THE FOURTH GENUS AND THE OTHER THREE. A NOTE ON *PHILEBUS* 27a8–9[1]

27a5 *ΣΩ. Ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἡγεῖται μὲν τὸ ποιοῦν ἀεὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ ποιούμενον ἐπακολουθεῖ γιγνόμενον ἐκείνῳ;*
ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Ἄλλο ἄρα καὶ οὐ ταὐτὸν αἰτία τ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ δουλεῦον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτίᾳ.
10 *ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;*
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται πάντα τὰ τρία παρέσχετο ἡμῖν γένη;
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.
b *ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα δημιουργοῦν λέγομεν τέταρτον, τὴν αἰτίαν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἕτερον ἐκείνων δεδηλωμένον;*
ΠΡΩ. Ἕτερον γὰρ οὖν.

(*Phlb.* 27a5–b3)

At first glance, this text raises no difficulty at all, and the *apparatus* has nothing special to say about it. The problem only emerges when we try to understand the course of the argument. From 23e3 to 26d10, Socrates described the first three genera: *τὸ ἄπειρον*, *τὸ πέρας*, and their mixture, *τὸ μεικτόν*. He now turns to the fourth genus: *ἡ αἰτία*. All he has said about it until now is that it can be called 'the maker' (*τὸ ποιοῦν*), whereas what it makes come into being (*τὸ γιγνόμενον*) can be called 'what is made' (*τὸ ποιούμενον*) (26e6–27a4). In the text quoted above, he tries to distinguish *ἡ αἰτία* from the first three genera.

This is at least what is implied by the conclusion he draws at 27b1–2. However, the way he reaches this conclusion is less clear, for the only distinction which appears in the text as it is printed is the distinction between the fourth and the third genera made at 27a5–7. As for 27a8–10, it seems merely to repeat this distinction in other words, for the presence of *ἄρα* at 27a8 makes the whole sentence a conclusion drawn from 27a5–7,[2] and the only way of understanding it as such is to take it as merely tautological, which implies that we should take *τὸ δουλεῦον* as a synonym of *τὸ ποιούμενον*. This interpretation could seem to be confirmed by the use of the verb *ἡγεῖται* at 27a5, which could already bring a touch of domination justifying the subsequent use of such a strong term as *τὸ δουλεῦον*. But this is hardly convincing: first, because it is really difficult to see how 'what is made'—that is, the product itself—could be said to 'serve' the cause *εἰς γένεσιν*, which can only refer to its own production, precisely because, as Socrates has just stated, the product always comes 'after' the cause—and also, necessarily, 'after' it has been produced; and secondly because, in this case, one could really not understand what allows Socrates to state at 27b1–2 that he has distinguished the fourth genus *from the first three*, and should rather agree with G. Striker[3] and E. Benitez[4] that he has only distinguished it from the third, *τὸ μεικτόν*, and not from *τὸ ἄπειρον* and *τὸ πέρας*. A solution to the first problem could be to translate *τὸ δουλεῦον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτίᾳ* by 'that which

[1] Many thanks to Michèle Broze and David Sedley for their comments and suggestions.

[2] As an anonymous referee for this journal observes, J. C. B. Gosling may have felt some disquiet about this *ἄρα*, since in his translation for the Clarendon Plato series (Oxford, 1975) he translated it, without any comment, by 'In fact': 'In fact what is responsible for something and that which is under its influence in the process of generation are not identical? They are two different things?' (19). All the other translations I have consulted have words like 'hence' or 'therefore'.

[3] G. Striker, *Peras und Apeiron. Das Problem der Formen in Platons* Philebos (Göttingen, 1970), 69–70.

[4] E. E. Benitez, *Forms in Plato's* Philebus (Assen, 1989), 84.

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is bound to become by a cause', with E. Benitez;[5] but this precisely leads to the second problem. If we want to avoid both of them, we should therefore construe τὸ δουλεῦον as referring to τὸ ἄπειρον and τὸ πέρας, ἐξ ὧν what comes into being comes into being, as Socrates says at 27a11, and corresponding to what the *Phaedo* calls ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ' εἴη αἴτιον (99b3–4), by contrast with the cause itself. This would make good sense of their qualification as 'slaves'. In this case, the priority of the cause would be stated twice, in two different ways: the first time, in relation to the product, by the verb ἡγεῖται (27a5)—in this case the priority is purely 'temporal', or at least 'logical'; the second time, in relation to its 'components', that is τὸ ἄπειρον and τὸ πέρας, by calling them τὸ δουλεῦον (27a8–9)—in this case, the priority is axiological. But how can we obtain this meaning from the text?

(1) A first alternative would be to turn the whole sentence into a question which introduces a new step in the argument by changing the accent of ἄρα at 27a8 into ἆρα and putting a question mark at the end.[6] This use of ἆρα alone would not be at all incompatible with the fact that a positive answer is expected: by itself, this particle does not imply any expectation of a positive or a negative answer, and there are many cases in which ἆρα alone does actually expect a positive answer, though ostensibly leaving the issue open to the person addressed.[7] *Τί μήν*; (27a10) would be a perfectly plausible answer to such a question, as its wide use in the *Philebus* confirms (see notably 29d9, where it answers a question containing ἆρ' οὐκ, but also 29d9, 33a2, 33e7, 34a9, 34e12, etc.).

The main objection against this reading would certainly be that, in that case, ἆρα would stand in second position in the sentence, while it usually stands first in prose; but it is interesting to notice that Plato is precisely the prose writer who postpones ἆρα the most frequently, and even more freely than the poets: Denniston[8] gives more than twenty examples of such postponements in the Dialogues, among which we can note a text of the *Philebus* which is very close to the present one (27b9–c1: τὴν δὲ τῆς μείξεως αἰτίαν καὶ γενέσεως τετάρτην λέγων ἆρα μὴ πλημμελοίην ἄν τι;), and, more interestingly, *Prt.* 358c4, where ἆρα stands alone in second position in a question which expects a positive answer (ἀμαθίαν ἆρα τὸ τοιόνδε λέγετε, τὸ ψευδῆ ἔχειν δόξαν καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν πολλοῦ ἀξίων;).

It is true that in most of the cases cited by Denniston, what stands before ἆρα is the whole group to which the question is belatedly attached, probably for emphatic purpose or, more precisely, in order to make immediately clear the theme of the question (in addition to the two texts quoted above, see e.g. *Grg.* 467e6–7: *Τὰ* δὲ *μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ* ἆρα *τοιάδε λέγεις, ἃ . . .*; *Prm.* 156a4–5: *Τὸ* δὴ *οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν* ἆρά *γε οὐ γίγνεσθαι καλεῖς*;), while at *Phlb.* 27a8 ἆρα would appear in the middle of the group which is the point of the question (*Ἄλλο . . . καὶ οὐ*

[5] Benitez (n. 3), 84. See also L. Robin, *Platon : Œuvres complètes. Traduction nouvelle et notes* (Paris, 1950), II, 573, who translates: 'ce qui, pour venir à exister, est asservi à une cause'.

[6] As C. M. J. Sicking remarks in 'Particles in questions in Plato', in A. Rijksbaron (ed.), *New Approaches to Greek Particles* (Amsterdam, 1997), 157–74, at 167–8, ἄρα-utterances can also be printed with a question mark; but the questions thus formed remain conclusive: they merely submit 'for confirmation or denial a suggestion based on the preceding statement or formula of assent' (J. M. van Ophuijsen, *Ὅ*ΟΥΝ, *ΑΡΑ*, *ΔΗ*, *ΤΟΙΝΥΝ*: the linguistic articulation of arguments in Plato's *Phaedo*', in C. M. J. Sicking and J. M. van Ophuijsen, *Two Studies in Attic Particle Usage. Lysias and Plato* [Leiden, 1993], 116). Hence the change of accent is necessary for obtaining a question which introduces a real new point.

[7] Cf. J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (Oxford, 1954[2]), 46–7.

[8] Denniston (n. 6), 49–50.

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ταὐτόν). But there are parallels for such an 'unnatural' position of ἆρα. For example, at *R.* 487a7–8, Socrates asks τελεωθεῖσι τοῖς τοιούτοις παιδείᾳ τε καὶ ἡλικίᾳ ἆρα οὐ μόνοις ἂν τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτρέποις;, where the theme of the question certainly includes μόνοις; and, at *R.* 405a6–7, ἆρα μή occurs in a group of words which separates a complement from the noun it completes, this noun being the true theme of the question (Τῆς δὲ κακῆς τε καὶ αἰσχρᾶς παιδείας ἐν πόλει ἆρα μή τι μεῖζον ἕξεις λαβεῖν τεκμήριον ἤ. . .).[9] The contrary situation is also possible: for example, at *R.* 437d8–10, we read δίψα ἐστὶ δίψα ἆρά γε θερμοῦ ποτοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ, ἢ πολλοῦ ἢ ὀλίγου, ἢ καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ ποιοῦ τινος πώματος;, though the theme of the question is merely the first δίψα, the second going with the genitives which follow.

The position of ἆρα at *Phlb.* 27a8 as I propose to read it does therefore not seem incompatible with the way Plato uses grammar, and might perhaps be explained by a willingness to emphasize not only what is placed before (ἄλλο), but also what is placed after (καὶ οὐ ταὐτόν), both forming the whole theme of the question.

(2) Another alternative, suggested to me by David Sedley, would be to keep ἄρα and to put a full stop after ἄλλο ἄρα, which in this case would relate to the distinction between the cause and the product, while in the rest of his intervention Socrates would simply assert that the cause is also different from the components of the mixture, an assertion then confirmed by Protarchus.

In any case, both alternatives would make the argument sounder without really emending the text.

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doi:10.1093/cq/bmi057

[9] *Euthphr.* 6b7–8 (Καὶ πόλεμον ἄρα ἡγῇ σύ εἶναι τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους. . .;) may be another parallel, but one could here as well print ἄρα, as for example A. Croiset does in the Budé series (Paris, 1941[2]).

ARISTOTLE ON THE HOMERIC NARRATOR

Ὅμηρος δὲ ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἄξιος ἐπαινεῖσθαι καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι μόνος τῶν ποιητῶν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ ὃ δεῖ ποιεῖν αὐτόν. αὐτὸν γὰρ δεῖ τὸν ποιητὴν ἐλάχιστα λέγειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐστι κατὰ ταῦτα μιμητής. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν δι' ὅλου ἀγωνίζονται, μιμοῦνται δὲ ὀλίγα καὶ ὀλιγάκις· ὁ δὲ ὀλίγα προοιμιασάμενος εὐθὺς εἰσάγει ἄνδρα ἢ γυναῖκα ἢ ἄλλο τι ἦθος, καὶ οὐδὲν' ἀήθη ἀλλ' ἐχόντ' ἤθος.

There is near consensus among scholars about the interpretation of the above passage from the *Poetics* (1460 a 5–11, text R. Kassel): Homer is praised because his poems have so little narrative and so much speech. This interpretation is defended by Bywater, Else, Lucas, Fuhrmann, and Halliwell.[1] In 1987 I suggested a different interpretation: Homer is praised because only in the proems he speaks in his own voice.[2] At that time I was neither aware that this was such

[1] I. Bywater, *Aristotle. On the Art of Poetry* (Oxford, 1909), 100–1, 118–19, 316–17; G. F. Else, *Aristotle's Poetics: the Argument* (Cambridge, MA, 1957), 620–1; D. W. Lucas, *Aristotle* Poetics (Oxford, 1968), 226–7; M. Fuhrmann, *Aristoteles* Poetik(Municn, 1976), 101 n. 10; S. Halliwell, *Aristotle's* Poetics (London, 1986), 126–7; *The* Poetics *of Aristotle* (London, 1987), 171–3.

[2] I. J. F. de Jong, *Narrators and Focalizers. The Presentation of the Story in the Iliad* (Amsterdam, 1987), 5–8.

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