translation. Joachim said nothing about the relations among his eight witnesses beyond indicating that two of the MSS were of especial authority—and one of them 'of very little value'. He was right on the last point, and his Ambrosian MS can be eliminated. He was right, too, to adduce the other five MSS. On the other hand, he was wrong about the Latin translation, which was done from an existing Greek MS—indeed, from one of Joachim's five. As for Philoponus, the matter is unclear; for although R. frequently refers to the commentary, he does not discuss its text (nor its lemmata), nor does he place it in his stemma. However that may be, a conscientious editor who wishes to weigh all the pertinent evidence for the readings of the archetype will have to work harder than Joachim did; for—unless I have miscounted—some twenty-five of the seventy-odd witnesses to the text are ineliminable.

There is a school of textual criticism which is sceptical of stemmatology: as R. demonstrates, here at least scepticism is the first refuge of the idle. But if his ideology is sound, are R.'s particular stemmatic propositions true? Are they solid inferences from firm premisses? Well, the premisses are surely firm enough. If the indolent reviewer who checked a few of R.'s reported readings against the plates at the end of the book could detect no errors, a serious critic will doubtless uncover a mistake or three—no collation is perfect. But that will not cause R.'s arguments to totter, since he almost always provides more premisses than his conclusion requires. As for the inferences, some are probative, some would satisfy any British jury, a few— inevitably—are more contestable. In short, if there may be room for revision at the edges, the central contentions of R.'s book—and the contentions pertinent to the constitution of the text of the *GC*—seem to me to be established.

The book is handsomely produced, and its forty-eight plates are clear and readable. (The stemma, which is crushed onto a single page, is the only blot.) R. is a scholar from the school of Dieter Harlfinger, and he therefore knows how to operate on a MS. His book is a major contribution to Aristotelian studies—and to much else besides. It boils with learning and it bubbles with enthusiasm. What more could you want?

Ceaulmont JONATHAN BARNES
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ESSAYS ON STOICISM

B. INWOOD (ed.): *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*. Pp. x + 438. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Paper, £19.95, US$26 (Cased, £50, US$70). ISBN: 0-521-77985-5 (0-521-77005-X hbk).

The essays collected in this volume may be divided into four sections: 1, the history of the school (and of the school of thought); 2, the philosophy; 3, relations with medicine, grammar, astronomy and geography; and 4, *capita selectissima* pertaining to the reception of Stoic philosophy in the middle ages and early modern times. For the most part, Stoic philosophy is approached here from a plurality of (often modern) systematic points of view. As is often the case in collections such as these, the excellent keeps company with the less excellent.

D. Sedley covers 'The School from Zeno to Arius Didymus' in an exemplarily clear and attractive way, with some emphasis on the philosophical diaspora with the war years 88–86 B.C.E. as its main cause, though he thinks that Panaetius, Stoic scholarch,

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may have left Athens earlier for his native Rhodes. He states (p. 32) that 'Arius Didymus', a 'court philosopher' of 'Augustus', 'is widely . . . identified with the Arius', large excerpts of whose work are preserved by Stobaeus. Not so: Stobaeus, Clement, and Eusebius cite a Didymus; Arius Didymus is mentioned and excerpted by, again, Eusebius; the court philosopher is only known as Arius. C. Gill, who treats 'The School in the Roman Imperial Period', provides an impressive amount of up-to-date information on persons, books, discussions, and themes, even including a brief account of the influence of Stoicism on Middle and Neo-Platonism (pp. 54–5).

R. J. Hankinson contributes a well-documented analysis of 'Stoic Epistemology', with the standard emphasis on sense-perception and the debate between Stoics and Sceptics. His translation of ὑπάρχοντος in the famous definition of the cataleptic impression as 'the existent thing' (p. 60), i.e. a corporeal 'object' (p. 61, cf. pp. 64, 68) is unfortunate—see J. Brunschwig's n. 26 on p. 215. H. is, of course, aware that some impressions are 'purely intellectual' (p. 61 n. 4), e.g. of 'incorporeals' (D.L. 7.51). One misses Cleanthes' testimony about Zeno's account of the regent part being imprinted via the senses at Eus. *P.E.* 15.20.2 (Ar. Did. fr. 39 Diels); here the καὶ in the formula ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων καί ὑπαρχόντων may be epexegetic. S. Bobzien's chapter on 'Logic', i.e. logic in the modern not the Stoic sense of the term, is the most complete and up-to-date brief overview available. Not an easy read, though, some knowledge of contemporary logic being clearly presupposed. But the complex peculiarities of Stoic *dialektikê* are admirably explained.

M. J. White discusses 'Stoic Natural Philosophy (Physics and Cosmology)'. Meteorology (think e.g. of Seneca's *Quaestiones Naturales* and D.L. 7.151–4) is not included. The account of theoretical physics and cosmology is capable, though there are a few odd errors: at p. 127, paraphrasing Diogenes Laertius, he includes a phrase (D.L. 7.133) rightly bracketed by Marcovich and Goulet, and his translation on pp. 134 and 137 of Orig. *Cels.* 4.14 (*SVF* 2.1052) absurdly turns matter into the regent part of the god during the conflagration (the words at issue should be translated 'as regent part he occupies the whole of matter'). His account of the Stoic view of 'limits', pp. 150–1, is not good; like other scholars (including J. Brunschwig, p. 219), he believes that these are purely mental constructs. This is based on Procl. *in Eucl.* 89.15–18 (*SVF* 2.488), but from *in Tim.* 3.95.7–15 (*SVF* 2.521) it is clear that Proclus' formula κατ' ἐπίνοιαν ψιλὴν ὑφεστάναι pertains to incorporeals like time, so Plu. *Comm. Not.* 1080E is right (and so is D. Frede, p. 186). Two excellent chapters are next. K. Algra provides a subtle and detailed account, ranging from Zeno to Seneca and Epictetus, of the many faces and rôles of 'Stoic Theology', inclusive of a fine interpretation of prayer as being directed to the self. D. Frede's analysis of 'Stoic Determinism'is wonderful. Though the scenario has already been written and our rôles cannot be modified, we are responsible for our actions in agreement with the rôle model on a sort of 'as if' basis, since the vast majority of causes (and so of effects) are unknown to humans.

J. Brunschwig's chapter 'Stoic Metaphysics' is written with the author's customary brilliance. Elegantly criticizing a paper of V. Caston criticizing a paper of his own, Brunschwig discusses the intricacies and implications of the partition of entities into somethings and not-somethings, and describes the Stoics' view of universals and of their so-called categories. But one need not agree with his interpretation of the two divisions of physics at D.L. 7.132 (accepted by M. J. White, p. 125). The first, since limits are incorporeals, may in fact be one of bodies on the one hand and incorporeals (ἀσώματα: privative of σώματα) on the other. I think it is called 'specific' because these (two) sections (to be subdivided themselves) come under a shared genus,

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presumably the 'something', so are its first species (προσεχῆ εἴδη, cf. D.L. 7.61). Then the second is called 'generic' because its three sections do not come under a genus as its species, but are, rather, parts of a whole.

M. Schofield, giving us his considered view of the main facts about 'Stoic Ethics', deals with his usual competence and clarity with its systematic aspects as well as with different views among the Stoics themselves, with some ancient criticisms, and with what this ethics meant in actual practice. A good read, and so a protreptic introduction to the subject. T. Brennan writes a shade discursively on 'Stoic Moral Psychology', esp. on the theory of action, the emotions, deliberation, motivation, and assent.

R. J. Hankinson, on 'Stoicism and Medicine', discusses a few key terms and notions which, to some extent, are common to both. A bit more is found in Chapter 4 of T. Tieleman, *Chrysippus' On Affections* (Leiden, etc., 2003). D. Blank and C. Atherton deal with 'The Stoic Contribution to Traditional Grammar'. This is a fine and very informative chapter, carefully delineating the likely contributions to the development of what became the discipline of grammar. The authors bury the anomalist/analogist controversy, and their detailed account of syntax, the parts of speech, and cases is excellent. A. Jones, on 'The Stoics and the Astronomical Sciences', briefly and competently discusses what ancient astronomy in its various phases was about and how it developed, then analyzes Cleomedes' *Meteôra*, pointing out that it is philosophical rather than scientific because it is vague about the mathematics and eloquent about the constitution of the stars (analogous observations on Posidonius' geography, p. 343; Strabo's is different but still philosophical because ethically motivated, p. 345). The chapter includes an account of various forms of astrology.

Much is also to be learned from the two final chapters. T. H. Irwin, 'Stoic Naturalism and its Critics', in an instructive way discusses reactions to and (partial) uses of Stoic thought from Thomas Aquinas to Pufendorf and Bishop Butler, in order to assess the quality of the arguments *pro* and *contra* that have been employed. A. A. Long, 'Stoicism in the Philosophical Tradition: Spinoza, Lipsius, Butler', is interesting not only for its account of Lipsius' Christianized Stoicism or Butler's ethics, but also for its comparativist study of Spinoza and Stoicism: striking resemblances, though Spinoza apparently hardly knew anything about Stoicism, as well as significant differences. The chapter of A. A. Long and one by T. H. Irwin on 'Stoic Naturalism in Butler' are also available in another Cambridge volume, namely, J. Miller, B. Inwood (edd.), *Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy*, also published in 2003. The inclusion of these contributions is therefore questionable. I would have preferred a chapter dealing in some detail with the Stoic or Stoicizing ingredients in Philo, Alcinous, and Plotinus.

So far I have said something about the individual contributions. What about the volume as a whole? The editor seems to have preferred to leave well alone, for there is no overall similarity of presentation, while ways of referring to the ancient evidence are widely divergent from chapter to chapter. One wonders what kind of public this collection caters for. It should be Greekless, for all Greek has been transliterated, but appears to be familiar with the various types of abbreviation for ancient names and titles used in scholarly literature on the subject, and 'the list of primary works' (pp. 417ff.) sports a number of texts in untranslated Greek or Latin. An introductory account of the ancient sources is lacking, which omission is only partially made good by the efforts of individual contributors to provide some necessary information. The bibliography provides an overview of the secondary literature referred to in the book (Hick's *Diogenes Laertius* and Hine's *Seneca* are presumably here by accident). This is followed (!) by the 'list of primary works', though 'works judged to

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be common and familiar to the presumed readers of this volume are not indicated' (p. 417)—but works by Cicero, Seneca, and Sextus are included nevertheless. The indexes are not always helpful: no references, for instance, for *SVF*, *pneuma*, or *honestum*.

Bilthoven JAAP MANSFELD
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STOICS AND CYNICS

M.-O. GOULET-CAZÉ: *Les* Kynica *du stoïcisme*. (*Hermes* Einzelschriften 89.) Pp. 198. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2003. Paper, €44. ISBN: 3-515-08256-5.

Since at least the time of Athenodorus of Pergamum—Stoic, librarian, and expurgator of Zeno's infamous *Republic*—and ever since, there have been attempts to clean up Stoicism, to purge it of its disreputable Cynic ancestry. G.-C. offers a re-evaluation of these sanitizations of Stoicism and offers a detailed examination of the affinities between Cynicism and the early Stoa. The *kynica* of the title is a reference to H. von Arnim's subsection of the same name in *SVF* (i.e. 3.743–56). In practice it refers to the fragments of Zeno's *Republic*, and the texts relating to Cleanthes and Chrysippus that report similar—usually scandalous—themes. The other key primary material discussed here is Diogenes' *Republic*, the supposed inspiration for Zeno's work of the same name.

The opening chapter discusses the status of these two *Republics*, and naturally devotes much space to an analysis of the most important ancient report of them, Philodemus' *De Stoicis*. In this work Philodemus wants to show how much the *Republics* of Diogenes and Zeno share in common, in order to embarrass contemporary Stoics. Such Stoics tended to follow one of two paths: either they rejected Zeno's *Republic* as inauthentic or merely the product of immature youth, or they acknowledged it but proceeded to construct a genealogy back through the Cynics to Socrates, thereby justifying the presence of Stoicism's Cynic heritage. G.-C. suggests that, despite some ancient doubts, it looks as if Zeno's *Republic* was genuine; she also argues—*contra* Schofield (*The Stoic Idea of the City* [Cambridge, 1991])—that Philodemus probably had personal access to the text.

Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the general character of Diogenes' *Republic*, Zeno's *Republic*, and the *kynica* of the subsequent early Stoics, in particular Chrysippus. Diogenes offers an individualistic 'anarchie libertaire' (p. 28), a negative cosmopolitanism that denies the importance of the traditional city. By contrast, Zeno has a more positive conception of the rôle of community. Despite his radical politics, Zeno accepts the social conventions by which he is surrounded, just as Socrates did when he refused to escape prison, and this marks an important break from the Cynic tradition. But there is still much that Diogenes and Zeno share in common, and—and this is a key theme in the volume—Zeno was not the only Stoic to look favourably upon their Cynic heritage. In particular, Chrysippus appears to have been very interested in the themes that can be found in Diogenes' *Republic*. The presence of Cynic themes in Chrysippus shows that Zeno's *Republic* cannot be written off—as some later Stoics tried—as an early immature work. The influence of Diogenes and his

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