil or mediating referent of *someone else,* the identity of the true referent of *someone else* can then be interpreted as 'someone other than the female caller', and via our shared knowledge about extramarital affairs, we can further infer that this referent must refer to some other woman, a person commonly referred to as 'the other woman'.

Through this example of 'voicing for another', we can see how versatile *else* is in being able to traverse different kinds of mental spaces, or alternate grounds. Essentially, *else* is able to do this because it has the property of a foil-mediated referring expression. That is, *else* can tag onto other terms such as indefinite pronouns, interrogative pronouns and quantifiers, then use these constructions as the mediating foil to identify the true referent. All the while, *else* is able to traverse grounds wherever these foils or mediators are able to go.

Our analysis of *else* within the framework of mental spaces and alternate grounds thus reveals that certain uses of *else* can be fairly complex, since the links between

[9] The notion of 'alternate ground' has been discussed by many different scholars using a number of different terms. Examples include Fillmore's (1971) 'taking the other fellow's point of view'; Goffman's (1974, 1981) notion of 'footing' and 'frame analysis'; Haiman's (1978) notion of conditionals as topicalizers; Langacker's (1978, 1985) 'surrogate ground' and 'conceptual displacement' phenomena; Rauh's (1981) 'center of orientation' perspective; Talmy's (1986) notion of 'decoupling'; and Hanks's (1990) 'decentering' analysis.

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Radio talkshow host 'voicing' for caller:
I'd just say, 'It's clear to me that you've been with someone else.'




Figure 3. A schematic representation of the layers of 'mental spaces' or 'alternate grounds' that speaker and hearer traverse as they trace the true referent of *else* in the dialogue excerpt from segment 13

referents are sometimes embedded through several layers of mental spaces. In future research, it would be interesting to investigate how children's use of *else* correlates with their cognitive and linguistic developmental stages – for example, whether they first use *else* in relation to more concrete referents such as objects and humans, then later to more abstract concepts such as propositions, some of which are realized as nominalized predications. In addition, it would also be interesting to compare the child's use of *else* and *other,* especially if there is evidence of a differential lag in the child's use of one of these referential expressions, since late acquisition would likely be indicative of conceptual and structural complexity. Similar investigations of the

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use of *else* among foreign and second language learners would be equally interesting. First, however, we need to investigate the subtle contrasts between *else* and *other* in the speech samples of adult native speakers of English. We attempt this in the next section, and in comparing these two near synonyms – *else* and *other* – we can then further describe the special role of *else* as a referential and cohesive marker.

4 When native speakers choose to use *other* rather than *else*[10]

Although *else* basically means 'other', it is not the case that native speakers can always readily substitute the word *else* wherever the word *other* is found. Indeed, even in contexts where substitution is possible, the use of *else* is often accompanied by some change in meaning, usually quite subtle, at times semantically inadequate, and at other times pragmatically inappropriate. In this section, we will examine how native speakers' use of the word *other* differs from their use of the word *else.* In particular, we will examine those conditions that block the paraphrasability of *else,* and also those conditions that readily permit *else* to substitute for *other* without a significant change in meaning. This will allow us to better understand the special meaning and function(s) that native speakers reserve for *else.*

4.1 Data description and methodology

A contextual analysis of *other* was undertaken to identify its various grammatical functions and distribution patterns. More specifically, 365 tokens of *other* (including variants such as the indefinite singular form *another* and the plural form *others*) were classified according to their grammatical configuration and use, with the following patterns emerging: (i) pronominal form, e.g. *another, the other(s)*; (ii) occurrence with a numerative pronominal, e.g. *another one, the other two, the other twenty percent;* (iii) occurrence with a lexically explicit noun, e.g. *the other day, the other side, another case, another arms race, other fundamentalists, some other fiscal measures;* (iv) occurrence with a lexically nonexplicit noun – or what Halliday & Hasan (1976: 274–82) refer to as a general noun, e.g. *another idea, another person, another place, other people, one other question, all the other stuff, what other things*;[11] (v) occurrence as the alternative morpheme *otherwise,* e.g. *it was the only way he could keep it [the fig tree] under control – otherwise it would have been enormous*; (vi) occurrence within an alternative *'X or the other'* construction, e.g. *one way or the other*; (vii) occurrence within an alternative *'X other than Y'* construction, e.g. *things other than external reality, another way . . . other than taxation*; and (viii) occurrence

[10] We thank Peter Fries for pointing out to us that our description of *else* would be incomplete if we didn't compare *else* with *other.* The analyses that follow allow us to more clearly identify the special role of *else* as a referential and cohesive device in relation to *other.*

[11] The following items constitute a complete list of the nouns classified as 'general nouns' in this study: *fact, idea, man, woman, person, people, moves (=actions), parts, place, space, spot, question(s), stuff, things.*

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within the reciprocal *each other* construction,[12] e.g. *just sitting there giggling and looking at each other.* Table 11 in section 4.2.1 shows the distribution and frequency of *other* in these grammatical environments.

Each token of *other* was then individually tested to see if it was paraphrasable with an *else* construction. We operationalized the paraphrasability test as follows: (1) Given a construction that makes use of the word *other* (or one of its variants), we first checked to see if an *else*-substitution is grammatically acceptable, and (2) in the event that an *else*-substitution is grammatically acceptable, we then checked to see if the substitution is semantically and pragmatically acceptable for the given context.

To illustrate, given a sentence such as *It's your understanding that he doesn't see* ***other people,*** we first checked to see if we could accept an *else*-substitution for *other.* The result in this case was positive: an equivalent construction *It's your understanding that he doesn't see* ***anyone else*** was considered grammatically acceptable. The construction was further considered semantically and pragmatically appropriate for the given context. This particular token of *other* was therefore counted among the tokens that were paraphrasable with *else.*

To illustrate with another example, the sentence *I thought he was, y'know, seeing* ***another woman*** was easily paraphrased with the expression *I thought he was, y'know, seeing* ***someone else*** – and in this case, too, the paraphrase is acceptable on grammatical, semantic, and pragmatic grounds.

In another example, a sentence such as *He starts seeing* ***other men****, but I didn't know it* could easily be grammatically rewritten as *He starts seeing* ***someone else****, but I didn't know it.* However, this particular paraphrase failed the semantic and pragmatic criterion because, in most situations involving male marital infidelity, the referring term *someone else* would normally conjure images of someone of the opposite gender, and in this particular situation would tend to trigger referents such as *other women,* rather than *other men.* In this example, the use of *else* in place of *other* fails to convey the speaker's sense of shock at finding out that her husband was bisexual.

Similarly, a sentence such as *under the law, every taxpayer is allowed when he sells a house and buys* ***another house*** *to get the rollover* can be grammatically rewritten as *under the law, every taxpayer is allowed when he sells a house and buys* ***something else*** *to get the rollover.* However, this *else*-paraphrase fails the semantic and pragmatic criterion, since the rollover in question applies only to situations involving a sale and the subsequent purchase of a similar item, namely a house, and not something of a different category. Thus in this study tokens of *other* are counted as 'not paraphrasable with *else*' when substitution with *else,* though grammatical, significantly alters the semantic and pragmatic reading of the original sentence.

Since each token of *other* fits into one of the eight grammatical categories identified above, we felt a pattern might emerge that would highlight those

[12] Another reciprocal construction involving *other* is *one another.* It is not included here because there were no tokens found in these data samples.

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conditions that are conducive to *else*-substitution, versus those conditions that inhibit its use. The results of our quantitative analysis are given in section 4.2.1, followed by the results of our qualitative analysis in section 4.2.2.

The 365 tokens of *other* used for this analysis are extracted from the UCLA Oral Corpus, a database of approximately 149,764 words, with a variety of speech registers ranging from informal conversations among friends, semi-formal dialogues such as radio talkshows, and formal speeches such as presidential debates. It is worth noting that *else* occurs with far less frequency than *other* in the UCLA Oral Corpus – with only 65 tokens of *else* compared to 365 tokens of *other* for the entire database, i.e. an *else: other* frequency ratio of about 1: 6.[13]

In the present study, we have limited our analysis of *other* to oral data. We feel justified in doing this since *else* frequently occurs with grammatical forms that are either indefinite or nonreferential, and given that referent specification is often less stringent in spoken than written discourse, it is possible that the potential for semantic and pragmatic overlaps (and hence paraphrasability) in the use of *other* and *else* is likely to be much greater in spoken than in written English.

4.2 Results

4.2.1 Quantitative analysis

4.2.1.1 Effect of referent specificity versus nonreferentiality

The frequency and distribution of the various forms of *other* identified in American native speaker discourse as reflected in the UCLA Oral Corpus is shown in table 11 below.

Of the 365 tokens of *other* found in the data samples, a significant proportion (274 tokens, i.e. 75%) were accompanied by a noun. More specifically, 49% were

Table 11. *Frequency and distribution of* other *in spoken native-speaker discourse*

Grammatical form of *other*	No. of tokens	Percentage
pronominal *other(s)* or *another*	38	(10.4%)
(an)other + numerative	16	(4.4%)
(an)other + **lexically explicit noun**	**179**	**(49.0%)**
(an)other + **general noun**	**95**	**(26.0%)**
alternative *otherwise*	7	(1.9%)
alternative *X or the other*	3	(0.8%)
alternative *(X) other than Y*	5	(1.4%)
reciprocal *each other*	22	(6.0%)
Total	365	99.9%

[13] Francis & Kučera (1982) likewise indicate that *other* occurs with a much higher frequency than *else*. More specifically, with respect to frequency ranking in the Brown Corpus, *other* ranks 52nd and *another* ranks 118th, while *else* ranks 569th.

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Table 12. *Paraphrasability of* other *with* else

Grammatical form of *other*	Paraphrasability with *else*	Frequency	%	
pronominal *other*				
• if singular *another* [=general noun as referent]	Yes	3/3	(100%)	⟵
• if singular *another* [=lexically explicit noun as referent]	No	3/3	(100%)	
• if singular *the other*	~No	6/7	(86%)	
• if plural *others* (cf. =everyone else/everything else)	~No	9/13	(69%)	⟵
• if plural *the others* (cf. =everyone else/everything else)	~Yes	4/8	(50%)	⟵
• if plural quantifier + *others* (cf. Q=nonreferential quantifier)	~No	4/4	(100%)	
(an)other + nominal substitute				
• if plural *all the other ones (=everyone else)*	Yes	1/1	(100%)	⟵
(an)other + numerative pronominal				
• if non-count *the other twenty percent of the time*	No	1/1	(100%)	
• if singular *another (cold/common) one*	~No	7/8	(88%)	
• if singular *the other one*	No	3/3	(100%)	
• if plural *the other two/three*	No	3/3	(100%)	
(an)other + **lexically explicit noun**				
• if singular (including 7 tokens of *another call=someone else*)	**~No**	92/100	**(92%)**	
note: if singular (excluding all 7 tokens of *another call*)	**~No**	99/100	**(99%)**	
• if plural	**~No**	75/79	**(95%)**	
(an)other + **general noun**				
• if noncount *all the other stuff*	Yes	1/1	(100%)	⟵
• if singular	**~Yes**	19/42	**(45%)**	⟵
• if plural	**~Yes**	22/52	**(42%)**	⟵
alternative *otherwise* (conjunctive use)	Yes	3/3	(100%)	⟵
alternative *otherwise* (nonconjunctive use)	No	4/4	(100%)	
alternative *X or the other*	No	3/3	(100%)	
alternative *(X) other than Y*	No	5/5	(100%)	
reciprocal *each other*	No	22/22	(100%)	
Total no. of *other* tokens paraphrasable with *else*	Yes	65/365	18%	

Note: ~ means a qualified response (e.g. *mostly, usually, often*)

accompanied by lexically explicit nouns, while 26% were accompanied by general nouns such as *person, place,* or *thing.* This is significant, since we have noted earlier that *else* tends to occur with indefinite and nonreferential pronouns and adverbs (e.g. *somebody, anyone, everywhere, nothing, who, where, what, all,* etc.). Indeed, our data samples reveal no token of *else* occurring with a lexically explicit noun. In light of this, the relatively high frequency (49%) with which *other* occurs with a lexically explicit noun in our data samples therefore highlights a significant difference between *other* and its synonym *else,* namely that *else* is semantically associated with indefiniteness and low referentiality, whereas *other* is flexible with respect to the definiteness versus indefiniteness distinction and can be used with either specific or nonspecific referents.

We see further evidence of this semantic difference in the results of the *else*-paraphrasability test, as summarized in table 12.

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The results indicate that pronominal uses of *other* can sometimes be paraphrased with *else* when they take the indefinite singular form *another* (3 out of 6 tokens), as in the utterance *like when the president [referring to Richard Nixon] . . . makes it seem like he's doing one thing when he's actually doing another [=something else].* This happens when referent specificity is not required, such that *other* can easily be paraphrased with a general (or nonlexically explicit) noun such as *thing.* However, *else*-paraphrasability is often blocked in the case of the definite singular form *the other* (6 out of 7 tokens), as in *you're talking about Type A and Type B behavior and the tendency toward one to get cancer and the other [≠someone else, *some type else] to have heart attacks and so forth.* The context for this type of contrastive 'A versus B' construction limits referent identification to 'one of two possible referents', and when one is mentioned, the subsequent referent is immediately identifiable with reference to the other. Such specificity tends to block *else*-paraphrasability. This highlights an important semantic distinction between *other* and *else,* namely that whereas *other* can be used in contexts involving definiteness with respect to referent identification, *else* is essentially aligned with indefiniteness.

The plural form *others* is also often not paraphrasable with *else* (9 out of 13 tokens, i.e. 69%), except in cases where *others* is used in the sense of 'everyone or everything else' and 'anyone or anything else', as in *they don't have to take the decisions of others into account [=they don't have to take everyone/anyone else's decision into account].* The same constraint holds with respect to the definite plural form *the others* – that is, *else*-paraphrasability tends to be blocked unless *the others* is used to refer to 'everyone or everything else (within a definable set)', as in *X sits down to drink her tea and the others [=everyone else] follow. Else*-paraphrasability fails, for example, in sentences such as *the Great Northern has been there for a long time but the others [=the other grain elevators; ?everything else] are new,* primarily because lexical specificity (in the form of *grain elevators* as opposed to *things*) is intended in this context.

Pronominal *others* is often accompanied by quantifiers and numerals. Our data samples reveal that tokens such as *numbers of others* and *(these) thousands of others* cannot be paraphrased with *else.* It is logical to suspect that *else*-paraphrasability can easily occur in contexts where pronominal *others* is accompanied by universal quantifiers such as *all the others* as well as its negative equivalent *none of the others,* since these forms are basically synonymous with referring expressions such as *everyone else* and *no one else.* Our data samples provided no such tokens; however, a web search of the British National Corpus for the phrase *all the others* yielded a random sample of 50 tokens out of a total of 307, and almost half of these random samples (23 tokens, i.e. 46%) are paraphrasable with *everyone else* when referring to humans, while one token was paraphrasable as *everyplace else* and another as *everywhere else.*[14] An example where *all the others* is paraphrasable with *else* is the

[14] These tokens were accessed through the British National Corpus Online Service at the following web address: http: //sara.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/cgi-bin/saraWeb?qy=all+the+others. We would like to acknowledge here our gratitude for this worldwide access to the BNC.

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sentence *There is nothing like worldly success on the part of one academic to make all the others [=everyone else] hate him or her.*[15] *Else*-paraphrasability often fails when nonhuman referents are involved, as seen in the sentence *Just as an unused muscle grows weak in comparison to all the others [≠everything else], so too does an unused side of the brain.* This is not surprising, given that the referring expression *everyone else* has come to be strongly associated with human referents, while the referring expression *everything else* is far too general (and hence much too all-encompassing) to adequately perform the task of obviative universal quantification within a selectively defined set.

In the UCLA Oral Corpus, evidence that the universal quantifier *all* is able to facilitate *else*-paraphrasability can be seen in the case of *other* used with a nominal substitute in expressions such as *all the other ones*. As noted in table 12 above, whereas *else*-paraphrasability is blocked in most *other* + numerative pronominal expressions such as *the other twenty percent of the time* (noncount context), *the other one* (singular context), and *the other three* (plural context), it is not blocked when it occurs in a plural context with the universal quantifier *all,* as in *He's one of the best roommates I've ever had . . . Oh, compared to what – to Daryl? . . . No, compared to all the other ones [=everyone else] too* (see segment 20 in section 4.2.2 for a qualitative analysis of this token).

Particularly prominent in table 12 above is the observation that the presence of a lexically explicit noun tends to block the use of *else.* Nonparaphrasability occurs in 95% of cases with plural nouns (75 out of 79 tokens), and in 92% with singular nouns (92 out of 100 tokens), a frequency that in fact rises to 99% if we exclude all seven tokens of the expression *another call (waiting)* – which is being used in an idiomatic and associative way by a radio talk-show host to mean *someone else (waiting),* referring to the next caller on his program.

On the other hand, co-occurrence with a general noun sometimes permits *else* to substitute for *other.* Paraphrasability is 45% for singular contexts (19 out of 42 tokens) and 42% for plural contexts (22 out of 52 tokens). For example, in the singular context, the expression *another woman* is often easily paraphrased as *someone else,* as in *He is seeing another woman [=someone else].* In the plural context, paraphrasability readily emerges when phrases such as *other people* acquire a meaning equivalent to that of obviative universal pronouns such as *everyone else* or *anyone else.* It is worth noting here that although only 65 out of 365 *other* tokens (i.e. 18%) are paraphrasable with *else,* 42 of these 65 tokens (i.e. 65%) occur with general nouns.

[15] Referential expressions involving *other(s)* generally pick up – or at least imply – a lexical item, as in the case of *all the others* above which is interpreted as *all the other academics.* Referential expressions such as *everyone else* and *everything else,* on the other hand, have a much broader quantificational scope. At times, the context is sufficiently constraining, so that the referential expression *everyone else* can be used as an obviative universal quantifier within a well-defined domain, in which case it can then serve as an adequate paraphrase for *all the others.* At other times, the paraphrase is not a perfect fit, as is the case with the example given above.

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The results in table 12 above also show that alternative uses of *otherwise* can easily be substituted with *or else* (3 out of 3 tokens) in conjunctive contexts. For example, *else*-paraphrasability is possible in constructions such as *I like to grow them outside until the foliage is a couple inches high so that they really get the advantage of the coolness outside; otherwise [=or else] they tend to go a little too quickly here sometimes.*

Paraphrasability is not possible, however, in nonconjunctive contexts such as (16) and (17) below, where *otherwise* performs adjectival and adverbial functions respectively.

(16) *Otherwise* (with an adjectival function):
What I'm referring to there is the mutual self-defense provisions that exist in the Inter-American Treaty, the so-called Rio Pact, that permits the nations, our friends in that region, to combine to take steps, diplomatic and **otherwise [=non-diplomatic; ≠or else]**, to prevent Nicaragua when she acts irresponsibly in asserting power in other parts outside the border, to take those steps whatever they might be to stop it. (UCLA Oral Corpus – 08470–08476)

(17) *Otherwise* (with an adverbial function):
But some of these problems will be popping up as we talk about whether – how much of the market can be uh described as operating like a competitor situation and how much of it is really operating **otherwise [=differently; ≠or else]**. And I guess for us right now, the question is: If it operates **otherwise [=differently; ≠or else]**, what does it mean in terms of decisions?
(UCLA Oral Corpus – 11458–11463)

Paraphrasability of *other* with *else* is also blocked or restricted in two other types of alternative constructions, namely the *'X or other'* construction (3 out of 3 tokens) and the *'(X) other than Y'* construction (5 out of 5 tokens). Interestingly, these are contexts in which the alternatives are pointedly identifiable as 'anyone or anything that is NOT X'. Paraphrasability with *else* is also blocked in the case of the reciprocal *'each other'* construction (22 out of 22 tokens). This context also involves easy identification of the referent represented by *other,* that is, within a restricted set involving X and Y, *other* identifies its referent as 'NOT X, and therefore Y'.

To briefly sum up our observations thus far concerning the semantic characteristics of the referential marker *other,* it was found that lexical and referent specificity tends to block *else*-paraphrasability. As highlighted in table 12 earlier, *else*-paraphrasability normally fails in contexts involving lexically explicit nouns (92–99% in singular contexts, and 95% in plural contexts), while it meets with some success in contexts involving general nouns (45% in singular contexts, and 42% in plural contexts). It was also noted that while plurality of referents frequently blocks *else*-paraphrasability, certain contexts where plural forms of *other* are being used to refer to universally quantifiable referents within a well-defined set (e.g. *the others, all the other ones, (the) other people, other countries, all the other things,* etc.) often permit *else*-substitution in the form of synonymous referential expressions such as *everyone else, anyone else, elsewhere,* and *everything else.*

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4.2.1.2 Effect of definite determiners

In addition to lexical explicitness, definite determiners also contribute to referent specificity and hence tend to block the paraphrasability of *other* with *else*. This effect is highlighted in table 13 below with respect to the definite article *the,* the demonstrative determiners *this, that, these* and *those,* and the possessive determiner *our* that were found in our data samples.

Table 14 further highlights the (non)paraphrasability rate of *other* with *else* when accompanied by the definite article and by demonstrative and possessive determiners. The definite article yields a very high nonparaphrasability rate of 89% (85 out of 96 tokens), while the demonstrative and possessive determiners appear to be even more effective in blocking *else*-paraphrasability (8 out of 8 tokens, i.e. 100%), though a larger number of tokens than those found in our data samples is needed for any strong claims to be made here, particularly in the case of possessive determiners.

Essentially, with respect to demonstrative determiners, we can easily say *this other person* or *those other countries,* but not **this person else* or **those countries else,* nor can we paraphrase these expressions as **this one else* or **those ones else.* In the case of possessive determiners, we can readily say *our other roommate,* but not **our roommate else.* Likewise, with the definite article, we can easily say *the other* but not **the else*; *the other one* but not **the one else*; *the other day* but not **the day else*; *the other prices* but not **the prices else.* Thus, while definite determiners are compatible with certain uses of *other,* they are basically incompatible with the meaning and use of *else.*

Nevertheless, in contexts involving the definite article *the,* it is important to note that paraphrasability is possible under certain conditions (see again table 13). A common condition discussed earlier is when *other* occurs either pronominally or with a general noun and is used in the sense of 'everyone or everything or everyplace else', as in the example *We've done all the other stuff [=everything else].* Another condition is when information on referent identifiability or specificity is easily retrievable in the absence of the definite article *the.* An example can be seen in the utterance *The other question [=Something else/One thing else/One thing more] that I wanted to ask you is how deep did you plant them?* In this particular context, referent identification of indefinite referring terms such as *something else, one thing else,* or *one thing more* is cataphorically provided in the form of the relative clause *that I wanted to ask you.* Such contexts, then, readily permit *else*-paraphrasability even though *other* is accompanied by the definite article *the.*

One other condition where *else*-paraphrasability is possible when *other* occurs with a definite article is found in the example *the only other thing [=the only thing else] you'd prune off a citrus tree is sucker growth.* A possible explanation here is that the obviative referring expression *the only thing else* has the effect of exhausting all possible referents, much in the same way as obviative universal referential expressions such as *all else, everything else, everyplace else, everybody else,* and *everyone else.*

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Table 13. *Effect of definite determiners on the paraphrasability of* other *with* else

Tokens of *other* accompanied by definite determiners	Paraphrasability with *else*	Frequency	%
set phrases:			
e.g. *on **the** other hand*	No	5/5	100%
the + pronominal *other*:			
e.g. *the other* (cf. the other [thing=general noun] that interests me)	~No	5/6	83%
the + pronominal *others*:			
⟶ e.g. *the others* (if = everyone else)	**~Yes**	**4/8**	**50%**
the + *other* + numerative pronominal:			
e.g. *the other one, the other two, the other twenty percent*	No	7/7	100%
the *(only)* + *other* + lexically explicit noun:			
e.g. *the other day, the other problem, the other side*	No	31/31	100%
e.g. *the only other pruning*	No	1/1	100%
e.g. *the other firms, the other models*	No	11/11	100%
the *(only)* + *other* + general noun:			
e.g. *the other person, the other thing*	No	7/7	100%
⟶ e.g. *the other question* (if =one thing else/something else, additive context)	Yes	1/1	100%
⟶ e.g. *the only other thing* (=the only thing else, exhaustive context)	Yes	1/1	100%
e.g. *the other things, the other women, the other eight people*	No	5/5	100%
universal quantifier + ***the*** + *other* + numerative pronominal:			
⟶ e.g. *all the other ones* (=everyone else)	Yes	1/1	100%
universal quantifier + ***the*** + *other* + lexically explicit noun:			
e.g. *all the other models, all of the other markets*	No	2/2	100%
universal quantifier + ***the*** + *other* + general noun:			
⟶ e.g. *all the other stuff* (=everything else)	Yes	1/1	100%
⟶ e.g. *all the other things* (=everything else)	Yes	2/2	100%
e.g. *all the other women* (gender specification required)	No	1/1	100%
indefinite quantifier + ***the*** + *other* + lexically explicit noun:			
e.g. *some of the other items, some of the other plants*	No	2/2	100%
X or ***the*** + *other*:			
e.g. *one way or the other, (in) one or the other*	No	3/3	100%
demonstrative determiner + pronominal *others*:			
e.g. *these thousands of others*	No	1/1	100%
demonstrative determiner + *other* + lexically explicit noun:			
e.g. *those other countries, those other prices*	No	2/2	100%
demonstrative determiner + *other* + general noun:			
e.g. *that other woman, this other woman, this other person*	No	3/3	100%
e.g. *all of these other things*	No	1/1	100%
possessive determiner + *other* + lexically explicit noun:			
e.g. *our other roommate*	No	1/1	100%

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Table 14. *Summary of effect of definite determiners on the paraphrasability of* other *with* else

Tokens of *other* accompanied by definite determiners	Paraphrasability with *else*	Frequency	%
Other with **definite article** *the*	**~No**	85/96	89%
Other with **demonstrative determiner** *this, that, these, those*	**No**	7/7	100%
Other with **possessive determiner** e.g. *our other roommate*	**No**	1/1	100%

In sum, definite determiners in the form of the definite article *the,* demonstrative determiners *this, that, these* and *those,* and possessive determiners such as *our,* are found to generally block *else*-paraphrasability, for the simple reason that they serve to enhance referent identifiability. Nevertheless, when *other* is used with the definite article in contexts involving the notion of obviative universal quantification, and hence low referentiality, it is possible for *else* to be used in place of *other*.

4.2.1.3 Effect of indefinite quantifiers and numerals

We have more than once noted that *else*-paraphrasability is often facilitated by the presence of universal quantifiers. In this section, we identify two other conditions that sometimes permit *else* to substitute for *other.* In addition, we highlight the fact that these conditions are often facilitative, but are not in themselves sufficient conditions for *else*-paraphrasability to be possible.

As seen from table 15 below, the universal quantifier *all* sometimes facilitates the paraphrasability of *other* with *else* (4 tokens out of 9, i.e. 44% of the time). As mentioned earlier, this usually happens when the intended referent is to have an exhaustive meaning such as 'everyone or everything else'. Nevertheless, *else*-paraphrasability is sometimes not possible (5 out of 9 tokens, i.e. 56% of the time for this study). Paraphrasability is blocked, for example, when lexical and referent specificity is intended, as when lexically explicit referents such as *all the other models* are preferred over vague referents such as *all else* or *everything else.* In addition, even general nouns can have specific reference by virtue of the presence of demonstrative determiners in a partitive construction; hence expressions such as *all of these other things* block *else*-paraphrasability. Paraphrasability is also often blocked when plurality of referents is intended, particularly when individuation, differentiation or variation of referents is being highlighted. To illustrate, expressions such as *all sorts of things* cannot be adequately paraphrased as either *all else* or *everything else,* since neither adequately captures the intended emphasis on a wide range or variety of possible referents.[16]

[16] Conversely, *other* cannot be used where the referent is nonindividuable or nonindividuated, as in cases involving obviative referential expressions that are accompanied by noncount quantifiers such as *little else* and *not much else.* These cases indicate that the relationship between *else* and its near synonym *other* is not a subset relationship, but an intersecting one.

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Table 15. *Effect of different quantifiers and numerals on the paraphrasability of* other *with* else

	Tokens of *other* accompanied by indefinite quantifiers or numerals	Paraphrasability with *else*	Frequency
	universal quantifier + *other* + numerative pronominal:		
⟶	e.g. *all the other ones* (=everyone else)	Yes	1/1
	universal quantifier + *(of) the* + *other* + lexically explicit noun:		
	e.g. *all the other models, all of the other markets*	No	2/2
	universal quantifier + *other* + general noun:		
⟶	e.g. *all the other stuff* (=everything else)	Yes	1/1
⟶	e.g. *all the other things* (=everything else)	Yes	2/2
	e.g. *all the other woman [sic: women]*	No	1/1
	e.g. *all of these other things*	No	1/1
	e.g. *all sorts of other things*	No	1/1
	any + pronominal *others*:		
⟶	e.g. *any others*	Yes	1/1
	any + *other* + lexically explicit noun:		
	e.g. *any other way, any other candidate's*	No	2/2
	any + *other* + general noun:		
⟶	e.g. *any other place* (=anyplace else/anywhere else)	Yes	1/1
	some (of the) + *other* + (adjective) + lexically explicit noun:		
	e.g. *some other word, some other course*	No	2/2
	e.g. *some other reasons, some other fiscal measures*	No	6/6
	e.g. *some of the other items, some of the other plants*	No	2/2
	some + *other* + general noun:		
⟶	e.g. *some other things, some other moves*	~No	3/4
	a lot of / many + *other* + lexically explicit noun:		
	e.g. *a lot of other countries, too many other needs*	No	3/3
	a few / a couple of + *other* + general noun (plural):		
	e.g. *a few other things, a couple of other things*	No	2/2
	numeral *one* + *other* + lexically explicit noun:		
	e.g. *one other sister*	No	1/1
	numeral *one* + *other* + general noun:		
⟶	e.g. *one other question* (=something else)	Yes	1/1
⟶	e.g. *one other thing* (=something else)	~Yes	1/3
	(≠ something else; specific referent intended)	~No	2/3
	definite numeral + *others* + lexically explicit noun:		
	e.g. *five other students*	No	1/1
	definite numeral + *others* + general noun:		
	about 100 other people	No	1/1
	indefinite numeral + *of* + pronominal *others*:		
	e.g. *numbers of others, (these) thousands of others*	No	3/3

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The results in table 15 further show that *else*-paraphrasability can also be facilitated when *other* is accompanied by the indefinite quantifier *any.* For example, the referential expression *any other place* can easily be replaced by *anyplace else* or *anywhere else.* As in the case of the universal quantifier *all,* however, the indefinite quantifier *any* fails to induce *else*-paraphrasability when lexical specificity is intended or required. This can be seen in the following response from vice-presidential candidate Geraldine Ferraro in a 'Meet the Press' interview where she says *I don't think the conclusion of whether or not a person is competent should be mine to make, or any other candidate's [?anyone else's]. I mean, that's up to the American people.* The context calls for a specific type of referent, namely *any other candidate's,* since a vague referring expression such as *anyone else's* would negate the speaker's whole point about the American electorate being the appropriate judge of a candidate's competence, a point which the speaker makes explicit in her next sentence. Paraphrasing *other* with *else* would clearly not work in this particular instance.

The results in table 15 further highlight the fact that *else*-paraphrasability can also be facilitated by numeral *one* in premodifier position. This easily happens with routinized conversational expressions involving additive contexts, where lack of referent specificity is often tolerated because it is easily retrievable from preceding discourse. The following example takes the form of a question from a caller to a radio talkshow host: *One other question [=Something else]. . . . I wonder if I could plant one of those [lilacs] against a- uhh a block wall fence?* Paraphrasability of *other* with *else* in this particular case is possible because discourse conventions help the hearer to interpret the expression *Something else* as a truncation of *There's something else I'd like to ask,* and this inference is usually borne out by an actual question being posed. The referent of *something else* is thus easily identifiable as a subsequent question, either via contextual inference or via subsequent elaboration, or both.

There is a sense in which *other* takes on an indefinite quality in the presence of a premodifying numeral *one.* This is not surprising given that, in the absence of definite determiners and quantifiers, *one other* (although more specific) is essentially synonymous with indefinite *another.* Thus an utterance such as *One other thing I should mention is the only other thing you'd prune off a citrus tree is sucker growth* can easily be paraphrased as either *Another thing I should mention is . . .* or *One thing else/ Something else I should mention is . . .* Note that lack of lexical and referent specificity is permissible – in fact preferred by design – in this particular construction, because the identity of the referent is immediately provided in the equative predicate clause. Nevertheless, *else*-paraphrasability is not always possible even with an indefinite referential expression such as *one other thing.* Paraphrasability is not quite appropriate, for example, when a degree of referent specificity is needed to provide emphatic closure to an argument or proposal, as when a presidential candidate concludes with the utterance *Lemme just say one other thing [≠something else] now,* or when a radio talkshow host responds with *if that is true, I would check one other*

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Table 16. *Effect of interrogative pronouns on the paraphrasability of* other *with* else

	Tokens of *other* accompanied by interrogative pronouns	Paraphrasability with *else*	Frequency
	interrogative pronoun + *other* + general noun (plural):		
⟶	e.g. *what other things* (=what else)	Yes	4/4
	e.g. *what other questions* (lexical and referent specificity required)	No	1/1
	interrogative pronoun + *other* + lexically explicit noun (plural):		
⟶	e.g. *what other reasons, what other steps* (=what else)	Yes	2/2
	e.g. *what other implications* (lexical and referent specificity required)	No	1/1
	Total no. of *what other* + *NP* tokens paraphrasable with *what else*	Yes	6/9 (67%)

thing [≠something else]. In other words, *else*-paraphrasability fails in cases of *specific* indefinite reference.

We have thus far identified certain types of indefinite and nonreferential quantifiers and numerals – namely *all, any* and *one* – that often facilitate the paraphrasability of *other* with *else.* At the same time, we have also identified certain conditions where even these quantifiers and numerals fail to effect *else*-paraphrasability. Among these conditions are contexts that require lexical and referent specificity, and contexts where plurality of referents is being emphasized, particularly when emphasis is placed on individuation, differentiation, or variation among referents.

4.2.1.4 Effect of interrogative pronouns

The results of the present study further reveal that interrogative pronouns also sometimes facilitate the paraphrasability of *other* with *else.* As shown in table 16, our data samples reveal 9 tokens of *other* occurring with the interrogative pronoun *what,* and *else*-paraphrasability is possible with 6 out of the 9 tokens (i.e. 67%).

Note that in the presence of interrogative pronouns such as *what, else*-paraphrasability is possible not only when *other* appears with a general noun, as in the question *So what other things [=what else] do you do?,* but also when *other* appears with a lexically explicit noun, as in the following prompt from an instructor *I think there were probably some other reasons for it too. What other reasons [=what else] can you think of?*

In the case of lexically explicit nouns, however, additional changes to the original sentence are sometimes required. We illustrate with an example from a presidential debate: *What other steps do you think should be taken to reduce this deficit?* An acceptable paraphrase such as *What else do you think should be done to reduce this deficit?* requires a lexical change in the main verb phrase, where the more specific verb phrase *should be taken* is replaced by the more general expression *should be done.* In cases such as this, *else*-paraphrasability is possible because lexical and referent specificity is either retrievable from preceding discourse, or otherwise not crucial to cognitive processing, but is rather a matter of stylistic consideration.

Paraphrasability is blocked, however, in the following examples where lexical and

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referent specificity are essential for an accurate interpretation of an utterance. For example, *else*-paraphrasability is dispreferred in the following sentences where greater lexical specificity plays an important part in clarifying a lecturer's instructions for his class: *Now, again . . . we'll have to see what other implications [?what else] that has for the whole economy. . . . And – let me just show you one more slide and see what other questions [?what else] are related to this kinky demand curve.*

To briefly sum up the quantitative findings from this study, it was found that grammatical forms that are identified with definite reference (e.g. definite article *the,* demonstrative determiners *this, that, these, those*, and possessive determiners) tend to block the paraphrasability of *other* with *else.* On the other hand, grammatical forms that are identified with indefinite reference (e.g. universal quantifier *all,* indefinite quantifier *any,* indefinite numeral *one* in premodifying position) and unspecified reference (e.g. interrogative pronoun *what*) tend to facilitate *else*- paraphrasability. However, except perhaps for the demonstrative and possessive determiners, many of these grammatical forms are not sufficient conditions for either blocking or facilitating *else*-paraphrasability. What has consistently been identified as the crucial factor is the criterion of whether lexical and referent specificity are required for a given context. *Else*-paraphrasability succeeds in contexts where lack of referent specificity is either permissible, or better yet preferred.

4.2.2 Qualitative analysis

In this section we will elaborate on the above findings with a more qualitative analysis of sample tokens of *other.* We begin with a discussion of one of the most consistent cues that block *else*-paraphrasability, namely lexical explicitness. Segment 14 below illustrates a typical context in which the use of precise language can make a crucial difference in one's utterance. In the context below, a politician (in this case, Walter Mondale) is arguing for the pro-choice position on the issue of abortion. At a time when he is running for the presidency, when he needs to be viewed as a leader with direction and purpose, choosing words such as *you've got another life involved* helps to elevate the moral plane of his argument, whereas using a vague expression such as *you've got something else involved* without further elaboration could easily cast him as a man without a set of clearly articulated views. Contexts such as these, where explicitness is favored over vagueness, tend to block the use of *else.*

Segment 14 (excerpt from the presidential debates)

	07511 WM:	The basic decision of the Supreme Court is that each person
	07512	has to make this judgment in her own life and that's the way it's
	07513	been done. . . I don't know the answer to when life begins, and
→	07514	it's not that simple either, **you've got another life involved**.
	07515	And if it's rape, how do you draw moral judgments on that,
	07516	if it's incest, how do you draw moral judgments on that . . .

In many other contexts, deciding between whether to be explicit or vague may not be crucial and may not involve serious consequences. Nevertheless, it is important to

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note that a change in word choice often involves some change in meaning, sometimes subtle, sometimes substantive. Segment 15 below represents one such common utterance in daily conversation.

Segment 15 (excerpt from a conversation between friends)
⟶ 06649 RH: D'ya wan- wanna hear **another story**?
06650 BH: Sure I do!

In asking the question *D'ya wan- wanna hear another story?,* the first speaker provides the hearer with a glimpse of how she classifies or evaluates the story that probably will follow. In this case, she views the story she intends to share as 'more of the same stuff' or 'something more along the same lines'. Even if the story turns out to be 'of quite a different kind', the speaker has elected to introduce it by means of linking it with something prior that is known. Simply speaking, the speaker would have been exploiting a very useful and fairly transparent referential strategy – introducing the unknown by linking it to something known. However, if the speaker were to paraphrase the question using *else,* the hearer will most likely come to a different interpretation. That is, on the basis of a question like *D'ya wan- wanna hear something else?,* the hearer will most likely infer that what is to follow is new and different, thus most likely unexpected for the hearer, and possibly not even a story. Thus, the choice between the so-called synonyms *other* and *else* often has some discourse-pragmatic consequences, since it often involves a choice between the presence of a lexically explicit noun and the absence of one, which in turn has some important consequences related to the identifiability versus nonidentifiability of the referent.

In some contexts, referent specificity or identifiability is not at all an issue. Such contexts are ideal for *else*-paraphrasability. In segment 16 below, the expression *one other question* can easily be paraphrased as *something else,* though *one other thing* or *one more thing* may represent more common choices in such a context. The use of a lexically nonexplicit expression such as *something else* is possible in this context because of the highly routinized and predictable format of radio talkshows such as 'The Garden Lady', where a caller phones in with questions and the talkshow host (who is the gardening expert) comes up with answers. Given that questions are often distributed over several turns of talk, deictic cues such as speaker roles are often sufficient to indicate that the referent of *something else* when uttered as an independent phrase by the caller most likely would mean 'one additional question'. That is to say, identifiability is not an issue in this context, and the choice between *other* and *else* is thus inconsequential.

Segment 16 (excerpt from a radio talkshow)
01018 CALLER:
⟶ 01019 **one other question**
01020 GARDEN LADY:
01021 ummmm
01022 CALLER:
01023 uhhh the latest sunset

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01024 magazine has u' article on
01025 lilacs
01026 GARDEN LADY:
01027 umhum
01028 CALLER:
01029 that will grow in Southern
01030 California
01031 GARDEN LADY:
01032 right
01033 CALLER:
01034 I live in Rosemead. 'ts quite
01035 hot in the summer time. I
01036 wonder if I could plant one of
01037 those up against a uhh a block
01038 wall fence?

As pointed out earlier in section 4.2.1.2, referent specificity or identifiability can be enhanced not only through the use of lexically explicit nouns but also through the use of definite determiners. Segments 17 and 18 below illustrate the use of *other* accompanied by a demonstrative determiner and the definite article *the,* respectively. Not surprisingly, *else* cannot be substituted for *other* in these contexts.

In segment 17, *else*-paraphrasability of the expression *that other woman* in line 05153 is blocked by prior identification of its referent in lines 05150 and 05151, and by the subsequent use of a demonstrative determiner *that* in line 05153 itself, which highlights not only a definite referent but a very easily identifiable one.

Segment 17 (excerpt from a radio talkshow)
05150 T: He is seeing **another woman**. Are you willing to continue to
05151 see him if he continues with **this woman**? Do you uh want to put
05152 yourself in the position of saying: 'If you don't stop seeing
→ 05153 **that other woman**, I won't see you anymore.' *(*someone else)*
05154 C: Uh no, that I wouldn't do.

In segment 18, the speaker's use of the definite article *the* narrows down the viable options to just *one of two possibilities,* and as such enhances the identifiability of the intended referent, since the context is such that if the referent is not X, then it has to be Y. The crucial semantic property that is consistently at odds with the acceptability of *else* as a substitute for *other* in these types of context involves the notion of definiteness and/or identifiability.

Segment 18 (excerpt from the White House transcripts)
03631 P: I want the most comprehensive note on all those who tried to
03632 do us in. They didn't have to do it. If we had had a very
→ 03633 close election and they were playing **the other side** I would
*(*somebody else/*something else)*
03634 understand this. No – they were doing this quite deliberately
03635 and they are asking for it and they are going to get it.

As discussed earlier in section 4.2.1.1, plurality also often blocks the use of *else.* For example, as seen from segment 19 below, even though it is grammatically

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possible in line 03827 to substitute the expression *other people say* with the expression *someone else says,* the semantic effect is far from desirable. In this particular context, an *else*-paraphrase would have the unfortunate effect of misrepresenting the intended number, which calls for a focus on plurality of persons. Simply put, *else* generally is unable to convey an explicit notion of plurality.

Segment 19 (excerpt from a radio talkshow)

03822 C: Uhm . . . Often, uh David is really uh pretty hysterical in
03823 the morning when I will leave for work or my husband
03824 leaves for work, and and we're just uh uh we just don't
03825 know what to do about it. And we've read a lot; we've
03826 talked to people; some people say, 'That's good. That
⟶ 03827 means that he really loves you,' and **other people** say, *(*someone else)*
03828 'Well maybe . . . the caregiver isn't right.'

In segment 19, one could also conceivably replace the expression *other people say* with *everyone else says.* However, using the obviative universal referential expression *everyone else* would result in a subtle change in the semantic collocation in the construction 'Some people say X, and other people say Y'. In terms of semantic difference, there is a sense in which the use of *everyone else says Y* tends to exhaust all possible alternative opinions, whereas this exhaustive interpretation is not semantically inherent to the use of the expression *other people say Y.* Said differently, plural referents such as *other people* are further individuable in a way that obviative universal referents such as *everyone else* aren't. Subtle differences in meaning such as this can be critical in determining nonparaphrasability of *other* with *else.*

There are, however, certain conditions that facilitate the paraphrasability of *other* with *else.* Among these, as identified in the preceding quantitative analysis in 4.2.1, are: (i) the presence of certain indefinite quantifiers and numerals such as the universal quantifier *all,* and (ii) the presence of interrogative pronouns such as *what,* particularly when they are accompanied by a general noun. Segments 20 and 21 below illustrate these two conditions. In segment 20, the noun phrase *all the other ones* can easily be paraphrased using *everyone else,* and in segment 21, the noun phrase *what other things* can likewise easily be paraphrased by *what else.*

Segment 20 (excerpt from a conversation among friends)

06356 Patrick.
06357 >I'm not going to beat up Euclid=why would I wanna beat up Euclid
06358 He's one of the best roommates I've ever h : : d<
06359 John.
06360 Oh, compared to what-to Daryl? Yeah, I'm sure he is.
06361 Patrick.
⟶ 06362 No: : : compared to **all the other ones** too= *(everyone else)*
06363 he's one he's one of the best.

Segment 21 (excerpt from the presidential debates)

07518 RR: With regard to this being a personal choice, isn't that
07519 what a murderer is insisting on, his or her right to kill

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07520 someone because of whatever fault they think uh, uh justifies
07521 that. Now I'm not capable and I don't think you are, any of us,
07522 to make this determination that must be made with regard to human
07523 life . . . I don't think that any of us should be called upon here
⟶ 07524 to stand and make a decision as to **what other things** might come
(what else)
07525 under the self-defense tradition . . .

It is not difficult to see why universal quantifiers such as *all* and interrogative pronouns such as *what* tend to readily facilitate *else*-paraphrasability. As has been noted in the literature, grammatical forms such as these are inherently associated with either low referentiality or nonreferentiality. Chafe (1994: 103–4), for example, has pointed out that universal pronouns inherently lack a clear referent (and we observe that this is true also of universal quantifiers, as seen in segment 20 above), while interrogative pronouns generally imply a 'lexical gap', with the identity of the referent either unknown or yet to be known (as seen in segment 21). The lack of focus on definiteness and specificity (and hence identifiability) that is inherent to these grammatical forms thus makes them highly compatible with *else.* This explains why *other* can often be paraphrased with *else* in the presence of these grammatical forms.

It is interesting to recall here that the distribution patterns in tables 8 and 9 (see section 3.3.2) for both the written and spoken discourse samples show *else* occurring with indefinite pronouns and adverbs about 78 to 79% of the time, with interrogative pronouns 10 to 15% of the time, with indefinite quantifiers 0 to 8% of the time, while the remaining 3 to 5% of the time its use is distributed between the indefinite adverbial *elsewhere* and the conjunctive alternative *or else.* What is evident from these distribution patterns is that *else* favors and tends to function best in those contexts where lack of referent identifiability prevails, or where lack of specificity is preferred. Indeed, these characteristics of *else* neatly explain why *else* cannot enter into reciprocal 'each other' constructions and 'one way or the other' constructions, such as those found in segments 22 and 23 below, since these types of constructions clearly possess very specific and easily identifiable referents.

Segment 22 (excerpt from the presidential debates)
07301 WM: Well, I think we're getting better all the time, and I think
07302 tonight, as we contrast for the first time our differing approach
07303 to government, to values, to the leadership in this country, I
07304 think as this debate goes forward, the American people will have
⟶ 07305 for the first time a chance to weigh the two of us against **each**
07306 **other** . . .
*(*each else)*

Segment 23 (excerpt from a radio talkshow)
05361 T: That's what strikes me about how you present yourself + very
05362 polarized + which is pretty typical of of a + certain ty-types of
05363 career women + an' aggressive women ++ ah + it's kinda black an'
05364 white, either, or ++ EITHER, I'm gonna be an engineer, work for
05365 NASA, burn up the world. OR + I'm gonna retire + y'know + I'm

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	05366	going to get married to the + man of my + dreams, an' + y'know
	05367	live inna little+ house with a white picket fence and have +
	05368	y'know SIX children. Ah ++ I get a kinda either or ++ feeling +
⟶	05369	from you + a kinda need to totally invest yourself in **one + OR**
	05370	**the other**. . . .

*(*one or else)*

At the same time, it is interesting to also note that the association of *else* with indefiniteness, lack of specificity, and lack of referentiality makes it ideally suited to a distinct set of cohesive functions that perfectly complements the cohesive functions of *other.* For whereas the use of *other* readily allows us to be more specific with respect to lexical and referential information, as well as number, the use of *else* allows us to choose *not to be specific.* This is important for at least three related reasons: (i) overspecification is costly in terms of cognitive processing, (ii) overspecification may often be redundant and quite unnecessary in real discourse where contextual cues are abundant, and (iii) the availability of a linguistic form that allows speakers to selectively de-specify certain referents also allows them to highlight and foreground other referents that are most crucial at any given time. Because *else* brings with it a unique quality which, though elusive, is in fact cognitively and discursively invaluable, it has found itself a semantic niche in the English language from which it is not likely to be easily dislodged.

5 Conclusion

This article has described the frequency, distribution, meanings, and discourse functions of *else* in American English, using a corpus-based approach complemented by a qualitative contextual analysis. The results make a contribution to English linguistics since this high frequency cohesive marker has not thus far been thoroughly described, perhaps because of the predominance of sentence-level approaches to grammatical description. One indirect conclusion of our research is that grammar must be examined from a discourse as well as a sentence-level perspective, if grammars are to become more comprehensive and accurate.

To further characterize the role of *else,* we contrasted it with its nearest equivalent, *other,* and demonstrated the complementary roles that these forms play. Whereas *other* is often used in contexts where greater specification in terms of definiteness, grammatical number, and lexical specificity of referents is intended, *else* is used in contexts where vagueness and lack of specificity with regard to the identity of referents is preferred.

This study could usefully be extended in a number of ways. First, it is possible that a larger database would yield somewhat different results. Certainly, more tokens of forms like *or else, elsewhere,* and *else's,* which were rare in our corpora, would occur and this would allow for a comprehensive analysis of these forms of *else.* Second, our results describe spoken and written American English. It would be interesting to look at a comparable corpus of British English to see what differences there might be. One such dialect difference we are aware of is the informal use of

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summat else in spoken British English, as in the utterance *Tell you summat else,* which means 'I'll tell you something else' (Token KB1 4873 from an online search of the British National Corpus). No such form occurs in American English. Third, it would be useful to extend this study of *else* and *other* to other forms and structures used for expressing comparative reference, e.g. *more, less, so, such*, and *as.* Finally, it would also be interesting to extend the present study to language acquisition contexts. This is because the present study has identified *else* as a comparative reference marker that plays a less specified semantic role than *other,* and it would be useful from a developmental perspective to determine whether the more elusive semantic property identified with *else* makes it more difficult to acquire, both for first and second language learners.

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