Debating Allison on Transcendental Idealism

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Wood on Allison

People talk about rats deserting a sinking ship, but they don't usually ask where the rats go. Perhaps this is only because the answer is so obvious: of course, most of the rats climb aboard the sounder ships, the ships that ride high in the water despite being laden with rich cargoes of cheese and grain and other things rats love, the ships that bring prosperity to ports like eighteenth-century Königsberg and firms such as Green & Motherby. By making the insulting comparison – as I am in the course of doing – between us Kant scholars and a horde of noxious vermin, my more or less transparent aim is to mitigate, or at least to distract attention from, the collective immodesty of what I am saying about us. For my point is that, in the past half-century or so, Kant studies has become a very prosperous ship indeed. Its success has even been the chief thing that has buoyed all its sister ships in the fleet of modern philosophy, most of which are also doing very well.

Time was when analytical philosophers treated everything before Frege and Russell as a Dark Age, worth mentioning at all only when it might provide analytical philosophers with some suitable object of derision and contempt when compared with themselves. But this state of affairs has long since ceased to prevail, and those remaining analytical philosophers who sometimes still act that way are seen not only by others, but usually even by themselves, as a dwindling breed of blinkered cranks, stubbornly holding on to a superannuated view of the philosophical world.

This success of Kant studies could not have taken place without the labour of many, many rodents assiduously gnawing away below

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decks on texts, arguments, theories and philosophical problems. But when the history of the late twentieth-century success of Kant studies comes to be written – and if it is written, as most histories tend to be, by focusing on only a very few of the most important accomplishments – then I think the narrative will have to be constructed chiefly around two books. Each of them marked the beginning of a distinct phase of analytical Kant studies.

The first book was Peter F. Strawson's *The Bounds of Sense*, published in 1966. Its author's death this past February 13 is much lamented by all who knew him – even by those, like myself, whose Kant courses have for over 30 years included annual protests that the Second Analogy *does not* involve a 'non-sequitur of numbing grossness'.[1] This book, as Strawson told me as recently as last November, was never intended as a piece of 'Kant scholarship', but rather was meant to be a critical philosophical encounter with Kant's ideas. This was what it had to be at the time, if it was going to get analytical philosophers to begin to take Kant's philosophy seriously. That could never have been achieved by even the best Kant scholarship being done at the time – by Lewis White Beck and some others. Strawson's book, however, made possible a second stage, in which Kant's philosophy could be defended sympathetically and in detail in books that lay claim to scholarly fidelity to the texts as well as to the philosophical rigour and sophistication necessary to engage analytical philosophers.

This second stage was initiated by Henry Allison's *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, published in 1983.[2] It established a new standard for philosophical work on Kant, and also made Kant's philosophy available as a serious option to many philosophers who previously could not have seen it in that light at all. I submit that, if it had not been for Allison, many other fine books on Kant's philosophy that combine careful scholarship with philosophical originality would not have had nearly so receptive an audience.

Thus, when Allison told me a couple of years ago that he was bringing out a second, revised, edition of *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, my initial reaction was both caution and scepticism. For I was afraid that, in trying to improve a good thing, Henry might be ruining it. This is, after all, an extremely common species of human folly, to which the best things are also the most vulnerable. However, when I got my copy of the new edition, I was both relieved and delighted to see that the most obvious change was one of which

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I enthusiastically approved.[3] In the first edition, the third part of the book was a sort of grab-bag of topics about which Allison has written much more in the intervening years. In the new edition, the third part was devoted instead to a detailed and systematic account of the Transcendental Dialectic. That is something still too rare in the Kant literature, and also vital for a proper understanding of the critical philosophy, since (as I always tell my first *Critique* classes on the first day) it is in the Dialectic rather than the Analytic that Kant hopes to achieve the main goals of his critique of reason.

In view of this prominence of the Transcendental Dialectic in the new edition of *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, it would seem appropriate for me to devote these comments mainly to some topic falling under it. If possible, this should be a topic specific enough that I might say something critical about it in a short compass, while being also a topic with significant implications for Allison's conception of Kantian transcendental idealism. The topic I select is Kant's attempt to resolve the Antinomies of Pure Reason, and especially Kant's attempt to draw a kind of indirect proof of transcendental idealism from this resolution. Allison defends Kant's argument on this point, but I remain sceptical and want to raise some questions about it.

Following the work of his student, Michelle Grier,[4] Allison diagnoses the antinomies as turning on a conflation of two principles, which he and Grier call 'P_1' and 'P_2'.

P_1: 'Find the unconditioned for the conditioned cognitions of the understanding, with which [the unity of a series of regressive conditions] will be completed' (A 307/B 364).

P_2: '[W]hen the conditioned is given, then so is the whole series of conditions, subordinated one to the other, which is itself also given (i.e. contained in the object and its connection)' (A 307–8/B 364).

P_1 tells you to *look for* the unconditioned in respect of a regressive series – a series such as the past events in time, regions of the world in space, parts of composites, causes of changes, or grounds of the existence of things. P_2 tells you that *there is something* there to be found, that the entire series exists as a whole. Prima facie it seems reasonable to pass from P_1 to P_2, since it makes sense to

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think that if you are unconditionally required to find something, then you are also justified in thinking it is there to be found. This is especially the case if the thing you are looking for is conceived as a *necessary condition* of the very thing with which your quest began. The problem, of course, is that the totality constituted by each regressive series can be conceived of in two ways, as either finite or infinite – either as having a first, unconditioned member or else as extending infinitely, with every member being conditioned by further members ad infinitum. These would seem, moreover, to be the only two possible options. Furthermore, for each option, there seems to be a decisive argument showing that it has to be the right one – an argument that works by showing the opposed option to be impossible. This generates a series of contradictions or antinomies, whose resolution seems indispensable if theoretical reason is to be saved from inconsistency in thinking about the world.

Kant's solution, as Allison presents it, is to accept P_1 but avoid the inference from it to P_2. The Kantian slogan for this is: *to treat principles of reason, such as P_1, not as constitutive, but as regulative only*. I give the thesis on which this solution is based a name: the 'regulativity of reason' (or just 'RR' for short). I won't discuss how Kant proposes to establish RR, but will instead focus attention on a supposed corollary of this way of resolving the antinomies that Allison wants to defend, namely that it yields an indirect proof for transcendental idealism – for the doctrine that the objects of our cognition are appearances only, not things in themselves, and a rejection of transcendental realism, the doctrine that the objects of our cognition are things in themselves. The problem is that I don't see how his further step follows. I don't see how RR entails transcendental idealism. I don't see why it would be necessary to accept transcendental idealism in order to use RR to resolve the antinomies.

Allison himself says one thing that might even suggest that he could agree with me here. He says:

> What makes transcendental realism ultimately incoherent and, therefore, 'necessarily false,' only emerges through its combination with P_2, since this leads the realist to regard a putatively *an sich* existing sensible world as a totality (*totum syntheticum*), which in turn generates the antinomial conflict. (pp. 393–4)

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Here Allison seems to be saying that transcendental realism leads to the antinomies only when it is combined with P_2. But then we might ask whether it wouldn't generate exactly the same antinomial conflict if we accepted P_2 while *not* regarding the sensible world as existing in itself – in other words, while accepting transcendental idealism. Conversely, we might ask whether the transcendental realist, who regards the sensible world as existing *an sich*, couldn't avoid the antinomies in exactly the same way Kant does, simply by accepting RR and therefore denying P_2, while still asserting that the objects of our cognition are things in themselves. What it takes to resolve the antinomies, it seems to me, is not the acceptance of transcendental idealism, but only the acceptance of RR. My question is: how is transcendental idealism supposed to be necessary for that?

There is one all too familiar way of answering this question, which depends on a certain way of interpreting transcendental idealism. Let me call this the 'hypochlorite' interpretation. It takes transcendental idealism to be a mind-boggling metaphysical doctrine that denies us access to all true reality, demotes the empirical world to a kind of illusion and gives us cognitive access only to the bleached-out objects that belong to this inferior realm. This interpretation holds that real things, things in themselves, cause in our minds a phenomenal world distinct from them which is composed entirely of subjective representations, on which our mind imposes certain necessary orderings. The knowable world of appearance is nothing but a flimsy sequence of subjective phantasms, while the real world remains always beyond our ken. I call this the 'hypochlorite' interpretation because it treats objects of sense as nothing but a tattered ordering of subjective impressions in our minds, like that expensive dress shirt with the tag screaming 'DO NOT BLEACH' that you carelessly tossed in the washing machine, along with a cup of bleach, when you washed those rags you used to clean up the mess you made on the garage floor.

On this interpretation, nothing is really given to our cognition except our actual sense impressions. The world of appearance is simply these, perhaps supplemented by a set of transcendentally grounded counterfactual conjectures about what sense impressions we would have if such-and-such were to happen. On this reading, transcendental idealism accepts P_1 as a regulative principle for making such conjectures and for seeking order among representations, but it avoids P_2 because it regards the world of appearance as noth-

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ing except the subjective representations actually given in our individual minds. It follows from this that no regressive cosmological series ever is, or ever could be, actually given in its totality. So both the infinity of the series and its first member can never be given. The place where they would be is empty, like the gaping holes in that expensive shirt, dissolved away by the corrosive hypochlorite of transcendental idealism. Thus, it would be only transcendental realists who are stuck with the real existence of the synthetic cosmological totalities that lead to the antinomies. Having refused to soak the fabric of reality in transcendental bleach, their world is not in tatters. They have stubbornly refused to reduce the knowable world to a string of paper dolls cut out of subjective tissue paper, and now they pay the price for their wicked ontological self-indulgence by having to contradict themselves. The transcendental idealist, with his virtuous metaphysical abstinence, is rewarded by being able to avoid the dilemma.

Despite the moral edification it might seem to involve, however, the hypochlorite interpretation of transcendental idealism is a non-starter because it is incompatible with Kant's basic doctrines regarding the category of reality or existence. Kant insists that that category applies, regarding the world of appearance, not only to what is directly given in perception but also to whatever is connected to or can be inferred from what is given according to transcendental and empirical laws (*KrV*, A 218, 225–6/B 265–6, 272–3). This is the only way transcendental idealism could ever allow for the real existence or actuality, as parts of the sensible world, of the minute insensible parts of middle-sized bodies, or extremely distant astronomical objects that we can't directly see but might learn about, for instance, through theoretical inferences from the data of radioastronomy. It is also the only way we can include in the phenomenal world those past events that occurred before any humans were there to perceive them, such as the events through which our solar system came into being out of a rotating nebula, as Kant hypothesized in his 1755 essay *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*.

Kant never embraces any instrumentalist reduction of claims about small or distant objects or past events. He insists they are 'existent' or 'actual' (and, in that sense, *given* as parts of the sensible world) every bit as much as the hand I right now thrust in front of my face. Kant's sensible world is therefore not a bleached-out, tattered remnant of the common-sense realist's world, as the hypochlorite

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interpretation of transcendental idealism would maintain. But if we count as existent or 'given' whatever can be inferred by transcendental principles from what is directly given in immediate intuition, then it would seem that the *totum syntheticum* involved in a regressive cosmological series might also be counted as existent or given, as it is connected to what is given through a necessary principle of reason.

One way to avoid this conclusion, of course, would be RR, which distinguishes the principle of reason P_1 from those transcendental principles of understanding through which we infer the existence or givenness of whatever is empirically real but can never be immediately present in sensation. But P_1 is a transcendental principle, so it is no longer immediately clear why RR should be any more acceptable to a transcendental idealist than to a transcendental realist. In other words, if we soak the world of sense in enough ontological bleach to make RR seem like an obvious consequence of transcendental idealism, then we get a more ontologically faded and tattered sensible world than Kant allows. But if – to mix our laundry-room metaphors – the transcendental idealist's sensible world contains enough ontological starch to include very small, very distant or long-past entities and events, then it is no longer immediately clear why it should not also include the cosmological series as synthetic totalities.

Even if we can avoid that consequence by accepting RR, it is not clear why there would have to be a connection between RR and transcendental idealism. Of course, it is true that unless transcendental idealists embrace something like RR, they are threatened with being committed to cognitions of the transcendent, which would force them to give up their transcendental idealism. But why should this count as an argument for RR, and not rather as an objection to transcendental idealism, which apparently cannot consistently embrace the postulate of actuality? Unless we have some independent reason for accepting RR, then it looks like merely an ad hoc way out of this difficulty. But we have not considered Kant's arguments for RR, so let's suppose that Kant has an independent reason why a transcendental idealist should embrace RR. Then this problem would go away. But there would still seem to be no reason for saying that it is necessary to be a transcendental idealist in order to hold RR. Transcendental realism is simply the doctrine that the objects of our cognition are things in themselves. There might be any number of

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different systems of metaphysics, epistemology and theories of the methodology of inquiry that accept transcendental realism and also have some reason for accepting P_1 as a merely heuristic or regulative principle of inquiry. These transcendental realists could offer exactly the same solution to the antinomies as Kant does. Unless it is shown why such a version of transcendental realism is impossible, Kant's attempt to draw an indirect proof for transcendental idealism from his resolution of the antinomies must be a failure.

I hasten to add that, much to his credit, Allison has always decisively rejected anything like the hypochlorite interpretation of transcendental idealism. He has long been well known for advancing what he calls a 'two-aspect' interpretation of it, according to which the appearances or phenomena found in the sensible world are every bit as robustly real, solid, vividly coloured and starchy as any entities existing in themselves, for the simple reason that, on this interpretation of transcendental idealism, appearances simply *are the very same entities as things in themselves*. On Allison's interpretation, what transcendental idealism asserts about these real entities is only that we cognize them not as they are in themselves, but only as they are given to us in sensible intuition and thought through the categories of pure understanding. For Allison, therefore, transcendental idealism is not a strange new metaphysical doctrine reducing the world around us to a one-ply tissue of subjective illusion, but instead a doctrine advocating due epistemic modesty about our knowledge of real things that – as real – of course exist quite independently of our knowledge of them. It is not, however, as some of Allison's critics have charged, an 'anodyne' recommendation of epistemological modesty. For it specifies precise (perhaps even controversial) limits for our possible cognition; it also opposes many views widely held during the modern period, which have either maintained that our metaphysical knowledge is not restricted to objects in the sensible world or else denied that we can meaningfully think about objects that we cannot also cognize.

Yet this seems to me only to make matters worse for Allison's attempt to defend Kant's use of the resolution of the antinomies as an indirect proof for transcendental idealism. And there would be a further apparent internal inconsistency involved in Kant's use of the antinomies to provide an indirect proof of transcendental idealism, even if we waive all the difficulties I have been raising so far. In Transcendental Doctrine of Method, Kant draws the conclu-

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sion (mainly from the antinomies themselves) that the proofs used in metaphysics must always be *ostensive*, never *apagogic* (A 789/B 817). That is, they must always exhibit the sources from which the proof draws its grounds of assent, and never content themselves with merely showing that the denial of the proposition to be proven leads to contradiction or absurdity. But it looks as if Kant's attempt to prove transcendental idealism through his resolution of the antinomies violates this stricture, by arguing against transcendental realism merely indirectly or apagogically, inferring transcendental idealism solely from the contradictions into which its alleged opposite, transcendental realism, is supposedly driven.

Kant's main argument for transcendental idealism, of course, is the one supposedly contained in the Conclusions from the above Concepts in both the spatial and temporal parts of the Metaphysical Expositions in the Transcendental Aesthetic (A 2630, 32–6/B 42–5, 49–53). Whether it is a good or a bad argument, it is not affected by the failure of Kant's attempt to support the same conclusion through his resolution of the antinomies. That resolution, as it seems to me, entitles him only to RR and not to any argument for transcendental idealism.

Allison's characteristic way of answering the objection I am raising here brings to light a tendency in his interpretation of Kant that seems to have intensified in this second edition but which I have always found both puzzling and problematic. Increasingly, Allison seems to think of 'transcendental idealism' and 'transcendental realism' not as fairly definite positions in metaphysics or epistemology, but as something more like two encompassing world-views, which he sometimes describes as 'meta-philosophical'. His remarks on this score might sometimes remind us of Fichte's opposition between criticism and dogmatism in the *First Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre* (1797), or Engels' contrast of idealism with materialism in some of his popular expositions of Marxism.[5] Kant actually seldom contrasts transcendental idealism with 'transcendental realism', and even where he does (as in the Fourth Paralogism in A) he seems to me never to portray the opposition in so Manichean a fashion. The effect of Allison's way of looking at matters, it seems to me, is to represent anyone who does not accept Kantian transcendental idealism as committed to a rigid 'transcendental realist' position on many things – such as the constitutive status of principles of reason – that you would not necessarily have to hold merely because

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you maintain (as a common-sense realist) that we cognize objects as they are in themselves. Allison's way of looking at the opposition therefore makes it seem easier to defend transcendental idealism than it properly is.

My questions here are typical of those with which Allison has had to deal since the first edition in that they are also questions about the defensibility of Kant's own position. Allison may not always convince us of the truth of questionable Kantian doctrines, but we usually get from him a defence of them that strikes us as being about as good as they probably admit. That, more than anything else, is why – to return at the end to the dubious metaphor with which I began – Henry Allison, more than anyone else, has been like a Pied Piper, attracting an increasing swarm of clever rats to Kant studies during the past two decades. This second edition will give them all a lot more to nibble at for years to come.

Notes

1 Kant's crucial inference in the argument in the Second Analogy, according to Strawson, 'can seem legitimate only if the critical faculty is numbed by the grossness of the non sequitur' (Peter F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense* (London: Methuen, 1966), p. 28).

2 Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983).

3 Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, 2nd edn (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004). Cited below by page number.

4 Michelle Grier, *Kant's Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

5 Fichte, *First Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre*, in Daniel Breazeale (ed. and tr.) *Fichte: Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and other writings* (1797–1800) (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994); Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, *Marx and Engels: Selected Works in One Volume* (New York: International Publishers, 1968), pp. 602–4.

Guyer on Allison

The first edition of Henry Allison's *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense* has been one of the most widely read and influential works on Kant in the last quarter-century. It

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is a model of a sympathetic defence of the work of a philosopher whose influence on modern philosophy is inescapable, but some of whose original doctrines had come to be seen as anachronistic or idiosyncratic, best left behind by the march of history. In addition to its effort to be as sympathetic to its subject as possible, another feature that has made the book exemplary is its detailed engagement with the secondary literature of the previous decades; students can learn a great deal not only about Kant but also about the history of Kant interpretation from Allison's work. Both of these factors help explain why Allison has taken on the enormous task of not merely expanding but also extensively rewriting what was already a very large book:[1] not everyone has been sympathetic to his sympathetic interpretation of Kant, and he has felt called upon to defend his position; but he has also addressed the secondary literature of the last two decades in as much detail as he had addressed the older literature in the original version of his book. Further, Allison has transformed his two chapters on the first and second Analogies of Experience in his first edition into an integrated treatment of all three Analogies in his new edition, and has added a detailed study of the Transcendental Dialectic that had no predecessor in the original work at all. All of these factors have contributed to a major new book, which will surely be discussed for years to come.

Since my interpretation and critique of Kant's transcendental idealism has widely been seen as an alternative to Allison's interpretation and defence of it, I will start by describing the conflict between our interpretations and explaining why I remain unconvinced by his interpretation and defence. But before I do that, let me say two things: first, whatever one's disagreements, one can only admire the scope and vigour of Allison's work; and, second, there are in fact many points in Allison's new book with which I fundamentally agree. In spite of some differences of detail, I think that there are deep affinities between his integrated approach to the Analogies of Experience and my own, and I trust that between the two of us we have now established that the Analogies can be read only as a unitary and comprehensive theory of time-determination.[2] And while I agree with Allen Wood that Allison's new interpretation of the Antinomy of Pure Reason does not save Kant's indirect proof of transcendental idealism, I think that Allison's demonstration of how the Paralogisms, Antinomy and Ideal of Pure Reason all flow from reason's idea of the unconditioned, building upon the work

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of Michelle Grier, as he rightly (and proudly) makes clear, is deeply illuminating.

But now let me turn to some points of disagreement. After explaining why I continue to disagree with Allison's underlying interpretation of transcendental idealism, I will also make some remarks about his treatment of the Transcendental Deduction, the Refutation of Idealism, and the regulative ideal of systematicity.

The essence of Allison's interpretation of transcendental idealism has always been his insistence that Kant makes not a metaphysical or ontological distinction between appearances and things in themselves as two different classes of objects, but an epistemological, methodological or metaphilosophical distinction between two ways of considering one and the same things: one, considering them as appearances, which includes the features of things in virtue of which they can be known by us, or 'epistemic conditions', and the other, considering them as 'things in themselves', which omits precisely these conditions. As Allison puts it, 'the thought of things as they are in themselves abstracts from an essential condition of human cognition' (p. 18). Thus, on Allison's view, Kant does not posit any things in themselves that are numerically distinct from appearances or actually lack any of the properties of such ordinary things – except, of course, in the special case of the transcendent things, namely the soul and God, which, should they exist at all, do lack either the spatial or, in the case of God, both the spatial and temporal properties of ordinary things. Instead, Kant only introduces a *concept* of things that omits those very properties by means of which we are capable of knowing things. Now, I have never held that Kant posits a second set of things that are ontologically distinct from ordinary things or appearances, except again of course in the cases of the soul and God, but I have held that Kant does argue, although in my view not very persuasively, for the claim that things – in some sense, the very same things we ordinarily talk about – do lack the very properties, namely spatiality and temporality, in terms of which all of our ordinary reference to them and discourse about them is couched. Thus, I have attributed to Kant not a two-world view, but an alternative version of a two-aspect view, on which Kant holds that spatiality and temporality are not aspects of things as they are in themselves but are a necessary aspect of our representations of them. I have also put this by saying that Kant removed spatiality and temporality from objects to our representations of them, just as

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previous philosophers had done for properties such as colour and smell – although for a diametrically opposed reason, that is, not the supposed *contingency* of our perception of those properties, but rather precisely because of the supposed *necessity* of our perception of those properties (see *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 28/B 44–5) – but that in so doing he was not adding a *third* class of objects to the world, just redistributing properties between the two classes of objects – namely, representations and things distinct from our representations – that every philosopher of the period, with the possible exception of Thomas Reid, already recognized.

Now I will say three things about Allison's interpretation that have always worried me, and about which I do not find that the new version of his book changes my mind. First, I have never understood why Kant should be thought to have introduced a concept of things that is merely supposed to celebrate the necessity of our 'epistemic conditions' for the cognition of objects precisely by *omitting* those conditions, unless he had some *independent reason* to hold that those epistemic conditions *could not also be* properties of objects. Second, it has always seemed to me clear that Kant *does* offer arguments that are intended to show that spatiality and temporality in particular are not and cannot be properties of things that exist independently of our representations of those things and which *for that reason* must be omitted from our conception of things as they are *in themselves*. Third, I do not believe that Allison actually succeeds in consistently maintaining his stance that Kant excludes spatiality and temporality only from the *concepts* of things as they are and does not ever himself assert that *things* really are not spatial and temporal. I believe that there are many places in the new book that make this clear. Indeed, I believe that in fact Allison himself actually expounds the argument that I have always maintained leads Kant to the denial that things as they are in themselves are spatial and temporal without realizing that this undermines his merely conceptual or abstractionist interpretation of Kant's transcendental idealism.

An adequate discussion of this vexed issue would go well beyond the space I have here, so I can only amplify these worries a bit. Let me begin with the simple point that a concept that merely *abstracts* from certain properties its objects would ordinarily be thought to have does not by itself give us any reason to change our beliefs about what properties those objects *do* have.[3] For example, a description of the qualifications for a job that omits all reference to the sex of

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candidates because of equal employment opportunity regulations does not imply that the successful candidate will not have a sex or must be an XXY chromosomal aberration. It simply means that those who are to make the hiring decision are not supposed to take the sex of the candidate into consideration in making their choice. Moreover, as this example suggests, when we formulate a concept of a type of object that abstracts from a property (or set of properties) that objects of that type would ordinarily be thought to have, we usually do so for some particular reason, in this case the belief that sex-based hiring decisions are invidious. In other words, it would be strange for anyone to form a concept of things that abstracts from what would ordinarily be thought to be such obvious properties as spatiality and temporality *unless he or she had some independent reason to believe that those are not real properties of things* (in this case, of course, not a moral reason like the principle that sex *ought* not to be a factor in most hiring decisions, but some other kind of reason that shows that spatiality and/or temporality *cannot* be a real property of objects). Further, this would seem to be particularly true in the case of 'epistemic conditions', that is, conditions that objects must satisfy in order for us to have cognition of them, where the natural inference from the fact that we *do* have cognition of any object would be precisely that it *really does* satisfy the condition. In this case, to introduce a concept of objects that omits the fact of their satisfaction of such conditions surely calls for a special explanation. My contention has been that Kant takes himself to have such an explanation – namely, an account of the conditions of the possibility of a priori cognition of the spatiality and/or temporality of the objects of our cognition that makes it impossible for him to allow that objects satisfy those conditions in virtue of anything that is true of them independently of our representation of them – and that he formulates a conception of things in themselves that does not *abstract from* but *denies* their spatiality and/or temporality *because* of this account.[4] And what I want to suggest now is not only that Allison has not undermined my interpretation of Kant's strategic situation, but that he actually accepts it in his exposition of Kant's main argument for the ideality of space without realizing that this endangers his own interpretation of transcendental idealism.

Before I attempt to demonstrate this, however, let me also suggest another reason why we should reject the idea that Kant introduces a concept of things in themselves that abstracts from our epistemic

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conditions for the cognition of things (somehow) in order to emphasize the status of our epistemic conditions. This is that, as Allison of course recognizes and argues, the *categories* are also epistemic conditions for our cognition of objects, but Kant never denies that we can use the categories in conceiving of things in themselves. To be sure, Kant's critique of traditional metaphysics is that the categories by themselves and without input from sensibility cannot yield *cognition* of things in themselves and that the transformation of the categories into ideas of pure reason actually conflicts with the limits imposed upon our cognition by the limits of our sensibility, but he never denies that the categories enter into our *conception* of things in themselves. Therefore, being an epistemic condition, as the categories clearly are, cannot itself be a sufficient reason for exclusion from the concept of things in themselves.

That being said, I now turn back to the issue of the non-spatiality and/or temporality of things in themselves. Here I make two claims: first, that Allison does not actually remain within the merely methodological limits of his abstractionist interpretation of transcendental idealism, and, second, that he actually ascribes to Kant much the same (epistemological) argument that I have claimed leads Kant to the outright denial of the spatiality and/or temporality of things in themselves. As evidence of the first claim, I will just adduce one passage from the introduction to his Chapter 5 on The Sensible Conditions of Human Cognition, which contains, as it should, the heart of his case for his interpretation of transcendental idealism. Here he says that:

> Uncontroversially, Kant's doctrine of transcendental ideality involves a denial of the traditional ontologies of space and time (the alternatives available to transcendental realism), but it does not follow from this that it is itself an alternative ontology. It may also be seen as an *alternative* to ontology, according to which space and time are understood in terms of their epistemic functions (as forms or conditions of outer and inner sense, respectively), rather than as 'realities' of one sort or another. (p. 98)

To say that space and time should be considered in terms of their epistemic function *whether or not* they are also 'realities' of some sort might be to refuse to play the game of ontology; but, I suggest, to say that space and time should be considered as epistemic functions *rather than* as 'realities' of some sort is not to refrain from ontology at all, but is in fact to say precisely that space and time are

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functions or products of our way of representing objects rather than properties or relations of those objects themselves. (For some other passages where Allison inexorably slides into an ontological rather than metaphilosophical interpretation of transcendental idealism, see pp. 24–5, 67–8, and 127.)

The same kind of slide from a supposedly methodological interpretation of transcendental idealism to an ontological one was in fact evident in the first edition of *Kant's Transcendental Idealism* as well. In an important passage of that work, Allison wrote:

> . . . behind Kant's formal idealism, lies a principle that is implicit in the *Critique* as a whole, but is nowhere made fully explicit: that whatever is necessary for the representation of something as an object, that is, whatever is required for the recognition or picking out of what is 'objective' in our experience, must reflect the cognitive structure of the mind (its manner of representing) rather than the nature of the object as it is in itself. To claim otherwise is to assume that the mind can somehow have access to an object . . . independently of the very elements that have been stipulated to be the conditions of the possibility of doing this in the first place. This involves an obvious contradiction.[5]

Here too, in spite of his official position, Allison said that to claim that something is an epistemic condition ('required for the recognition or picking out of what is 'objective' in our experience') is to say that it reflects the structure of the mind *rather than* the nature of the object as it is in itself – an obviously ontological claim. Moreover, while to claim that the mind can have access to objects independently of its conditions of access to objects would obviously be absurd, it is equally a *non sequitur* to infer that the properties in virtue of which objects satisfy our conditions of access to them must be contributed by the mind, *unless there is some specific reason why those properties could only be contributed by the mind.* That is what I have contended Kant attempts to supply in his fundamental argument for transcendental idealism and it is, I now claim, what Allison himself now attributes to Kant in his exposition of Kant's fundamental argument for ideality.

My interpretation has been that Kant is led to the *denial* that spatiality (as usual, we can confine the discussion to this) is a property or relation that things have independently of our way of representing them *because* of his assumption that the contrary would be incompatible with our a priori knowledge of spatiality (*not* just of

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the specific synthetic a priori truths about space that are formalized in geometry, although the argument applies to them too and Kant does use an illustration from geometry in his clearest exposition of his argument). This is, of course, exactly what I take Kant himself to say when he says, in his Conclusions from the above Concepts, that is, in the second edition, *both* the metaphysical and transcendental expositions of space, not just the latter, that:

> Space represents no property at all of any things in themselves nor any relation of them to each other, i.e., no determination of them that attaches to objects themselves and that would remain even if one were to abstract from all subjective conditions of cognition. For neither absolute nor relative determinations can be intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they pertain, thus be intuited a priori. (A 26/B 42)

This paragraph – the first but not the second sentence of which Allison quotes as the first step in his reconstruction of Kant's argument for ideality (p. 118) – clearly indicates that Kant believes the *denial* of the spatiality of things as they are in themselves to follow from the apriority of our knowledge of that spatiality. Why does he believe this? Why should he not believe the exact opposite, namely that if we know a priori that we can perceive only objects that are spatial then we should infer that any object we do perceive really is spatial? The reason, I have claimed, lies in his interpretation of the necessity that we know when we know something a priori: his position is not that we know a conditional or *de dicto* necessity that *if* we know some object *O* it does satisfy some condition *C*; rather he asserts an absolute or *de re* necessity that when we know *O* it *necessarily* satisfies *C* – which he then supposes cannot be true if the object satisfies *C* on its own, for in that case at least as far as we could know it would satisfy *C* only contingently, but can be true only if we *make* it satisfy *C*, something we can do only for our own representations of objects and not for objects that exist independently of us and our representations of them. This is the position, I have argued, that Kant evinces in his discussions of synthetic a priori knowledge in geometry at A 48/B 65–6 in the *Critique* and in *Prolegomena*, §13, note I, although, as I claim, it does not apply just to geometrical knowledge, but also to more general claims about spatiality. (I would also observe that this is an argument that starts from a metaphysical assumption – that certain truths about spatiality are necessary – and then reaches a metaphysical conclusion

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– that things in themselves are not spatial – *through* an epistemological account of under what conditions we could or could not *know* necessity. So, like Allison but unlike Rae Langton, I do believe that transcendental idealism depends upon Kant's epistemology.)

Now I claim that Allison actually attributes the inference from a priori knowledge to non-reality to Kant and thereby undercuts his own 'mere abstraction' interpretation of transcendental idealism, although he does not acknowledge that it is Kant's interpretation of the necessity that we know when we know something a priori that is in turn the basis for this inference. He quotes a passage from §8 of the *Prolegomena*, and then glosses it by saying that:

> The claim is . . . that an a priori intuition is possible if and only if it contains or presents to the mind a form of its own sensibility . . . The argument consists of two steps . . . The first maintains that an a priori intuition is *not possible* if its content is a determination (whether intrinsic or relational) of things as they are in themselves. The second affirms that such an intuition *is possible* if its content is a form of sensibility. Assuming the exhaustiveness of these alternatives and the results of the Expositions, it follows that space and time, the contents of these representations, are nothing but forms of sensibility. (p. 123)

I find no way to read Allison's conclusion that space and time are 'nothing but forms of sensibility' except as the ontological denial of the independent reality of space and time, and he clearly holds that Kant infers this from the apriority of our knowledge of space and time. I think that he owes us an explanation of this inference, although I do not know what explanation one can find in Kant except the one I have offered. I need not add, of course, that I think that this explanation rests on an unjustified assumption of absolute rather than conditional necessity, and that in my view Kant's transcendental idealism therefore rests on a rotten foundation.

This will just have scratched the surface of a very difficult issue, but now I will turn even more briefly to the three other areas of contention that I mentioned at the outset. I begin with Allison's interpretation of the second-edition Transcendental Deduction of the categories. Allison accepts Dieter Henrich's condition that any interpretation of the Deduction must show it to be an argument in two main steps,[6] but rejects Henrich's interpretation that in the first phase of the Deduction Kant shows that the use of the categories is the necessary condition for the unification of any manifold of intui-

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tion that we might happen to unify, thereby leaving undetermined whether the categories apply to *all* of our intuitions, while in the second phase Kant adds the premise that all of our intuitions are unified in the representation of a single world in space and time, allowing him to reach the conclusion that the categories apply to all of our intuitions, which is what the Deduction is supposed to prove. Instead, Allison claims, in the first part of the Deduction (§§15–20), Kant argues only that the categories are necessary for the *thought* of any object of experience at all, without assuming that we have *any* actual experience of objects, while in the second he adds the premise that we do have an objective experience of a unified world in space and time, and reaches the desired conclusion that the categories apply to all of our intuitions through that additional premise. (In the first edition, Allison associated this position with a linguistic claim that in the first half of the Deduction Kant was using a formal concept of an object, expressed by the word *Objekt*, while in the second half he was making a substantive claim about the universal validity of our experience of objects, expressed by the term *Gegenstand*; this proposal did not gain any traction in the literature, and Allison has now dropped it.) I agree with Allison that Henrich's interpretation of the two stages is wrong, but I think that his cannot be right either. This is because, while I agree with both Henrich's and Allison's interpretation of the intended result of the whole Deduction, I think that what Allison ascribes to the first stage of the Deduction would just be a repetition of what has already been established in the Metaphysical Deduction, that is, that *if* we are to make judgements about objects we can do so only through the use of the categories. I further think that both Henrich and Allison must be wrong about what is proven in the first stage of the Deduction because Kant *begins* with the claim that all of our intuitions *are united* in the transcendental unity of apperception ('all manifold of intuition has a necessary relation to the *I think* in the same subject in which this manifold is to be encountered', B 132), and then argues that the use of (objective) judgements and therefore the categories is a necessary condition for this unity of apperception, from which it already follows that the categories apply to all of our intuitions. However, the first stage of the second-edition Deduction does this without reference to the specifically spatiotemporal character of our intuitions. The second stage of the Deduction then reintroduces this character of our intuitions, but it cannot do this just in order to infer

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the universal applicability of the categories, since that, as I say, has already been established. So it must be to make some other point or points. In fact, the second half of the Deduction seems meant to accomplish two goals. First, since it reminds us that our intuitions of our own inner states as well as of external objects are mediated by a form of intuition that has supposedly been shown to be transcendentally ideal, it tells us that through the unity of apperception that is itself grounded on the use of the categories we do not gain knowledge of the unity of the self as a thing in itself; in other words, it prepares the way for the Paralogisms of Pure Reason more clearly than did anything in the text of the first-edition Deduction. Second, by telling us that the categories must be used to ground our unified experience of a world of objects in space and time, it prepares the way for the proof, in the System of Principles, of something that Kant has not established thus far in either the Metaphysical or the Transcendental Deduction, namely that we not only must apply the categories to *all* of our intuitions but must also use *all* of the categories – for what the System of Principles will demonstrate is precisely that *each* of the categories plays an indispensable role in our cognition of an objective world of objects in space and time.[7]

Next, a brief comment on the Refutation of Idealism. Allison objects to the attempts by Jonathan Bennett[8] and myself to distance the Refutation of Idealism from the first Analogy of Experience. His position is that the first Analogy has established the necessity of a persisting substance for the determination of time, and that all that then needs to be said about the case of empirical self-consciousness is that, since all representations are fleeting occurrences, no persisting self can be immediately given, so the persisting thing that is needed for the determination of time, even in the case of the empirical subject, 'must be something outwardly intuited, which, given the nature of human sensibility, means something intuited in space' (p. 292). I agree that the crux of Kant's argument is to establish that we must intuit something distinct from our own representations, and that the spatiality of our perception of the latter follows immediately from this if the Transcendental Aesthetic's claim that spatiality is the form of outer intuition is accepted. But I think that Allison's account of the preceding steps of Kant's argument is too simple. On his own account of the first Analogy, its central argument is that we can cognize change (*Wechsel*) only as the alteration (*Veränderung*) of the states of an enduring substance; but this means that, in order to have

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empirical cognition of our own states of inner sense, we do have to posit an enduring self in some way or other, and cannot simply omit this from the argument. Second, it should also be noted that we can no more immediately perceive an enduring external object than we can immediately perceive an enduring self: since in either case all we are immediately given is fleeting representations, our representation of any enduring external object must be as much of an interpretation of our fleeting representations as is our representation of an enduring self. My interpretation of Kant's various drafts of the Refutation is therefore that the empirical self as an enduring object is constructed as a determinate ordering of our states of inner sense which are themselves ordered by means of their correlation with states of enduring external objects, an accomplishment of judgement rather than intuition that requires the application of the category of substance to what we interpret as representations of the states of outer objects as well as the use of the category of causation and particular causal laws (and possibly the category of interaction and particular laws of interaction as well) in order to assign a determinate sequence to the states of external objects, from which the order of our own inner states is then derived. In all of this, the key thought is that even though in one sense all we have to work with is our own representations of objects, in order to make the temporal determinations we have to make we must also regard them as representations of something or things *other than themselves*, which are *therefore* assigned to positions in space because that is how we can represent things other than our own representations. It is thus the idea of *changing states of objects that are distinct from our own states of mind but causally connected to them in a determinate sequence*, rather than the mere idea of enduring external objects, that supplies the crux of Kant's argument.

Finally, a word about Allison's treatment of the regulative ideal of systematicity in his final chapter, which discusses the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic. Allison thinks that the ideal of systematicity is meant to solve the problem of induction, that is, the inference from observed to unobserved cases (which he interestingly notes was formulated by Georg Friedrich Meier as well as by Hume, and was therefore really inescapable for Kant) (p. 427). Allison thinks that the idea of systematicity can solve the problem of induction because it is what will allow the understanding 'to go beyond every given experience (beyond this part of the whole of possible

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experience) and hence . . . to take the measure of its greatest possible and uttermost extension' (A 664–5/B 672–3, cited on p. 426). On the face of it, Kant's conception of systematicity would seem to promise little help with the problem of induction. Kant's criteria of homogeneity, specificity, and affinity might lead us to posit various unobserved forms of beings (inorganic and organic) to fill in the gaps in the hierarchy of forms that we have observed, but this does not appear to have anything to do with the question of whether further instances that we have not yet observed of the particular sorts of objects that we have observed will resemble the latter in all respects. If a solution to the problem of induction is to be found in Kant's reflections on systematicity at all, it will therefore have to be more complex and less direct than Allison suggests. Perhaps Kant does point towards such a complex and indirect connection between systematicity and the problem of induction in the published Introduction to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* when he suggests that our sense of the *necessity* of a particular law of nature depends upon our seeing it as having a determinate place within a *system* of particular laws of nature, a place at which it seems to us that *only* that particular law could fit (5: 184–5). The unstated premise that would link this thought to the problem of induction would be, of course, that a law of nature that is necessarily true must be true always and everywhere. Yet merely placing a particular generalization within a bigger system would not in fact guarantee that it is true always and everywhere unless there were a guarantee that the system of laws as a whole is always and everywhere true – a guarantee for which Kant makes no argument at all. So if his thought about systematicity is intended to provide a solution to the problem of induction, which Kant does not explicitly say, it provides at most a first step towards some more elaborate argument that it does not develop.

Thus, on the several issues that I have touched upon even Allison's revised book leaves us much to debate and develop. But the difficulty as well as the number of issues that he raises make this inevitable. We can surely expect that Allison's extraordinary labours for this new edition of his work will be rewarded with as many more years of discussion as his first edition has already enjoyed, and for this we can be very grateful.

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Notes

1 Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*, revised and enlarged edition (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2004); pages cited parenthetically. References to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* will be located by the customary 'A' and 'B' pagination; other citations to Kant will be located by the usual *Akademie* edition volume and page numbers. All translations from Kant are from the Cambridge edition (1992–).

2 However, it must always be remembered that we were preceded in this enterprise by Arthur Melnick, in his path-breaking *Kant's Analogies of Experience* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973). The concept of a temporally determinate route through experience was central to Peter Strawson's interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction (where Kant only hints at it) in *The Bounds of Sense* (London: Methuen, 1966), but Strawson did not offer a sympathetic or cohesive interpretation of the Analogies of Experience.

3 I made this objection in some detail in my review of Allison's *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, in the *Journal of Philosophy*, 89 (1992), 99–110.

4 This is of course a simplification, since Kant also has metaphysical and theological arguments against the ultimate reality of space and time. For my full account of Kant's arguments, see *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), Part V. For an account of Kant's argument for transcendental idealism that rests everything on the metaphysical premise that relations are not real, see Rae Langton, *Kantian Humility* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

5 Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 27.

6 Dieter Henrich, 'The Proof-Structure of the Transcendental Deduction', *Review of Metaphysics*, 22 (1969), 640–59. See the lengthy discussion of this famous article between Henrich and Hans Wagner, Reinhard Brandt, Burkhard Tuschling, Konrad Cramer, Gerd Buchdahl and others in Burkhard Tuschling (ed.), *Probleme der 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft': Kant-Tagung Marburg 1981* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1984), pp. 34–96.

7 I have argued for this approach to the relation between the Metaphysical Deduction, Transcendental Deduction, and System of Principles more fully in 'Space, Time, and the Categories: The Project of the Transcendental Deduction', in Ralph Schumacher and Oliver R. Scholz (eds.), *Idealismus als Theorie der Repräsentation?* (Padeborn: Mentis, 2001), pp. 313–38.

8 See Jonathan Bennett, *Kant's Analytic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 202–18, and *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, Part IV.

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The Real Pied Piper: Response to Allen Wood's Comments

Although I assume from the overall tenor of his remarks that Allen Wood's comparison of me to the Pied Piper was intended as complimentary, I hesitate to accept the honour because, according to the legend, the rats that the Piper enticed were deluded rather than clever and he led them to a watery demise rather than, as Wood suggests, to a sounder ship. Thus, I shall begin by assuring you that I have no such malignant intent. Instead, I shall suggest that the portion of the *Critique* that Wood finds unappetizing contains some savoury morsels.

According to Wood, on my reading, the Antinomy results from a conflation of what Michelle Grier has termed 'P_1' and 'P_2.' He further claims that on this reading all that is required to resolve it is to accept the former while rejecting the latter and that this amounts to taking P_1 as a regulative principle. He terms this the 'regularity of reason' or RR solution, and while he does not seem to have any quarrel with it per se, he questions its connection with transcendental idealism. Thus, he effectively asks why not simply affirm RR and be done with it, without dragging in the excess baggage of transcendental idealism.

In support of this, Wood appeals to my own emphasis on the necessity of combining P_2 with transcendental realism in order to generate the antinomial conflict. Against this backdrop, he asks (1) whether a transcendental idealist who accepts P_2 would not be confronted with the same conflict, which is to suggest that transcendental idealism is not *sufficient* to resolve the Antinomy, and (2) could not the transcendental realist avoid it simply by rejecting P_2 and affirming RR, which is to deny that this idealism is even *necessary*? Moreover, in this vein he suggests that, rather than clarifying the relationship between Kant's resolution of the antinomial conflict and transcendental idealism, my reading of this idealism, with which he is generally sympathetic, makes it seem even more mysterious.

Finally, in support of his rejection of Kant's indirect argument for transcendental idealism, Wood points to Kant's claim in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method that transcendental proofs must always be ostensive rather than apogogic (A 789/B 817). His point, of course, is that Kant's own stricture seems to preclude anything

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like his indirect proof, which makes one wonder why he bothered to offer it.

Just as I resist the Pied Piper appellation, I respectfully object to Wood's characterization of my position, which, without comparing myself to Shakespeare, I believe to be a little like the proverbial Hamlet without the Prince. In this case, the Prince is the doctrine of transcendental illusion. As supposedly inseparable from the theoretical use of reason, this doctrine plays a leading role in the Transcendental Dialectic as a whole (not merely the Antinomy chapter). Moreover, that it plays such a role is the main lesson that I have learned from my former student Michelle Grier, one of those Kantian rats who is far too clever to follow this (or any) Piper uncritically.

To be sure, Wood does not ignore the Prince completely, since he acknowledges the role assigned to P_2 in Kant's analysis of the presuppositions underlying the antinomial conflict. He does, however, largely finesse Kant's deeply controversial claim regarding the unavoidability of transcendental illusion, a claim which, in my judgement, makes this doctrine the real Pied Piper. Moreover, in so doing, Wood makes it somewhat too easy to drive a wedge between Kant's resolution of the Antinomy and transcendental idealism. I shall try to explain myself.

To begin with, Wood attributes to me the view – I am not sure if he also attributes it to Kant – that transcendental illusion arises from a simple conflation of P_1 and P_2. According to Wood, this conflation is tempting, perhaps even natural; but it is not unavoidable. For if he thought that it were, he would hardly have suggested that the antinomial conflict could be avoided simply by jettisoning P_2, leaving P_1 with a perfectly innocent regulative function that is blissfully free of any ontological commitment. In my initial discussion of reason, however, as part of my effort to explain its unavoidability, I explicitly denied that the illusion rested on (or involved) such a conflation. After all, conflations are not the sort of things that one might regard as unavoidable. Thus, it was with this in mind that I wrote: 'It is not that P_1 is simply conflated with P_2, since there remains a clear conceptual difference between them. It is rather that it cannot be acted on without, at the same time, assuming P_2'.[1]

By the conceptual difference between the two principles I meant that P_1 is a logical maxim for the use of reason, whereas P_2 is a substantive metaphysical principle. The problem arises when reason, as

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it unavoidably does, endeavours to make a real rather than merely a logical use of P_1. This causes a problem because such a use is inseparable from P_2, which constitutes its 'application condition'.[2] In other words, we cannot use P_1 in our thought about the world, as reason insists that we must, without, at the same time, presupposing P_2. And since P_2, as a subjectively necessary condition for the real use of P_1, presents itself as objective, this means that the latter's real use involves taking a subjectively necessary principle as objectively necessary. It is this that, in my view, constitutes transcendental illusion.

The question then becomes why this illusion should be unavoidable, indeed inseparable from the theoretical use of reason. The answer, in brief, turns on the inseparability of the search for conditions from the assumption that an absolute totality of conditions and, therefore, an unconditioned, is in some sense 'given'. Although one may embark on a treasure hunt without assuming that there really is a treasure (the mere possibility is enough), a 'condition hunt' is somewhat different. Since the conditioned is related *analytically* to some condition, which, as itself conditioned, is similarly related to its condition, etc., one is bound to presuppose an unconditioned, where the explanatory buck stops.[3]

Given this unavoidability, Kant's key move is to distinguish between the illusion and its deceptiveness. It is here that the analogy with familiar perceptual illusion comes into play. Just as an oar reflected in the water continues to present itself to the senses as bent, even though we know that it is really straight, so, in searching for conditions for a given conditioned, it continues to seems *as if* the series of conditions, each member of which is itself conditioned, must be anchored in something unconditioned, even though we know, through transcendental critique, that the latter is illusory. And if this is correct, it follows that the goal of such a critique is not, as Wood seems to suggest, to remove the illusion (since that is impossible), but merely to liberate us from its deceptive power.

The key to this liberation lies in the recognition of the connection between the deceptiveness of the illusion (though not the illusion itself) and transcendental realism. Moreover, at this point I must once again respectfully reject Allen's depiction of my view. He claims that for me transcendental realism leads to the Antinomy only when combined with P_2, which, I suspect, is why he raises the possibility that a transcendental realist could avoid it simply by discarding P_2. This is to get things precisely backwards, however, for

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what I claimed was rather that P_2 leads to the Antinomy only when combined with transcendental realism. Thus, it is the latter, not P_2, that is to be discarded, if the Antinomy is to be resolved. Indeed, P_2 *cannot be discarded*, since it is inseparable from the theoretical use of reason. Consequently, transcendental realism makes it impossible to avoid being deceived by the illusion, which means that the rats who followed the real Pied Piper to their doom are the transcendental realists, whereas, as I shall argue below, those who follow transcendental idealism (and only those) are able to avoid this fate.

The former point can be illustrated by Kant's treatment of the Paralogisms.[4] According to Kant, the fundamental metaphysical error of which the rational psychologist is guilty is the hypostatization of the 'I' of apperception, which means taking a mere thought entity as a real object to which the categories may be legitimately applied. This hypostatization is intimately related to, yet distinct from, the illusion. The latter makes it seem *as if* the I were such an entity, whereas the hypostatization goes on to affirm that it really is. Clearly, apart from the illusion there would be nothing to motivate the rational psychologist's hypostatization; but, equally clearly, one can acknowledge that the idea appears (to reason) to be such an entity and yet resist drawing the substantive metaphysical conclusion that it is.

The problem, however, is that the transcendental realist lacks the conceptual tools for resisting this conclusion. Since, by definition, such a realist conflates mere appearances with things as they are in themselves and since by the latter is meant things qua thought through a putative pure understanding, independently of the conditions of human sensibility, whatever presents itself to reason as subjectively necessary for *thought* is unavoidably deemed to be objectively necessary as well. In other words, the transcendental realist is unable to distinguish between the subjective and the objective *within the domain of the rationally necessary* because whatever presents itself as subjectively necessary for thought is, by that very fact, also taken as objectively necessary. By contrast, for the transcendental idealist the hypostatization of the 'I' is still regarded as subjectively necessary; but by distinguishing between conditions of thought and conditions of cognition and limiting the latter to objects of possible experience, the idealist is able to recognize the fallacious nature of such an inference and thereby avoid succumbing to the illusion.

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I have discussed the Paralogisms in order to underline my thesis that the same line of reasoning applies to the Antinomy (and to the Ideal for that matter[5]). In other words, on my reading of the Dialectic, Kant adopts basically the same strategy in his critique of all three branches of special metaphysics. In each case it is a matter of exposing the underlying illusion, showing how, under the covert assumption of transcendental realism, this illusion gives rise to an avoidable metaphysical error.

In suggesting this, however, I do not wish to deny that there are significant differences, which give pride of place to the Antinomy and explain why it was Kant's discovery of it rather than of either the paralogistic reasoning of rational psychology or the analogous errors of rational theology that awakened him from his dogmatic slumber. These differences stem mainly from the two-sided nature of the illusion in question, which is a function of the peculiar nature of the cosmological idea. As the idea of the *sensible* world taken as an *absolute totality*, it is, as it were, subject to two masters – the understanding and reason – which pull in opposite directions. According to the former, it is subject to the conditions of a distributive unity in time and space, whereby everything must be regarded as an object of possible experience. According to the latter, it must meet the conditions of a collective unity of reason, which means that it must be thought as constituting an absolute totality. Consequently, I have suggested that the idea of the world be characterized as 'pseudo-empirical'.[6] It is empirical in so far as its elements are spatiotemporal entities and events; but it is non-empirical in so far as the idea contains the thought of an absolute totality that can never be given within a possible experience.

Since transcendental realism is oblivious to this problem, it is incapable of recognizing the self-contradictory nature of the idea of the world on the basis of which it dogmatically constructs the arguments for the theses and antitheses of the various antinomies. Indeed, for the transcendental realist the idea does not *seem* self-contradictory, since such a realist is constrained by P_2 to think of the world (the sum total of appearances) as constituting an absolute totality, dismissing as irrelevant the fact that such a totality transcends the conditions of possible experience. Having rejected the distinction between appearances and things as they are in themselves, transcendental realism naturally treats the rule for the thought of the latter (P_2) as applicable to the former as well, thereby generating the anti-

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nomial conflicts. Fortunately, however, transcendental idealism once again comes to the rescue. By insisting on the distinction between objectively valid and necessary conditions of the *cognition* of things as appearances and merely subjectively necessary conditions of the *thought* of things as they are in themselves, transcendental idealism exposes the contradiction in the idea of the world that remains hidden for transcendental realism.

This brings us, then, to the relationship between the resolution of the Antinomy, transcendental idealism, and the assignment of a regulative role to reason. We have seen that Wood locates the key to the resolution solely in the latter, which he denies stands in any intrinsic connection with transcendental idealism. In response I shall make three points. The first is purely textual and, I take it, non-controversial, namely, that Kant only introduces the topic of a regulative use of reason in sections eight and nine of the Antinomy chapter *after* purportedly resolving the Antinomy in section six by appealing to transcendental idealism. Consequently, it seems that, for Kant at least, the appeal to this regulative function presupposes the resolution rather than itself constituting it.

Second, *pace* Wood, I believe that Kant assigns a regulative role to P_2 in its various incarnations rather than to P_1. Thus, if we consider the transcendental ideas (soul, world, freedom, and God) to which Kant officially assigns a regulative function, we can easily see that they are all manifestations of P_2. This becomes even more obvious if we turn to the Appendix and consider Kant's account of the *focus imaginarius*, which is both illusory and indispensably necessary in its regulative function.[7] Indeed, qua purely logical principle, P_1 is not properly described as either regulative or constitutive in the Kantian lexicon.

Third, I believe that the assignment of a regulative function to the ideas already presupposes transcendental idealism. Admittedly, this claim seems surprising, since many contemporary philosophers, who would not hesitate to characterize themselves as transcendental realists, readily make use of something like Kantian regulative ideas. Daniel Dennett, with his well-known distinction between various 'stances' understood as predictive explanatory strategies without any ontological commitment, here comes immediately to mind. As I have argued, however, there is a significant difference between Kantian regulative ideas and heuristic fictions such as Dennettian stances; for whereas the former are deemed *subjectively necessary*

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as products of pure reason, the latter are arbitrary and justified on purely pragmatic grounds.[8] Accordingly, the sense of a Kantian regulative idea is crucially dependent on the distinction between a merely subjective and an objective necessity, a distinction which a transcendental realist cannot allow (except, perhaps, by taking the former in an attenuated psychological sense, which has nothing in common with a Kantian idea) and which transcendental idealism first makes possible. And for this reason I submit that Kant's resolution of the Antinomy is inseparable from his transcendental idealism.

Finally, although I do not have time to rehash my interpretation of Kant's indirect proof of transcendental idealism, about which Wood is highly sceptical, I cannot ignore his point regarding Kant's strictures on apogogic proofs, of which the indirect proof seems to be a paradigm case. I shall make two points, both of which require considerably more elaboration than I am here able to provide. First, Kant does not rule out apogogic proofs entirely (for example, he allows them in mathematics) but only in transcendental proofs, where it is possible '*to substitute* that which is subjective in our representations for that which is objective, namely the cognition of what is in the object' (A 791/B 819). And such substitution is precisely what Kant accuses the transcendental realist of doing. Second, on my reading Kant's indirect proof for transcendental idealism does not violate his strictures against apogogic proofs because it is not a transcendental proof in the sense at issue. The reason for this is that, unlike the apogogic arguments offered for the theses and antitheses of the four antinomies, it is not intended as a proof of a substantive metaphysical position.

At this point I suspect that Wood will dig in his heels and insist that even non-hypochloretic versions of transcendental idealism are not without substantive metaphysical commitments. Specifically, they are committed to a fairly robust realism, which assumes that objects exist independently of us and our cognitive capacities, even though we cannot cognize them as they are in themselves. If this, or something like it, is Wood's rejoinder, then I completely concur, though I deny its relevance to the point at issue. I say this because transcendental idealism, properly understood, shares at least the first part of this view with most forms of transcendental realism. Thus, as Kant himself makes clear, the dispute between these two species of transcendentalism arises only when, under the guidance

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of P_2, one extends the conditions of human cognition from objects of possible experience to things in general and in themselves.[9]

One Small Theme in a 'Very Large Book': response to Paul Guyer's Comments

I am grateful to Paul Guyer for his comments, which nicely highlight some of the main differences between us. I particularly appreciate his generous remarks about the last part of my book, which, as he notes, is completely new and builds on the groundbreaking work of Michelle Grier. But before responding to the issues Guyer raises, I must note with some amusement his comment that *Kant's Transcendental Idealism* was already in the first edition 'a very large book', which I have proceeded to make even larger. This is, alas, quite true; but it is also true that some of Guyer's own books are larger still! Since time is short and he has focused most of his attention on transcendental idealism, I shall limit my response to that topic, saving a discussion of the other issues he raises for another occasion.

It is no secret that Guyer is not a fan of transcendental idealism, which he envisages as arising from a systematic transference of spatiotemporal properties from ordinary objects to their representations. Although Kant pursues this transference in a radically different way (by means of a reflection on the possibility of a priori knowledge), the end result is much like Berkeley's. The major difference is that whereas Berkeley (with some consistency) excluded from his ontology any beings beside minds or spirits, Kant continued to affirm the existence of a ghostly realm of things in themselves, which is composed of the ordinary objects of experience, but now stripped of all those properties on the basis of which they were formerly cognized.[10] I take this to be roughly the picture that Strawson has endorsed; and, while I admit that it is suggested by some passages, I both find it incoherent and deny that it represents Kant's view. Guyer and I disagree on the latter point, but we are in full accord on the former.

Nevertheless, we draw diametrically opposed conclusions from this incoherence. Guyer is not bothered by it, because he believes that everything that is of lasting value in the *Critique*, which he equates with Kant's 'transcendental theory of experience', is logi-

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cally independent of transcendental idealism.[11] By contrast, I *am* bothered by it for two reasons. First, I believe, perhaps naively, that a philosopher of the calibre of Kant would not embrace such a manifestly absurd view, particularly for the reason that Paul suggests. It is not that I assume that great philosophers, including Kant, are incapable of great mistakes; it is rather I believe (or at least hope) that these mistakes will be more subtle and interesting than those of which Kant is guilty on Guyer's reading. Second, unlike Guyer, I regard transcendental idealism as ubiquitous and, therefore, inseparable from the positive achievements of the *Critique*. Although not often the topic of explicit discussion, it is always there as an essential background assumption.[12]

Let us then turn to Guyer's critique of my interpretation of transcendental idealism. He voices a number of 'worries', which evidently have not been assuaged by my new treatment of the topic. The bottom line, however, seems to be that on my reading transcendental idealism is a 'merely conceptual and abstractionist' (p. 4) doctrine rather than the straightforwardly ontological thesis he takes it to be. Moreover, to make things even worse (or perhaps better), I do not consistently maintain this abstractionist view, since I recognize at times that Kant does, indeed, make ontological claims about the non-spatiotemporality of things in themselves and even argue for it on the same basis as he does.

It is easy to see that behind this line of criticism stands the notorious issue of the 'neglected alternative', that is, the possibility that spatiotemporal properties might pertain *both* to appearances *and* to things in themselves. Interestingly enough, despite our many differences, Guyer and I agree that Kant explicitly rules out such a scenario rather than leaving the possibility open on the grounds of noumenal ignorance, as it is often thought he *ought* to have done.[13] But rather than considering that contentious issue, I shall take a closer look at Guyer's example, which is presumably intended to epitomize what he finds objectionable in my view. Since it can hardly be thought that, in 'abstracting' from the gender of a job candidate, a hiring committee is assuming that the candidate is genderless *an sich*, the operative question becomes the relevance of this analogy for my interpretation of transcendental idealism. And here I must confess being somewhat perplexed.

Is the point supposed to be that I attribute to Kant the view that spatiotemporal properties do not pertain to things as they are

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in themselves *because*, in the rarified atmosphere of transcendental reflection, one abstracts from these properties? Clearly, that would be even worse than the howler Guyer attributes to Kant, since the very notion of abstraction presupposes that objects really possess the properties from which one abstracts. Or, bringing in the notion of an epistemic condition, is the point that, in my view, such conditions cannot be satisfied by the *very objects* of whose cognition they are supposed to be conditions? Here I would ask: what objects are we talking about? They surely cannot be appearances, since, *ex hypothesi*, these are precisely the objects that *do satisfy* these conditions. They must, then, be things as they are in themselves. But whereas I understand the concept of things so considered to be of things that *do not satisfy* these conditions, Guyer glosses this as 'a concept of objects that omits the *fact* [my emphasis] of their satisfaction' (Guyer p. 5), which is to commit me to the abstractionist howler noted above. Although it may regrettably be the case that some of the things I have said in the past suggested such a view, I have never held it. Moreover, in the new version of my book I have gone out of my way to make this clear – evidently without much success.

Why, then, apart from my apparent lack of clarity, does Guyer continue to attribute such a view to me? My suspicion is that it is motivated by his transcendentally realistic interpretation of Kant's idealism. This interpretation is transcendentally realistic because it assumes that by 'things in themselves' are meant the 'real' things to which spatiotemporal properties are normally attached, and he takes the idealism to consist in the relocation of these properties to the subjective domain of 'mere representations'. Given this underlying picture, it seems natural to assume that some explanation like the one Guyer provides is necessary to account for the otherwise incomprehensible migration of these properties from their natural habitat in things to their new home in the mind. In addition, this view has the great virtue of providing a neat explanation of why such properties cannot pertain to things in themselves, namely, they cannot be in two 'places' at once. Thus, even though Guyer readily acknowledges its incoherence, he does not hesitate in attributing this view to Kant. More to the present point, convinced of the correctness of this picture as a reading of Kant, he seems to think that my proposed alternative must reduce to some form of abstractionism. And if I wish to go beyond this and actually deny that things as

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they are in themselves are spatiotemporal for Kant, then I not only contradict myself, but end up agreeing with Guyer.

Whatever obscurities, difficulties, and tensions it may involve, however, I believe that my own view is quite different from, and I hope more nuanced than, the one that Guyer attributes to me. To begin with, I no longer hold (if indeed I ever really did) that transcendental idealism is a simple consequence of the acceptance of the notion of epistemic conditions. I do acknowledge that the latter brings with it an idealistic commitment of a sort, namely, the relativization of the concept of an object to what can count as an object for beings with a cognitive constitution such as ours. But I am careful to distinguish this from transcendental idealism proper.[14] The latter, I now argue much more explicitly than in my earlier work, is closely tied to Kant's 'discursivity thesis', that is, the claim that human cognition rests on the cooperation of two distinct 'faculties' or cognitive functions, each of which supplies an a priori element: sensibility, through which objects are given, and understanding, which provides the concepts through which they are thought.

Of itself, this is hardly controversial. What seems to be controversial, however, is my further claim that Kant's transcendental distinction between things as they appear and the same things as they are in themselves is to be understood in light of it. Things as they appear are subject to the forms of sensibility; though if they are to be cognized as such they must be brought under the categories and their schemata as well. Correlatively, to *think* things as they are in themselves is to think the very things that appear through pure categories, independently of the conditions of sensibility. Since I thought that I stated the latter point relatively clearly, I am not sure why Guyer points out, as if it constituted an objection to my view, that the categories are likewise epistemic conditions, which we can use to think things in themselves (Guyer, p. 15). To use his own terminology, is he suggesting that for Kant things as they are in themselves *satisfy* these intellectual conditions, which would mean that they are cognized through them? This can hardly be said of the Critical Kant; though he did seem to hold some such view in the *Inaugural Dissertation* and even in the *Critique*, he acknowledges that we can form analytic judgements regarding things so considered.[15]

Nevertheless, the thought of things as they are in themselves does, as Paul suggests, involve an abstraction of sorts, but not from

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all relation to our epistemic conditions. The abstraction is rather from the specifically *sensible* conditions through which objects are given, and its possibility is grounded in the independence from sensibility of the intellectual conditions through which they are thought. This independence, which is reflected in the characterization of the pure (unschematized) categories as concepts of objects in general, is also what necessitates a Critical restriction on the scope of these conditions (their reach exceeds their grasp). Moreover, this scope restriction is reciprocal. That of the understanding entails a corresponding restriction of sensibility, since if sensibility were assumed to encompass things in general the understanding would as well. Correlatively, the restriction of the scope of sensibility to appearances entails that of the understanding. That is why in the Phenomena–Noumena chapter, in which Kant's explicit concern is to restrict the scope of the categories to phenomena, he introduces the concept of the noumenon precisely to curb the pretensions of *sensibility* to be coextensive with the real (A 255/B 311). This restriction of sensibility is a central tenet of transcendental idealism. Indeed, in my view, it *just is* transcendental idealism.

This implies that the key to transcendental idealism lies in Kant's theory of sensibility. Again, this is hardly news, but it does call for a brief look at this theory. To begin with, Kant defines 'sensibility' as '[t]he capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects' (A 19/B 33). I find it significant that this definition encompasses not merely a capacity to be affected, but to be affected *in a certain way or manner* (*Art*). This indicates that Kant thought that a basic contribution of sensibility must be assumed at the ground floor, so to speak, independently of any reflections on the nature of space and time or the possibility of a priori knowledge. Moreover, I believe that this is a consequence of the discursivity thesis. Given Kant's conceptual framework, to deny that sensibility makes such a contribution is to assume that the senses acquaint us with things in themselves. But, as I have argued in my book, this is incompatible with the discursivity thesis, since it entails that the understanding has at most a 'logical' (clarificatory) but not a 'real use'.[16] Accordingly, the attribution of such a preparatory function to sensibility, which Kant characterizes as that of 'allow[ing] the manifold of appearance to be ordered in a certain way' (A 20/B 34), is a necessary condition for the operation of the understanding and, therefore, of discursive cognition, as Kant conceives it

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I further believe that it is in light of this concern with the general conditions of discursive cognition that we must approach Kant's endeavour in the Aesthetic to connect space and time with human sensibility, a project in which the intuition arguments play a central but underappreciated role. Since I cannot here revisit Kant's complex line of argument, I must content myself with affirming that, whatever one may think of the arguments of the Metaphysical Expositions, their primary aim is to establish the a priori contributions of space and time to human experience as *sensible* conditions. This contrasts with Guyer's own view in an important way. According to Guyer, Kant's denial of spatiotemporality to things in themselves is a direct consequence of his (misguided) attempt to account for a priori knowledge of space and time. By contrast, I have argued that Kant's conclusions regarding ideality should be seen primarily as a consequence of the arguments in the Metaphysical Expositions that sensibility makes an a priori contribution to human cognition through its forms: space and time. Simply put, being an a priori *condition* of human cognition or experience is not the same as being an *object* of a priori cognition, although there is no doubt that for Kant they are intimately related. Moreover, since the conclusions regarding ideality are a consequence of the former rather than the latter, I do not see why they involve the crude modal fallacy that Guyer attributes to Kant.

But what about these conclusions? Inasmuch as they involve claims about the non-spatiotemporality of things in themselves, are they not themselves metaphysical, as Guyer maintains? Part of the answer lies in how one understands the concept of the thing in itself and part in how one construes 'metaphysical'. I shall discuss each in turn.

Paraphrasing Arthur Melnick, the concept of the thing in itself is not the concept of another kind of *thing* (a non-spatiotemporal one), but another kind of *concept* of a thing (one qua cognized by a 'pure understanding').[17] Moreover, I believe that this constitutes the major difference between Guyer and me regarding transcendental idealism. Indeed, I readily grant that *if* the concept of the thing in itself were a concept of a different kind of thing Guyer would be correct, but I should also note that if I had thought that to be the case I would not have spent so many years struggling with Kant's idealism.

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Assuming, then, that Melnick is correct, why does Kant introduce this other kind of concept of a thing, one which, *ex hypothesi*, cannot yield cognition of objects? The short answer, which is all that I can here proffer, is that it is in order to effect the scope restriction discussed earlier. For apart from this restriction our a priori cognition based on the categories would encompass objects in general, just as the ontological tradition to which Kant was heir had supposed.

As a consequence of this, I further maintain that Kant's empirical realism, which is expressed in the formula that space and time are empirically real and transcendentally ideal, is not a second class surrogate for a 'real realism', but the only warranted or critically grounded form of realism that there can be for a Kantian.[18] It turns on a restriction of the scope of spatiotemporal predicates to the domain of possible experience, which is itself a consequence of the source of these predicates in human sensibility. Given this source, it follows that such predicates are not applicable to things in themselves, understood as things thought through a putative pure understanding, and, therefore, not to things in general or as such. After all, what is not applicable to a certain concept of a thing is not applicable to the concept of a thing as such.

I have attempted to express this view by suggesting that rather than a radical move *within ontology*, Kant's ideality thesis be seen as an *alternative to ontology*. I did so for two reasons. First, it evokes Kant's famous remark concerning the necessity of abandoning the 'proud name of an ontology' for 'the modest one of a mere analytic of the understanding' (A 247/B 303). Although Kant explicitly relates this to the Analytic, I believe, on the basis of what I have said about the reciprocal nature of his restriction thesis, that it applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the Aesthetic as well. Second, the argument of the latter purports to rule out the three generally recognized ontological alternatives (substance, property, and relation) and maintains instead that space and time are 'two sources of cognition' (A 38/B 55), which I take to mean that they are forms or ways of knowing things rather than themselves things, properties or relations thereof. Accordingly, their scope is limited to what falls within their purview, which in this case is what can be sensibly given. As long as there is agreement on this point, I have no fundamental quarrel with those who wish to retain the terms 'ontological' or 'metaphysical' to characterize Kant's view.

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Nevertheless, I resist doing so because it makes it all too easy to approach the *Critique* with a picture that does, indeed, reduce transcendental idealism to nonsense. According to this picture, which has been explored to devastating effect by Prichard, and to which I believe that Guyer adheres, to say that we know only appearances or that space and time pertain only to appearances is to claim either (a) that things only *seem* to be spatiotemporal, whereas in reality they are not or (b) that a certain class of things, namely appearances, really are spatiotemporal, but these are merely representations. The first alternative makes transcendental idealism into a form of error theory or scepticism, the second makes it into a form of subjectivism or phenomenalism.

In my opinion this is a false dilemma, which is the direct result of viewing transcendental idealism through transcendentally realistic spectacles. Accordingly, I cannot help but regard such an approach as deeply misguided, particularly since the central aim of the *Critique* is to challenge such a realism. At least this has provided the focal point of my work on Kant's theoretical philosophy for the past thirty-odd years. Wood seems to have *some* sympathy for this view, though he tends to resist it at points, while Guyer apparently has little or none. Nevertheless, I again thank them both for their comments and criticisms, which have forced me once again to try to reformulate my views in a more adequate way. Moreover, in so doing I have become acutely conscious of the fact that to satisfy the distinguished co-translators of the *Critique* regarding issues of such fundamental significance for the interpretation of Kant is no easy task.

Notes

1 See *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p. 230.

2 Ibid., p. 330.

3 As I tried to argue, even the anti-metaphysical positivist is tacitly committed to this assumption. See *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 331–2.

4 I say this even though Kant mentions the opposition between transcendental realism and transcendental idealism only in the A-version of the fourth paralogism and it does not enter explicitly into his treatment of the first three paralogisms. For my discussion of this issue see *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 339–41. Later (pp. 419–22), I make a similar claim with respect to the Ideal, where it does not explicitly enter all.

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[5] See the preceding note.
[6] See *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p. 360.
[7] See *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 425–30. My discussion of this topic is greatly indebted to the work of Michelle Grier.
[8] Ibid, pp. 421–2.
[9] See A 496–7/B 524–5 and *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p. 395.
[10] I find noteworthy in this regard Kant's dismissive characterization of Berkeley's idealism as a 'dreaming idealism', which 'makes mere representations into things' (*Prol.* 4: 293). Quite apart from the question of its fairness to Berkeley, it seems to me that this is precisely what Guyer accuses Kant of having done.
[11] See, for example, Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, p. 335.
[12] As Kant puts it at one point, his version of idealism 'runs through my entire work, although it does not by far constitute the soul of the system' (*Prol.*, 4: 374).
[13] For my discussion of the neglected alternative problem, see *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 128–32.
[14] Kant's Transcendental Idealism, pp. 12–14.
[15] See, for example, A 276/B 273; A 286/B 342–43; A 433/B 461; A 609/B 663.
[16] For a somewhat more detailed discussion of this, see *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 14–16.
[17] See Arthur Melnick, *Kant's Analogies of Experience*, p. 152. It should be noted, however, that my characterization of these different concepts differs significantly from Melnick's.
[18] I argue for this thesis in 'Transcendental Realism, Empirical Realism, and Transcendental Idealism', *Kantian Review*, 11 (2006), 1–28.

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