REVIEW ESSAY

Better than Barraclough? Putting Global Labor History on the Map[1]

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Reviewed in this essay:

Patrick K. O'Brien, *Oxford Atlas of World History: Concise Edition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Geoffrey Barraclough, *Hammond Atlas of World History, Fifth Edition*. Edited by Richard Overy. Maplewood, NJ: Hammond, 1999.

Jeremy Black, *DK Atlas of World History.* New York: Dorling Kindersley Publishing, 2001.

Labor historians have been in the forefront of the movement to create a new global, transnational, and world (GT&W) history.[2] At the same time the last two and a half decades have seen the appearance of a whole series of new atlases of world history. How well have global, transnational, and world *labor* (GTW&L) historians been served by these new atlases? What do GTW&L historians want in an atlas anyway?

The benchmark for contemporary world history atlases in regard to labor as in all else is Geoffrey Barraclough's 1978 *Times Atlas of World History.* Let us put aside the utterly deplorable *National Geographic Society Atlas of World History*, so stingy with its maps, drowned in illustrations, and bound to a single continuous narrative. Every significant modern world atlas shows the influence of Barraclough's 1978 work.[3] For good reason! Barraclough's atlas operated on a much bigger budget than earlier atlases and assembled a theretofore unparalleled team of historical consultants. He was convinced that the growing influence of the social sciences, of archaeology, economics, sociology, and political science, was transforming the historical profession and leading to "revolutionary progress."[4] His own atlas was an effort to synthesize the areas of greatest social science advance. The textual sections of the atlas indicate a

International Labor and Working-Class History
No. 70, Fall 2006, pp. 143–154
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https://doi.org/10.1017/S0147547906000202 Published online by Cambridge University Press

profound knowledge of historical context but the cartographic sections mark a literal remapping of the GT&W past. Barraclough's style and intellectual preoccupations can still be seen in the most important recent GT&W atlases.

For the general reader, this book is a delight. The most casual glance shows that Barraclough loved maps: bold maps in strong colors, with topographical features; big maps covering the greater part of two folio pages, forcing the text to crawl around the page so as not to obscure the maps; and small maps, inserts amplifying or focusing on themes of the larger maps. Unusual map projections abound. Accustomed to employing projections to accomplish specific purposes, some geographers were upset by Barraclough's use of Molyweide or orthographic projections for their own sake. Such objections ignore the need to educate historians about the existence of different projections and to show them that they need not rely exclusively on Mercator or even on the increasingly popular equal-area projections. More valid was the geographers' complaint that Barraclough's maps lacked useful scale indicators, making estimates of distance difficult.

Barraclough was unafraid to take positions. A two page spread on "Invasions and Migrations: Indo-Europeans and Semites" jumps headlong into a still furious academic controversy, identifying the homeland of the Indo-Europeans as north of the Black Sea in the Zagros and Taurus mountains and stressing their role as horsemen. Scholars within their disciplines dispute all these propositions ferociously but Barraclough knew that indecision and compromise yield poor maps.

State formation was one of Barraclough's great interests as a historian and it is the dominant theme of this atlas. But, as he announced in his introduction "history is dynamic, not static."[5] Let us concede the inevitable maps of the unification of Germany and Italy, maps that even the most resolute GT&W histories are required to provide for their historical audiences. Previous atlases did focus on static positions, for example, on the precise division of Europe at the completion of major treaties. Barraclough was more interested in dynamics, on the processes by which states grew and expanded and in the internal revolts and insurrections that marked the expansion of the modern states' internal consolidation of power.

Here, the state of historical knowledge continually hindered Barraclough's task. Jeremy Black is persuasive in arguing that the use of solid map colors to identify states can be extremely misleading by suggesting that state power extended equally to all parts of its territory, a criticism applicable to almost every state before 1750 and quite a few today.[6] But based on material currently available, it would be difficult to construct a series of world history maps estimating the degree of administrative penetration of the national territory before 1750. Black sets a noble goal though for future researchers but his own atlas, reviewed in this essay, makes no more effort than Barraclough to translate his critique into geographic practice. The goals of historical atlas makers are limited by the state of historical knowledge.

Finally, more than any of his predecessors, Barraclough attempted to make his atlas genuinely world historical. In some sense, his heroic efforts were

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foredoomed. Even today the amount of historical research on Europe and North America far outweighs that available for other areas of the world and thus provides detailed information for American and European historical cartographers that cannot be matched by other regions. It was much worse twenty-five years ago. Further, in Barraclough's time as today, the number of European and North American historians still outnumbers that for other areas of the world and market considerations inevitably have their influence. Yet the agenda that Barraclough set has been advanced notably both by scholars and by recent atlases.

Appreciation of the transformation that Barraclough wrought and its continuing echoes can be seen by placing his achievement in historical perspective. To understand the magnitude of Barraclough's accomplishment, let us compare some first-rate world history atlases of the pre-Barraclough (pre-B) era with post-Barraclough (post-B) texts. Using a very summary classification of maps in the pre-B age atlases and those of his contemporaries and comparing them with Barraclough and with post-B atlases, his influence is clear. Among atlases of the pre-B age or by his contemporaries, Shepherd's *Historical Atlas* devoted 57.8% of the pages of map illustrations exclusively to European themes and Georges Duby's *Atlas historique*, 43.1%. In comparison, Barraclough devoted only 29.6%. Barraclough's influence is easily seen in the post-B successors, works under review here, Patrick O'Brien's *Oxford Atlas of World History* devotes 27.2% and Jeremy Black's *DK Atlas of World History*, a mere 13.7%.[7]

Although Barraclough pioneered some key aspects of GT&W historical investigation, it would be a mistake to throw away atlases of the pre-B age or by his contemporaries. Their strong focus on Europe and the US allowed them to cover some key events in these areas in greater detail. Mentioned earlier, the ancient Shepherd's *Historical Atlas*, first published in 1929 and now revised and updated in its ninth edition still has undeniable charms; its detailed rendering of major European treaty settlements remains an impressive accomplishment.[8] The map of "Central Europe about 1648" is an education in seventeenth-century European political history. Although commerce is given some attention, labor plays a very minor role. Shepherd offers a very helpful "plan of a mediaeval Manor" and a lovely map of "Mediaeval Industry" in Western Europe but no reference to the First or Second Industrial Revolutions. R.R. Palmer's *Atlas of World History*, the leading atlas in the US of the 1950s, reflected Palmer's interest in the spread of ideas across Europe and between Europe and the Atlantic. Palmer's emphasis on an Atlantic revolution was a precursor of today's TG&W history but outside his interest in charting the spread of Enlightenment ideals, Palmer's atlas lacked a breadth of interest and a wide-ranging focus; in terms of cartographic precision and detail, it is much weaker than Shepherd's. Palmer was resolutely uninterested in political change. His atlas ignored the diversity of pre-nineteenth century European political structures. The Holy Roman Empire appeared as a single unit on a par with France or England. Basically Palmer presented the

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reader with repeated iterations of the same pale-green Europe with a couple of dozen intellectual centers identified in red. Palmer's obsession with the spread of ideas overcomes every other theme of modern history.[9]

The year 1978 was a good year for historical atlases and Barraclough's first edition and two other excellent atlases appeared or began application in that year. In terms of cartographic accuracy and clarity of presentation the *Grosser historischer Weltatlas*, whose latest edition appeared between 1978 and 1981, remains the unequaled standard. Earlier editions undoubtedly influenced Barraclough's cartographic methods, but the *Grosser historischer Weltatlas*'s conception of GT&W history and certainly of labor history, is thoroughly traditional and totally Euro- and Germano-centric. Also published in 1978, and referred to above, Georges Duby's *Atlas historique*, remains one of our favorites.[10] Centered on France, Europe, and North Africa and on the evolution of consolidated states, it takes a quick look at the Industrial Revolution in England but does a better job on enclosures and on the commercial importance of medieval and early modern Venice. Duby was also interested in political history and his electoral maps document the regional popularity of socialism and communism in principal European nations. Despite the very clear advance of Duby's atlas over Shepherd and Palmer in regard to worldwide coverage, he cannot match Barraclough's standards and, with the significant exception of his electoral maps, Duby largely ignored the economic and the social history of labor.

Despite the undoubted attractions of other atlases, Barraclough still rules. In most areas that concern TGW&L historians, Barraclough far exceeded preexisting or contemporary standards and established the basic framework for succeeding editors. From the beginning his approach was innovative. Replacing the preoccupation with Biblical history of earlier atlases, Barraclough included labor processes that took place in preliterate times, formerly considered "prehistoric." Once forbidden territory to historians, terrains first explored by archaeologists now occupy prominent places in TG&W history. Along with the editors of the otherwise staid *Grosser historischer Weltatlas*, Barraclough devoted serious attention to the agricultural revolution; an event that occurred in much of the world between 8,000–10,000 years ago.[11]

Barraclough's coverage of early modern and modern industry and labor was also in advance of other atlases. For one, Barraclough paid attention to rural industry, a cradle of the European working class. His two maps on "The European Economy: trade and industry 1550–1775" (180–181), one for the sixteenth century and another for the end of the eighteenth century, showed the relationships between regions of rural and urban industrial production and their development between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Stressing the eras of rural industrialization and the complicated relationship between rural and urban industry in the early modern period these maps provided an indispensable preparation for nineteenth-century industrialization. Barraclough also understood the importance of the industrial region in the modern era. A large part of the phenomenon labeled "European

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industrialization" was concentrated within a few dozen relatively small regions, crossing borders and scattered across the continent and Barraclough's maps of the First and Second Industrial Revolutions indicate its major heartlands (200–201 & 210–213).

Finally, underlining a major fact of modern human geography, in his map of "Colonial America 1535 to 1783" Barraclough made an awkward initial effort to deal with unfree labor, with the geography of slavery. His map of "Colonial America 1535–1783" labels the destination regions of the slave trade and his map of "Trade and Empire in Africa, 1500–1800" indicates the principle sending areas. (162–163). Though pointing in the right direction, even for its time, these efforts to present the spatial aspects of the slave trade were manifestly inadequate.

In their treatment of rural industry, delineation of the industrial region and attention to the slave trade, the atlases under discussion here have generally followed Barraclough's lead, generally improving and elaborating his advances but not always.

Let us first look at the *Hammond Atlas of World History* edited by Richard Overy, a historian of the Second World War and fascism. This is really the fifth edition of Barraclough's atlas and most of the maps are the same as in earlier editions. Some worthwhile changes and additions have been made but the prodigal spirit of the early edition, rich in resources and willing to experiment, is gone. In the map on "The European Economy: Trade and Industry 1550–1775" Overy has inserted a valuable new inset on urban and rural industry in Russia (180–181) that adds to Barrclough's existing treatment of these topics. Barraclough's inadequate treatment of the slave trade has only been marginally expanded; indicators of the origin and destination of American slaves have been transferred to the maps on "The Emerging Global Economy" and barely surpass Barraclough's fumbling efforts. And the colors are diluted too. Yes, it is a pale imitation of its predecessor.

With fewer maps and less text, the *DK Atlas of World History*, edited by Jeremy Black, a thoughtful student of modern cartography, provides surprisingly serious competition to the Hammond Atlas. The basic strength of the DK atlas is its determination to present systematic worldwide and large-scale regional maps for particular historical eras; except for Asia, the regional maps are really continental maps. While such maps lack the detail of those in the other atlases, they often force the reader to consider neglected aspects of world history. The effects of the DK approach are interesting. The DK mapmakers have provided information about the worldwide expansion of agriculture and the human population that are clearer and more informative than those in Barraclough/Overy.

The DK's world map of "indentured labor" indicates the importance of India and China to the flow of unfree labor in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and not simply the movement between Europe and the Atlantic world. Its map of "Trading in Human Lives" (84–85) provides the best single map of the slave trade of any of the volumes, a map that underlines the

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importance, not simply of the Atlantic trade, but of the Arab traders and the slave markets in North Africa, Persia and the Ottoman world. Another minor but highly interesting map is that on "The politics of cotton" (93). It shows the complex linkages between the US slave South, industrial Britain and colonial India in the nineteenth century. Although an isolated example within Black's atlas, this map represents a potentially powerful way of relating production and distribution and free and unfree labor, but more on this later. The history and geography of mapmaking are a minor but interesting sub-theme of this atlas.

Still, despite the exemplary treatment of unfree labor, in regard to economic and social factors, Black's collection is weaker than the atlases of its competitors and even of Barraclough's. Even more than Barraclough, Black emphasizes state formation as the central process of historical geography. The attention to industrial regions and to the industrialization process is weaker and references to rural industry are much reduced. In part the problem here may be the difficulty of documenting these factors in any detail outside the European and North American world. The problem is well illustrated in Black's vague map of "The World's Economic Revolution" (92–93) contrasted with the much more detailed and informative map of "The Industrial Revolution" (in Europe) (204–205).

Working creatively within the framework set by Barraclough, the distinguished economic historian, P.K. O'Brien, does the best job overall of any of Barraclough's successors. Under review here is the "concise" edition and, in a work so labeled, we suppose that we cannot expect to find the cartographic extravagance so characteristic of Barraclough. O'Brien's concision loses the nice edge of the comparison of urban and rural industrial regions in early modern Europe found in Barraclough; O'Brien presents us with a map for "The Growth of the Atlantic Economies, 1620–1775" that covers the entire period and abandons the efforts to show changes between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Still, he strengthens and clarifies Barraclough's original references to the slave trade with a couple of pages devoted to the "Slave economies of the Western Hemisphere," (126–127) and slave origins are also indicated earlier on with a graph of "African-American Population Growth" in the Caribbean (124). Unlike the DK atlas there is no reference to the North-African and the Near-Eastern slave trade.

O'Brien, however, expands his atlas to include more attention to demographic history and urban history than other atlases. His map on "European Urbanization, 1500–1800" is interesting although it does not make full use of the research on European and Mediterranean urban hierarchies done in the last decade.[12] O'Brien also shows a consistent interest in population growth. His final series of maps on the contemporary era is brief and to the point and ends with an eloquent cartographic statement of modern problems. If only the people in the red states would read these maps!

While Overy, Black, and O'Brien generally develop or expand along lines largely pioneered by Barraclough, where the master fails so do the disciples.

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There are several areas where Barraclough's treatment of GTW&L history and that of his successors could be substantially improved.

First, Barraclough and O'Brien have paid due attention to the connections between natural resources and factory-based industrialization. Maps of lignite, ore, and coal resources and their proximity to the First and Second Industrial Revolutions suggest a strong relationship but while these atlases give us some idea of the relationship between natural resources and industrialization they tell us little about the relationship between *human* resources and industrialization. We lack any depiction of the overlap between earlier industrialized regions, often dominated by rural industry, and new industrialized areas, centered around factories. What was the relationship between old industrial regions—the eighteenth century brownfields—and nineteenth-century industrialization and class formation? To what extent and where did factory and mine-based industrialization occur in greenfield areas new to wage labor and to what extent and where did it develop in brownfield areas of old industry? These are matters of interest to labor historians eager to explore the extent to which preindustrial labor traditions affected the newly-emerging factory proletariat and to examine whether newborn proletariats, developing in "factories in the fields" have different characteristics from proletariats that emerge in long-established industrial centers. Given their attention to rural industry in the eighteenth century, our editors need only have followed up on their earlier insights to help labor historians. For England and for Europe as a whole, much of the spade work has been done and only systematic comparison is lacking.[13] Geographers may not be able to solve these questions, but they can help labor historians pose them more clearly. This is a missed opportunity.

Secondly, in common with an early generation of historians and atlas editors, Barraclough separated commerce from production, emphasizing commercial ties before the nineteenth century and industrial locations thereafter. At times, in a European or even a Mediterranean perspective, it may make sense to separate preindustrial commerce from industry but at all times a world historical perspective provides a geographical opportunity to transcend such historical dichotomies. On a world scale, commerce and production must balance and over time this balance has often worked out in geographically interesting ways. For example, much emphasis has been placed on the primacy of commerce in the Dutch economy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and there is a basis for this in a European context. On the world scene however, exploring the connections between commerce and production reveals a new and less-familiar world. In one capacity or another more than one-and-a-half to two million people labored for the Dutch East India Company, the Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC), in the centuries between 1595 and 1695. On a world scale, Dutch commercial predominance cannot be separated from its role in working-class formation.

At the work of Dutch historian Jan Lucassen shows, on a world scale Holland and the VOC were more deeply involved with proletarianization and commodity production than is generally realized. Purely in Dutch waters, the

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emphasis on commerce neglects the shipbuilding and ship-repair industries in Amsterdam and Rotterdam but examination on a world scale shows the important role of the VOC in class formation, particularly in the creation of unfree labor. The growth of the VOC was made possible by the proletarianization of the Dutch countryside that produced the surplus workers willing to take employment as clerks, sailors, and soldiers in deadly overseas ventures from which only one out of three returned: Dutch employment was importantly swelled by Asian and African workers. Foreign trade was a prodigious consumer of Dutch proletarian lives. An emphasis on Dutch commerce also seriously underestimates the many thousands of unfree and slave workers laboring for the VOC around the world in the Banda Isles in the Moluccas, on the Cape, and on the northeast coast of Java.[14]

At the same time economists, geographers, and sociologists are dissolving the rigid distinctions commercialization and production. Recent work that has focused on "commodity chains"—taking a commodity and following it through the production and commercial steps that link the raw material to the market—offers a way of combining production and distribution in geographic representation.[15] Long before the development of a "commodity chain" approach, Sidney Mintz's work on sugar illustrated how focusing on a single commodity might underline the ties between free, less free, and unfree laborers and how the growing mass consumerism of the West was linked to the expansion of slavery in portions of the America, in the Caribbean and in parts of Asia.[16] Mintz's approach has been adopted widely and historical studies of a variety of foods including salt, chocolate, cod, tobacco, and other commodities are already available for mapping.[17] Richard Appelbaum and Nelson Lichtenstein further explore such themes as they apply to today's retail economy earlier in this very issue of *ILWCH*.

Such work as that on the anthropology and history of food by Mintz and on the commodity chain process by economists and sociologists allow us to see the connections not only between, for example, San Domingue/Haiti, France, and all of continental Europe but also the links between slaves, indentured apprentices, savagely disciplined sailors and soldiers, and highly-regulated factory workers in the seventeenth and eighteenth century world economy. A map of the geography of nutmeg production and distribution in the seventeenth century or of automobiles in the twenty-first, or, for that matter, garments sold at Wal-Mart, would make some of the same points while providing an interesting comparative perspective.

Thirdly, Barraclough's focus on state formation in the modern period made him largely oblivious to the GT&W factors that powerfully shaped developing capital and the emerging labor force.

The growth and spread of international regulatory institutions was an important feature of nineteenth-century economic growth. This century witnessed the rise of GT&W institutions that still undergird and regulate the world economy. For example, the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed the formation of the Universal Postal Union (1874), the International

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Bureau of Weights and Measures (1875), the International Railway Congress Association (1884), the International Labor Office (1901), the International Council for the Study of the Sea (1901), the International Maritime Bureau against the Slave Trade (1890), the International Office of Public Hygiene (1907) and the Central Bureau for the International Map (1909). Craig Murphy has identified hundreds of organizations, congresses, and conferences that emerged after 1850.[18]

All these organizations enforced standards on a world economy that required such regulation in order to function and their number would grow exponentially in the twentieth century, An overlay of the membership in these organizations at several points in time would provide a useful index of participation in the modern economy in the era of the Second Industrial Revolution between 1870–1950.

Barraclough's emphasis on nineteenth and twentieth-century nationalism is one sided in its depiction of the modern era. Nationalism mobilized strong support in Europe and the US in the late nineteenth century, but it did so in part because it encountered strong opposition from internationalists, among them social reformers and the labor movement. Studies by Daniel Rodgers, Leila Roup, and Carl Strikwerda have reminded us that the nationalist assault reached such strength because it had to overcome powerful internationalist opponents.[19] Liberal reformist internationalist congresses were an important feature of the late nineteenth-century political scene. Feminism was an important political movement that must be understood in an international context.

Nineteenth-century socialist and twentieth-century communist movements must be understood within a global context to be understood at all; no political movements have been more consciously internationalist. The revolutions of 1848 in many areas and particularly in European capital cities contained a substantial working-class component. In the late nineteenth century labor became an international movement as trade unions and class identities spread across national boundaries and across continents, although largely remaining confined to the white and noncolonial world. Even the great wave of labor and anticolonial insurrections that followed the First World War between 1917 and 1923 remain outside the scope of these atlases although the simultaneity and scope of these protests would seem the natural terrain of historical geographers. More specialized geographies such as the *World Atlas of Revolutions* illustrate some interesting ways of mapping GT&W insurrectionary movements.[20]

Of course, the acme of labor internationalism came during the interwar period with the formation of the Communist International. Serious Communist parties appeared in many regions of the world and the presence or absence of Communist parties and their rise and disappearance have shaped the political traditions of many countries.

In recent years we may think little of the Communist parties of South Africa and Indonesia or the Indian Naxalites, but fifty or sixty years ago the reach of Communism was much greater. In 1957 when the Egyptian novelist Naguib Mahfouz wrote *Sugar Street*, the final novel of his famous Cairo

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trilogy, he portrayed the three grandsons of the Abd al-jawad family in terms that clearly were intended as political prophecy; one son was the lover of an Egyptian politician, one an advocate of fundamentalist Islam, and the other a Communist.[21] Today it takes a real leap of the imagination to see leftist revolution as a possibility in the Middle East. But one of the tasks of historians and of historical geographers is to remind their readers of roads not taken as well as those that became main highways.

Fourthly, it seems that some attention should be given to new technologies being utilized by historians and historical geographers. A recent roundtable discussion at the American Historical Association was dedicated to historians' uses of the computing tool called Geographic Information Systems (GIS), a computerized system which makes it much easier to integrate geographical characteristics with tabular data, and its uses for history. J.B. Owens, an organizer of the panel, emphasized the importance of GIS for world history due to its capacity to represent large-scale processes, potentially overlaying or comparing economic, demographic, industrial, agricultural, shipping, trade, and other data.

The potential uses of this for global labor history were demonstrated at the panel on a micro-scale by Zephyr Frank's localized maps of artisan flows in nineteenth-century Rio de Janeiro, in which maps overlay residential and occupational data with city maps in order to illustrate the changing density over time of tinkers, carpenters, and candle and soap makers in the center of this industrializing city.[22] Such maps can shed light on changing locations of the workplace, workers' networks of association, rates of property ownership, workers' families' use of public schools, and, on one occasion in 1880, a protest against rising streetcar fares in a neighborhood dominated by these artisans.[23] Also, as case studies, maps shedding light on local conditions in places like nineteenth-century Rio de Janeiro could provide excellent basis for comparative studies of industrialization and urbanization.

In terms of world historical atlases using GIS technology, talk of the use of Atlas Information Systems (AIS) or Analytic Geographic Atlas Information System (AGAIS), both GIS applications, seems at this time largely speculative, as do occasional suggestions that electronic atlases will one day replace print versions. The benefits of such technologies, however, can certainly be of great influence to print atlases in the future, and even if responses to queries on a screen may never replace or replicate the overall coherence of the world historical atlas, they may offer new perspectives or ways to visualize or integrate world historical and geographical events, places, networks, and trajectories. As new electronic mapping technologies do greatly facilitate the feasibility of making modern history maps that incorporate economic, social, and political data, it is possible that future world history atlases could be some combination of printed maps with accompanying, limited query-based software that could allow users to collect data to make new maps or to update existing maps.

Finally, are labor geographers, such as those represented in the recent *ILWCH* issue on the relatively new subfield of labor geography,[24] engaged in

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the project of incorporating global labor history into historical atlases? At this time (and as the recent issue suggests), much of the work of these geographers so far has not consisted so much of cartography in a world-historical context but of valuable studies, localized both in time and place, emphasizing the place-shaping capacities of local agents,[25] or the interactions between agents and environments in working-class communities.[26] It is such work that, as with Black's criticism of traditional solid-color representation of political entities and suggestion of a potentially better alternative, could be further contextualized by—and represented in—future world historical atlases.

In looking at the development of modern world history atlases, GT W&L historians have some cause for celebration. Modern atlases pay much more attention to indusrialization and economic processes, such as migration and demography, than did their predecessors. Yet there remains much to be done. The continuity of industrial development needs exploration. The sharp division between commerce and production needs to be softened or abolished. The role of GT&W forces in the development of capitalism and in the emergence of modern labor movements needs underlining. What is really needed is a new Barraclough, someone willing to fundamentally rethink the purposes and character of the world historical atlas.

NOTES

1. We would like to thank Miriam Cohen for her helpful comments.

2. For an overview of recent work on GT&W labor history see Michael Hanagan, "An Agenda for Transnational Labor History" *International Review of Social History* (May 2004) 455-474. and Marcel van der Linden *Journal of American History* (Dec. 1999), 1078–92.

3. Noel Grove, *National Geographic Society Atlas of World History* Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, 1997.

4. Geoffrey Barraclough, *Main Trends in History* (New York, 1979).

5. *Ibid*, 13.

6. Jeremy Black, *Maps and History: Constructing Images of the Past* (New Haven, 1997), *Maps and Politics* (Chicago, 1998)

7. These counts were based on the major themes of individual pages of the atlases that contained maps. We did not count all the maps; the largest map on the single page dictated the classification. In general most pages were pretty easily characterized. This work was done during free office hours and an unusual run of students may have put off the counts by one or two.

8. William R. Shepherd, *Shepherd's Historical Atlas* (New York, 1976).

9. R.R. Palmer, *Rand McNally Atlas of World History* (Chicago, 1957).

10. George Duby, *Atlas Historique* (Paris, 1978).

11. Josef Engel and Ernst Walter Zeeden, eds., *Grosser historischer Weltatlas* (München, 1978–1981), 3 vols. With supplements.

12. See Jan de Vries, *European Urbanization, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, MA, 1984); and Paul M. Hohenberg and Lynn Hollen Lees, *The Making of Urban Europe, 100–1950* (Cambridge, MA, 1985).

13. See Derek Gregroy, *Regional Transformation and Industrial Revolution: A Geography of the Yorkshire Woolen Industry* (Minneapolis, 1982); N.M.G Pounda *A Historical Geography of Euorpe 1500–1950* (Cambridge, 1979); and *An Historical Geography of Europe 1800–1914* (Cambridge, 1985).

14. Jan Lucassen, "A Multinational and its Labor Force: The Dutch East India Company, 1595–1795," in *International Labor and Working-Class History* 66 (Fall 2004): 12–39.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0147547906000202 Published online by Cambridge University Press

15. On commodity chains Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz, eds., *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism* (Westport, CT, 1994).

16. Sidney Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (New York, 1985).

17. Some examples include: Sophie D. Coe and Micahel D. Coe, *The True History of Chocolate* (New York, 2000); Jordan Goodman, *Tobaco in History: The Cultures of Dependence* (London, 1993); Mark Kurlansky, *Cod: A Biography of the Fish that Changed the World* (New York, 1997), and *Salt: A World History* (New York, 2002); Jack Turner, *Spice: The History of a Temptation* (New York, 2002); and Barbara Freese, *Coal: A Human History* (New York, 2004).

18. Craig N. Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850* (Oxford, 1994).

19. See Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, MA, 1998); Leila Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton, 1997); and Carl Strikwerda, "Reinterpreting the History of European Inegration: Business, Labor, and Scoial Citizenship in Twentieth-Centry Europe," in Jytte Klausen and Louise A. Tilly, eds., *Eurpean Integration in Social and historical perspective, 1850 to the Present* (Lanham, MD, 1997), 51–70; and *Idem.* "The Troubled Origins of European Economic Integration: International Iron and Steel and Labor Migration in the Era of World War I," *American Historical Review* 103 (1998), 1106–1142.

20. Andrew Wheatfield, *The World Atlas of Revolutions* (New York, 1983).

21. Naguib Mahfouz, *Sugar Street* (New York, 1992).

22. "Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and History: Aggregating Data, Connecting Places, and Analyzing Processes," A Roundtable Discussion, Annual meeting of the American Historical Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, January 5, 2006.

23. Ibid. Zephyr Frank's presentation included material for his forthcoming *The Urban Tapestry: History and Geography in Rio de Janeiro, 1840–1900*.

24. *ILWCH* 64 (Fall 2003) "Workers, Suburbs, and Labor Geography."

25. For example, the case studies in Andrew Herod's *Labor Geographies*, or Don Mitchell's *The Lie of the Land: Migrant Workers and the California Landscape* (Minneapolis, 1996).

26. A particularly fine example of this is Anne Mosher's *Capital's Utopia: Vandergrift, Pennsylvania, 1855–1916* (Baltimore, 2004), charting the experience of this community, planned and developed by the local steel mill and its workforce in the late nineteenth century.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0147547906000202 Published online by Cambridge University Press