Introduction

Facing Emotions

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WE ASKED THE CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE TO CONSIDER HOW emotions have been valued as a form of knowledge or refinement or, alternatively, rejected or associated with failed education. How and why have emotions been gendered or racialized? In what ways have emotions been understood to influence the imagination? Or conceptualized as disembodied or as excessively embodied? What are emotions' epistemological, aesthetic, political, or moral implications? Prior to these questions, however, lies a simpler but still difficult one: What are emotions? How do we understand them today?

We begin simply, then, by reviewing the etymology and some modern everyday definitions of the word *emotion*. *Emotion* comes into English through the Old French *esmovoir*, itself derived from the Latin *emovere*, meaning "to remove, displace" ("Emotion"). A moment of pointed attention to emotion is documented by figure 1, from an English translation of *Physiognomische Fragmente* (1775–78; *Essays on Physiognomy*), a system for reading character in faces and postures by Johann Kaspar Lavater, a Swiss Protestant pastor. Using images designed by the seventeenth-century French artist Charles Le Brun and the eighteenth-century German artist Daniel Chodowiecki, *Essays on Physiognomy* illustrates a range of facial expressions that demonstrate passion's movement and seeks, in turn, to move viewers. In English we often say that someone who experiences a strong emotion feels moved, because strong emotion gives a sense of being physically affected, even dislocated. Further, Merriam-Webster recalls that *emotion* in its earliest usage meant "disturbance" or "excitement" ("Emotion").[1] To be so moved, this association implies, is to shift from quiescence to animation. An emotion stirs up or agitates the person feeling it. *Le petit Robert* retains this sense of agitation in the current use of the French *émouvoir*: "Agiter (qqn)

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1. Impotent terror and anger. The noſe is weak and unimpaſſioned.

2. Contempt, horror, threats; a character harſh, inſenſible, inexorable.

3. Anger and terror in the upper part of the face: the under has almoſt all the coldneſs of indifference.

4. The wretched deſign of a face which expreſſes the terror of a mind timid and deſtitute of energy.

5. Exhauſted rage, contempt, deſpair. That face could have nothing of greatneſs, were it in a ſtate of reſt.

6. The factitious ſcorn either of an idiot, but who was not one from his birth, or of a man who affects an inſolent and contemptuous air.

7. The upper part of the face ſuppoſes experience, and activity in a good cauſe: the noſe is very ordinary. The lower part, and particularly the mouth, expreſſes the contempt of a feeble mind.

8. The look of envy and contempt; a character harſh and unrelenting; an ordinary underſtanding, to judge by the under part of the face.

9. The violent condition of an ordinary man, a prey to exceſſive pain.

10. The terror of a man whoſe character is naturally energetic, though the lower part of the profile indicate weakneſs.

11. The terror of a man who is extremely irritable, and whom repeated frights have reduced to weakneſs and imbecility.

12. The terror of a child ſavage and violent, and who has ſomething too maſculine.

13. The maſculine face of a woman obſtinate and diveſted of greatneſs: terror is putting her to flight.

14. A faint impreſſion of terror; an indolent and phlegmatic character.

15. Brutal deſire in an obſtinate and vulgar perſon.

16. Irritated and ſuffering, he is incapable of bearing up againſt the pain which torments him.

The noſes in general, and eſpecially 1. 3. 8. 11. and 14. want expreſſion, and are badly drawn.

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


FIG. 1

A plate in Lavater's *Essays on Physiognomy* (trans. Henry Hunter; vol. 2; London, 1789–98) and the adjacent key explaining the emotions depicted (72). Courtesy of the Lewis Walpole Library, Yale University.

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par une émotion plus ou moins vive" ("To agitate, disturb (someone) by a more or less strong emotion").[2] Although "someone" is in parentheses, the sense conveyed is, for example, that I can move someone to feel sympathy for me or another person and that someone or something can move me to joy or tears. I can be moved by a memory or by reading a work. Thus, to move or be moved emotionally can be interpersonal or elicited by contact with an animate being (a pet) or an inanimate object (a memory, a poem). At its root, then, *emotion* implies movement, a crossing between bodies, subjects, locations—or a failed attempt to make that crossing.

Merriam-Webster conveys a more static individual possession or state in its current definitions: "a: the affective aspect of consciousness . . . b: a state of feeling . . . c: a conscious mental reaction (as anger or fear) subjectively experienced as strong feeling usually directed toward a specific object and typically accompanied by physiological and behavioral changes in the body" ("Emotion"). In defining emotion as "the affective aspect of consciousness" and "a conscious mental reaction . . . subjectively experienced as strong feeling," the dictionary implies that we know when we are experiencing an emotion. Each of us feels our own feelings: we are the subjects of our emotions, even the owners of them.

Positing subjects who, by being conscious of their feelings, own both those feelings and themselves, the dictionary definition reflects the individual self-possession that continues to pervade much Western philosophy and in particular North American culture's reliance on the possessive individual (MacPherson). Accordingly, at least in our everyday understanding of emotion, many of us believe ourselves—or need to believe ourselves—emotionally self-aware and self-possessed. Insofar as we live and work in environments that reward individualistic endeavors (interviewing for academic jobs, writing and publishing articles under our own names, teaching "innovative" courses, doing administration), then, we might find ourselves involved in a paradox: knowing that our emotions can and do escape our consciousness and ownership but needing to think and act as if they don't.

Many essays in this issue, whether in the central section or under the rubrics Theories and Methodologies, The Changing Profession, and Correspondents at Large, explore ways in which emotions slip beyond our conscious, individualistic grasp. First, if we invoke the interpersonal potential of emotion relayed in the everyday French usage, emotion becomes something that moves between or among subjects. I may identify with someone's feelings so intensely that I cannot distinguish them from my own. I may or may not be conscious of this identification. Alternatively, one of my feelings may mask another: instead of feeling angry with a loved one who has hurt me, I might feel anxious. Indeed, Freudian psychoanalysis made it possible to conceive of emotions as repressed into the unconscious, so that we remain rationally unaware of them. Whether we *own* unconscious emotions is a theoretically difficult question—complicated by the ways in which particular feelings, such as guilt, desire, or rage, might be created by the social relations surrounding our birth and upbringing.

Second, recent studies of emotion suggest other ways in which my feelings are not my own. They may be culturally scripted: I learn to feel emotions by reading texts, by watching television programs, by being socialized through family, school, work, religious institutions, and other "ideological state apparatuses," as Louis Althusser describes them. Because correct emotions are required in certain contexts, such as work or intimate relationships, I learn to perform them, although I may not feel them. Arlie Hochschild termed such emotional performance "feeling rules."[3] Focusing more generally on the cultural scripting of emotion, Sarah Ahmed, in *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, shows

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how emotions circulate socially to affect how we (think we) feel personally. She draws on Freud to argue that we do not always know how we feel. Reading a poster from the right-wing British National Front, Ahmed demonstrates that rather than feel angry about a bad economy and a government that perpetuates it, we might displace our anger onto an immigrant group that, we are told, is taking away our jobs. The poster pits a "you," the British taxpayer, against a "them," designated as "swarms of illegal immigrants" who are looking for an easy life. Ahmed shows how the "'you' implicitly evokes a 'we,' a group of [white] subjects who can identify themselves with the injured nation in this performance of personal injury" (2). Working through Marx, Ahmed shows that while emotions circulate (through the poster's public display), they also attach themselves to individuals. They accrue value and intensity and erase "the history of their production and circulation" (11). So after seeing this poster we might feel personally injured (and feel this emotion as our own—it attaches to us intensely) by the inhuman, insect-like—even plague-like—"swarms" of immigrants, whom we hate for injuring us and by extension the British nation. And our feelings erase how we come to have them (why we respond so strongly to the message of the poster) and the history of immigration.

Other theorists argue that our emotions are not our own because they are interpersonally mobile: I feel an emotion because your feeling affects me. In *The Transmission of Affect*, Teresa Brennan argues that there is an intrinsic relation between the affects a person feels and the environment—situations and other people. Emotions move among people, but also among the social, the psychological, and the biological. She names this social process, which influences one's physiology, the "transmission of affect":

> The origin of transmitted affects is social in that these affects do not only arise within a particular person but also come from without. They come via an interaction with other people and an environment. But they have a physiological impact. . . . [T]he emotions or affects of one person, and the enhancing or depressing energies these affects entail, can enter into another. (3)[4]

Affect thus can be personal while moving in ways that extend individual subjectivity through involvement with other people and with places (7–8).

Emotional transmission may occur, for example, when an academic lucky enough to be tenured or to have a tenure-track job enters an elevator full of job candidates on their way to interviews at the MLA convention. The tension and anxiety in the elevator are palpable. Picking up on this stress, I feel my heart beating faster and perceive a sick feeling in the pit of my stomach. If I realize that I am responding to the tension and anxiety in the elevator, I may sympathize with the candidates' situation by recalling my own stressful history of job interviews. By contrast, "if I am not aware that there are affects in the air," as Brennan explains, "I may hold myself solely responsible for them and ferret around for an explanation in my personal history" (6)—such as the overdue article I have not finished or the unhappiness of my adolescent daughter. The job candidates' anxiety depletes those to whom it is communicated. Other kinds of emotions can enhance the people who receive them: "you become energized when you are with some loves or some friends" (6). As is evident here, affects and their transmission have "an energetic dimension" and "change the biochemistry and neurology of the subject" (6, 1).

In positing biochemical and neurological components of affect, Brennan's work resonates with that of neuroscientists and neuropsychologists such as Antonio Damasio. Dissenting from the time-honored Cartesian split between body and mind, Damasio argues in *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* that emotion is an integral part

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of human reason. As a neurologist, Damasio is primarily concerned with how the chemical and electrical workings of the brain relate to emotion and reason. He explains:

> There appears to be a collection of systems in the human brain consistently dedicated to the goal-oriented thinking process we call reasoning, and to the response selection we call decision making, with a special emphasis on the personal and social domain. This same collection of systems is also involved in emotion and feeling, and is partly dedicated to processing body signals. (70)

To illustrate this, he gives the example of walking home at midnight:

> Your brain has detected a threat, namely [a] person following you, and initiates several complicated chains of biochemical and neural reactions. . . . Yet you do not neatly differentiate between what goes on in your brain and what goes on in your body . . . You will be aware that you are in danger, that you are walking faster, and that—one hopes—you are finally out of danger. The "you" in this episode is of one piece: in fact, it is a very real mental construction I will call "self" . . . , and it is based on activities throughout your entire organism, that is, in the body proper and in the brain.

For Damasio, then, emotion and reason are in constant communication; they work together to define the self that "endows our experience with subjectivity." The self in question here is continually monitored by the brain and updated as the body interacts with the environment (226–27).

By calling into question Merriam-Webster's self-possessed individual who is conscious of her or his emotions, the varied theories of Ahmed, Brennan, and Damasio all testify to what Patricia Clough and Jean Halley identified as the "affective turn" in their 2007 collection by the same name. These theories and the critical practices to which they give rise tend to distinguish among emotion (as tied to a particular body or subject), feeling (the subjective response to emotion), and affect, which is often imagined as a quality that escapes emotions and feelings because it does not belong to a particular body or subject but, rather, enables a bidirectional capacity to affect and be affected (Gregg and Seigworth).

The second part of Merriam-Webster's third definition of emotion establishes the corporeal nature of feeling, for the "strong feeling" following from the "conscious mental reaction" is "typically accompanied by physiological and behavioral changes in the body." Beyond the neurobiological theories that characterize some of the most recent research and writing on emotion or affect, the embodied nature of emotion has ancient precedents. For example, in Greece in the fifth century BCE Hippocrates's theory of the humors posited an interdependency between the body and emotions. This work was so influential that Galen extended it in second-century Rome, and, as Noga Arikha indicates in her study of the humors, "[f]or over two thousand years thereafter, humoural theory explained most things about a person's character, psychology, medical history, tastes, appearance, and behavior" (xvii). Humors were understood to be liquids that circulated in the body, central to its functioning: blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile. According to the theory, the humors were produced from heat generated by digestion, processed by the liver, and further refined by traveling through the bloodstream to the heart and brain. Each person was believed to have a temperament, defined by the proportions of the humors in the body: "An excess of choler (yellow bile) in the blood produced the choleric temperament; an excess of black bile produced the melancholic; an excess of phlegm, the phlegmatic; an excess of blood, the sanguine." At the same time, humors changed depending on diet and climate. Many remedies were developed to help balance the humors—blood-

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letting counteracted an excess of blood, for instance. Most important, humoral theory assumed an interrelation between emotions and reason, physiology and psychology, individual and environment (xviii). Such an interrelation characterizes many theories of emotion both ancient (such as Aristotle's) and modern (such as Ahmed's), as well as others in between (see, e.g., Dixon; James).

However, at least as early as the seventeenth century in Western cultures, the power that emotion exerted over body and mind troubled thinkers who wanted to see the mind as superior to both body and emotion. Such concerns gave rise to various precepts and practices designed to regulate the emotions, controlling physical appetites, functions, and behaviors. This regulation has often meant that we own neither our emotions nor our corporeal control over them (through behavior). For instance, certain kinds of people (slaves, women, homosexuals, ethnic or raced others) have been understood as determined by their bodily appetites and intense emotions and thus as inferior to citizens—white, heterosexual, able-bodied men, presumed to transcend the corporeal through reason. This hierarchy has meant that each group has been differentially subject to a society's disciplinary ("civilizing") practices and that the training of bodies and emotions is based on both external pressures and internal self-monitoring.

As we have seen, the principal blind spot in Merriam-Webster's definition is its individualistic premise: we are aware of our emotions and feel them to be our own. Whatever its limits, this current, everyday definition shows that emotion is a psycho-physiological category in modern understandings. Emotions concern our mental life and its influence on our body.

Historically, this psycho-physiological category has been designated *passions*, *sentiment*, *sensibility*, and, most recently, *affect*. Yet we chose the messier term *emotions* for this issue because it is a recognizable, modern, everyday word rather than a historically or theoretically specific one. Whatever our personal experiences of emotion might be, most of us recognize that feeling emotions, whether the "right" or "wrong" ones, or not feeling them at all defines who we are and who we are perceived to be in situations. Thus, reading a series of essays that, taken together, attest to the enormous range of what emotions (whatever their name and definition) have meant in given times and places and genres gives us a new breadth of knowledge that our specializations, however capacious, cannot provide. Whether envisioning an intersubjective movement between teachers and students, between writers and readers and texts, between audience members and performers, between variously embodied persons, or between human beings and animals, a desire to cross boundaries—*to move*, in short—is evident across the essays in this issue.

To explore how emotion crosses boundaries between people, we turn briefly to two examples of our own in different genres and from different time periods. In short pieces on Marie de Rabutin, the marquise de Sévigné (1626–96), and George Brewer (1766–?), we investigate how these writers promote emotions as natural at the same time that they reveal how emotions are culturally produced. Sévigné's letters to her daughter suggest how personal writing records but also produces and manages emotions. Brewer's didactic text invokes the power of visual images to call forth embodied responses, including emulation, but also uses the narrative frames of some images to prevent the feeling of "bad" emotions.

Writing Maternal Love: The Case of Madame de Sévigné

Sévigné is renowned for the letters she wrote to her adult daughter, the comtesse de Grignan, conveying the mother's intense and unique love. When Grignan left Paris after

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the birth of her first child to join her husband, who had been appointed lieutenant governor in Provence, Sévigné was obliged to forge a language for maternal emotion because there was virtually no preexisting script for it. Indeed, the ideology of maternal love was developed in France only in the eighteenth century, when the notion of sensibility helped promote a belief in natural maternal tenderness, nurturance, and selfless devotion.[5] In fact, Sévigné anticipated the Enlightenment discourse of motherhood in representing her love for her daughter as natural, all encompassing, and the focus of her life.[6] Throughout her hundreds of letters to her daughter, written over eighteen years (1671–96), Sévigné returns again and again to the theme of loss. For her, Grignan's departure for Provence ruptured an essential mother-daughter unity. Several months after Grignan left her, Sévigné recalls the traumatic event when she prepares for a trip to tend to property in Brittany:

> Ce départ me fit souvenir du vôtre. C'est une pensée que je ne soutiens point toute entière que l'air de la veille et du jour que je vous quittai. Ce que je souffris est une chose à part dans ma vie, qui ne reçoit nulle comparaison. Ce qui s'appelle déchirer, couper, déplacer, arracher le cœur d'une pauvre créature, c'est ce qu'on me fit ce jour-là; je vous le dis sans exagération. (1: 255; letter 167)
>
> This departure reminded me of yours. That's a thought I can't entirely bear any more than the atmosphere of the eve and the day that I left you. What I suffered is a thing apart in my life that has no comparison. What was done to me that day is called ripping apart, cutting, displacing, tearing out a poor creature's heart; I tell you this without exaggeration.

Using the metaphor of dagger blows tearing the very heart from the maternal body, Sévigné conveys the extremity of her suffering at the loss of her daughter. By disavowing any rhetorical inflation of her self-depiction, Sévigné seeks to establish the authenticity of her feelings. Yet she does inflate—"exaggerate"—by accumulating four words to describe the violence done to her heart. The gap between her claim of emotional authenticity and her investment in rhetorical performance suggests that the act of writing about her maternal emotions influenced what she felt, or what she believed she felt, even perhaps, at times, creating feelings where none had existed before her writing.

At the same time, Sévigné's use of a corporeal metaphor to represent her feelings defines one aspect of her invention of a language for maternal emotion. Indeed, because she is writing to her daughter, we find in Sévigné's letters an attention on female bodies that is unique in the period. In seventeenth-century drama and novels, for instance, the body is absent; corporeal matters were deemed unsuitable for serious cultural productions. Because she was writing personal letters (even though she often circulated hers and Grignan's to friends), Sévigné was not subject to the strictures governing these other genres and could, therefore, privilege women's corporeal concerns, including portrayals of embodied emotion.

When she described Grignan's departure as tearing out the maternal heart, Sévigné knew that her daughter was pregnant with her third child. Although she insists that nothing in her life compares with the violence of Grignan's leave-taking, Sévigné evokes, nonetheless, the image of giving birth in describing herself as passively enduring the rending of her body and the displacement of her daughter-heart: the agony of labor and birth separates one body into two.

Sévigné explicitly identifies with her daughter's pregnant body five months later, when Grignan waits to give birth: "Mon dieu, ma bonne, que votre ventre me pèse! Et que vous n'êtes pas seule qu'il fait étouffer!" ("My God, my dearest, but your belly weighs me down! And you are not the only one it stifles"; 1: 366; letter 211). By claiming to be weighed

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down and stifled by her daughter's belly, Sévigné expresses her worry over Grignan's health and the imminent ordeal of giving birth. Obstetric care in seventeenth-century France was limited, and because of difficult births and the spread of germs, many women died in childbirth (including the comte de Grignan's first two wives). Moreover, in making her daughter's body her own, Sévigné dissolves emotional boundaries between mother and daughter. Repeatedly, Sévigné asserts an essential unity binding the two together.

In so doing, Sévigné shows herself to be powerfully influenced by how her culture understood mother-daughter relations. By the same token, in asserting her authentic feelings in opposition to her rhetorical inflation of them, she also attests to the ideology of feminine letter writing. The intimate letter in the seventeenth century was considered woman's domain because of her supposedly emotional nature. Women were seen to write spontaneously, unself-consciously about emotion to others, whereas men wrote self-consciously, out of reason. Theories and examples of women's letters—published in popular epistolary manuals or as individual letters—encouraged women to write, but the genre of their writing was deemed inferior to real literature. Moreover, as the published examples illustrate, women's emotionalism predisposed them to write love letters, especially letters of loss and suffering about being abandoned by a man.[7] In writing love to her absent daughter and in detailing her consequent suffering, Sévigné adapted the heterosexual premise of the love letters published in her day to portray the suffering maternal body.

In writing to her daughter, as well as to other intimates, Sévigné adhered to a culturally conservative ideology of epistolary femininity. She frequently describes her style in terms that reflect common assumptions about the spontaneity of women's writing. As she avers to Grignan, "Vous savez que je n'ai qu'un trait de plume; ainsi mes lettres sont fort négligées" ("You know that I have only one pen stroke; therefore, my letters are very careless"; 1: 133; letter 204). Her writing comes out of her pen all at once, spontaneously, resulting in a careless style. The fact that Sévigné shows herself conscious of a style that she claims, paradoxically, is natural reveals the gap between what her culture told her about feminine letter writing, which she seems to have believed, and what she actually knew.

However innovative, Sévigné's representations of maternal emotion attest to the culturally widespread conviction that daughters were supposed to mirror their mothers. Works on female conduct from the seventeenth to the early twentieth century vested mothers with the authority and responsibility to raise their daughters in their own image. For instance, Sévigné's contemporary François de Grenaille asserts in *L'honneste fille* (1640; *The Virtuous Daughter*) that mothers create masterpieces in forming daughters to reflect themselves: "Pour produire une Fille, la mère fait son image; on peut encore dire qu'elles ont le mesme droict sur leur ouvrage, qu'a un Peintre sur son portrait" ("To produce a daughter, the mother makes her own image; one can say further that they have the same right over their artwork as a painter over his self-portrait"; pt. 1, 89). Despite the visual metaphors here, as Grenaille and other writers on female education detail, mothers were meant to "produce" virtuous behavior in their daughters through strict regulation of body and mind. Apart from its behavioral specifics, mother-daughter reflectivity had psychological implications, especially since mothers were accorded dominance over daughters, who were expected to submit to their mothers' desires, or, in other words, to fulfill these desires. As their mothers' works of art, on a par with a painter's self-portrait, daughters were tantamount to maternal alter egos and even possessions.

To illustrate these psychological implications, let us return to Sévigné's representation

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of her body severed by Grignan's departure. The mother describes the *daughter's* leave-taking as "the day that *I* left you." Making herself the subject of the action, Sévigné reveals the boundary confusion between maternal and filial identities fostered by mother-daughter reflectivity and grants herself the dominance accorded mothers. By taking over as subject, Sévigné denies her daughter any potential autonomy even though Grignan chose to join her husband, out of duty or desire or both. In describing her physical, emotional torment, Sévigné further assigns agency to an impersonal other: "ce qu'*on* me fit ce jour-là" (conveyed by the English passive, "what was done to me that day"), implying that Grignan was the passive object of her own leave-taking. In general, Sévigné prefers to construe her daughter's departure as an abduction rather than as the result of Grignan's will: "Je ne m'accoutume point qu'on m'ait ôté ma fille, qu'on me l'ait enlevée et emmenée si loin" ("I'm not used to the fact that my daughter was taken away from me, that she was abducted and taken so far away"; 1: 342; letter 199). Insofar as mother-daughter reflectivity encouraged Sévigné to expect her daughter to fulfill the mother's desires, then Sévigné either had to deny that Grignan had desires of her own or feel injured and embattled by any sign of Grignan's autonomous will.

Sévigné's letters to her daughter illustrate both aspects: denial of filial desires and injury at any evidence of them.[8] From this perspective, when she identifies with her daughter's pregnant body, even as she conveys worry and sympathy, Sévigné also denies the specificity of Grignan's experience, including her relationship to the father of her child. Yet affective reflectivity authorized Sévigné to view her daughter as her possession, so that claiming Grignan's body as part of her own seemed natural. Ultimately, Sévigné's representations of maternal emotion tell us a story about a problematic dissolution of boundaries between one self and another, a circulation of affect that complicates impersonal and autonomic models.

Physiognomy, Expression, and Emotion: The Case of *The Juvenile Lavater*

While the Enlightenment celebrated reason as the most divine and elevated attribute of humankind, the proper place and function of feeling was coming to the fore. Sensibility, the capacity for refined physical as well as emotive response, was implicated in the conceptualization of human rights but, at the same time, was criticized as a dangerous indulgence in imagination (e.g., Hunt; Barker-Benfield; Pateman). In this context Lavater began his *Essays on Physiognomy*.

Popular across Europe, *Essays on Physiognomy* was translated many times, including at least three translations into English between 1789 and 1798. "Lavater" became a kind of synecdoche for the study of reading facial expression, and other works sought to capitalize on the vogue for physiognomic interpretation. One of them was George Brewer's 1812 *The Juvenile Lavater; or, A Familiar Explanation of the Passions of Le Brun, Calculated for the Instruction and Entertainment of Young Persons; Interspersed with Moral and Amusing Tales, Illustrating the Benefit and Happiness Attendant on the Good Passions, and the Misfortunes Which Ensue the Bad, in the Circumstances of Life*. Despite the title, Brewer's work owes less to Lavater than to Le Brun, whose *Méthode pour apprendre à dessiner les passions* (1698; trans. in 1734 by John Williams as *A Method to Learn to Design the Passions*) proffered illustrations and guidelines for depicting core passions drawn from Descartes (Ross).

The Juvenile Lavater frames Le Brun's drawings of twenty passions (attention, admiration, admiration with astonishment, veneration, rapture, desire, joy with tranquillity, laughter, acute pain, simple bodily pain, sadness, scorn, weeping, compassion, horror, terror, anger, hatred or jealousy, and, finally,

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despair) with the narrative of a father instructing his children through commentary and stories. Combining Lavater's system for reading expression and Le Brun's for drawing passions, *The Juvenile Lavater* suggests that there exists a palette of human emotions that are legible to the viewer-reader across culture, time, and artistic style and that to become an adept reader of human passions, one must study them through both narrative and visual art.

At the start of the narrative, the father, Mr. Willock, opens his book of Le Brun's drawings of the passions, fulfilling a promise for entertainment that his children have been anticipating with pleasure. As he presents the first image, "the portrait of ATTENTION," a full-page image from LeBrun is encountered (fig. 2). The children's reaction is instructive: "the eyes of all of them were in an instant fixed on the same object. 'Pray, sir, whose portrait is that?' cried John, the eldest boy.—'That, my dear,' said Mr. Willock, 'is your face, and the face of all of you at this moment.'" The children find this hard to believe: "'Indeed, papa,' cried Henry, 'you are only jesting with us; for I am sure that it is not in the least like me,'" to which his father replies:

> "Well then, . . . look at your brother William, and tell me if it is not like him."—"Yes, indeed, papa," cried Henry; "he makes just such another face."—"True . . . ," returned Mr. Willock; "and so do *each* of you; because this is the face of *Attention*, which *each* of you show at this moment. Only observe how the eyebrows sink and approach the sides of the nose—how the eyeballs turn towards the object of notice—how the mouth opens, and especially the upper part—how the head declines a little, and becomes fixed in that posture, without any remarkable alteration—such," said he, "is the portrait of *Attention*. . . ." (4–6)

Almost immediately the children discover that, in their anticipation, they magically produced the correct expression. Attention is presented as recognizable in a naturally occurring facial expression. By drawing the children's attention to one another's faces, the father teaches them to recognize the physical signs—head posture, partially open mouth, focus of the eyes, and drawn eyebrows—of the internal state of attentive focus. While Henry initially does not recognize himself in the drawing, he sees it immediately in others, for expression naturally indicates internal states in *The Juvenile Lavater*.



FIG. 2
"Attention," from George Brewer's *The Juvenile Lavater* (facing p. 21). Engraving after Charles Le Brun. Courtesy of HathiTrust.

Further, there is a bare hint that in shaping one's face to express the "good" passions, or in studying them attentively, the children (and we too) may learn to experience them. To illustrate the value of attention, Mr. Willock tells a moral tale about two brothers. The brothers are instructed by their father to meditate frequently on a copy of Le Brun's image. One of them neglects this task, ceases contact with his brother, and falls into debt through lack of attention to his business. Encountering the neglected Le Brun image by chance and learning that his brother is

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seriously ill, he pays a call on him. After the sick brother recovers, he learns of the debt and, in thanks for the kind "attention," pays it off in time to save his sibling from ruin.

To be carried as reminders of which passions one ought to imitate—as tools for self-direction, almost for contemplation—is entirely different from the original purpose of Le Brun's images: to show artists how to use facial expression to delineate interior states of feeling in historical painting. It differs too from Lavater's own interest in promoting the correct interpretation of human facial expressions and bodily comportment. Here the study of proper feeling is turned back on viewers, who are invited to reflect on their interior states and to monitor their sensibilities. From here it is a short step to suggesting that by modulating one's expression, one might reproduce the proper interior state of feeling.

The actor and theater critic Henry Siddons had already considered this issue in his 1785 *Practical Illustrations of Rhetorical Gesture and Action*. In a curious passage, he describes how a young man, new to the theater, responds to the stage action by unconsciously imitating the actors' motions and expressions. Lisa Zunshine notes this passage as a significant example of "theory of mind"—granting to others the interiority that we assume in ourselves—but also a moment of unease because the novice auditor really feels the emotions that the actors present without feeling (129).

Vertigo ensues: at the very moment of the authentic, natural production of an expression truthfully indicating an interior state (attention), the children touch on the problem of imitation, the way that the facial expression of a practiced actor or in an artistic image creates in naive viewers a feeling lacking in the actor or image. Moreover, imitating particular kinds of bodily comportment and facial expression may bring about interior feelings to match—drawing physiological training and visual arts into the circuit of regulating the passions.

This leaves us with the problem of "bad" passions, where Brewer's work takes a gothic turn. Certain passions are apparently too dangerous to risk replicating in the reader or the child viewer and must be distanced through a generic turn. Brewer illustrates the passions from acute pain to despair with the tale of "the wicked Baron, and Nicholas the honest wood-cutter." This is the longest story by several pages and includes the most images—nearly half the passions are interpolated into this story. Terror may be observed at a distance as an elevating or instructive passion (as Edmund Burke had argued in *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* [1757]), but Brewer's child readers ought not to feel it in their own bodies.

The Juvenile Lavater, then, theorizes emotion—it posits specific affective states as natural and preexisting yet tries to teach and constrain them. One could argue that this approach points to the sociological concept of "feeling rules"—scripted instruction in socioculturally expected emotions. But the work's effort both to claim these emotions as natural and to teach expression and the corresponding internal feeling suggests an anxiety of its own—a fear that emotion might be learned after all, which implies that one could learn the wrong passions. This brings us to what Sianne Ngai has termed "ugly feelings." The relation of embodiment and emotion in the post-Enlightenment period demonstrates the need for affective regulation but points even more to embodied emotion not simply as personal property but also as a site for knowledge making and self-making.

Each essay in this issue responds in its own way to the overarching question, what is at stake for literary scholars in thinking emotion? The essays can be grouped into five conceptual categories according to how they interpret emotion: body, philosophy, loss, politics, and teaching. While this divi-

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sion is to some extent arbitrary—essays often address more than one of the concepts—we hope that it helps the reader navigate the twenty-one contributions and suggests unexpected confluences.

Essays that engage portrayals of embodied emotion raise the vexed question of whether physiological manifestations of emotions are natural or learned. Early modern accounts of emotions promoted technologies of civility, whereas from the nineteenth century onward embodiment became a troubled site for displacing racialized, sexualized, and animalized anxieties.

Writing on early modern affect, Gail Kern Paster traces the historiography of conduct manuals. She shows how the advent of the works of Norbert Elias in English translation, along with those of Mikhail Bakhtin and Michel Foucault in the 1980s, marked a watershed in the understanding of conduct literature in the United States. Earlier interpretations, presenting what Paster calls an idealistic vision, lauded the standards for civilized behavior promoted in conduct literature as models that should still be emulated. Debunking this vision, Elias, Bakhtin, and Foucault demonstrate that bodies and emotions have been socially, historically constructed for political reasons. Elias's reading of conduct literature invited literary scholars to analyze how depiction of the body "mediates the social conflicts that are external to a literary text and . . . generate the forms of consciousness portrayed in it." At the same time, his blindness to gender—to how men and women are socialized according to different standards—opened up work for feminist and cultural critics.

Giving an account of the Berlin Center for the History of Emotions, Ute Frevert shows how scholars there are building on the work begun by Elias (and Max Weber), studying the period from the seventeenth to the twentieth century. Frevert takes us on a tour of the center's three major research areas: education and cultivation of emotions, emotions and the body, and emotions and power, detailing the kinds of collaborative and individual projects under way in each area.

Opening with a scene of difficult or frustrated reading, Mary A. Favret's "The Pathos of Reading" considers "the feeling of reading"—the ways in which what Favret calls "pathetic reading," named for the Greek word *pathos* (meaning "suffering" or "experience"), depends on sensory embodiment. She finally argues that John Keats's poetry performs pathetic reading—reading that makes its own difficult conditions and the material obscurity of the text on the page conscious and visible. In so doing, she challenges us to rethink our esteem for fluent, painless reading and to engage with the difficult, the obscure, the pathetic suffering experience of hampered reading and vision.

Rochelle Rives's "Facing Wilde" traces the shift from a universalizing Lavaterian physiognomy through the nineteenth-century racializing and particularizing of facial and bodily forms. Focusing on Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec's portrait of Oscar Wilde on the occasion of the trial for libel (a trial Wilde initiated, which led to his own conviction on charges of sodomy), Rives argues that changing images of Wilde document a change from facial expressions as revelatory of a presumed interior character to the scripting of physiological expression that constructs and constitutes personalities—here that of the sodomite and thus the type of the pathological homosexual.

Writing from personal experience as a successful black academic, Patricia A. Matthew recognizes herself with surprise in bell hooks's account of the "margins" as a site of radical possibility. Matthew reminds us that one's body affects not only one's intellectual work but also its conditions. Along with limitations, racialization (and disability, one might add) brings situated knowledge and emotional states that are valuable sites for personal knowledge and institutional critique.

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The essays focused on philosophical accounts illuminate the ethical or moral dimensions of emotion, whether defined as rational emotion, as compassion linking human beings to nonhuman animals, as existential anxiety, as a Stoic aversion to pity, or as relating to an "unmovable" (unemotional) subject. In "Animals Are from Venus, Human Beings from Mars," Gregory B. Stone argues that critics have long misread Guido Cavalcanti's poem "Donna me prega" ("A Lady Asks Me") by assuming it to be an antilove poem. Stone's innovative interpretation shows that for Cavalcanti love is a rational desire. Indebted to the thinking of Averroës, a medieval Islamic rationalist philosopher who reinterpreted Aristotle, Cavalcanti believed that human beings have two kinds of desire, an animal appetite (a simple motion toward pain or pleasure) and a human desire, love or will, that entails making ethical choices about an imagined future outcome. In Stone's reading, Cavalcanti's poem shows the emotional valences of "cogitation," a part of human desire, and concludes that the "failure to make use of the cogitative power—the failure to think, love, hate—is 'death.'" That is, such failure betrays what defines an ethical human life, since this consists in rational emotion—love.

Whereas for Cavalcanti human beings are animals whether acting from appetite or cognition, recent philosophers of emotion distinguish between human and nonhuman animals in order to theorize the ethical relationship we have to nonhuman animals. In "Posthuman Compassions," Elisabeth Arnould-Bloomfield illustrates how for many contemporary thinkers compassion holds the key to an ethical relationship with companion species. Two philosophers have developed theories that dislodge the mimetic, identificatory model of compassion for companion species, whereby the human subject retains power over the nonhuman animal. Reading Jacques Derrida in tandem with Donna Haraway, Arnould-Bloomfield teases out the intricacies of their very different approaches to compassion. In sum, Derrida proposes a "negative" compassion whose ethics inheres in our inability to identify with the pain of the nonhuman animal. Haraway, by contrast, insists that ethics consists in the compassion of a relationality that respects the heterogeneity of both the human and nonhuman animal.

In "Better Living through Dread," Paul Megna elaborates the ethics of existential anxiety by showing how some of the most famous modern philosophers engaged in a dread-based asceticism rooted in Middle English devotional literature. Using the idea of "emotion scripts" found in Sarah McNamer's work, Megna studies an array of Middle English devotional works—including those of the hermit Richard Rolle, John Wycliffe, Julian of Norwich, and Margery Kempe—that seek to solicit dread while performing what he calls "good fears." Megna demonstrates that, in sum, these Middle English texts script the emotions of dread, hope, and love so that the authors and their audience can talk to God. In his readings of Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre, Megna reveals what each thinker owes to premodern theologies of dread; each in his own way writes "emotion scripts" to establish "'emotional communities' in which subjects deliberately strive to be 'anxious in the right way.'"

Adam Potkay's "Contested Emotions" considers the "moral emotions" of pity and gratitude, opening with William Wordsworth's "Simon Lee," in which the poet grieves over an old man's expressions of gratitude for a kindness. Gratitude becomes troubling, Potkay suggests, in the 1790s as the concept of rights develops—one need not feel gratitude for something to which one has a right, and true benevolence ought to end with the deed. Tracing ideas of compassion versus rationality from Jonathan Swift's Houyhnhnms through William Godwin's *Enquiry concerning Political Justice,* Potkay turns back to Wordsworth. A close reading

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of three poems leads Potkay to argue that in paying extensive attention to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sensibility and sympathy, we have missed the strong line of stoic antisentimentalism that subtends Wordsworth's response to the problem of gratitude.

In "The Scandal of Insensibility; or, The Bartleby Problem," Wendy Anne Lee studies the dilemma posed by the insensible who does not align himself with the Enlightenment understanding of emotion. Thomas Hobbes, Lee demonstrates, theorizes emotion as narrative, as causes and effects, as internal responses to external objects, all occurring over time. Emotion involves a movement inward and a movement against: we receive motions caused by external objects (other people), but we also resist or react to those objects because of our internal mechanisms. Resistance here still implies movement—the motion of response. The assumption that to feel means to move and be moved raises the problem of the insensible: "because insensibles do not move, there is no way of knowing what or, more important, whether they feel." Herman Melville's story "Bartleby, the Scrivener," Lee argues, complicates the assumption that to have an interiority is to produce emotion in another or respond to another's production of emotion in us. The insensible thus poses the social and ethical dilemma of what to do with an immobile subject, yet at the same time, as Lee elaborates, the insensible generates narrative.

The next set of essays considers the ways in which literature or letter writing creates, or scripts, the emotion of loss. Whether the loss incurred is that of a person, a physical ability, or an undamaged climate, at stake is the transmission of feeling, among characters and among the readers or auditors. We are asked to consider how some literary works convey emotion in ways that defy or surpass intellectual understanding.

In a reading of the Middle English poem *Pearl*, Sarah McNamer argues that the literariness of certain works conveys emotion beyond what their words describe. *Pearl* was composed in an era when the shared hearing of written texts was the norm among the elite, and its form and content are inseparable. Through its sound patterns, as McNamer demonstrates, the poem, narrated by a father who mourns the loss of a beloved young daughter, generates emotion in the listener, who grieves with the narrator and also finds solace. The poetic language produces visual and tactile images in the listener and the reader, while its patterned sound makes verbal music for the listener to hear. All this works to script feeling. In hearing or reading this poem, one is called upon to enact the feelings of loss and consolation that the poetry scripts. Because of the literariness of *Pearl*, much of the scripted emotion is felt between the lines. Thus, McNamer shows how a literary text might move its listener or reader in ways that surpass even the most rigorous critical analysis.

Focusing on the famous black page and Yorick's twice-told death in Laurence Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*, George E. Haggerty reveals that this scene's salient feature is that Yorick has a companion, Eugenius. In holding hands and in expressing his wish that the two will meet "hereafter," Yorick shows that only this friend can share in the intimacy of death as well as in the promise of a happy afterlife. The love shared between these male friends at the moment of loss invokes an elegiac tradition explicitly between men. Indeed, the physical contact between men, one dying, one remaining in life, recurs in later elegies, from Walt Whitman to Wilfred Owen. Further, when Eugenius avows that he does not know how to part with Yorick, he conveys his love implicitly, and the implicitness gives his words meaning. This meaning lies not in knowledge (for he does not know how to lose his beloved friend) but in emotional intimacy and its tragic loss. Literature can convey emotion without naming it. Haggerty underscores this capacity to evoke emotion by explaining how

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the black page that Sterne places right after Yorick's death indicates the unsymbolizable nature of death. It expresses the devastating loss of intimacy between the men in as powerful a way as the words of love and mourning that come before and after it.

That literature can, through words, elicit feelings that paradoxically escape verbal analysis also concerns Blakey Vermeule. In the persona of a female "Professor Casaubon" (with a nod to George Eliot's *Middlemarch*), Vermeule discovers that philosophers and cultural-literary theorists alike espouse neuroscience as the "key to all mythologies" where the intellectual understanding of emotion is concerned. Despite neuroscience's explanatory power and its tempting conviction, Vermeule's Casaubon ultimately doubts this key's power to elucidate feeling. Instead, she considers one of the most eloquent literary portrayals of loss, which does not explain feeling in words—Virginia Woolf's evocative *To the Lighthouse*. Professor Casaubon recalls how Woolf's Lily Briscoe, who had loved Mrs. Ramsay, feels blank after her death and wonders what she feels. Only in realizing her artistic vision in her painting does Lily find solace in an unarticulable coming together of the disjoined thoughts and feelings that previously troubled her—one memorialized in the image of the lighthouse's stroke in the dark and in Lily's finished painting (though no one may ever see it).

Peta Tait's essay on emotions in drama and other kinds of performance returns to the notion of scripting emotions. Marking a historical contrast between Anton Chekhov and Caryl Churchill, Tait notes that Chekhov's characters explain their complex feelings to others, including how the characters relate to the natural environment emotionally, through references to literary and dramatic works. Such references show how emotions are disseminated and repeated in social performance. By contrast, the twenty-first-century playwright Churchill illustrates how climate change due to global warming entails the loss of a script for emotional response; there are no literary or social precedents on which to call. This suggests, Tait maintains, that instead of feeling emotionally immobilized, we need to change our emotions to effect social action on global warming.

Chris Mounsey's account of his struggles with reduced vision draws on disability approaches that consider variable rather than uniform concepts of capability. Mounsey offers a compelling account of how one can reinterpret a loss (here a loss of vision) without denying there is a loss. Moving from *visual* reading (privileged in the practice of silent reading as a sign of literacy) to *aural* reading has deepened and changed his reading practices and scholarship. Mounsey offers a personal and practical example of how through grief and adaptation his reading practice has changed the kinds of work that he does.

The essays exploring the politics of emotion examine how language or performance constructs emotion, whether emotion scripts feeling for the reader, abides in sentence syntax itself, or seeks to convey the writer's preferred self-image. Attention to the ways in which language transmits emotion reveals the transformative forces at play between writer and reader, performer and audience, self and others.

Reading Geoffrey Chaucer's *Legend of Good Women*, Anne Schuurman goes against the critical current by emphasizing the text's appeal to readers' pity. While previous critics deny the pathos of the *Legend,* Schuurman shows how Chaucer, as a master rhetorician, invokes his readers' pity by casting his portrayals of lovelorn women both in an intertexual relation to classical literature and within a hagiographic tradition. Enlisting Sarah McNamer's work on the ways hagiographic medieval texts function as scripts for readers' imitation of compassion, Schuurman argues that Chaucer's *Legend*, a secular work, similarly scripts pity for performance by

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readers. Such performance is both inauthentic (imitative) and authentic (interiorized). Schuurman illustrates how the *Legend* plays out the paradox that emotional experience is learned and imitative just as the art of writing poetry is. Here the politics of emotion—and, indeed, the politics of poetry in the *Legend*, with its intertexual and hagiographic debts—concern "our ability to distinguish between the authentic and the ersatz."

Katrin Pahl takes the relation between language and emotion even further in her essay. She recommends turning away from the term *emotions* as too likely to invite taxonomies of particular emotions, opting instead to "think with" the often pejorative, "ugly" term *emotionality*. Like many involved in affect theory and queer critique, Pahl worries that *emotions* inevitably implies interior subjectivity, with the danger of essentializing emotion as a force of nature. Locating emotionality less in personal subjectivity than in language and even sentence syntax, Pahl argues that the power of emotionality is mobile and transformative, carrying one beyond one's self and into relations not only with others but also with the self. Focusing on G. W. F. Hegel and the playwright Heinrich von Kleist, she reads text as emotional, as "self-affective," when it is incongruent with itself, not merely expressive of emotions presumed to belong elsewhere. Pahl ends by noting that the "old philosophical logic of the Western tradition . . . was developed partly to discipline or avoid emotionality." Therefore, by turning to the emotionality of sentences, we expand the horizon of the logical.

In a more taxonomic and mimetic vein, Vinay Dharwadker's "Emotion in Motion" draws our attention to the *Nāṭyashāstra*, a Sanskrit manuscript on the aesthetic representation of emotions from around 200 CE. This transhistorical and transcultural essay could easily fall under the rubric of embodied emotion or philosophy and emotion, but we set it here for the way that it resituates European-centered traditions and raises foundational questions about emotion as cognitive or constitutive, contextual, and performative. Dharwadker first finds the *Nāṭyashāstra* surprisingly resonant with Darwin's late-nineteenth-century work on emotion and expression in human beings and animals. He continues the comparison through William James's late-nineteenth-century work on emotions as cognitive and Silvan Tomkins's twentieth-century reconfiguration of affect as distinct from cognition. Darwin's formulation (based on global empirical evidence) of thirty-four common emotional states and Tomkins's hierarchy of nine primary affects tightly and unexpectedly parallel the *Nāṭyashāstra*'s eight stable emotional states and total of forty-nine stable, auxilary, and psychosomatic symptoms. Yet there are key differences that illuminate in both directions. By working carefully through the implications of the *Nāṭyashāstra*'s purpose of instructing artists and performers (an element missing from Darwin, James, and Tomkins) and also its distinctions among existential and long-lasting emotional states (*sthāyī bhāva*), triggers or causes (*vibhāva*), emotional expression (*anubhāva*), short-lived emotions (*vyabhichārī bhāva*), and psychosomatic signifiers (*sāttvika bhāva*) that can be received by observers, Dharwadker is able to highlight limitations of European core writings and to raise significant questions about the relation between emotion and cognition, about emotions as constitutive, and about the significance of the aesthetic representation of emotion and audience reception.

Anca Parvulescu's "Kafka's Laughter" brings us back to the question of a subject who feels. Yet in interpreting Franz Kafka's account of his laughter in a 1913 letter to Felice Bauer, Parvulescu demonstrates laughter's affective investments even as Kafka seeks to claim his own laughter. In his letter to Bauer, Kafka recounts how, two years earlier, he found himself bursting into laughter in a meeting with the president of the insurance

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company for which he worked. Proposing eight complementary interpretations of Kafka's epistolary anecdote, Parvulescu discovers that this laughter moves among multiple objects; he himself cannot settle on one as the single object of mirth. Rather, Kafka's laughter gains affective autonomy. Parvulescu emphasizes, nonetheless, that in writing to Bauer (rather than in his journal), Kafka makes a bequest: he would like to be remembered as a great laugher and for joyfulness.

Turning to early-nineteenth-century America in "Nat Turner and the Work of Enthusiasm," John Mac Kilgore takes up the rich period term *enthusiasm* to discuss Nat Turner's Rebellion—an 1831 slave rising in Virginia—and Turner's *Confessions*. Encompassing a continuum from an illicit belief in divine favor to an elevated capacity associated with poets, orators, and patriots, enthusiasm is complexly linked to white fear of black rebellion and of political revolution. Kilgore argues that while enthusiasm could be imagined as legitimate in democratic revolt, it was condemned when those rebelling were black. This inability to recognize the democratic and other positive benefits of enthusiasm when it is associated with Nat Turner continues to diminish Turner's claim to patriotic affect. The link between enthusiasm and fanaticism that Hegel draws when considering black religious practices and bodies makes it especially difficult to read Turner and black enthusiasm more generally within a larger transatlantic revolutionary and Romantic movement. By "dissolv[ing] the boundary between reason and affect," emotion becomes first a form of knowledge and then the ground for political action.

Finally, two essays focus on teaching. They call on us in the humanities to reclaim epistemological understandings of emotion for our pedagogies, whether to intervene in the ever-increasing digital age or to encourage our science-oriented undergraduate students to discover the relevance of literary representations of emotion.

Megan Boler advocates a "pedagogy of discomfort" in "Feminist Politics of Emotions and Critical Digital Pedagogies." She pits uncomfortable feelings against both neuroscientific mapping and online education, asking how we should understand the value and function of emotion in the digital age. Questioning the "affective turn" for its tendency to elide the political implications of emotions as tied to specifically situated and embodied experience, Boler reaffirms twentieth-century second-wave feminist and women-of-color work that valued emotion as a form of knowledge, opposed to Enlightenment celebrations of reason at the expense of emotion. Boler wonders what happens to the messy embodied encounters of differences in the classroom when education take place in a digitally mediated mode (through distance learning and computer-mediated communication). She calls for inventing ways to replicate the messiness of personal encounters in digital environments.

Working in the foreign language classroom, Logan J. Connors details his strategies for getting students engaged in the literary study of emotion. Connors has discovered that when his undergraduates combine reading, writing, and discussion about the emotions of literary characters, they relate to the course because they are studying affect in other courses, on neuroscience, psychology, animal behavior, and so on, and because they are going through emotional challenges in their own lives. He provides examples, focused on a classic early modern novel, to show how he involves students in discovering that analyzing fiction builds knowledge as productively as disciplines deemed more useful—those in the social and natural sciences.

Notes

1. Current French usage retains this sense of disturbance in the expression "Quelle émotion!" ("How

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disturbing [*or* upsetting]!"), describing a situation that provokes emotional stress.

2. Unattributed translations are Jensen's.

3. Hochschild first used the term "feeling rules" in her 1979 "Emotion Work, Feeling Rules and Social Structure." She continued to analyze the emotional labor demanded by service jobs, in which workers must adhere to feeling rules. Secretaries must act friendly and dependable, for example, no matter how they are treated and what they actually feel.

4. Brennan distinguishes between feelings and affects. Affects are physiological but also encompass judgments. Feelings are not physiological but, like affects, involve discernment (5).

5. For analysis of the developing ideology of motherhood in eighteenth-century France, see, e.g., Duncan; Gutwirth.

6. Sévigné's letters to her daughter were first published in 1726. By this time, Grignan's part of the correspondence had been destroyed by her own daughter. For an analysis of the reception history of Sévigné's letters, see Montfort; Goldsmith. See also Roger Duchêne's introduction to the collected letters.

7. For further analysis of feminine epistolarity, see Jensen, *Writing*.

8. For extensive interpretations of Sévigné's relationship to her daughter in the correspondence, see Farrell; Jensen, "Letter Writer."

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