answers that the definition of 'man' is true of Socrates but the definition of 'pallor' is not. But his asymmetrical answer depends on an asymmetrical identification of the predicates. Pair 'man' with 'pale' and 'pallor' with 'humanity': then there is a symmetrical answer, the definitions of 'man' and of 'pale' being true of Socrates and the definitions of 'pallor' and of 'humanity' not.

M. packs far more into his short book than this review can mention. He has hatched a rare bird: an essay which takes a tired topic and proves both original and exhilarating.

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DIALOGUE AND PERPLEXITY

J. J. CLEARY, G. M. GURTLER (edd.): *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. XIII, 1997*. Pp. xviii + 291. Leiden, Boston, and Cologne: Brill, 1999. Cased, $71. ISBN: 90-04-11394-0.

'Working to prepare this commentary I have learned both from his paper and because of his paper as I returned to familiar passages with a fresh set of insights and questions.'

This quotation from W. Wians's comment on R. Bolton's paper 'Aristotle on Essence and Necessity' neatly expresses the value of a publication such as this, in which each colloquium consists of a main paper, a comment, and a joint bibliography. Such a format is probably the best refutation that can be made of Plato's assertion that a book cannot answer back! And it is with Plato that most of the colloquia are concerned. One exception is that on Aristotle, already mentioned, in which Wians takes issue with Bolton's 'highly original' interpretation of A.'s account of 'scientific knowledge', an interpretation in which he seeks 'a single type of necessity that applies to all principles without involving essences' and argues, against widely held scholarly positions, 'that *A Po* I 4–6 focus on scientific conclusions rather than premises'.

The other exception is the colloquium on Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, which features here not because the Proceedings have inadvertently strayed into the field of literary criticism, but because, J. Moravcsik suggests, dramatists present in action themes about which philosophers theorize. He interprets the play as 'centering around the development, destruction and rebuilding—on a deeper level—of a friendship', a view that is challenged by D. Konstan, who points rather to pity and honesty as the major determinants in Neoptolemus' behaviour.

Three main themes emerge from the colloquia on Plato. G. B. Mathews traces 'The Career of Perplexity in Plato', suggesting that P.'s views on the 'aporetic' method of philosophy and his consequent portrayal of Socrates' rôle in the dialogues developed over time to the point where S. is given the honourable rôle of midwife to philosophical truths (as in the *Theaetetus*) and is finally pensioned off (my phrase) in favour of discussion of specific perplexities that can be (re)solved.

In his paper 'Plato's Statesman and Politics' J. M. Cooper contends that the argument which the Visitor uses to establish the thesis that the expertise of the ideal statesman is to be identified with that of the ideal king is so 'flagrantly invalid' that in reality 'the king is assimilated to the statesman, not the other way about'. In his commentary P. Mitis strongly rebuts the view that Plato is thereby acknowledging that

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https://doi.org/10.1093/cr/51.1.66 Published online by Cambridge University Press

some experts (generals, judges, orators, and public educators) have 'a substantial title to be exercising a statesmanlike skill'. The ideal ruler is also the subject of M. Schofield's paper, 'The Disappearance of the Philosopher King', in which he suggests that, whereas his initial non-appearance in the *Timaeus* and his total non-appearance in the *Statesman* can be explained without damage to a unitarian view of Plato's dialogues, his non-appearance in the *Laws* cannot, and 'the familiar developmental story of optimism turning to pessimism is vindicated'. R. Kamtekar agrees that many differences between the *Republic* and the *Statesman* can be explained by the differing purposes of the dialogues (what Schofield terms the 'bottom up' creation of the ideal state vs. the 'top down' definition of the ideal ruler), but she also argues that the *Laws can* be viewed much more positively as an attempt to establish in practical terms the nearest approximation to the ideal state and the ideal ruler.

References in that colloquium to paradigms and approximations link very closely with the three remaining colloquia. D. R. Miller welcomes L. Brisson's 'accurate and useful' discussion of 'Plato's Theory of Sense Perception in the *Timaeus*: How it Works and What it Means' (which includes a translation of and commentary on colours in *Tim*. 67c–68d) but does not share his view that the links between body and soul and within the soul are ill-defined.

Exactly what it is that the perceiving and thinking soul/mind is doing is also the central issue both in M. Dixsaut's paper 'What is it Plato Calls Thinking?' and in N. D. Smith's 'How the Prisoners in Plato's Cave are "Like Us" '. D. argues that thinking (*dianoeisthai*), defined in the *Theaetetus* as the dialogue of the soul within itself, is common to all four states of mind/soul on the Divided Line and in fact *is* the line, 'the single underlying activity' which is thus divided. She then equates *eikasia* with the state of conjecture and uncertainty of the soul working with images of objects, and *dianoia*, its counterpart on the top half of the line, with the state of conjecture and uncertainty of the soul working with images of the intelligibles. The aspect of *eikasia* which S. stresses, on the other hand, is that of the resemblance or approximation of the shadow or image to its original. He takes Socrates to be referring to his present company and to their attempts in Book 1 to define justice, which though inadequate do 'capture some of the truth of the Platonic conception' and are not entirely jettisoned. 'It follows that the *Republic* is a remarkably unified work', a view with which D. Roochnik wholeheartedly agrees. He does, however, suggest yet another interpretation of *eikasia*, that of a 'kind of double seeing', since we do not commonly mistake shadows and reflections for their originals. In which case the prisoners 'like us' are not in a state of *eikasia*, but of *pistis*, a confident trust in their sensory perceptions.

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STOICISM

K. Ierodiakonou (ed.): *Topics in Stoic Philosophy.* Pp. 259. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999. Cased, £40. ISBN: 0-19-823768-5.

This collection consists of the editor's introduction and eight articles, none previously published in English.

The first two articles concern Stoic logic. Jonathan Barnes asks whether there is anything that Chrysippus in his logic held because of something that Aristotle had held in his logic, taking 'because' broadly. The interest of the article lies more in the nature of the ground covered than in the conclusion, which is that there is not enough

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https://doi.org/10.1093/cr/51.1.66 Published online by Cambridge University Press