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Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third-Wave Democracies

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Countries in the third wave of democratization have introduced competitive elections before establishing basic institutions of a modern state such as the rule of law, institutions of civil society and the accountability of governors. By contrast, countries in the first wave of democratization became modern states before universal suffrage was introduced. Because they have democratized backwards, most third-wave countries are currently incomplete democracies. Incomplete democracies can develop in three different ways: completing democratization; repudiating free elections and turning to an undemocratic alternative; or falling into a low-level equilibrium trap in which the inadequacies of elites are matched by low popular demands and expectations. The significance of incomplete democratization is shown by analysing public opinion survey data from three new democracies varying in their predecessor regimes: the Russian Federation (a totalitarian past); the Czech Republic (both a democratic and a totalitarian past) and the Republic of Korea (formerly an authoritarian military regime).

A spectre is haunting contemporary studies of democratization: conventional influences, such as the introduction of free elections, have not (or at least, not yet) created political regimes that match the standards of established democracies. Within five years Samuel Huntington moved from characterizing the late twentieth century as the third wave of democratization to proclaiming *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.[1] Larry Diamond's global review of *Developing Democracy* emphasizes a growing 'gap between electoral and liberal democracy'.[2] The World Movement for Democracy proclaims that its primary priority is '*deepening democracy beyond its electoral*

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[1] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

[2] Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 10.

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form'.[3] Constructive critics of third-wave democracies are not worried about the gap between an ideal democracy and existing polyarchies that concerns Robert Dahl. Their anxieties focus on daily violations of the rule of law, corruption and unaccountable government.

The introduction of free competitive elections is a necessary step in the establishment of democracy. This demonstrates publicly and authoritatively that the old regime is gone, and that the populace now has a choice about who governs and, less certainly, about how their country is governed. Initially, studies of third-wave democratization treated the institutionalization of electoral competition as sufficient to consolidate democracy. But the insufficiency of this condition is increasingly recognized. Linz and Stepan conclude, 'Consolidation does not necessarily entail either a high-quality democracy or a high-quality society'.[4]

Systematic empirical evidence confirms the judgement that even though major positive changes have occurred in undemocratic regimes, more changes are needed. According to Freedom House, the median country in the world today has some but not all of the attributes of a first-wave democracy. In its global review of 191 countries, eighty-one are described as free, that is, enjoying basic civil liberties and political rights; fifty-seven as partly free; and fifty-three as not free.[5] While it is reasonable to describe countries such as Ghana, Kyrgyzstan and Thailand as freer than a decade ago, it would be premature to say that they have completed the process of democratization. For example, many countries do not adhere to the rule of law even though they hold elections. Of the fifty-three countries placed in the bottom half of Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, twenty-three hold more or less free elections.[6]

While free elections are necessary, they are not sufficient for democratization. In many third-wave democracies, something is missing, but what is it? The short answer is: basic institutions of the modern state. The purpose of this article is to distinguish between two very different developmental processes, the introduction of institutions of the modern state and of free democratic elections. Anxieties about new democracies are due to differing sequences in the development of first and third-wave democracies. Countries in the first wave, such as Britain and Sweden, initially became modern states, establishing the rule of law, institutions of civil society and horizontal accountability to aristocratic parliaments. Democratization followed in Britain as the government became

[3] See 'Documents on Democracy', *Journal of Democracy*, 10 (1999), 177–81, p. 178, italics in the original. Cf. Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971).

[4] Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, 'Toward Consolidated Democracies', *Journal of Democracy*, 7 (1996), 14–33, p. 30.

[5] Freedom House, *Freedom in the World: 1997–98* (New York: Freedom House, 1998), pp. 3ff. Consistent with Dahl's concerns about the imperfections of democratic systems, Freedom House places only twenty-six of 191 countries at the highest point in its seven-point scale.

[6] Transparency International. 'Transparency International Ranks 85 Countries in Largest Ever Corruption Perception Index' (Berlin: Transparency International press release, 22 September 1998), p. 3

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accountable to MPs elected by a franchise that gradually broadened until universal suffrage was achieved. By contrast, third-wave democracies have started democratization backwards, introducing free elections *before* establishing such basic institutions as the rule of law and civil society – and they have yet to complete the process of becoming both modern and democratic states.[7]

The political upheavals of the twentieth-century demonstrate that regime change is not a teleological process; hence, there is no certainty that incomplete democracies will become complete. The completion of democratization and repudiation are not the only alternatives: it is possible for a new democracy to persist indefinitely as a 'broken-back' democracy, with free elections but deficient in the rule of law, civil society and/or accountability.

SEQUENCES OF DEMOCRATIZATION

A democracy is a compound of institutions of a modern state and institutions of mass participation and representation. The creation of a stable or established democracy is thus the resultant of two separate processes, modernization of the state and democratization of participation in governing the state. The sequence in which countries develop a modern state and introduce democratic elections has differed radically between waves of democratization.

Weber characterizes the modern state as based on the rule of law and multiple institutions of civil society. It is above all a *Rechtsstaat*, relying on the *rule of law* rather than rule by arbitrary decisions of a ruler or his agents. Laws are necessary to control bureaucrats implementing decisions of governors, and to introduce predictability and thus rationality in the administration of government. Laws also constrain governors, however rulers are chosen. Secondly, society in a modern state is more than an extension of the ruler's household; there are institutions of civil society independent of the state, such as universities, churches, business associations, trade unions and media, and each is free to advocate their interests. Thirdly, to some extent there is a form of horizontal accountability of governors to elites, who can present their views through traditional channels, or even through an assembly of estates or individuals elected on an undemocratic franchise. Democracy is not a necessary attribute of the modern state, as is shown by the absolutist character of the initial modern states, monarchical France and Prussia. Nor was democracy included in Weber's ideal-type paradigm of a modern state.[8]

According to the minimalist definition identified with Joseph Schumpeter,

[7] For reviews of new democracies, see Richard Rose, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies* (Oxford: Polity Press, and Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy', *Journal of Democracy*, 5 (1994), 55–69; and Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[8] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1947); Ira J. Cohen, 'The Underemphasis on Democracy in Marx and Weber', in R. J. Antonio and R. M. Glassman, eds, *A Weber–Marx Dialogue* (Manhattanville: Kansas State University Press, 1985), 274–95.

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democracy is a political system in which free elections with universal suffrage create vertical accountability, as governors depend on the votes of the mass of population rather than being horizontally accountable to an undemocratic assembly of notables. By taking Britain from the time of Disraeli and Gladstone as his paradigm example, Schumpeter took for granted the existence of a modern state.[9] By making free elections the essence of democracy, Schumpeter ignored the widespread existence of unfree and unfair elections, and such ambiguous categories as muddled or managed elections. Long before the third wave of democratization, there were 'far from free' elections in dozens of developing countries that lacked all the attributes of a Weberian modern state. The third wave of democratization reflects the spread of competitive elections in developing countries, whether or not they have fully institutionalized the modern state.[10] While the third wave has increased by 77 per cent the number of countries holding competitive elections, the number of countries recognizing political and civil liberties has increased by only 40 per cent.[11]

A minimalist definition of democracy is vulnerable to what Terry Lynn Karl has called the 'fallacy of electoralism', that is, 'privileging elections over all other dimensions of democracy'.[12] In his definition of polyarchy, the closest approximation of the ideal democracy, Robert Dahl adds to Schumpeter's minimalist electoralist definition a multiplicity of institutional attributes and procedures, such as recognition of individual civil liberties and freedom to organize political parties and pressure groups. Dahl's definition presupposes the existence of a modern state, for in the absence of a *Rechtsstaat* there can be no guarantee of individual rights, freedom of association or that votes are counted fairly.[13] Each attribute is then given a more or less reliable and valid numerical rating; and they are then combined into a single one-dimensional quantitative scale ranking regimes as more or less democratic or simply as democratic or undemocratic regimes.[14] No attempt is made to characterize, let alone

[9] Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 4th edn (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1952), p. 269.

[10] Guy Hermet, Richard Rose and Alain Rouquié, eds, *Elections without Choice* (London: Macmillan, 1978); Jorgen Elklit and Palle Svensson, 'What Makes Elections Free and Fair?', *Journal of Democracy*, 8 (1997), 32–46.

[11] Freedom House, *Freedom in the World: 1997–1998*, p. 5.

[12] Terry Lynn Karl, 'Electoralism', in Richard Rose, ed., *The International Encyclopedia of Elections* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000), pp. 95–6.

[13] Likewise, S. M. Lipset's emphasis in *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1960) on a high level of economic development as a prerequisite for democracy presupposes the existence of institutions of a modern state. But there are good theoretical and empirical grounds for arguing that causation can also run in the opposite direction, that the legal rights of a modern *Rechtsstaat* and freedom of association in civil society have a positive influence on economic development. See, for example, Amartya Sen, 'Democracy as a Universal Value', *Journal of Democracy*, 10 (1999), 3–17, and Surjit S. Bhalla, 'Freedom and Economic Growth: A Virtuous Circle?' in Axel Hadenius, ed., *Democracy's Victory and Crisis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 195–241.

[14] Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998), especially Appendix C, 'On Counting Democratic Countries', pp. 196–9.

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differentiate, undemocratic regimes; 'dictatorship is simply a residual category, perhaps better denominated as "not democracy" '.[15]

The conjunction of the modern state and democracy is contingent: a state that is both modern and democratic is only one of four logical possibilities.[16] In addition to modern democracies and undemocratic non-modern states the twentieth century has seen the rise of Nazi totalitarianism in a modern state, Germany, and democracy being sustained in India, a country that is conventionally described as not modern, a characterization on economic rather than political criteria. Politically, India started modernizing in the nineteenth century. The rule of law was institutionalized through an elaborate court system and institutions of civil society acted as pressure groups on British rulers generations before India became independent and held its first free election. Indeed, some of the measures that turned Britain into a modern constitutional bureaucracy, such as a civil service recruited by meritocratic examination, were first introduced in India by such early Victorian reformers as Macaulay, Northcote and Trevelyan.[17]

In the first wave of democratization, the modern state came before countries sanctioned competitive elections with universal suffrage. In England, the rule of law was established in the seventeenth century and the Crown became accountable to Parliament. Independent institutions of civil society, both economic and political, emerged in the late eighteenth century. From 1832 onwards Acts of Parliament progressively broadened the franchise until universal suffrage was secured in 1918, and accountability of the government solely to the House of Commons was resolved by confrontation with the House of Lords at the beginning of the twentieth century. The sequence of democratization was similar in Scandinavia, the Low Countries and in the Old British Dominions.[18] The American Constitution institutionalized the rule of law and institutions of civil society in the eighteenth century; however, the achievement of universal suffrage was not complete until the 1965 Voting Rights Act. In retrospect, the creation of a modern state appears as the embryonic stage in the generation of the first wave of democracies.

Second-wave democracies are characterized by the breakdown of the initial attempt at introducing free elections, and subsequent success in the second

[15] Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, 'What Makes Democracies Endure', *Journal of Democracy*, 7 (1996) 39–55.

[16] Historically, the great majority of states have been neither modern nor democratic. The modern state enters three-quarters of the way through S. E. Finer's account of *The History of Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), vol. 3, pp. 1261ff.

[17] See the various references to India in Henry Parris, *Constitutional Bureaucracy: The Development of British Central Administration since the Eighteenth Century* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969).

[18] See, for example, Dankwarts A. Rustow, *The Politics of Compromise: A Study of Parties and Cabinet Government in Sweden* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955); Hans Daalder, 'Paths Toward State Formation in Europe', in H. E. Chehabi and Alfred Stepan, eds, *Politics, Society and Democracy: Comparative Studies in Honor of Juan J. Linz* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press 1995), pp. 113–30.

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round. Germany and Austria are paradigms for positive success. While both were modern states by the First World War, the introduction of universal suffrage in 1919 was followed by the breakdown of democracy.[19] The Nazi attempt at 'de-democratization' collapsed in military defeat in 1945. The re-introduction of democracy did not require the simultaneous creation of a modern state; what was needed was 'de-nazification', getting rid of the legacy of the undemocratic past and institutionalizing bulwarks against another breakdown. In Germany the adoption of a Basic Law was carried out by politicians socialized in the democratic Weimar Republic or before, and in Austria the Second Republic reinstated the country's 1920 Constitution. Major parties traced their foundation to 1871 (the German Social Democratic Party) or 1889 (the Austrian Socialist Party). Democratization in Spain makes the same point. Although the development of the modern state in Spain occurred more slowly, the Franco dictatorship was not totalitarian, thus allowing institutions of civil society to develop within stipulated limits. In the decade before his death Franco actively 'de-personalized' his dictatorship and created the framework for a constitutional monarchy, which became the instrument for democratization after his death in 1975.

However, some second-wave democracies show persisting difficulties. After the Second World War, Italy and Greece introduced new democratic regimes before institutions of a modern state were securely in place. Greece subsequently had a military coup, and Italian democracy has been challenged from both left and right. Both countries meet the Schumpeterian criterion of giving the electorate the power to 'throw the rascals' out – but their governments have had many rascals. On the ten-point Corruption Index of Transparency International, Greece has a rating of 4.9 and Italy 4.6, a worse position than that of a number of countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe.

Third-wave democracies have begun democratization backwards. Free elections and accountability of the government to the electorate have been introduced before the institutions of a modern state are fully secured. The governors of these new democracies thus face a double challenge: completing the construction of a modern state while competing with their critics in free elections. The extent of the challenge is greater when a new democracy follows a totalitarian rather than an authoritarian regime.[20] While an authoritarian regime excludes the mass of the population from political participation, they may be satisfied with passive compliance with what the regime dictates, and it may allow some scope for select institutions of civil society and the rule of law. By contrast, in Communist countries the totalitarian vocation of the old regime led it to attempt to coerce the population to achieve ideological goals, as in Stalin's Russia or Mao's China, and rooted out or distorted institutions of the modern state. The loss of power of the apparatchiks who commanded the

[19] See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

[20] Linz, 'Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes', in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds, *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 3 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 175–411.

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Communist non-market economy adds a third challenge, introducing the institutions of a modern market economy.[21]

While there is only one way in which a regime can be a complete democracy or completely undemocratic, logically, there are many ways in which a new regime can be an incomplete democracy or incompletely undemocratic.[22] To demonstrate this, we examine three new democracies – the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic – that have differed in the sequencing of the development of a modern state and of democratization. For this reason, we should expect them to differ too in the extent to which they are moving beyond electoralism to become complete democracies.

Russia is an extreme example of democratization backwards, for it introduced free elections without having a modern state. Tsarist Russia was not a modern state, and the Soviet Union's Leninist regime was developed into a totalitarian state by Stalin. This destroyed institutions of civil society and undermined the rule of law, while one-party elections made accountability a farce. Brezhnev-style 'liberalization' relaxed pressures from the party-state rather than introducing a modern state. The government remained accountable to the party rather than the electorate. When free elections were introduced in 1993, the prior absence of any party but the monopolistic Communist Party of the Soviet Union meant the creation of 'democracy from scratch'.[23] Given the legacy of a Soviet 'anti-modern' state,[24] we would expect the Russian Federation today to be a long way from a complete democracy, because of critical weaknesses in attributes of a modern state. For Russia, it is optimistic to describe the post-Communist challenge as 'Rebuilding the Ship at Sea'.[25] A much more accurate description would be 'Building the Ship of State at Sea'.

The Republic of Korea is an example of an alternative starting point for third-wave democratization, a modern state with authoritarian but not totalitarian political institutions. The significance of Linz's distinction between these two forms of undemocratic rule is made clear by comparing it with the People's Democratic Republic of North Korea. Even under the Republic of

[21] The opening of Janos Kornai's classic, *The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), has chapters about power and ideology and bureaucratic control before chapters about money and investment and wages.

[22] Dichotomizing the four characteristics of a democratic modern state – the rule of law, civil society, free elections and accountability – yields sixteen logical categories, including fourteen intermediate categories. However, because of interdependencies, new democracies are not evenly distributed in all of these intermediate categories and some, for example, those in which free and fair elections are missing, are not democratizing.

[23] See M. Steven Fish, *Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). On the move from unfree to free elections, see Stephen White, Richard Rose and Ian McAllister, *How Russia Votes* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1997).

[24] Richard Rose, 'Living in an Antimodern Society', *East European Constitutional Review* (1999), 68–75.

[25] The sub-title of a book by Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, *Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

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Korea's military dictatorship, trade unions and student organizations could articulate demands. Moreover, economic development depended on the resources of a strong state, and the pressures of export-led growth led *chaebols* (business conglomerates) to be sensitive to global markets as well as local political pressures.[26] Until the mid-1980s, the Republic of Korea was a 'model developmental dictatorship run by a strong military government', characteristics similar to those of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America.[27] Since then it has introduced democratic institutions. In 1992 a civilian was elected president in a free election and in 1997 Kim Dae Jung, a prominent opposition politician, was elected, showing Korea had an accountable electoral democracy. Freedom House now classifies the Republic of Korea as just as free as Chile or Greece. The main democratic shortfall is in the rule of law. The National Security Law is enforced against critics of the government, and close links between banks, *chaebols* and government have led to bribery and corruption involving the family of presidents.[28] Because of a legacy of institutions of civil society and sufficient rule of law to secure property rights, we would expect the Republic of Korea today to be more advanced towards the completion of democracy than Russia.

Czech history combines elements from all three waves of democratization. When an independent Czechoslovakia was established in 1918 it inherited the institutions of a modern state, established by the Habsburgs. Between the two world wars Czechoslovakia was the only regime in Central and Eastern Europe that maintained a democracy. It then fell victim to a brutal Nazi occupation and, after three years of democratic governance, for four decades from 1948 Czechoslovakia was under a heavy-handed Communist rule that purged politicians and sought to suppress institutions of civil society. It also turned the heavily industrialized Czech economy into a non-market command economy. Czechs who opposed the Communist regime could only exercise 'the power of the powerless', hypocritical subservience, duplicity and evasion.[29] Shortly after

[26] Cf. Hagen Koo, ed., *State and Society in Contemporary Korea* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Sun Hyuk Kim, 'Civil Society in South Korea', *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, 15 (1996), 81–97.

[27] Cf. Robin Luckham, 'Crafting Democratic Control over the Military: A Comparative Analysis of South Korea, Chile and Ghana', *Democratization*, 3 (1996), 215–45; Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1979), and contributions by Koreans and non-Koreans to Chung-in Moon and Jongryn Mo, eds, *Democratization and Globalization in Korea: Assessments and Prospects* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999).

[28] Cf. Alice Amsden, *Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); En Mee Kim, *Big Business, Strong State: Collusion and Conflict in South Korean Development, 1960–1990* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997).

[29] Cf. Vaclav Havel *et al.*, *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central Eastern Europe* (London: Hutchinson, 1985); Victor Mamatey and Radomir Luza, eds, *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1919–1948* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973); and David M. Olson, 'Democratization and Political Participation: The Experience of the Czech Republic', in K. Dawisha and B. Parrott, eds, *The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 150–96.

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democracy was re-introduced following the collapse of Communism, the failure of elected Czech and Slovak leaders to reach agreement on the relationship of the two parts of the country led Czechoslovakia to break up into two independent states at the end of 1992. A path-dependence approach to Czech democratization is ambiguous. If events in the past half century are regarded as most important, then the Czech Republic would be expected to have many of the shortcomings of the Russian Federation, and to have democratized less than the Republic of Korea. However, if earlier history is emphasized – the creation of a modern state in the late nineteenth century and of a democratic state between the two world wars – then the Czech Republic may be further advanced in democratization than either the Russian Federation or Korea.

POPULAR EVALUATIONS OF INCOMPLETE DEMOCRACIES

In evaluating democracies, political scientists use two different approaches, one emphasizing democratic institutions and the other democratic attitudes. Following Schumpeter, the institutionalization of democracy can be measured from election data about party competition or the alternation of parties in control of government; and following Dahl, many researchers have constructed measures derived from aggregate indicators of political institutions and performance. This approach characterizes countries as more or less democratic. Following Almond and Verba's pioneering *The Civic Culture*, survey researchers focus on the presence or absence in individuals of democratic attitudes. The 'democraticness' of social behaviour and attitudes is also emphasized in the congruence theory of Harry Eckstein and in the social capital work of Robert Putnam.[30]

Surveys can be used to evaluate institutions by asking respondents: 'On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in your country?' The wording of the question implies that the government is a democracy, or at least, democratizing. However, of the twenty-one post-Communist countries where this question has been asked by the European Commission's Barometer Surveys, only eleven are classified as free or democratic by Freedom House, nine as partly free and one as unfree. In Albania, hardly an exemplar of democratization, 76 per cent were reported as satisfied with democracy, while in Bulgaria only 6 per cent said they were satisfied with democracy there.[31] The correlation between each country's

[30] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963); Harry Eckstein, Frederic J. Fleron Jr, Erik P. Hoffmann and William M. Reisinger, eds, *Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia: Explorations in State–Society Relations* (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[31] Data as reported in Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis', in Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 31–56, at Table 2.10. For a fuller discussion of different survey measures of popular support for democracy, see Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives*, chap. 5.

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Freedom House score and aggregate satisfaction found in surveys is nil (0.001).[32] Even if the validity of question and answers are accepted, they fail to identify whether dissatisfaction is caused by election outcomes or processes, the lack of institutions of a modern state, or both.

Since the attributes of a modern state – the rule of law, institutions of civil society and an accountable government – are each distinctive, to ascertain the extent to which citizens see their political regime as having more or less completed democratization, a survey must investigate each of these topics as well as electoral processes. These questions have been asked in Barometer surveys that we have conducted in three different new democracies. For Korea, we use New Korea Barometer surveys, nationwide representative random samples with face-to-face interviews of 1,000 Koreans in January 1996 and 1,117 Koreans in May 1997, when deficiencies in political institutions were evident; and a sample of 1,010 Koreans in October 1998, a year after the Asian economic crisis.[33] The seventh New Russia Barometer is a nationwide representative random sample of 1,908 people undertaken by VCIOM, the oldest Russian survey institute, between 5 March and 15 April 1998; the popular anxieties it found became apparent to international bankers with the collapse of the rouble in August 1998.[34] In the Czech Republic, 1,017 individuals were interviewed in a nationwide survey in February 1998 as part of the fifth New Democracies Barometer (NDB) survey of the Paul Lazarsfeld Society, Vienna.[35] Collectively, the surveys are referred to as our Barometer surveys.

Comparisons between popular evaluations in established democracies and new democracies are at best problematic and in some cases impossible. The absence of regime change in established democracies makes it meaningless to ask for comparisons between the old, undemocratic regime and the new regime, an issue of basic importance in new democracies (for an example, see below Table 1). Even if the same verbal formulation can be used, differences in context produce differences in meaning and interpretation. Arguably, citizens in new democracies may be more appreciative of inadequate new institutions, viewing them as the 'lesser evil' to an undemocratic predecessor than citizens in established democracies, who may express dissatisfaction because they compare their regime with a Dahlian ideal. This would explain the European

[32] Calculated from twelve European Union countries plus Norway, as reported by Dieter Fuchs, Giovanna Guidorossi and Palle Svensson, 'Support for the Democratic System', in Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, eds, *Citizens and the State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 323–53, at Table 11.4.

[33] Fieldwork by Korea-Gallup. For full survey details, see Doh Chull Shin and Richard Rose, *Koreans Evaluate Democracy* (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Studies in Public Policy, No. 292, 1997); and Doh Chull Shin and Richard Rose *Responding to Economic Crisis: The 1998 New Korea Barometer Survey* (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Studies in Public Policy, No. 311, 1998).

[34] For details, see Richard Rose, *Getting Things Done with Social Capital: New Russia Barometer VII* (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Studies in Public Policy, No. 303, 1998).

[35] Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, *New Democracies Barometer V: A 12-Nation Survey* (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Studies in Public Policy, No. 306, 1998).

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Commission's Eurobarometer report that 76 per cent of Albanians are satisfied with their democracy and 56 per cent of Romanians, as against 55 per cent of Swedes and 46 per cent of the British.[36] Austrian scientific funding of the New Democracies Barometer has made it possible twice to sample Austrian opinion, within the aforementioned limits of comparability. Austria is particularly suited for comparison with post-Communist countries, since its historic territory included parts or the whole of many countries subsequently forced into the Soviet bloc. Moreover, Austria is a second-wave not a first-wave democracy, and between 1938 and 1955 much of it was occupied by Nazi and then Soviet troops. The 1998 NDB survey interviewed a representative nationwide sample of 1,048 Austrians.[37]

Rule of Law

As emphasized in the preceding section, the rule of law is central to the creation of a modern state. In an undemocratic regime, departures from the rule of law are of two main types, depriving individuals of their liberties, often by arbitrary actions; and retail and wholesale corruption, extracting small sums of money from ordinary citizens and large sums for allocating public property and resources, especially in dealings with rich foreign corporations and governments.

In a new democracy, repression should be exceptional, for the voiding of an undemocratic regime is usually accompanied by a 'deconstruction' of repressive laws and institutions of the old regime in order to advance what Isaiah Berlin has aptly termed freedom from the state.[38] Unlike economic promises, making public officials avoid arbitrary and repressive actions is not expensive in money terms – but it does mean the surrender of arbitrary powers.

When people are asked whether they feel freer today than under their previous regime, in all three countries a big majority consistently report a sense of greater freedom from the state. In the Czech Republic an average of 81 per cent feel freer; in Russia, 73 per cent; and in Korea, 70 per cent (Table 1). The higher proportion of Koreans reporting no change in freedom may reflect the lower level of repression in a Korean state that was undemocratic but not totalitarian. In all three countries, hardly anyone considers themselves less free in their new regime than in an undemocratic regime.

In new democracies, corruption is a more pervasive threat to the rule of law than is political repression.[39] Corrupt practices are carried over from the old regime and there are new opportunities for corruption as new governors gain the power to re-allocate the assets of the old regime. In post-Communist countries privatization has tended to favour those with insider knowledge and

[36] Klingemann, 'Mapping Political Support in the 1990s', Table 2.10.

[37] For systematic comparisons of Austria with post-Communist country data, see Rose and Haerpfer, *New Democracies Barometer V*, chap. 5.

[38] Isaiah Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958).

[39] See Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, pp. 90ff.

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TABLE 1 *Percentage Reporting Gains in Freedom from State with Democratization*

	Korea	Czech Rep.	Russia
Freedom to say what you think	82	80	74
Join any organization you want	73	88	74
Travel, live where you want	71	91	n.a.
No fear of unlawful unrest	69	62	n.a.
Decide whether or not to participate in politics	68	79	66
Decide for yourself about religion	56	87	80
Average across six activities:			
Better	70	81	73
Same	28	15	21
Worse	2	4	6

Note: Comparison of conditions today with previous regime: Korea, under Chun Doo Hwan; Czech Republic, under the Communists; Russia, before perestroika;
Sources: New Korea Barometer, 1996, 1,000 respondents; New Democracies Barometer V, 1998, 1,017 respondents); New Russia Barometer VII, 1998, 1,908 respondents.

members or friends of the old *nomenklatura*. Scholarly works about Russia ask: 'Is Moscow the next Palermo?'[40] In the Czech Republic, corruption scandals involving major investment funds close to government forced Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus from office in 1997. In Korea, the state's promotion of economic development after as well as before democratization has led to corruption reaching up to the presidency itself.

Our Barometer surveys show widespread awareness of elite corruption – and a tendency to see it as worsening with democratization. In Russia, 74 per cent think corruption among public officials in national government is worse than under Communism, and in the Czech Republic 69 per cent. In the Russian Federation, only 4 per cent think that corruption has fallen since democratization and in the Czech Republic, only 6 per cent hold this view. In the 1997 Korean survey, when President Kim Young Sam's family was on public trial for corruption, 85 per cent described corruption as high or very high, but in the 1998 survey, undertaken after an opposition leader, Kim Dae Jung, was elected president, only 26 per cent described corruption as high. The ten-point Transparency International corruption index, which emphasizes elite corruption, shows big cross-national differences: it places Austria at 7.5, compared to the Czech Republic at 4.8, Korea at 4.2 and Russia at 2.4.

[40] Stefan Hedlund and Niclas Surdström, 'Does Palermo Represent the Future for Moscow?' *Journal of Public Policy*, 16 (1996), 113–55; Jeffrey D. Sachs and Katharina Pistor, *The Rule of Law and Economic Reform in Russia* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997).

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For the great mass of the population, corruption at the top is remote while corruption in the delivery of local services is immediate, and the extortion of bribes or presents by local officials can create widespread popular resentment.[41] Our Barometer surveys ask people whether they expect to be treated fairly in the allocation of everyday services. In the Czech Republic, at least five-sixths expect to be treated fairly by the doctor, bank, local shops, post office and police. The weakness of the rule of law in Russia and Korea is shown by less than half expecting fair treatment from the police, and at least two in five not expecting fair treatment at municipal offices. In Korea there are big differences in fair treatment between local shops (92 per cent) and police (45 per cent). In Russia, the biggest difference is between the doctor's office (83 per cent expecting fair treatment) and banks (24 per cent).

Confronted with public services that do not operate in a modern, that is, impersonal, rule-bound, bureaucratic fashion, citizens have a wide choice of alternative strategies. They can push hard within the rules to get their entitlements, turn to the market in so far as this is feasible, use connections, pay bribes to compensate for bureaucratic inadequacies, or passively resign themselves to accept whatever officials decide. If the mass public expects governors to stick to the rules and does so itself, this creates popular pressure for governors to abide by the rule of law or be punished electorally. But in so far as people assume bribes and connections are necessary to get things done, the rule of law is undermined throughout society. To determine the standard procedures that people expect to use, the Barometer surveys ask what people would advise a friend to do to correct for bureaucratic shortcomings.[42]

Most people in regimes where laws are not administered by Weber's ideal-type 'vending machine' bureaucracy expect to make extra efforts to secure what they want. However, there are substantial differences between countries in what people do (Table 2). In the event of bureaucratic failure, Koreans and Czechs are inclined either to turn to the market (for example, buying a house if they cannot get subsidized housing, paying a tutor to improve a young person's examination marks or a doctor for private treatment) or push hard to make bureaucrats do what they are supposed to do. Russians, however, are more likely to pay a bribe or use connections to get a government permit or hospital treatment, a university place for their offspring, or subsidized housing. While almost half of Czechs or Koreans would write a letter to head office to rectify a delay in issuing a government permit, Russians are more likely to turn to connections or bribes.

[41] T. Wing Lo, *Corruption and Politics in Hong Kong and China* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993); Tianjian Shi, *Political Participation in Beijing* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).

[42] For a detailed discussion of strategies in a Russian context, see Richard Rose, 'Getting Things Done in an Anti-Modern Society: Social Capital Networks in Russia', in Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin, eds, *Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1999), pp. 147–71.

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TABLE 2 *Strategies in Response to Problems with Public Services*

	Strategy			
	Corruption	Bureauc'c	Market	Passive
1. *Getting into university without good enough grades*				
Russia	38	n.a.	36	26
Czech Republic	12	n.a.	71	17
Korea	5	n.a.	37	57
2. *Getting a better flat when not entitled to publicly subsidized housing*				
Russia	44	n.a.	30	27
Czech Republic	14	23	48	15
Korea	22	n.a.	64	15
3. *Action if an official delays issuing a government permit*				
Russia	62	18	n.a.	20
Czech Republic	35	46	n.a.	19
Korea	21	45	n.a.	34
4. *Getting treatment for a painful disease when hospital says one must wait for months*				
Russia	57	13	11	19
Czech Republic	24	31	31	14
Korea	(not applicable; no public health service)			

Note: Corruption: offer bribe, use connections, make up a story; Bureaucratic: write a letter of complaint, push officials to act; Market: buy what you want legally, education, pay a tutor; Passive: nothing can be done.
Sources: New Korea Barometer 1997 (*N*, 1, 117); New Democracies Barometer V 1998 (*N*, 1,017); New Russia Barometer VII 1998 (*N*, 1,908).

Civil Society

A civil society requires trusted political institutions as well as interpersonal trust. However, Communist regimes took over all major institutions of society in an effort to control organized opinion and mobilize support for the party-state. In reaction, people turned to informal networks of friends and family, creating an 'hour-glass' society in which individuals insulated themselves from distrusted formal organizations. Distrust of large institutions made the Czech Civic Forum movement a protest group rather than a political party. In Vaclav Havel's words, 'Parties are for the party (that is, Communists); Civic Forum is for all'.[43] By contrast, the undemocratic rulers of the Republic of Korea did not emulate the totalitarian practices of North Korea. Institutions of civil society could and did organize independently of the state. The legacies of previous regimes are reflected in organizational memberships today. In Korea our Barometer surveys found 75 per cent reporting they were members of some kind of voluntary association, whereas in Russia only 10 per cent reported membership in a sports,

[43] Quoted in David M. Olson, 'Political Parties and Party Systems in Regime Transformation', *American Review of Politics*, 13 (1993), 619–58, p. 642.

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TABLE 3 *Trust in Representative Institutions Low*

	Percentage trusting			
	Austria	Korea	Czech Rep.	Russia
Parliament	31	23	16	13
Political parties	17	21	15	7
Most people you know	77	77	55	34

Sources: As in Table 2. Czech, Russian and Austrian replies are coded as trusting if institutions are rated 5,6 or 7 on a seven-point scale ranging from no trust (1) to great trust (7). Koreans are coded as trusting if replying that they definitely or somewhat trust an institution.

recreation, musical, artistic, political, neighbourhood or charitable organization.[44]

Distrust of representative institutions of civil society is widespread; a majority of citizens in Austria as well as in the three new democracies distrust both parliament and political parties; the only difference is in the degree to which representative institutions are distrusted (Table 3). Less than one in eight Russians trusts parliament or political parties; among Czechs the level of trust is only a few percentage points higher, and in Korea, parliament and parties are trusted by less than a quarter of the population. In Austria, the level of trust is relatively higher for parliament (31 per cent) but lower for political parties (17 per cent), a harbinger of the protest vote that gave the populist and demagogic Freedom Party the second-largest proportion of votes at the 1999 Austrian election. When asked about other institutions of society, in all three new democracies a majority expresses distrust of each major political institution; in Austria the only exceptions in a list of fourteen institutions are the police (trusted by 54 per cent) and the courts (53 per cent). On a seven-point scale, the median respondent in our Barometer surveys is not actively distrustful, but at the mid-point, a position best characterized as sceptical.[45]

People socialized into an undemocratic political regime have good reason to distrust the institutions of a repressive state. In self-defence against pressures from large organizations, they can put their trust in face-to-face relations with other people whom they know, and in fact this tends to occur. More than

[44] For more details, see Doh C. Shin, *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chap. 4; and Rose, *Getting Things Done with Social Capital*, pp. 56ff.

[45] See William Mishler and Richard Rose, 'Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies', *Journal of Politics*, 59 (1997), 418–51. Because the World Values Survey asks about confidence in institutions rather than trust, and evaluation is on a four-point scale without a neutral mid-point, it is not comparable with figures discussed here. See Ronald Inglehart, Miguel Basanez and Alejandro Moreno, *Human Values and Beliefs: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), variable 279.

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three-quarters of Austrians and Koreans trust most people whom they know. In the Czech Republic, 55 per cent trust most people they know, while in Russia the proportion falls to barely a third, perhaps a reflection of youthful exposure to Soviet indoctrination in the 'virtues' of reporting to the security services politically incorrect statements made by family and friends. More detailed statistical analysis shows that individual trust in other people does *not* spill over into trust in political institutions.[46]

Free Elections

While free elections are necessary for a democracy, they are also divisive, as parties compete by criticizing each other. Arguably, socialization into a collectivist culture, whether Communist or Asian, could make people dislike the divisive and sometimes rancorous debate that accompanies free elections. In fact, competitive elections have strong popular endorsement. When NRB VI asked Russians in January 1996 whether the presidential election planned for June should be held or postponed, an option reportedly canvassed by President Yeltsin's entourage, only 6 per cent favoured postponement, 73 per cent endorsed elections and the remainder were 'Don't knows'. In the Czech Republic, the 1998 New Democracies Barometer found that 92 per cent endorsed the idea of a political system offering people a choice of parties to support. When Koreans were asked about elections offering a choice of candidates and parties for government, 79 per cent were positive.

Distrust of the practice of parliament and political parties does not mean that people want to abandon the chief institution that does what cannot be done in an undemocratic regime, freely and publicly criticize the government of the day. When our Barometer surveys ask citizens whether or not they would like to see the closure of parliament and the abolition of political parties, events that have happened in the not so distant national past, big majorities rally to the defence of these institutions – if only as the lesser evil compared to a one-party state or a dictator. In Austria, 89 per cent oppose the suspension of parliament and parties, in Korea 81 per cent, in the Czech Republic 79 per cent, and in Russia 62 per cent.

Accountability

The separation of powers creates a mechanism for horizontal accountability, as parliament and the courts can impose checks on the executive. In Korea this has been demonstrated by the courts convicting leading politicians on corruption charges, and the introduction of separately timed elections of the president and parliament, so that 'cohabitation' is necessary. The Czech Republic has

[46] See William Mishler and Richard Rose, 'What Are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies', *Comparative Political Studies* (forthcoming, 2001), and Kenneth Newton, 'Social and Political Trust in Established Democracies', in Norris, *Critical Citizens*, pp. 169–87.

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recognized the independence of the judiciary, and in the 1997 government crisis a split in the governing party checked an arrogant prime minister, and corruption was exposed. In Russia, however, the Constitution was written to President Yeltsin's order and gives the executive great autonomy from the Duma.

When things go wrong politically, the doctrine of accountability states that government should be held to blame, and this view is widely held in new democracies. When Koreans are asked who is to blame for the country's political problems, 95 per cent name the president, and 94 per cent the *chaebols* paying big bribes to high-level politicians; no other group is named with such frequency. Similarly, the New Russia Barometer finds a big majority blame those constitutionally responsible for the country's problems; immediately after the 1996 presidential election three-quarters or more blamed President Yeltsin, the government, or the apparatus around Yeltsin.

Casting blame is not enough; citizens should also be able to influence those whom they blame. But citizens are sceptical about the extent to which their new democracy is more responsive to their wishes than an undemocratic regime. When asked to compare the influence of people like themselves on government today as against former times, the median category say their influence is much the same (see Table 4). The second-largest group in Korea and the Czech Republic say their influence on government has increased. However, the largest group of Russians, 46 per cent, actually see ordinary people as having less influence on government than in the Soviet Union. While many citizens in established democracies may complain that government ignores their wishes, this is not so strong an indication of alienation from government as holding the view that today's new democracy offers ordinary people no more influence than a military dictatorship or a Communist one-party state.

In the eyes of citizens, the Republic of Korea, the Czech Republic and the Russian Federation have some attributes of democracy but not all. The deficit is not so much in the minimal institutions of democracy: free, competitive elections are popularly endorsed and held in all three societies, and there is also a widespread consensus that people now have greater freedom from the state. Incompleteness is in the institutions of the modern state. Institutions of civil

TABLE 4 *Influence of Ordinary People on Government*

	Korea %	Czech Rep. %	Russia %
More influence now	41	33	9
The same	52	42	45
Less influence now	9	25	46

Sources: New Korea Barometer, 1996, 1,000 respondents; New Democracies Barometer V, 1998, 1,017 respondents); New Russia Barometer VII, 1998, 1,908 respondents.

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society, including parties and parliament, are everywhere regarded with distrust, and elected officials are blamed for major shortcomings of public policy.

In the opinion of Koreans, Czechs and Russians, there is a positive consensus that their new regime meets basic requirements for a minimalist, electoral democracy. People feel much freer than before to say what they think and do what they like, a necessary precondition for competitive elections. There is also near unanimity in favour of free elections and allowing parties to compete and parliament to criticize the government. Voters are also ready to vote the governing party out of office. But democratization cannot be complete, in so far as the new regime still lacks the basic requisites of a modern state. There is a negative consensus that their new regime does not respect the rule of law, as it is seen as more corrupt than its predecessor. Trust is low, and a majority do not think their new system more accountable to ordinary people than the old regime.

In a fundamental sense, popular evaluations of a new democracy cannot be compared with established democracies, because the latter has not had a regime change. The great majority of Austrian adults were born after the fall of the Nazi Reich in 1945, and the median citizen was born after 1955, the year in which Soviet occupation troops left Lower Austria and Vienna. Thus, most Austrians can take their freedom for granted, whereas in new democracies freedom from the state is a new experience. The rule of law was interrupted far less by seven years of Nazism than by four decades or more of Communism. The Transparency International corruption score for Austria places it in the top fifth, with a rating as high as the United States, whereas the Czech Republic and Korea are just within the top half for integrity, and Russia is among the ten most corrupt countries in the ranking of eighty-five nations. Like citizens in many democracies old and new, Austrians do show a high level of distrust of parties and parliament. In effect, Austrians see the Second Republic, established in the second wave of democratization after 1945, as a modern, bureaucratic state governing by the rule of law. But like citizens of many other established democracies, Austrians can be critical of the extent to which their polyarchy falls short of an ideal democracy, and some register a populist protest by voting for Jörg Haider's Freedom party.[47]

ALTERNATIVE PATHS OF INCOMPLETE DEMOCRACIES

Logically, an incomplete democracy can follow one of three different paths: completion, repudiation or the indefinite persistence of incomplete democracy. If a third-wave democracy is to develop into a *complete* democracy, it must do more than hold free and fair elections; it must also become a modern state. Here, state-building does not refer to creating a common national identity among the

[47] See Richard Rose, 'The End of Consensus in Austria and Switzerland', *Journal of Democracy*, 10 (2000), 26–40.

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populace, but to the development of institutions and procedures that effectively enforce the rule of law against corrupt public officials, promote popular trust by increasing the trustworthiness of political institutions and increase the accountability of government to ordinary people.

An *incomplete* democracy can reflect deficiencies of supply and demand. On the supply side, governors have shown major shortcomings – corruption, untrustworthiness and unresponsiveness to ordinary people. On the demand side, Koreans clearly see the solution to supply-side difficulties as completing democracy rather than turning to an undemocratic regime. Whereas in 1997 Koreans gave the Kim Young Sam government a mean rating of 6.2 on a ten-point scale ranging from complete dictatorship (1) to complete democracy (10), when asked how much democratization was desired, the average respondent scored 8.4.[48] Czechs are also confident that shortcomings of their new government can be overcome. When asked to evaluate the current regime, 57 per cent give a positive response, while 73 per cent are positive about the regime five years in future. Russians are less optimistic about completing democracy. In the 1998 survey only 36 per cent were positive about the current regime, and just under half, 49 per cent, were positive about a post-Yeltsin regime in five years. By contrast, in Austria there is a higher level of initial endorsement of the current political system (67 per cent positive) and little change in expectations of the future (66 per cent positive)

The *repudiation* of an incomplete democracy is a third alternative. Between the two world wars, this happened throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Asian countries have repudiated fewer new democracies because there have been fewer attempts at democratization in the first place. Moreover, in some Asian countries politicians explicitly justify supplying undemocratic rule on the grounds that it is more appropriate culturally and economically beneficial. Singapore is often cited as an example. However, this view was challenged within Asia even before the 1997 Asian economic crisis,[49] and systematic analysis shows no correlation between democratic or undemocratic governance and economic success.[50]

To measure support for undemocratic alternatives, our Barometer surveys ask people whether they would approve of any or all of three undemocratic alternatives: rule by the army, rule by a dictator, and, in post-Communist countries, a return to Communist rule. In all three countries, an overwhelming majority rejects the idea of military governance, including Korea, which had decades of experience of military rule (Table 5). In the Czech Republic,

[48] For a detailed analysis, see Richard Rose, Doh C. Shin and Neil Munro, 'Tension between the Democratic Ideal and Reality: Evidence from Korea', in Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens*, pp. 146–68.

[49] Cf. Lee Kwan Yew, 'Interview with Fareed Zakaria', *Foreign Affairs*, 73 (1994), 109–27; Dae Jung Kim, 'Is Culture Destiny?' *Foreign Affairs*, 73 (1994), 189–94; Francis Fukuyama, 'Asian Values and Asian Crisis', *Commentary*, 105 (1998), 23–7; David Kelly and Anthony Reid, eds, *Asian Freedoms: The Idea of Freedom in East and Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1998).

[50] John F. Helliwell, 'Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth', *British Journal of Political Science*, 24 (1994), 225–48. See also Sen, 'Democracy as a Universal Value'.

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TABLE 5 *Endorsement of Undemocratic Alternatives*

	Korea %	Czech Rep. %	Russia %
(a) The army should govern the country			
Agree	15	3	15
Disagree	85	97	85
(b) Better to get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide everything			
Agree	19	13	36
Disagree	81	87	64
(c) We should return to Communist rule			
Agree	n.a.	16	41
Disagree	n.a.	84	59

Sources: Barometer surveys as cited in Table 2. 'Agree' answers combine respondents saying definitely or somewhat agree, and those grouped as disagreeing are similarly treated.

seven-eighths reject introducing a dictator in place of parliament and in Korea three-quarters; in Russia, just under two-thirds are against this alternative. Among Czechs, only one in six endorses returning to a Communist regime, while two-fifths of Russians endorse this reactionary course.

In Russia elites have supplied a corrupt, distrusted, unaccountable and only partly free regime and there is a higher level of endorsement of undemocratic alternatives. A total of 61 per cent of Russians endorse at least one of the three undemocratic alternatives, more than double the proportion of Koreans (28 per cent) or Czechs (25 per cent). However, there is no consensus among Russians about which undemocratic alternative is preferable. The largest minority favours returning to Communist rule, but this is barely half the big majority who give a positive rating to the old regime. Since the data in Table 5 show that 59 to 85 per cent reject each of the undemocratic alternatives offered, this cautions against concluding that the collapse of the new Russian regime is inevitable.

In default of completion or repudiation, the alternative is the *persistence of an incomplete 'broken-back' democracy*. If the shortcomings of governors lead the public to scale down demands to match what political elites can supply, this creates a low-level equilibrium trap. Dissatisfied citizens may accept the Churchill claim that democracy is a 'lesser evil' compared to alternative regimes that they have experienced.[51] Cultural theories of democratization also predict that incomplete democracies will persist indefinitely because the norms of elite or mass political culture are assumed to change very slowly. The Republic of Italy is a striking example of a second-wave new democracy persisting as an

[51] For an elaboration of this argument, see Richard Rose, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies* (Oxford: Polity Press, and Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1998).

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TABLE 6 *Russian Attitudes Towards the Rule of Law*

Q. How closely do you think the national government comes to the idea of the law-governed state (pravovoye gosudarstvo)?	
Very close, to some extent	29%
Not very close, not at all	71%
Q. Some people say that laws in this country are often very hard on ordinary people.	
Agree	61%
Disagree	39%
Q. A writer once said: 'The harshness of Russian laws is softened by their non-enforcement'. Do you think this is true?	
Agree	73%
Disagree	27%

Source: New Russia Barometer VII 1998 (*N*, 1,908).

incomplete democracy for half a century, notwithstanding disregard for the rule of law as evidenced by Mafia influence, violent challenges from the right and left in the 1970s, high levels of corruption, and distrust of politicians. Popular demands in the 1990s to complete the process of democratization have transformed the Italian party system, but other consequences are still being worked out.

In Russia, there are indications of a low-level equilibrium trap, as citizens disapprove of their new regime failing to achieve the standards of a modern state – but may prefer this to the greater evil of an efficient and effective undemocratic regime. This point is illustrated by Russian ambivalence about whether or not it is desirable to enforce the rule of law (Table 6). On the one hand, most Russians do not think that the country is now governed by the law. But, on the other hand, a majority also views the laws negatively, regarding them as very hard on ordinary people. Hence, almost three-quarters of Russians regard non-enforcement of Russian laws as desirable in so far as this can soften the impact of an otherwise repressive regime. Generations of living without a modern state have taught Russians how to cope with what they have.[52]

THE PRICE OF INCOMPLETE DEMOCRATIZATION

A regime that is an incomplete democracy, with free elections but lacking essential elements of the modern state, may survive indefinitely, but only at a price. Major derogations from the rule of law and untrustworthy institutions of civil society limit the effectiveness of a broken-back democracy.

[52] See Rose, 'Getting Things Done in an Anti-Modern Society'; and Alena V. Ledeneva, *Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

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A modern state is required for the development of a modern market economy. Basic resources of a market – property, capital and contracts – are secured by the rule of law. The rule of law was among the major resources of early industrializing nations; democracy was not. Both Britain and Germany industrialized long before they could be called democratic in the modern sense. In the absence of the rule of law, then, even boom economies such as Korea can end up in a financial crisis, as happened in 1997. The Russian financial default in 1999 has had major costs, because it discourages long-term investment and foreign lending. As the president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has emphasized, 'Weak institutions are the main obstacle to economic growth'.[53]

A modern state is also required for the introduction of a welfare state. Historically, the launch of the welfare state required respect for rules of law defining the taxes that individuals should pay to become eligible for benefits, and the value of entitlements, and the same was true in Austria. Institutions of civil society, including trade unions, churches and voluntary associations, were also intimately involved in the development of the administration of the welfare state. Bismarck's Germany pioneered the development of the welfare state, which promoted social welfare as a form of 'authoritarian defense' against the threat of democratization.[54] An often ignored feature of the growth of Scandinavian welfare states is that the rule of law was institutionalized before universal suffrage, and Denmark, Finland and Sweden have the three best ratings in the Transparency International corruption index.

The World Bank's prescription for new democracies is double-edged: 'Focus the state's activities to match its capability'.[55] An incomplete democracy lacks the capacity to maintain a fair and efficient welfare state, because public institutions cannot be trusted to deliver benefits to everyone entitled to them, nor can subjects be trusted to pay the taxes required to finance social benefits. People will only look to the state for welfare and pay taxes if they believe that the state will treat them fairly and be effective in delivering services. Korea has followed Japan, another economically modern but often corrupt Asian democracy, in encouraging citizens to rely on the market for major welfare services. Of total expenditure on health care in Korea, only half is financed through the public sector, a share almost as low as in the United States. Of total education expenditure, 41 per cent is privately financed, compared to 25 per cent in the United States and 2 per cent in Sweden. In consequence, Korean government takes only 26 per cent of Gross Domestic Product in current

[53] Horst Köhler, in *Transition Report 1999* (London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1999).

[54] See Peter Flora and Jens Alber, 'Modernization, Democratization, and the Development of Welfare States in Western Europe', in P. Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, eds, *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1981), pp. 37–80.

[55] *The State in a Changing World* (Washington, DC: World Bank World Development Report, 1997), p. iii.

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revenue, compared to 32 per cent in the United States, 57 per cent in Sweden and 58 per cent in Denmark.[56]

Generous welfare programmes are neither a necessary condition for democratization, as first-wave democracies have demonstrated, nor are they a substitute for political benefits, as illustrated by the failure of Brezhnev's policy of 'welfare state authoritarianism', a social contract in which education, health, secure employment and pensions were guaranteed in return for political acquiescence. It failed.[57] The capacity of the Russian state has deteriorated since. Even before the August 1998 financial crisis, the New Russia Barometer found that 75 per cent of employees and pensioners received their wages or benefits late or not at all at some time during the year; the likelihood of not being paid is highest for public administrators and deliverers of social services.

The absence of trustworthy political parties encourages high electoral volatility. On the supply side, political elites create, merge or break up parties with great speed; if a party that an individual votes for disappears during the life of a parliament, then its voters cannot hold it accountable. If major politicians campaign without a party label, as have President Boris Yeltsin and President Vladimir Putin, or their party label is a cover for a personal following, stable party identification cannot develop. Party splits and mergers and shallow party identification in post-Communist new democracies have produced levels of volatility between successive elections that are three to five times higher than in established democracies, and far greater than that in the initial elections in second-wave democracies such as Austria.[58]

'Idiotization' (cf. the French *incivisme*) is another likely consequence of institutionalizing an incomplete democracy. Ghia Nodia, a sociologist raised in the Soviet Union, defines idiotization as the conscious rejection of the obligations of a citizen.[59] At the individual level, this is a rational reaction to a government that is unaccountable and unresponsive to demands. In post-Communist societies, previous experience of compulsory political participation encourages the de-politicization of everyday life. By contrast, in Korea the military dictatorship allowed individuals to join voluntary associations of civil society, and tolerated opposition and trade-union demonstrations, thus laying the foundations for participatory protests rather than 'idiotization'.

When people have lived most of their lives under a regime that is neither a modern state nor democratic, there are good reasons for individuals to prefer an incomplete democracy, whose infirmities assure a measure of freedom from the state, to the greater evil of a regime that effectively pursues authoritarian

[56] OECD, *OECD in Figures 1998* (Paris: Supplement to *OECD Observer*, No. 212, 1998), pp. 50, 54, 46. These data call into question Adam Przeworski's claim that democratization depends on the state providing a high level of material welfare benefits.

[57] Linda J. Cook, *The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).

[58] See Richard Rose, *What is Europe?* (Harlow: Longmans, 1996), Figure 7.2, at p. 153.

[59] 'How Different Are Postcommunist Transitions?' *Journal of Democracy*, 7 (1996), 15–29, at p. 26.

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or totalitarian goals. The strengthening of an 'electoralist' democracy in which political elites are corrupt or violate the rule of law cannot be resolved by invoking liberal democratic values. A more appropriate model for the untrusted governors of an incomplete democracy is a law-based constitution of checks and balances, which James Madison saw as a virtue of the founding constitution of the United States:

> If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.[60]

[60] Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers* (New York: The Modern Library edition, 1948), Number 51, p. 337.

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