Pan-Europe's Cosmopolitan Outsiders[1]

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Introduction

The Habsburg monarchy has often been held up as a model of European multiethnic coexistence.[2] Such nostalgia is lent a certain credibility by the fact that in the immediate aftermath of the monarchy's collapse, a Habsburg aristocrat, Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, created the Pan-European Union, the most successful pre-1945 movement for European integration. Founded in 1923, the Union still exists today and its honorary president until his death in 2011 was Otto von Habsburg. This seems quite an illustrious pedigree, but the Pan-European Union actually had rather humble origins. The circles in which Coudenhove moved early in his career and those who inspired and supported his movement at its inception hailed from Viennese pacifist and progressive social reform movements. The significance of this formative environment has not been sufficiently explored. What, if anything, was Coudenhove's debt to his Viennese colleagues and predecessors?

Coudenhove's most immediate debt was to Alfred Fried (1864–1921), the Austrian cofounder of the German Peace Society and one of German pacifism's leading theoreticians and publicists. A little-noticed part of Fried's pacifist organizing began with his proposal in 1909 for the states of Europe to establish a pan-European bureau. Fried's pan-European proposal got almost no traction in his lifetime, yet it was a tremendously influential failure, directly leading to later, more successful integration efforts. My purpose, however, is not to enshrine Fried as a more legitimate European founding-father figure than Coudenhove. The usual (and valid) criticism of studies that undertake to identify so-called European Union founding fathers or grandfathers is that these figures tend to fall short of the ideals they are supposed to represent—their multicultural sentiments, to give just one example, often turn out to be fundamentally compromised by national chauvinism and Eurocentrism. Fried would not hold up any better. Therefore, I argue for Fried's inclusion in the historiography on European integration not to introduce a new founding father, but rather to help

[1]I would like to express my gratitude to Malachi Hacohen for comments that have tremendously improved this article. I would also like to thank an anonymous reviewer for insightful feedback and suggestions that have particularly strengthened my discussion of the broader international context.

[2]For a discussion thereof, see: Malachi Haim Hacohen, "Kosmopoliten in einer ethnonationalen Zeit? Juden und Österreicher in der Ersten Republik," in *Das Werden der Ersten Republik. … der Rest ist Österreich,* ed. H. Konrad and W. Maderthaner, vol. 1 (Vienna, 2008), 281–316.

Austrian History Yearbook 46 (2015): 296–326 © Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota 2015
doi:10.1017/S0067237814000204

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0067237814000204 Published online by Cambridge University Press

complicate that literature, which ought to reflect more of integration's myriad conflicts and failures. Conflicts and failures, after all, have been and continue to be more numerous than successes.

Failures, moreover, are important not just because their inclusion makes the historical record more accurate, but because they have sometimes, nevertheless, been a source of ideas that partly succeeded. This is certainly the case with Fried's work. Fried's story is an important part of the history of the peace movement's lasting impacts. As Roger Chickering has shown in his classic work on the peace movement in imperial Germany, "The Hague tribunal, the League of Nations, and ultimately the United Nations can be traced back to the inspiration and persistent agitation of [that] movement."[3] The peace movement failed to realize many of its goals, but inspiration for the European Union in the work of Fried and some of his collaborators can be added to the list of the movement's partial successes. In a recent biography of Fried, Petra Schönemann-Behrens has undertaken the important task of detailing his pacifist thinking and has argued for his successful elaboration of a coherent pacifist theory.[4] She has not, however, undertaken a discussion of the influence of Fried's pan-European idea on Coudenhove, which I will argue is substantial. In the dissertation on which her book was based, she noted Karl-Friedrich Scheer's 1983 observation that Fried's influence on Coudenhove was evident in Coudenhove's heavy borrowing of Fried's terminology. To this point, she added that Coudenhove published his first article on Pan-Europe in 1923 in a journal Fried had founded and edited until he died in 1921.[5] Clearly, there is room for more research into this connection, and I undertake that here.

To be clear, Fried's influence on Coudenhove is mentioned in much of the literature on interwar movements for European unity and on Coudenhove himself, but there is no in-depth discussion of that influence.[6] In part, this has to do with the conventions in the literature on movements for European unity. This literature tends to be divided between surveys of *ideas* of Europe and of European unity among great thinkers from the ancients forward and studies of *movements* for European unity, the first significant of which took off in the interwar period.[7] These priorities in the literature partly explain the minimal attention

[3]Roger Chickering, *Imperial Germany and a World without War: The Peace Movement and German Society, 1892–1914* (Princeton, 1975), 35.

[4]Petra Schönemann-Behrens, *Alfred H. Fried: Friedensaktivist—Nobelpreisträger* (Zürich, 2011).

[5]Petra Schönemann-Behrens, "'Organisiert die Welt:' Leben und Werk des Friedens-Nobelpreisträgers Alfred Hermann Fried (1864–1921)" (PhD diss., University of Bremen, 2004), 168. This is actually an error. The article in *Die Friedens-Warte* appeared in that journal's Jan.–Feb. 1923 issue; Coudenhove's first article on Pan-Europe was "Panueopa. Ein Vorschlag," *Vossische Zeitung*, 15 Nov. 1922.

[6]See, for example: Anita Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, "Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi, Founder of the Pan-European Union, and the Birth of a 'New Europe,'" in *Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea, 1917–1957,* ed. Mark Hewitson and Matthew D'Auria (Oxford, 2012): 89–110, at 92; Anita Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, *Botschafter Europas: Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove und die Paneuropa-Bewegung in den Zwanziger und Dreißiger Jahren* (Vienna, 2004), 72; Peter Stirk, *A History of European Integration since 1914* (London, 1996); 27; Katiana Orluc, "Caught between Past and Future: The Idea of Pan-Europe in the Interwar Years," in *Reflections on Europe: Defining a Political Order in Time and Space,* ed. Hans-Ake Persson and Bo Strath (Brussels, 2007): 95–120, at 104; Paul Michael Lützeler, "Paris und Wien oder der kontinentale Grundkonflikt: Zur Konstruktion einer multikulturellen Identität in Europa," in *Europas Identitäten: Mythen, Konflikte, Konstruktionen,* ed. Monika Mokre et al. (Frankfurt, 2003): 36–54, at 43.

[7]In the first category, the classic is: Denys Hay, *Europe: The Emergence of an Idea* (Edinburgh, 1968). See also: *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union*, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge, UK, 2002); Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality* (Basingstoke, Hampshire, 1995). In the second category, see, for example: Peter Stirk, *A History of European Integration since 1914* (London, 1996); Peter Stirk, *European Unity in Context: The Interwar Period* (New York, 1989); Carl H. Pegg, *Evolution of the European Idea, 1914–1932* (Chapel Hill,

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0067237814000204 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Fried has received—he was neither a philosophical nor literary figure of international renown, nor the leader of a significant interwar movement for unity.

Beyond these issues of scholarly priorities and periodization, I believe that Fried's marginal place in the literature also results from a misunderstanding of his work. This is one of my main claims in this article. Katiana Orluc has made some of the most consistent references to Fried's influence on Coudenhove, but she has described Fried's pan-European idea as "amorphous" and has furthermore argued that "he envisaged neither a political union nor a European federation as a first step towards a world-wide organization."[8] The implication is that Fried did not provide a fully formed proposal and thus could not have had a particularly profound influence on Coudenhove. I show that although her conclusion is understandable, it is mistaken: Fried's Pan-Europe was a thoroughly reasoned and elaborated idea rooted in pacifist theory. However, his proposal was couched in cautious terms that, if considered without recourse to the extremely hostile early twentieth-century Central European context, might appear vague or noncommittal. Put differently, I argue that the Central European context is absolutely key to understanding the terms in which Fried made his pan-European proposal, the content of the idea itself, and the way in which Coudenhove understood it. In fact, the fin de siècle and interwar Austrian contexts reveal a fascinating story about two figures—Fried and Coudenhove—from radically different backgrounds, who found themselves in strikingly similar dilemmas for which Pan-Europe offered a solution. Fried was the Viennese son of a financially ruined Hungarian Jewish immigrant family; Coudenhove was from an old aristocratic family in Bohemia. Yet, they both found themselves marginalized by the prospect of, and then the ultimate division of, Europe into self-styled nation-states.

I do not wish to suggest that the Central European nationalist context was the sole determining factor in either Fried's or Coudenhove's thought. Fried's pan-European proposal was an integral part of his pacifism and I discuss the pacifist theory in which it was rooted in detail. Nor do I aim to suggest that the dilemma of nationalist conflict in Central Europe was the only prompt behind all proposals for European unity in the early twentieth century —I also discuss French interest in the pan-European idea. Nonetheless, I argue that for both Fried and Coudenhove, the nation-state threatened marginalization. I contend that it is reasonable to see Fried's work in Austrian pacifism and Viennese progressive social reformism as a response, although unfortunately for him, they were utterly marginal movements. But because of their shared dilemma, Fried's proposal perfectly suited Coudenhove, who found himself politically marginalized in the interwar period. His modifications to Fried's plans reflected the changed circumstances in the interwar period. This arc demonstrates that the marginal movements Fried drew upon in fact became sources of the interwar pan-European movement, itself the forerunner to post-1945 European integration. Thus, Fried's ideas and the movements they were rooted in are absolutely central to the history of ideas and movements for European unity.

In the first section, I begin with a brief overview of Fried's career and then discuss ways in which his Austrian-Jewish background sheds light on the motivations for his

1983); Guido Müller, *Europäische Gesellschaftsbeziehungen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg: Das Deutsch-Französische Studeinkommittee und der Europäische Kulturbund* (Munich, 2005); and Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge, UK, 2007).

[8]Katiana Orluc, "Caught between Past and Future," 104. Interestingly, Orluc discounts Fried's importance because he did not call for a political union, but she concludes that one of the main reasons that Coudenhove's Pan-Europe failed was precisely because he envisioned a political union, a goal too far-reaching and difficult to achieve in his time (ibid., 119).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0067237814000204 Published online by Cambridge University Press

internationalism. Against this background, in the second section I discuss his pan-European proposal and his strategy for its achievement. In the third section, I discuss Coudenhove's use of the pan-European idea, his own motives, and his goals for the movement he built in the 1920s. I conclude by briefly discussing the significance of this historical arc for our understanding of both the early history of movements for European unity and the European Union today.

1. Context, Motivations, and Inspiration

Born in 1864, Fried grew up in an educated bourgeois Hungarian-Jewish family in Vienna. Until the Stock Exchange crash of 1873, the prosperous family lived in a wealthy, almost exclusively non-Jewish Viennese neighborhood. The Frieds were secular and liberal in political outlook, and Fried recalled having "experienced almost nothing of Jewish belief" during his upbringing.[9] After the crash, the family moved to Leopoldstadt, or "Matzoh Island," the neighborhood that was home to the majority of poor, recent East European Jewish immigrants. In 1879, after three of the four required years of gymnasium, Fried left school to apprentice with a bookseller, his father being unable to support the family of eleven. In Leopoldstadt, Fried also developed an interest in his Jewish heritage and began reading Jewish history.[10] He never became observant, but his interest in his Jewish background persisted. He would refuse to convert when asked to do so by a colleague in the German peace movement;[11] he was deeply distressed by the pogroms in the Russian Empire and by the Dreyfus Affair, and he maintained that:

> [i]t is not the religious community that ties me to Jewry, because ... Jewish belief is alien to my world-view. What causes me to hold out is the current social situation of the Jews. In this time of repression and persecution, I would see freeing myself from a community to which I belong through birth and heritage as desertion during war-time. As an intellectual, I believe I have the duty to persevere with the oppressed minority.[12]

Fried originally hoped to make his mark as an intellectual by becoming a writer. However, after failed attempts to get poems published and after discouraging responses to his narrative writing, he decided to concentrate on securing a stable living in publishing and followed a job opportunity to Berlin in 1883. He did not discover the peace movement until the beginning of the 1890s—when he was in his mid-twenties—but, as he would later put it, pacifist inclinations were latent in his earlier views. He described an early interest in pacifism, for example, awoken by an exhibit in 1881 of paintings inspired by the Russo-Turkish war, as playing a role in shaping his left-leaning political convictions, his interest in democracy and free thought, and his "active opposition to all things conservative and nationalist."[13] In 1887,

[9]Schönemann-Behrens, "Organisiert die Welt," quotation 19. This and all other translations, unless otherwise noted, are mine.

[10]Fried reported feeling that "it [was] time that I knew about the history of my people," and read Heinrich Grätz's eleven-volume *History of the Jews* (ibid., quotation 27n).

[11]In 1909, Otto Umfrid, an Evangelical pastor and leading German pacifist, made the "intimate suggestion" that Fried convert because his Jewish background jeopardized the effectiveness of the peace movement's propaganda. Fried refused. See: Brigitte Hamann, *Bertha von Suttner: ein Leben für den Frieden* (München, 1986), 229–30.

[12]Ibid., quotation 229–30.

[13]Schönemann-Behrens, *Alfred H. Fried*, quotation 38.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0067237814000204 Published online by Cambridge University Press

he opened his own press and, when he heard in 1891 of Suttner's founding of the Austrian Peace Society, he wrote to her to offer his support and they began what would be a lifelong collaboration.

On Fried's suggestion, in 1892, Suttner began to edit a journal named for her novel, *Die Waffen Nieder!,* which Fried published and promoted.[14] He founded the German Peace Society in the same year, and his career, from that point forward, was devoted entirely to the peace movement. He served as editor of the journal *Monatliche Friedenskorrespondenz* from 1896 to 1899, when he took over editorship of *Die Waffen Neider!,* changed its name to *Die Friedens-Warte,* and significantly expanded its scope and reach. As a result, the journal was increasingly cited in works on international law, both by the pacifist international lawyers Walter Schücking and Heinrich Lammasch, and more broadly by the professors of international law, Karl Lamprecht and Josef Redlich.[15] Left liberal and Social Democratic politicians, including Georg Gothein and Albert Südekum, also contributed to the journal.[16]

In 1911, Fried recruited Schücking and the legal scholar Otfried Nippold to establish the *Verband für internationale Verständigung*, which was to cultivate public opinion in favor of treaties of international law and enlist the support of economic elites—individuals who presumably had a financial stake in the maintenance of international peace and security.[17] Related to these organizing efforts, Fried produced an astounding body of work in the form of more than seventy-five books and countless journal articles. *Die Friedens-Warte* soon become established as one of the top pacifist journals internationally, won the support of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and had a circulation of nearly ten thousand by 1914.[18] Fried won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1911. In Switzerland during the war, he continued to publish and write for *Die Friedens-Warte*, advocating Wilson's ideals and arguing against a dictated peace.

Die Friedens-Warte was intended as a clearinghouse, and the peace movement was explicitly supposed to be bipartisan. Fried would ally himself with anyone willing to further the peace movement's cause. Nonetheless, if we want to understand his pacifism and pan-European idea, it is helpful to understand the political and ideological convictions that motivated him and the particular problems he undertook to solve. To this end, in this section, I discuss first the reforms Fried sought in his political engagement with progressive movements; second, his view concerning the ideals represented in the Austrian multiethnic empire and the German national empire; and third, his incorporation of principles drawn from progressive social reform and from Habsburg multiethnicity into an ideology he called "scientific pacifism."

Throughout his career, Fried was left-leaning in his political views. He joined the Social Democratic Party when in Berlin and remained a member through the 1890s. He was also sympathetic to the cause of progressive social reform and, when he returned to Vienna in 1903, he became involved in a number of reform movements, where he found like-minded activists. Progressive groups offered a solution to the crisis of liberalism that coincided with the rise of modern, racial anti-Semitism in late nineteenth-century Central Europe. Led by Viennese cosmopolitans like Josef Popper-Lynkeus, they proposed to secure societal progress by social and political reforms promoted through what Ingrid Belke has termed

[14]The novel was an international bestseller. See: Bertha von Suttner, *Die Waffen Nieder!* (Dresden, 1899).

[15]Ingrid Belke, *Die sozialreformerischen Ideen von Josef Popper-Lynkeus (1839–1921) im Zusammenhang mit allgemeinen Reformbestrebungen des Wiener Buergertums um die Jahrhundertwende* (Tübingen, 1978), 30.

[16]Ibid.

[17]On the Verband für internationale Verständigung, see: Chickering, *Imperial Germany,* 148–65.

[18]Ibid., 80.

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"enlightenment-progressive reform associations."[19] Their methods were to promote gradual change—they did not call for violent upheaval. Belke describes them as "anything but extremists, one could best compare them with the English 'Radicals,' the more so as they often pointed to the Anglo-Saxon example for their program."[20] As we shall see, Fried's pacifism was characterized by a similar, gradualist approach.

Social, political, and cultural reformers belonged to a loose grouping of movements, some of which, like the Fabians, proposed a broad reform program, whereas others, like the temperance movement, were more limited in their focus. Some progressives, like Fried, kept up appearances with Viennese high society; others, like the vegetarians, wore linen and grew long beards (Fried received much correspondence from them, but he appears to have remained unconvinced).[21] He was a member of groups that opposed dueling, vivisection, and capital punishment, but his highest profile involvement was in the Esperanto movement, of which he was a leader.[22]

Progressive social reform went hand in hand with pacifism. Indeed, though most leaders in the peace movement did not wish pacifism to be understood as a social movement, social reform movements contributed much to achieving pacifist goals and have often been treated as part of the peace movement, broadly construed.[23] This makes sense: progressive social reform was widely understood by pacifists to be a critical stepping-stone toward the achievement of lasting peace. Suttner, for example, saw the primary task of the peace movement as the cultivation of the conditions for peace. Pacifists were therefore to do much more than simply oppose escalating armament and promote the development of international law and the use of arbitration. In addition, they were to combat nationalism, religious intolerance, and social injustice, and to fight for human rights, especially women's rights. Suttner was also active in the fight against anti-Semitism.[24] Fried's investment in progressive social reform was, in short, not only consistent with, but also integral to his pacifism.

Fried also found allies and supporters among the freemasons, who were sympathetic to internationalism, tended to embrace a cosmopolitan worldview, and were often involved in progressive social reform. Because freemasonry was illegal in Austria from 1868–1919, Austrian masons had to create what were called "border lodges" just over the border in the Hungarian half of the monarchy. Their presence in Vienna was established through

[19]Belke, *Die sozialreformerischen Ideen von Josef Popper-Lynkeus*, 4.

[20]Ibid., 8. She summarizes the common concerns among progressives as follows: to place restrictions on large-scale manufacturers and landowners; to institute protections for workers and small tradesmen; to promote state welfare for the sick, elderly, and disabled; and to champion reform in public education, continuing education for workers, reform of criminal law, and general, secret, and direct suffrage (achieved for men in 1907).

[21]There is literature from vegetarian associations scattered throughout the Alfred Fried collection at the League of Nations Archives. See, for example: League of Nations Archives, Geneva (hereafter LoN), Alfred H. Fried Collection, box 82.

[22]On Fried's involvement with reform movements other than Esperanto, see: Hoover Institution Archives (hereafter HIA), Alfred H. Fried Collection, box 4. On capital punishment, see: Alfred H. Fried, *Das Tagebuch eines zum Tode Verurteilten* (Berlin, 1898). Also, in 1898, he began a book project based on a questionnaire on capital punishment circulated among prominent European public intellectuals. He hoped to assemble a collection of essays against capital punishment, though he did not always get the response he expected—Max Nordau and Ernst Haeckel, for example, did not oppose the death penalty. See: Schönemann-Behrens, "'Organisiert die Welt,'" 81–82. Regarding Esperanto, Fried corresponded with Esperanto associations throughout Europe and wrote an Esperanto textbook in 1903. See: LoN, Alfred H. Fried Collection, box 60; and Alfred H. Fried, *Lehrbuch der Internationalen Hilfssprache "Esperanto" mit Wörterbuch in Esperanto-Deutsch und Deutsch-Esperanto* (Berlin, 1903).

[23]Chickering, *Imperial Germany*, 27–34.

[24]Suttner worked on this cause with her husband, Arthur Gundaccar von Suttner, who founded the Society for Resistance against Anti-Semitism. She earned the name "Jew Bertha" in the anti-Semitic press for this work. See: Hamann, *Bertha von Suttner*.

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charitable and social reform associations. The association affiliated with Fried's lodge—the Socrates benevolent society—was the most progressive in the city. Freemasons would become some of Fried's strongest supporters in Vienna.[25] Later, they would provide key early support to Coudenhove, who was also a freemason.[26]

In general, freemasons and progressive social reformers were members of cosmopolitan networks in fin-de-siècle and interwar Austria and were mostly, though not entirely, Austrians of Jewish background. Importantly, their cosmopolitanism went hand in hand with their loyalty to the Habsburg monarchy, a loyalty I believe one can reasonably expect to have influenced Fried's perspective on international organization.[27]

Like progressive social reform, celebration of Habsburg multiculturalism was a response to the crisis of liberalism at the close of the nineteenth century. The crisis in the Habsburg monarchy had implications for Austro-Hungarian Jewry that extended beyond its borders. If the Habsburg monarchy, and by extension Europe, were to be composed of ethnically defined nation-states (instead of multiethnic states), Jews would be unwelcome in the monarchy, and by extension, in all of Europe. Jews were, therefore, more willing to embrace the idea of multiethnic Habsburg patriotism than other ethnic groups in the monarchy. The orthodox rabbi and politician, Joseph Bloch (1850–1923), summed it up nicely when he wrote: "If one could construct a specifically Austrian nationality, Jews would form its foundation."[28] In the early twentieth century, Jewish intellectuals joined Catholic Jews like Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Catholic aristocrats in an attempt to breathe new life into the image of the monarchy as the conciliatory, pluralist and, frankly, better embodiment of Germandom.[29] In fact, Fried made his own contribution to the Austrian myth in 1908 with *Wien-Berlin: Ein Vergleich*, in which he portrayed Austria as a model of moderation, in contrast to Germany.[30] *Wien-Berlin* is, I argue, important because it illustrates how Fried's pacifism, though international in scope and even global in ambition, was grounded in, if not motivated by, an Austrian context.

In *Wien-Berlin* Fried described Berlin as a young city of cultural neophytes with poor aesthetic taste, militarist tendencies, and a ruthless habit of prioritizing, above all else, order,

[25]The importance of Fried's relationship to freemasonry is reflected in a letter he wrote to his wife from Switzerland during World War I, in which he told her that if he died there and she found herself in need, she should seek help at the Socrates lodge. Incidentally, he instructed her to write to Carnegie if the masons were not able to help her. See: LoN, Alfred H. Fried Collection, box 31.

[26]Historisches Museum der Stadt Wien, *Zirkel und Winkelmass: 200 Jahre grosse Landesloge der Freimaurer* (Vienna, 1984); Eugen Lennhof and Oskar Posner, *Internationales Freimaurer-Lexikon* (Zürich, 1932).

[27]Fried defined international organization as "a cohabitation of equal states for the purpose of reaching the greatest advantage through the slightest expenditure of energy. It succeeds by way of agreements pertaining to a state's basic necessities of life and it operates and is promoted by the ever-growing interdependence of the cultured world *(Kulturwelt)*, which itself is a result of the technical development of our era. It transforms the old politics of jealousy and the pursuit of hegemony into a politics of commerce and order." Alfred H. Fried, "Kurzgefasste Darstellung der Pan-Amerikanischen Bewegung" *Internationale Organisation* 4 (1916): 1–36, at 6. ("Interstate," "intergovernmental," "cross-national," and "international organization" are all common translations of "zwischenstaatliche Organization." I will use "international organization" throughout, because Fried used "internationale organization" interchangeably with "zwischenstaatliche organization.")

[28]Malachi Haim Hacohen. "Dilemmas of Cosmopolitanism: Karl Popper, Jewish Identity, and 'Central European Culture,'" *The Journal of Modern History* 71, no. 1 (1999): 105–49, quotation 115. On Bloch and Austrian multiethnicity, see: Ian Reifowitz, *Imagining an Austrian Nation: Joseph Samuel Bloch and the Search for a Multiethnic Austrian Identity, 1845–1919* (New York, 2003).

[29]See Edward Timms, "National Memory and the 'Austrian Idea' from Metternich to Waldheim," *The Modern Language Review* 86, no. 4 (1991): 898–910.

[30]Alfred H. Fried, *Wein-Berlin, Ein Vergleich* (Vienna, 1908).

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efficiency, and productivity. "A *Ringstrasse,*" he wrote, "would be entirely impossible in Berlin because it does not lead somewhere."[31] Berlin was designed for practicality; Vienna, for beauty.[32] He tied a litany of objectionable cultural tendencies among Berliners to political and nationalist extremism. The "vehemence, bitterness, and intransigence" among Berliners, Fried quipped, "is unthinkable in Vienna."[33] According to him, Berlin lacked neutral political ground where people of different persuasions, classes, and races could interact. In ecumenical Vienna, on the other hand—even under Karl Lueger—"Jews and antisemites, socialists and feudalists, Germans and Czechs are pleasant to each other in coffee houses, restaurants, street cars, and trains."[34] This evaluation of early twentieth-century Vienna as a bastion of reason and moderation (possessed, apparently, even by anti-Semites) starkly contrasted with Fried's evaluation of Germany: Germany was the home of intolerance; Austria, of pluralist civility.

Wien-Berlin was an expression of Fried's frustration with the hostility to pacifism he had encountered in Germany. His work to organize an active peace movement in Germany from the early 1890s until 1903 had been filled with disappointments.[35] In fact, he had become convinced through his first attempts to promote Bertha von Suttner's work in Germany that Suttner's moral pacifism had no chance there. Accordingly, by the time of the first Hague Peace Conference in 1899, a decade after he had discovered the peace movement, Fried adapted his pacifism to what he called Germany's "bitter" and "abrasive" political atmosphere.[36] Inspired by the work of Eugen Schlief, whom Fried described as having brought a "north German rationalism" to pacifism, Fried came to believe that in Germany—where he posited that militarist attitudes were more entrenched in the national soul *(Volksseele)* than in Austria—pacifism only had a chance if packaged in a "soulless shrewdness."[37] When *Die Friedens-Warte* replaced *Die Waffen Nieder!* in 1899, the new

[31]Ibid., 11. On the significance of the Ringstrasse, see: Carl E. Schorske, "The Ringstrasse, Its Critics, and the Birth of Urban Modernism," chap. 2 in *Fin-De-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (New York, 1981), 24–115.

[32]For Fried, the city's purpose was also reflected in the fashion of its populace. The Viennese had their clothes tailored. They dressed well, not out of personal vanity, but because they considered themselves accessories of the city's beauty. Berliners, in contradistinction, shopped at large, tacky department stores because they could not recognize the difference in quality between store-bought and tailored attire. They had a long way to go before achieving the elegance of the Viennese. Viennese shoppers were also more "honorable" because they did not engage in impulse shopping (like the Berliners), but bought only what they needed and only where they knew they could find the best quality. See: Fried, *Wien-Berlin*, 20–27.

[33]Ibid., 80.

[34]Ibid., 81.

[35]Fried founded the German Peace Society, but within a year, he was expelled from it. From the start, the Austrian, with his close ties to Bertha von Suttner, opposed the strong nationalist tendencies of his German colleagues. The fact that Fried was probably difficult to work with may have contributed to his expulsion. Roger Chickering has described him as "combining relentless zeal with no tact whatsoever," though Schoenemann-Behrens is more positive, describing him as having "a deep-seated optimism, fighting spirit, and refusal to give up even in seemingly hopeless situations." The specific event that seems to have triggered his expulsion was news that Fried had published what was considered risqué or even pornographic literature. In fact, the controversy began in the right-wing, anti-Semitic press. The book series included *Die Liebe mit 45 Jahren: Intime Memoiren*, by Restiv de la Bretonne; *Die Hygiene der Liebe, Die Physiologie der Liebe*, and *Die Physiologie des Genusses*, by Paul Mantegazza; *Der Metaphysik der Geschlechterliebe*, by Arthur Schopenhauer; and *Die Hörigkeit der Frau* (The Subjugation of Women), by J. S. Mill. Regardless, the other members of the Peace Society probably knew of these publications and found them problematic only when they wanted Fried to resign. Without Fried, the German Peace Society lost its most active organizer and quickly became ineffectual. Bertha von Suttner had to defend him before the German pacifists and convince him to continue publishing pacifist literature. See: Chickering, *Imperial Germany,* 49; and Schönemann-Behrens, "'Organiziert die Welt,'" 28, 47.

[36]Alfred H. Fried, *Jugenderinnerungen* (Berlin, 1925), 24.

[37]Ibid., 32.

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journal reflected Fried's strategic shift from Suttner's moral pacifism toward materialist pacifism. Though *Die Friedens-Warte* remained a forum for a broad variety of antiwar ideas, ethical and material, and though Fried himself remained convinced of the "moral feeling" that drove Suttner's pacifism, such sentiment would not appear in his own writing for *Die Friedens-Warte*.[38]

To summarize my argument thus far, Fried's pacifist goals were rooted in progressive social reform and informed by the ideal of Austrian multiethnicity. These, in turn, were responses to the crisis of liberalism, the rise of radicalizing nationalism, and the dilemma of Jewish exclusion. The materialist pacifism that Fried embraced in the 1890s represented his attempt to give pacifism a social scientific foundation and, thereby, to withstand the dismissal moral pacifism suffered in a hostile German political climate. In elaborating what he termed "scientific pacifism," Fried strayed slightly from the basic premise that was the point of departure for most pacifists, moral or otherwise. This premise, as mentioned above, was that the purpose of the peace movement was to cultivate the conditions for peace by promoting the implementation of international law and binding arbitration.[39] Although Fried generally agreed with the movement's legalist approach to internationalism, he focused on what he viewed as a necessary prerequisite. Before legal reforms could be successful, there would have to be widespread acceptance of something pacifists took to be self-evident: the existence of an international community that transcended state borders.[40]

This international community was understood to have both an ethical and a material dimension. All human beings were part of the ethical community "because of their very humanity and their innate disposition to rational and ethical conduct."[41] Pacifists believed that the ethical community's material infrastructure was developing in the form of "the ongoing social and economic internationalization of European life," which would result in a transnational community of interests. A developed ethical and material international community "would make the elimination of warfare a question of economic utility, as well as one of moral precept."[42] Suttner concentrated on building the ethical dimension of the international community; Fried focused on promoting its material infrastructure through international organization. It was in this effort that Pan-Europe would become a key element.

Despite its emphasis on material conditions, Fried's materialist pacifism was anything but Marxist, though he did take from Marx the basic premise that political action was the result

[38]On *Die Friedens-Warte* as a forum for a broad variety of antiwar ideas, see: Schönemann-Behrens, *Alfred H. Fried*, 99–100. On Fried's continued sympathy with the "moral feeling" that drove Suttner's pacifism, see: Fried, *Jugenderinnerungen,* 33.

[39]For a broader, international view of debates between the promoters of legal versus political forms of international organization before and during World War I, see: Stephen Wertheim, "The League of Nations, A Retreat from International Law?" *Journal of Global History* 7 (2012): 210–32. Wertheim's discussion of the legalist approach relies on distinguishing a number of categories, including internationalism, pacifism, and organicism, to which Fried's thinking does not seamlessly conform. For example, his approach was largely congruent with Wertheim's description of legalism, though he rejected binding arbitration as a short-term goal; his embrace of organicism was not tied to an idealist perspective and an alignment with those promoting a political organization (which Fried also saw as premature before the war, though he did support the League of Nations, once it was established); nor would Fried probably qualify as a pacifist according to Wertheim's usage of the term. None of this is necessarily to question Wertheim's characterization of the legal/political debate in the Anglo-American and French contexts, but to suggest that perhaps Central European perspectives might complicate the picture.

[40]Chickering, *Imperial Germany,* 23–4.

[41]Ibid.

[42]Ibid.

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of economic forces, not moral consciousness.[43] Rather, Fried's pacifism reflected the nineteenth-century peace movement's middle-class, liberal roots.[44] Thus, a greater influence than Marx was the Russian financier, Ivan Bloch, who argued that precisely because of the growing economic and infrastructural interdependence in Europe that came with industrialization, any future war would be an unprecedented disaster. And though Fried also took from Marx the notion that the economic forces guiding politics progressed along determined patterns, he was far more influenced in this regard by the Russian sociologist, Jacob Novicow.[45] Novicow's argument, influenced by Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Comte, and Spencer, was that society was governed by identifiable rules and that natural development according to these rules would result in world federation. Novicow subscribed to a branch of fin de siècle evolutionist thought—organicism—that posited increasingly complex self-organization rather than competition as the engine of evolution in human civilization. This may seem like an unconventional interpretation of the role of evolution in societal development—and, indeed, Fried was unable to find a publisher for a German translation of Novicow's *La Critique du Darwinisme social*—yet the juxtaposition of evolution with socially progressive causes was conventional enough for Carnegie to fund *both* the peace movement and eugenics research in German-speaking Europe.[46]

Like eugenicists in medicine, Novicow believed that intervention in the evolutionary process—again, understood mostly as a process of increasingly complex self-organization and less as a process of "survival of the fittest"—could speed up progress. He hoped to achieve a European federation within his lifetime and believed this to be realistic in part because his plan respected national sovereignty. He cautioned that "the European federation shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the [constituent] countries."[47] The individual characteristics of each country, he asserted, must be protected so that "[i]f the French prefer to live in a republic, the English in a parliamentary monarchy, and the Russians in an absolute monarchy, that is their business."[48] The sense in which he used "federation" was, Novicow admonished, "the most conservative."

Fried's contribution was to take the work of Bloch, Novicow, and other materialist antiwar thinkers and assemble them into a coherent ideology, "scientific pacifism," which was a success insofar as it attracted serious discussion and some sympathy in the German academy.[49] Fried became known as the chief publicist and theoretician of pacifism in Central Europe. Through Pan-Europe, he hoped to realize the goals of scientific pacifism.

2. Fried's Prewar Pan-Europe

Fried's pan-European idea grew from a study he had published on the Pan-American Union, an organization of Latin and North American diplomatic representatives in Washington, DC, that

[43]Ibid., 95–96.
[44]Ibid., 96.
[45]Ibid.
[46]See : Jacques Novicow, *La Critique du Darwinisme Social* (Paris, 1910). For publishers' rejections, see: Wigands Verlag to Alfred H. Fried, Leipzig, 3 Mar. 1906; and Carl Winter's Verlag to Alfred H. Fried, 6 Nov. 1909, LoN, Alfred H. Fried Collection, box 86.
[47]Jacques Novicow, *Die Föderation Europas*, trans. Alfred H. Fried (Berlin, 1901), 14.
[48]Ibid.
[49]Chickering, *Imperial Germany,* 135.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0067237814000204 Published online by Cambridge University Press

promoted economic integration, standardization of transport, and cultural and educational exchange.[50] Fried's book on Pan-America was anything but a detached study of that union. He was interested in Pan-America as a model for Europe and went into what he described a period of "eremitic isolation" in order to write the final and most difficult chapter on pan-Americanism as a model for Europe.[51] It was this study that Coudenhove cited in his famous 1923 book, *Pan-Europa*.[52] Indeed, as Anita Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer has recently noted, Coudenhove was aware of a number of plans for Europe, but Fried's influence was the strongest—in fact, his work alone was quoted in *Pan-Europa*.[53]

This section discusses the pan-European idea in detail. First, I put Fried's idea in context—he was not the only European pacifist inspired by pan-Americanism. I discuss the reasons pan-Americanism had heuristic value for European pacifists and then outline the specific influences at work in Fried's pan-European proposal. Second, I discuss the functions, membership, leadership, and goals of Fried's proposed confederation. Third, I provide an overview of his attempts to head off potential objections, as well as the objections that his pacifist colleagues actually raised to his proposal for a pan-European bureau. And fourth, I conclude the section with a brief discussion of how and why Fried nonetheless persisted in promoting Pan-Europe throughout World War I, paving the way for Coudenhove.

As mentioned, Fried was not alone in viewing the Pan-American Union as a model for Europe. The pan-European idea had another early proponent in Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, who as early as 1906 had lamented that no sister organization to the Pan-American Union existed in Europe.[54] A member of the French senate, leading pacifist, and president of the European Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, d'Estournelles was one of Fried's long-time collaborators. Both men had a long track record of promoting international organization as a solution to conflicts within Europe.[55] They hoped, for example, that the result of the European response to the Boxer Rebellion could be a cooperative protectorate through which a strong local government could be overseen by a "European Colonial Union." This form of indirect rule, they stipulated, would synchronize global politics *(Weltpolitik)* and would serve as a means to coordinate European interests.[56]

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[50]Alfred H. Fried, *Pan-Amerika: Entwicklung, Umfang und Bedeutung der Zwischenstaatlichen Organisation in Amerika, 1810–1916* (Zürich, 1918).

[51]Alfred H. Fried to Bertha von Suttner, 6 Mar. 1910, LoN, Bertha von Suttner Papers, box 19, folder 220.

[52]Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europa* (Vienna, 1923).

[53]Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, "Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi," 92; Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, *Botschafter Europas,* 90.

[54]Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, "European Anarchy and American Duty," *Outlook* 83, no. 14 (1906): 805.

[55]Fried, for example, had called for a "continental confederation" as early as 1899. See: Alfred H. Fried, "Die Flottenvermehrung - der Weg zur Abrüstung?," *Die Friedens-Warte* 1, no. 19 (1899): 117–19. And in 1901, he endorsed the idea of an economic union of European states. See: Alfred H. Fried, "Die amerikanische Gefahr," *Die Friedens-Warte*, 3, no. 35–36 (1901): 137–39. In a letter to Fried dated 20 Aug. 1903, d'Estournelles described the combined purpose of their work as the effort to convince the French and Germans of the necessity of a "European federation." LoN, Alfred H. Fried Collection, box 57, d'Estournelles de Constant correspondence folder. Similarly, Fried thanked d'Estournelles for support in his efforts to promote the "great cause of Occidental federation." See: Fried to d'Estournelles, 7 June 1904, LoN, box 57, d'Estournelles de Constant correspondence folder.

[56]Putting aside, for a moment, the end goal of European unity and the implications of such imperialist precedents of our understanding of the origins of the European Union, it is noteworthy that this call for the common administration of colonial possessions also anticipated the League of Nations and its Mandates System. As Susan Pedersen has argued, the Mandates System served as a forum for debates among representatives of the great powers about whether and how empire should be internationalized. More specifically, according to Pedersen, the system achieved not a "new and specific form of governance," but rather "particular processes of international scrutiny, consultation, appeal, and publicity." Its greatest impact was in the "generation and promulgation of international norms," not in its

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This foundation could, they argued, ultimately lead to European political unity, something essential in order for Europe to maintain its status as the world's leading bearer of culture *(erstrangiger Kulturträger)*. The culmination, d'Estournelles hoped, would be a United States of Europe.[57]

In agreement with d'Estournelles and other prominent figures who would become leaders of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, such as Elihu Root, Fried viewed colonialism in unproblematic terms as fuel for global international organization.[58] In 1899, for example, he proposed the establishment of a European Colonial Union to oversee global politics (*Weltpolitik*).[59] This union was to include the major European powers and "Europeanized America"—"I include Turkey and the Balkans," he wrote, "as little as I include China and

administrative system. She concludes that the system's legacy lies in the "displacement of some amount of conflict over non-consensual rule into the international realm, and the strategic use of that realm by imperial powers and nationalist movements alike, and *not* higher levels of development or more enlightened forms of government." See: Susan Pedersen, "The Meaning of the Mandates System: An Argument," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 32, no. 4 (2006): 564–65, 81–82. Fried's proposal anticipates Central European contributions to these interwar debates. The case of mandatory Iraqi is illustrative. Britain faced its strongest opposition to its promotion of Iraqi independence from German and Swiss officials. The Central Europeans opposed stipulations to Iraqi independence granting the British a privileged post-mandatory economic and military relationship with Iraq, a relationship that essentially perpetuated colonialism. Instead, motivated by their own national interest as the only great power without colonial possessions, the Germans' international vision for the post-mandatory period was one of "a world of formally equal sovereign states regulated largely through market competition." See: Susan Pedersen, "Getting out of Iraq—in 1932: The League of Nations and the Road to Normative Statehood," *American Historical Review* 115, no. 4 (2010): 975–1000, at 990. This German position echoed Fried's earlier position. I would argue that Fried embraced pan-Americanism in part as a means to advance the two main concerns that would drive the Central European agenda concerning the Mandates System: ensuring Germany's status among European great powers and expanding economic access to former colonies over a decade before the debate over the status of Iraq occurred. For Fried, the Pan-American Union was a model for a loose confederation of equal European states fostering international trade and realigning colonial relationships such that trade with and oversight of colonies were undertaken collectively (eliminating privileged status of the original colonizing state).

[57]Indeed, for Fried, colonialism clearly served the goal of international organization. Colonialism was just one way in which empires—as international and/or interregional communities of interest—were fuel for international organization. They shared this status with federations like the United States and the Swiss Republic. See: Alfred H. Fried, *The Restoration of Europe* (New York, 1916), 108; and *The German Emperor and the Peace of the World* (London, 1912), 5. The Pan-American Union stood out, however, as a *model,* rather than as *fuel.* I hypothesize that Fried's evolutionist paradigm makes sense of this subtle, but important difference. Empires and federations, it seems, were older, more primitive forms among international institutions. Fried regarded the Pan-American Union as the most evolved example, set apart by its voluntary, flexible, evolving nature. Because realization of world organization and, along the way, European organization would be the result of a protracted, evolutionary process, such *flexible* models were ideal. In other words, the Pan-American Union was useful as the most evolved example of an ever-changing type of institution that would promote an evolutionary path toward world organization. Pan-Americanism should probably be taken more seriously in the ongoing discussion complicating the idea that Woodrow Wilson's America was the model for the view of international organization and international law that formed the foundation of the League of Nations. Mark Mazower has recently argued that empire, specifically the British Empire—rather than Woodrow Wilson's America—was the model for the view of international organization and international law that formed the foundation of the League of Nations. See: Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton, 2009). But given how much of Fried's thinking seems to have anticipated the League—in particular the Mandates System—one wonders whether the inclusion of Central European thinkers would complicate this new narrative. Looking beyond Woodrow Wilson may not only occasion a shift in perspective back to Europe and its empires; rather, it may also reveal a different *American* model for the League in the form of the Pan-American Union.

[58]Adolf Wild, *Baron d'Estournelles de Constant (1852–1924): Das Wirken eines Friedesnobelpreisträgers für die deutsch-französische Verständigung und europäische Einigung.* (Hamburg, 1973), 107.

[59]Schönemann-Behrens, *Alfred H. Fried*, 100.

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Japan."[60] Fried eschewed the peace movement's goal—which he regarded as a dream—of a permanent international court of arbitration to which all states would be answerable and whose decisions would be binding. In the short term, Fried argued, conflicts on the European continent being so intractable, the community of interest that a colonial union would build in the administration of overseas possessions was a step in the right direction.[61] The union would channel European colonial interests toward a common trade agenda, the common administration of possessions in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere, and ultimately global law.[62]

Although this idea found some supporters among German pacifists, it also incited substantial controversy and criticism. Suttner, notably, voiced strong objection to the politics of exploitation as a means to forge international organization.[63] This did not mean, however, that Suttner opposed colonialism in and of itself, simply that she was more concerned than Fried was about colonizers' methods. Suttner represented the consensus among those who promoted international oversight of colonial administration in her simultaneous concern for the welfare of colonized populations and her assumption that without excessive exploitation and violence, colonialism could carry out a benevolent, civilizing mission. Suttner initially joined Fried in supporting a European military presence in China after the Boxer Rebellion, seeing in it the seeds of a new phase of international organization in Europe, but she became disillusioned by the troops' tactics.[64] Fried did not focus on such concerns about native welfare—likely he would have classed them as belonging to the kind of moral pacifism that he rejected. Instead, he was concerned with how colonialism could promote peace and integration within Europe and thereby enable Europe to promote cooperation and, eventually, integration at the global level.

Nevertheless, having failed to find adequate support for a colonial union, Fried returned to the goal of fostering communities of interests on the European continent. His 1910 study of pan-Americanism as a gradualist model of European regional integration was the first in-depth exploration of the pan-European idea. Where d'Estournelles lamented the lack of pan-European congresses like those held by the Pan-American Union, Fried offered a concrete proposal for their realization.[65]

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[60]Ibid., quotation 100.

[61]Ibid.

[62]In addition to offering a window into his views on empire, Fried's thinking regarding the proposed European Colonial Union also reveals his position on the question of tensions between the goals of regional and global international organization. It might appear on the surface that the goal of European regional integration was at odds with the larger goal of global federation, but in Fried's mind, no such tension existed. This is because he took for granted that international organization on a global scale required stewardship and that Europe was destined for that role. In order to set an example for the rest of the world and guide the global process of political and legal integration, moreover, Europe had to be internally stable and secure. In this view, Fried was again representative of a broad consensus concerning colonialism among European liberal internationalist thinkers and promoters of international law. On the centrality of colonialism to the conceptualization and development of international law, see: Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge, 2005). In the case of eventual, global integration, as elsewhere, Fried declined to provide detail about whether and how the various regional international orders would ultimately merge into an overarching international order. His argument, again, was that this would be an evolutionary development that relied on flexibility and an open-minded approach; thus, detailed plans were not only impossible, but also detrimental.

[63]Petra-Schönemann-Behrens, *Alfred H. Fried*, 101.

[64]Brigitte Hamann, *Bertha von Suttner: A Life for Peace* (Syracuse, 1996), 157.

[65]In fact, this seems to have been a source of some tension with d'Estournelles. Upon receipt of a copy of Fried's *Pan-Amerika*, d'Estournelles wrote "I thank you and congratulate you on your fine volume, Pan-America. This is the subject upon which I wanted to work for many years. This is not the first time you have realized my intention, nor, I

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The most direct influence informing Fried's proposal was Novicow, in particular his *La fédération de l'Europe,* which Fried translated into German in 1901.[66] In *La fédération,* Novicow made the argument briefly discussed above, that it was the task of pacifists to intervene in Europe's evolutionary path, which had strayed from its natural trajectory of international organization into a trajectory of imperialism and militarism. Intervention, Novicow argued, could right Europe's evolutionary path and lead to the creation of a United States of Europe within his lifetime. Indeed, Novicow proposed federation as a panacea for most of Europe's problems. For example, as a solution to conflict over Alsace-Lorraine, he proposed a league of small neutral states including Belgium, Switzerland, and the two contested provinces.[67] Fried borrowed heavily from Novicow's evolutionary paradigm, but he disagreed that federation, even in its most conservative form, was possible within a generation.

Fried's skepticism about the speed of international organization charted at the time as the most retrained or cautious form of contemporary thinking regarding federation among antiwar thinkers.[68] In contrast to Novicow, Fried argued that if the project of building a large, federal state were undertaken in the short term, it would fail for lack of a sufficient foundation in regional interdependence.[69] Thus, it was "a mistake always to look upon the United States of America as a model for Europe."[70] Fried's proposal for international organization was, in other words, gradualist, even conservative. Although his worldview was cosmopolitan and idealistic, his approach to integration was first and foremost pragmatic.

However, Novicow's confidence and Fried's caution about the potential speed of international organization notwithstanding, their difference was one of degree, not of kind. They both dismissed utopian visions of unity along with any ideas they regarded as idealistic, overambitious, or politically extremist. Victor Hugo's romantic nationalist and Mikhail Bakunin's anarchist proposals for a United States of Europe are two prominent examples that they rejected.[71] Fried's choice not to promote Novicow's United States of Europe, but to

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hope, the last." See: Fried to d'Estournelles, 17 June 1910, In LoN, Alfred H. Fried Collection, box 57, d'Estournelles correspondence folder.

[66]Novicow, *Die föderation Europas.*

[67]Sandi Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe 1815–1914* (New York, 1991), 166. D'Estournelles, incidentally, also argued that resolution of tensions over Alsace-Lorraine through the establishment of a permanent French-German alliance would be the basis for the eventual federation of Europe. See: Alfred H. Fried, *Handbuch Der Friedensbewegung*, vol. 2 (New York, 1972), 160.

[68]The contemporary scholar of pacifism Edward Krehbiel described the "internationalist" approach, for which he used Fried's Pan-Europe as example, as holding the position "that nationalism is no longer expressive of the [current] age, but that federation is not, as yet, feasible; that the present sovereignty of states is detrimental, but that one cannot hope to change the theory suddenly." Internationalists therefore proposed "a sort of confederation, a cooperative union of sovereign states, a true concert of powers." See: Edward Krehbiel, *Nationalism, War, and Society: A Study of Nationalism and its Concomitant, War, in their Relation to Civilization; and of the Fundamentals and the Progress of the Opposition to War* (New York, 1916), 219–20.

[69]Fried, *Handbuch*, vol. 1, 114–16.

[70]Fried, *The Restoration of Europe*, 108. See also Fried, *Handbuch,* vol. 1, 114–15.

[71]There are various ways to categorize Hugo's and Bakunin's proposals. Hugo's aligns well with Edward Krehbiel's "federalist" category, made up of ideas holding that "nationalism is out of date; that as long as it and national sovereignty exists, war and its ills will continue, that international law can never remedy these evils ... that the fundamental step toward eliminating war is an organization with power, above the several states, which shall determine what is right and just in any case." See: Krehbiel, *Nationalism, War, and Society,* 220. Federalists, however, believed that nations should retain local autonomy in order to cultivate "their own qualities and institutions, their *Kultur*" (ibid., 221). In fact, federalists believed that the survival of Kultur depended upon the end of absolute sovereignty because it was precisely in the condition of sovereignty that wars "in which one tries to suppress the *Kultur* of the other" occur (ibid., 220–21). Fried's specific objection to the "great sovereign state"

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introduce a more cautious pan-European proposal likely reflects his concern about the particularly inhospitable Central European audience. Furthermore, his concern with selling international organization to the likes of Bismarck and Wilhelm II is, as I will discuss in more detail below, one of the keys to understanding not only the restrained goals of Pan-Europe, but also its purported vagueness.

This brings me to the second point of this section, concerning the specific steps Fried envisioned for Pan-Europe's realization. He identified four areas of priority in the Pan-American Union, which were to be mirrored in Pan-Europe. The first was trade and transport. Specific initiatives included extended railroad connections, agreements concerning free maritime transport and port trade, a standing international customs commission, steps toward the standardization of weights and measures, plans for international coinage, the establishment of an international bank, expanded consular services, commissions to promote important regional industries, and an international trade dictionary.[72] Beyond these areas of first priority, Fried identified public health and civil law as the second tier. Specific goals included internationally coordinated sanitation administrations, extradition agreements, standardization of the legal status of foreigners, the protection of intellectual property, and ultimately the establishment of a commission to codify international civil law and sponsor pan-European conventions.[73] The third tier of "purely ideal goods," which Fried also hoped could be managed internationally, included the protection of natural treasures, the establishment of an inventory of region-wide natural resources, the collection and sharing of key statistical information such as census data, a coordinated archaeological commission, an international natural and art museum, the exchange of official state publications and bibliographic information, support for international academic conferences, and exchange programs for professors and students.[74] The final step, which was to be talked about only after significant progress in all the other areas discussed, would be the establishment of arbitration agreements.[75] Fried probably left this for last not because it was least important, but because it was most likely to prompt resistance as an infringement on sovereignty, particularly among a German audience—German delegates to the 1907 Hague Convention had led the veto against a binding international arbitration agreement.[76]

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that Victor Hugo had invoked when he called for a United States of Europe was that, from Fried's perspective, international organization was not primarily a political process, but rather, following Novicow, a "process of social evolution." See: Fried, *Restoration*, 104; and Fried, *Handbuch,* vol. 1, 114–15. Bakunin's ideas have been described by Roger Chickering as utopian, by which he means the position that "war [is] an inseparable aspect of a social and political order that is utterly corrupt and beyond rehabilitation," making withdrawal or revolutionary assault on society the only viable options. See: Chickering, *Imperial Germany*, 19. Novicow described Bakunin's proposal for Europe as "a pure utopia, which could only appeal to those who live in complete ignorance of social science." See: Novicow, *Die Föderation Europas*, 14.

[72]Fried, "Kurzgefasste Darstellung," 19–21.

[73]Ibid., 20–21.

[74]Ibid., 21–22.

[75]For a later summary of these steps, see: Fried, *Restoration,* 140.

[76]Chickering, *Imperial Germany,* 229–30. But by putting arbitration last in his steps toward the achievement of Pan-Europe, Fried was also expressing the frustration he felt after the Second Hague Conference with what he described as the peace movement's preoccupation with arbitration. In 1908, he tried to convince his colleagues that their work on arbitration was pointless, because commitment to arbitration agreements went out the window when real attacks were imminent. Fried argued, therefore, that international organization should be the movement's priority. Specifically, pacifists should focus on a campaign to convince elites and governments that European civilization already existed and needed to be cultivated. See: Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism*, 111.

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Fried hoped that this gradualist approach, focused on small steps in many fields, would be attractive to Europe's political realists. In highlighting the improvement in the quality of everyday life that an international organization would bring to the citizens of European countries, Fried presented integration as an expression of rational self-interest rather than an attack on national identity. He hoped that support from leaders in industry, politics, and the academy would give Pan-Europe credibility and enable it to grow into a loose confederation of states whose economies were integrated, whose transportation systems were standardized, and in which cultural and educational exchanges were extensive.

Eventually, Pan-Europe would also administer a common legal system and resolve disputes through arbitration. Although the bureau would have little power, it would be a stable alliance as long as Europeans came to recognize and invest in their membership in an international community. In short, he wrote, "Europe must finally become Europe":

> [Europe] must cease to be a mere geographic expression, it must be a cultural idea, a social concept. This may still sound utopian, but it is not at all. … [Europe] must undertake a different form of political and economic life. This is not as difficult today as it was a few decades ago. … First, many complex alliances have already been implemented within Europe, and second, an authoritative example exists in the Pan-American movement that could simply be replicated. … Instead of wasting the strength of all the nations on armament that does not achieve true security but instead retards all opportunities for development, the European states must standardize their infrastructure, facilitate their transportation, internationalize their governments and ensure stability through mutually established security treaties. … A greatly empowered Pan-America will exist along side an equally powerful Pan-Europe—not opposite or in opposition to it, but in conjunction with it.[77]

Thus, to reiterate, Pan-Europe, even after the realization of all the measures discussed, was to be confederal, not federal: a federation could not succeed unless Europe were already organized. Only when common interests and interconnections in Europe developed beyond the spheres of economics, infrastructure, and technology to permeate educational and cultural life could federation be considered. As Fried had been arguing since at least 1901, even before he had settled on the Pan-American Union as a specific model, "an economically unified Europe must necessarily develop into a politically unified Europe."[78]

Having outlined the steps to be taken and the goals to be realized, the delicate question of where the bureau would be located and what countries it would represent remained. Even in his attempts to court Wilhelm II, in which he suggested that the kaiser would be the ideal leader of an organized Europe, he suggested that the seat of power be a less controversial location than Berlin. That city was out of the question—having been expelled from the German Peace Society, Fried had neither a strong network of collaborators there, nor the endorsement of the German liberals he had courted.[79]

Fried endorsed the idea of establishing pan-European headquarters in a neutral country. Interestingly, d'Estournelles did not agree. In his own mentions of the desirability of a Pan-European Union, he simply assumed Paris would be headquarters.[80] I bring up this

[77]Fried, *Pan-Amerika*, 287.

[78]Fried, "Die amerikanische Gefahr," 139.

[79]See: Schönemann-Behrens, 94–117. See also Fried's discussion of his disappointment with German liberals and his decision not to attempt further political alliances, but instead to designate the German Peace Society as a purely humanitarian entity. Alfred H. Fried, *Die Moderne Friedensbewegung in Deutschland und Frankreich.* (Leipzig, 1908), 3.

[80]Paul Henri d'Estournelles de Constant, *America and Her Problems,* trans. George A. Raper (New York, 1915), 16.

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unapologetic promotion of Paris as European headquarters because it contrasts strikingly with Fried's avoidance of Berlin. It stands to reason that, in addition to reflecting a predictable attitude concerning Paris as the fount of civilization, d'Estournelles was operating on the assumption that his public would be flattered by the proposition of Paris as headquarters of a supranational European organization. In contradistinction, as we have seen in several other instances, Fried was concerned that his public would be offended by such a suggestion for Germany's capital. The choice of location for Pan-Europe's capital again suggests Fried's concern with his hostile, Central European audience. This is further evident in his sometimes awkward attempts at once to win German supporters and to chastise his German radical nationalist opposition. Fried's book on the German kaiser and the peace movement balances flattery of Wilhelm II against exasperation with what he characterized as the closed-minded German public and the "threatening and overbearing" pan-German press.[81]

The question of pan-European membership was equally fraught, in part as it called for some sort of definition of Europe. Though he never provided a list of proposed constituent countries, Fried's previous proposal for a colonial union suggests the membership he had in mind for Pan-Europe. Membership was not to be assumed for all European states: "It must be considered," Fried wrote in 1911, "that in the gradual development of an inter-state union, not all states that constitute geographic Europe will be able to be incorporated initially. The states with the highest cultural development will initiate the process."[82] As is usual in attempts to define the boundaries of Europe, questions arose about Britain and Eastern Europe. As mentioned above, Fried excluded Britain, which he argued would come to constitute its own federation within its empire. He included the Russian Empire and objected to rhetoric about Russian backwardness. In his introduction to his German translation of Novicow's *La fédération de l'Europe*, Fried wrote:

> From the supposedly so backward Russia, we West Europeans have received so many liberating ideas that it will no-longer be a surprise if we find in the following book a spirit imbued with such originality and vigor, clarity and superiority, that it joins company with the best that Western scholarship produces today.[83]

The inclusion of a region and ethnicity often excluded from ideas of Europe at the time points to the fact that these categories were not definitional for Fried. Europe was a secular community of "cultured states" in which membership was defined by the evolutionary sociological concept of intellectual struggle—states with the highest cultural value were the ones farthest removed from physical struggle.[84] The focus of his pacifism was the construction of an international social and economic infrastructure that would serve, if you will, as a body for this mind. Though Pan-Europe was to be composed of sovereign states, its success depended upon the citizens of those states recognizing their membership in a moral and cultural community that transcended national boundaries. Thus, although not a challenge to the nation-state in and of itself, the international community that underpinned Pan-Europe was absolutely incompatible with the radicalizing nationalism that was gaining currency in the early

[81]Fried, *German Emperor*, 147.
[82]Fried, *Handbuch*, vol. 1, 114.
[83]Alfred H. Fried, "Preface," in Novicow, *Die Föderation Europas*.
[84]See: Harry Elmer Barnes, "A Sociological Criticism of War and Militarism: An Analysis of the Doctrines of Jacques Novicow," *The Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 2 (1921): 238–65.

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twentieth century. And in *Wien-Berlin*, Fried had depicted the alternative: intellectual, rather than physical, struggle in a supranational polity.

Radicalized nationalism was not just an obstacle in the way of Fried's internationalist goals; it was in important ways a point of departure: Pan-Europe offered a solution to the Jewish predicament of exclusion. It offered a model in which Europe's nation-states would not be constituted by ethnic belonging, and Jews would retain their membership in their home states and, by extension, in Europe.

Clearly, Fried could not mobilize broad-based support for Pan-Europe around this Jewish dilemma. Instead, Europe's public and political leaders would have to become convinced that international organization was in their own self-interest. This would be a protracted, evolutionary process. For this reason, I believe, he declined to elaborate specific, detailed plans for the composition, functioning, and governance of Pan-Europe. Some of the greatest obstacles to international organization included the charges of naive utopianism and infringement on national sovereignty; Fried chose not to incite those charges. Rather, following the strategy of the international peace movement, he concentrated less on the end goal and more on cultivating the necessary conditions for its eventual achievement. In short, what has been understood as vagueness was in fact public relations strategy.

I now move to the third point of this section, which concerns another aspect of Fried's public relations strategy: the attempt to head off objections. In what follows, I discuss Fried's answers to concerns about the appropriateness of the pan-American model for Europe and the ultimate rejection of his proposal. Like d'Estournelles, Fried was wholly uncritical of the pan-American example, but had nonetheless to justify his position to others. The most substantial critique he had to address was that pan-Americanism was simply a vehicle for United States hegemony in the Western hemisphere and, if emulated, would similarly lead to the domination of Europe by one great power. In a nutshell, Fried's reply was that the United States' preeminence in the Pan-American Union was consistent with European and American colonial interests, that the United States' dominant role was nonetheless benign, and that checks against the violation of national sovereignty existed within the union that would serve equally well in a pan-European union.

Following his evolutionist paradigm, Fried premised his argument with the assertion that pan-Americanism was the result of inevitable, evolutionary development, development in which Europe lagged behind. The Pan-American Union indicated that the Western hemisphere was progressing faster along the trajectory of international organization and would therefore have an advantage on the world stage should Europe fail to follow its lead. Furthermore, pan-Americanism was not only a model for Europe, but was even a potential vehicle for European economic conquest in Latin America. He observed that the participation of pan-American member countries in the second Hague conference in 1907 conveyed an "advantage for the Europeans, who through this opportunity, ... discovered South America for the second time."[85]

In thus condoning European colonialism, he was far from alone among pacifists. Otto Umfrid, the German Peace Society's spokesman on colonial affairs, argued that although brutal conquest could not be advocated, nonetheless dynamic and populous nations had a right to expand abroad and to acquire territory in stagnating and underpopulated parts of the world—namely in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.[86] The United States and Europe, in other words, were justified in conducting colonial exploits alongside or as part of efforts toward cultivating international trade and law. That the United States would assert economic

[85]Fried, "Kurzgefasste Darstellung," 26.
[86]Chickering, *Imperial Germany,* 305–6.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0067237814000204 Published online by Cambridge University Press

or cultural hegemony in the Western hemisphere through the Pan-American Union was thus, in Fried's estimation, natural and unproblematic.[87]

The United States' hegemonic position in the Pan-American Union was, Fried further argued, not only natural, but also beneficial to Latin American countries. He quoted from Latin American delegates who confirmed this assertion, for example, a Chilean scholar of international law who reported that:

> The Latin American States that came to Washington fearful that the United States intended to impose its will on them convinced themselves that despite the observable moral influence that it exercised—which couldn't be otherwise—it treated them as equals, without ever imposing its superiority."[88]

In a similar vein, Fried quoted a 1908 speech delivered at the University of Chicago by a Brazilian Statesman asserting that:

> You with your high culture cannot do any nation injustice and an intimate contact with you will, therefore, in any case, only bring the other party advantage and progress."[89]

Fried insisted that the United States' dominant role was constructive as long as it was not militarist, and he sought to assure his readers that the United States was explicitly anti-interventionist:

> The Americans sought to protect themselves from every system of violence, intervention, egotistical power politics, dynastic interests and diplomatic ambition; against that which *Kultureuropa* has actually attempted to protect itself since the days of the French Revolution and the combatting of which has been the preoccupation of the last 120 years of history.[90]

Fried's protestations notwithstanding, the power dynamic in the Pan-American Union brought into serious doubt its applicability as a model for Pan-Europe. The Pan-American Union's permanent central bureau was, after all, in Washington, DC. Its representatives were Latin American diplomats stationed in Washington. The sitting secretary was the United States Secretary of State. In Fried's optimistic estimation, by the first decade of the twentieth century, this central bureau in Washington had become a kind of ministry of the interior for all of America.[91]

The question of which European state would occupy an equivalently preeminent role in Pan-Europe was an obvious problem. Could an attempt at a regional confederation succeed without one powerful country taking a leadership role? Fried himself had acknowledged that the Pan-American Union had had several false starts in the early nineteenth century because "it lacked a power capable of taking on the leadership role."[92] Only when the United States joined and assumed leadership did pan-Americanism take off.

Nonetheless, Pan-Europe, according to Fried, would be made up of continental European states and would not be a vehicle for any one state's imperialist aspirations. Although, as mentioned above, most German pacifists agreed that colonialism was acceptable outside of

[87]Ibid.
[88]Fried, "Kurzgefasste Darstellung," 32.
[89]Ibid., 31–32.
[90]Ibid., 33.
[91]Ibid., 25.
[92]Ibid., 14.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0067237814000204 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Europe, they held that imperialist conquest was unacceptable on the continent. In fact, German pacifists were staunch defenders of Europe's existing territorial boundaries; they did not want their movement to be associated with any policy that called into question the status quo concerning Alsace-Lorraine.[93] Yet again, Fried argued, a model for ensuring the stability of Europe's borders was to be found in the Pan-American Union, specifically in the principle of inviolable state sovereignty, which that union was supposed to uphold.

Rather ironically, Latin American delegates had deployed this very principle in their attempts to combat the United States' hegemonic tendencies within the Pan-American Union. By pressuring the United States to accept state sovereignty as a basic principle of pan-Americanism, they hoped to deter violations of their sovereignty.[94] Fried imported this principle to the radically different European context, where it allowed him to argue that Pan-Europe would not become a vehicle for the dominance of one great power. Using a principle deployed by weaker states against interference by a great power, Fried offered Europe's great powers two assurances: first, that joining Pan-Europe would shore up their global standing and, second, that it would secure their preeminent standing within Europe. Pan-Europe would not, in other words, disturb the European political and territorial status quo. Having, he thought, made a watertight argument for the applicability of pan-Americanism as a model for the organization of Europe, Fried made his proposal for institutional backing to his fellow pacifists.

In October of 1909, a year before his book on pan-Americanism appeared, Fried made his formal call for the creation of a pan-European office. He gave a speech outlining his goals for Pan-Europe to International Peace Bureau's General Assembly at the Universal Peace Congress in Brussels. It was received with applause.[95] The assembly then adopted Fried's resolution, which read as follows:

> The general assembly of the Berne Bureau expresses the wish that the governments of Europe or some among them create a pan-European bureau after the example of that founded by the American republics in Washington.[96]

In spite of the initial enthusiasm with which his proposal was received, it soon became clear that support would not be as categorical as Fried had hoped. Even the limited financial support he won for the project came with lukewarm endorsement. The Hungarian pacifist and feminist, Ilona Zipernowsky, who incidentally was elected as a Hungarian delegate to the committee

[93]Chickering, *Imperial Germany,* 288–89.

[94]In fact, the Union did serve as a platform for Latin American countries to assert their own interests and to press the United States to recognize the principle of state sovereignty. Gradually, beginning in the late 1880s, Latin American nations won incremental concessions on this front and ultimately established absolute national sovereignty as a basic principle among Pan-American Union members by the early 1930s. This was not an unmitigated victory: official recognition of the principle of national sovereignty did not mean an end to U.S. violations of the sovereignty of Latin American states. See: Richard V. Salisbury, *Anti-Imperialism and International Competition in Central America 1920–1929* (Wilmington, DE, 1989).

[95]Alfred H. Fried, "Das Pan-Europäische Büreau," *Die Friedens-Warte* 11, no 10. (1909). Petra Schönemann-Behrens offers a brief summary of Fried's proposed resolution and his response to later criticism, also citing his reports in *Die Friedens-Warte* in *Alfred H. Fried,* 172.

[96]Alfred H. Fried, "Die Brüsseler Generalversammlung," *Die Friedens-Warte* 11, no. 10 (1909): 186. Indicating the degree to which Fried's proposal was warmly received in Brussels (criticism would come later), in the minutes of the congress Fried is recognized for all of his various contributions to the peace movement, including his advocacy for the creation of a pan-European bureau. See: Bureau International Permanent de la Paix, *Procès-Verbal de L'assemblée Générale des Déléguées des Sociétés de la Paix, Bruxelles, 1909* (1910), 12.

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of the International Peace Bureau at the Brussels congress, provided what appears to be the only funding Fried succeeded in securing.[97] In September of 1910, Zipernowsky reported to Fried that she and her husband, Károly, were willing to send Fried financial support, but they were skeptical about his pan-European proposal and preferred that he use the funds to support one of his pacifist publications. However, she continued, "if you think that something can be made of the Pan-European Bureau idea, that would be fine as well."[98]

Fried soon faced concerns from fellow pacifists about the possibility that a pan-European initiative could be a source of economic strain with the United States and, therefore, stand in the way of world organization. The issue of tensions with the United States was a long-standing concern that Fried had tried long ago—apparently unsuccessfully—to lay to rest.[99] But, unfortunately, Fried had also been inconsistent on this issue. He had a record of objecting to proposals for regional integration that he thought would constitute stumbling blocks for continental or global organization. He particularly objected to Friedrich Naumann's *Mitteleuropa* idea.[100] I contend that his objection to regional proposals like Naumann's had less to do with their regional nature and more with ideological underpinnings that Fried opposed. Fried criticized Naumann's "pronounced nationalist views" elsewhere.[101] But it did not help Fried's argument for Pan-Europe that he chose to mask such ideological concerns behind arguments about the deficits of regional integration, because this very criticism could legitimately be leveled at a number of his own projects.

Such inconsistencies aside, Fried's response to his colleagues' concerns about Pan-Europe inciting tensions between regional and global integration hinged on his conviction that they misunderstood his proposal. He thus reemphasized that he was not calling for the creation of a *polity,* something that would indeed hinder the project of world organization. Rather, he emphasized, the Pan-American Union upon which the Pan-European bureau was modeled was simply "a kind of commercial, sanitary, and scientific information office, a headquarters for the study of common American affairs dedicated to preparing for later agreements, a headquarters for exchange and documentation, news, etc."[102] Although a *political organization* of European states would, he contended, hamper increased cooperation with the Americas, the kind of *information office* he had in mind could only promote world organization. Moreover, by providing examples of the benefits of international organization, the pan-European bureau would help Europeans to overcome the psychological obstacle that stood in the way of integration. They would awaken to the aspiration for international organization, which would position them to lead the effort toward world organization.[103]

Though Fried's insistence that he was not proposing an obstacle to world organization rested on a fine distinction, he could point to Andrew Carnegie, on whose initiative the Pan-American

[97]Fried, "Die Brüsseler Generalversammlung," 187.

[98]See: Anna (Ilona) Zipernowsky to Alfred Fried, 10 Sept. 1910, in LoN, Alfred H. Fried Papers, box 86. And in a letter dated 2 Dec. 1910, she confirms her husband's willingness to support Fried's effort to establish a pan-European bureau and requests details concerning when and where to send funds.

[99]Fried, "Die Amerikanische Gefahr."

[100]Fried, *The Restoration of Europe,* 109–10.

[101]Fried, *The German Emperor*, 128. Interestingly, Fried's perspective differs somewhat from recent scholarly perspectives questioning whether Naumann's *Mitteleuropa* was more an imperialist rather than a nationalist project. See: Gregor Thum, "Mythische Landschaften: Das Bild von 'Deutschen Osten' und die Zäsuren des 20. Jahrhnderts," in *Traumland Osten: Deutsche Bilder vom Östlichen Europa im 20 Jahrhundert,* ed. Gregor Thum (Göttingen, 2006), 185.

[102]Alfred H. Fried, "Das Pan-Europäische Bureau im Lichte der Völkerrechtswissenschaft," *Die Friedens-Warte* 11, no 12 (1909): 221–25, at 221.

[103]Fried, "Kontinental oder Mondial?"

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Union was founded, for corroboration. Carnegie had published an article in *Die Friedens-Warte* in 1907 promoting European economic integration and arguing that such integration was necessary if Europe were to remain economically competitive with the United States.[104]

Nonetheless, one can see how Fried's pacifist colleagues remained skeptical. Even if Fried's proposal for Europe would not throw up any new institutional barriers to global collaboration, Fried clearly did intend for the Pan-European Union not only to catch up to the Pan-American Union, but also to supersede it. It is hard to see how this would not provoke concern from colleagues in the United States.

The pan-European proposal was not taken up again at the next meeting of the General Assembly in Berne in 1911. The meeting was devoted almost exclusively to the pressing problems of the Morocco crisis and the Italo-Turkish war, and no further resolution on Pan-Europe was passed at this or the final two Universal Peace Congresses before the outbreak of World War I.[105]

The mixed response Fried received after the Universal Peace Congresses did not weaken his investment in the pan-European idea to any degree. Similarly, the war did not occasion a shift in his pacifism. This brings me to the fourth and final point of this section—namely Fried's promotion of Pan-Europe during World War I, which he spent in exile in Switzerland. In his first wartime work, *Europäische Wiederherstellung*, which came out in 1915, he argued that the war did not necessitate a revision of the peace movement's primary goals and strategies because:

> [t]he present war is the logical outcome of the kind of "peace" that preceded it ... Pacifism, which public opinion ... has declared a failure ... has in reality been fully justified by the war. Because we saw that war was bound to result from this condition of national isolation, we worked, warned and sought to develop the forces or organization as a preventative. We had no illusions; we were engaged in the struggle against a catastrophe which we clearly foresaw. ... We never doubted that the opposing forces were stronger. ... We saw the war coming.[106]

Thus, Fried continued to assert in *Europäische Wiederherstellung* that war was not inevitable, but rather an aberration from the true evolutionary path: sociological evolution followed, he argued, "a universal natural law that leads from chaos to world-organization as from cell to Homo Sapiens. Evolution is always the outcome of association and organization."[107] The war, in Fried's opinion, was the consequence of a "fatal error" in the interpretation of Darwin's theory, which allowed militarists to "see in history nothing but the decisions of force, entirely overlooking the fact that the whole course of world-history is a process of constantly increasing organization … The fact that the lion tears open the antelope does not imply that the massacre of the population of one state by that of another is a natural law."[108] Rather, Fried argued, "an uninterrupted line of progress leads *from isolated primitive man up to modern pan-Americanism* [original emphasis]."[109]

Europe, moreover, desperately needed to follow the example of pan-Americanism, because the war itself demonstrated:

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[104]Andrew Carnegie, "Kontinentale oder Nationale Industrie?," *Die Friedens-Warte* 9, no. 10 (1907).
[105]Schönemann-Behrens, *Alfred H. Fried*, 173.
[106]Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism*, quotation 140.
[107]Fried, *Restoration of Europe*, 27.
[108]Ibid., 35.
[109]Ibid., 27.

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> that the world has already become an economic unit, which if disturbed at one point, suffers in all parts of the organism; that the political interrelationships were already so highly developed that—at least in Europe—wars could no longer be "localized."[110]

For this reason, the organization of Europe was as pressing as ever. Fried purposed a European Cooperative Union, to be overseen by a pan-European bureau located in a neutral country.[111] Its purpose would be to promote association between states based upon nonpolitical common interests.[112] By eschewing the political, Fried hoped that "we shall meet less opposition than if we attempt simultaneously to organize them politically."[113]

Therefore, as before the war, Fried focused on propaganda for the key ideas behind his integrationist ideal, instead of outlining concrete steps toward political integration. He was careful in *Die Friedens-Warte* to make it clear that he was not calling for an end to national sovereignty. In a 1916 article on pan-Americanism, he wrote that the creation of a pan-European bureau would not necessitate political reorganization:

> rather simply a regularization and ordering of international coexistence and cohabitation; a building up of what I have described above as "international organization." No longer do these states join together in common consultation in order to "federate" ... *But it would be unwise to believe that out of these efforts something else should not also emerge, something higher than that which appears directly in the program and is to be immediately undertaken.* (original emphasis)[114]

As always, the proposal was for uncontroversial, initial steps in nonpolitical fields, but the ultimate goal was political union:

> In the long run a close association of economic, technical, social and ideal fields will inevitably make itself felt in political relations as well. Following the line of least resistance, there will eventually be a complete form of international organization.[115]

This long-term process of international organization, moreover, would ultimately temper nationalism. Fried remained highly critical of nationalism, claiming that it emphasized "certain superficialities, which it misrepresents as the highest ideals of humanity" and that behind it was merely "the desire to repulse all that is outwardly different."[116] In short, according to Fried, nationalism represented a primitive stage in evolution, was "created by disorganization, and [could] serve only disorganization."[117]

Whereas before the war, appeals to Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm had seemed reasonable to Fried, by 1917 he was appealing to Austrian leaders, presumably on the assumption that they would share his frustration with radicalized nationalism. Fried argued specifically that Austria had a special role to play in building Pan-Europe not only because of its domestic multiethnicity, but also because the monarchy did not, he claimed, have a legacy of imperial conquest (he failed to address the question of Bosnia). This, he argued, made Austria unique among European powers. With recourse to both Austria's domestic and international

[110]Ibid., 83.
[111]Ibid., 137.
[112]Ibid., 134.
[113]Ibid., 135.
[114]Fried, "Kurzgefasste Darstellung," 26.
[115]Ibid.
[116]Ibid., 32.
[117]Ibid., 33.

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moderation, he suggested in a letter to Austria's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Ottokar Czernin, on 2 June 1917 that the monarchy:

> has the advantage that is not burdened by a history of aspirations for conquest or world domination. Furthermore, due to its nationally-mixed character, evidence suggests that an international order would be the best guarantee of its domestic order. ... The consonance of its domestic interests with the international order to which the vast majority of all states aspire would even give the monarchy the right to lead the collaborative effort toward this great work of the future.[118]

Fried had believed that the principle of nationality would not survive the war with any legitimacy, but the monarchy disintegrated along national lines within a year and a half of this letter. He was convinced that European history would become dominated by "the new, the constructive, safeguarding and liberating principle of international justice."[119] The establishment of the League of Nations seemed like a vindication, but he died in 1921, before the abject failure of the League to protect national minorities in Europe's nationalizing states.[120]

In summary, Fried's pan-European initiative was intended to remedy the very nationalist conflicts that characterized the interwar period, conflicts that were particularly disastrous for Europe's Jews. His proposal certainly had shortcomings, of which his uncritical embrace of the pan-American example was significant. Nevertheless, Pan-Europe failed before World War I first and foremost because of the hostile context of fin-de-siècle Central Europe into which it was introduced. War was widely expected, even eagerly anticipated, and nationalism became increasingly radicalized. The peace movement came late to Central Europe and remained marginal there. Little wonder, too, that the pacifist ideal of international organization should find one of its foremost champions in a Jewish progressive reformer:

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[118]Alfred Fried to Count Ottokar Czernin, Berne, 2 June 1917, HIA, Alfred H. Fried Papers, "Increment, March 1984."

[119]"Kurzgefasste Darstellung," 132.

[120]Given Fried's career-long investment in European unity, his embrace of the League of Nations might seem inconsistent. Indeed, during the war, Fried had rejected the idea that at the war's end, a third Hague peace conference should establish the terms of peace in Europe because "[t]he Hague Conferences include all the nations of the world; to refer the further organization of Europe to all of them would be a mistake." See: Alfred H. Fried, *Restoration*, 100. Intriguingly, after the war, he seems to have changed his position. In his introduction to an edited collection of commentary on the League published in 1919, he reasserted that aspiration to a world state was premature, but also that "[e]arlier, I suggested a European Cooperative Union … The world war has taught us that the global interconnections are already strong enough so that the organization of one continent would no longer work. It appears to me that a global cooperative union … is one mechanism that should be encouraged and developed." See: Alfred H. Fried, "Einleitung," in *Der Völkerbund: Ein Sammelbuch* (Leipzig, 1919), 15. I hypothesize that Fried was willing to give up his investment in the organization of European in favor of world organization because it had become clear from the very outset that the League was a vehicle for the perpetuation of European hegemony, not—as he had feared in 1916—a threat thereto. His investment in European organization, as I have noted above, was driven in no small part by the conviction that Europe had to lead the process of global international organization. Once it became clear that the League would not disturb that trajectory, Fried was on board. The prominent position of the United States did not concern him because he viewed the United States as essentially part of Europe. (The statement that "[o]utside of Europe the United States alone really belongs in the European group" had been part of his argument against non-European involvement in the European postwar settlement. See: Fried, *Restoration,* 100.) Whether he objected to the fact that the League of Nations Covenant allowed for the perpetuation of American regional organization dominated by the United States in making an exception for the Monroe Doctrine is unclear in the few available relevant sources—*Die Friedens-Warte* ceased publication from 1916 until 1920 (shortly before Fried's death), and the two relevant books he published in 1919 and 1920 were edited volumes for which he only authored short introductions. See: *Der Völkerbund* and *Der Weltprotest gegen den Versailler Frieden* (Leipzig, 1920).

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Jews had everything to lose from the disintegration of multiethnic states and the reorganization of Europe along national lines that defined them as ethnic or racial outsiders. The disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy placed Central European Jews in bleak circumstances. The interwar period was also bleak for the region's aristocrats, who had to embrace nationalism or propose cosmopolitan alternatives. Coudenhove found precisely such an alternative in Fried's pan-European idea.

3. Coudenhove's Interwar Pan-Europe

In the interwar period, a revised and reoriented peace movement found broader support in Austria and Germany than it had before World War I, and the pressing problem of minorities in Central and Eastern Europe's new and reconfigured nation-states eventuated a reorientation of pacifism toward human rights.[121] The new national divisions in Europe also introduced a whole new spectrum of concerns and a profoundly changed political climate in which the pan-European idea attracted far wider support than it had during Fried's lifetime.

In the early 1920s, a flurry of publications and new organizations called for European political, economic, and cultural unity. These movements, it is widely argued, derived from pessimism about the future of Europe as a great power.[122] Europeans felt threatened by the rising economic power of the United States and Japan and the political menace of Communist Russia, and thus sought to reconstruct Europe as a stable power and ensure its leading position in the world. According to Katiana Orluc, "European consciousness arose in the interwar period in the context of shock and loss—shock at the cruelty of the First World War and loss of the 'occidental culture' of a Europe that, prior to 1914, had existed as something self-evident."[123]

Coudenhove noted in *Pan-Europa* that "Mr. A. H. Fried ... asserts that in the year 1914 the existence of a pan-European bureau would unquestionably have prevented the outbreak of the World War—which is very likely true."[124] With the Pan-European Union, Coudenhove attempted to adapt Fried's idea to respond to interwar tensions and prevent future war in Europe. In response to the climate of urgency in the 1920s, he introduced three significant changes. In this final section, I give an overview of those changes, discuss Coudenhove's reasons for making them, and evaluate their significance. Finally, I offer an argument for the reasons why Coudenhove had greater success than Fried.

Coudenhove's first change was to advocate that the first steps toward political unification be taken immediately. He offered the following reasoning: the only decisive impediment to the political organization of Europe before the war had been the fact that Europe was composed of different kinds of polities. After the war, he argued, the twenty-six European democratic

[121]Hans Wehberg, a follower of Fried's and a scholar of international law, took over leadership of the peace movement in Weimar Germany. For more on the shift in focus from international organization to international human rights that followed, see: Daniel Porsch, "Die Friedens-Warte zwischen Friedensbewegung und Wissenschaf," *Die Friedens-Warte* 74, no. 1–2 (1999): 63–78.

[122]Wim Roobol, "Ariside Briand's Plan: The Seed of European Unification," in *Ideas of Europe since 1914: The Legacy of the First World War*, ed. Menno Spiering and Michael Wintle (New York, 2002), 33, 37; Rune Johansson, "Ideas on Europe—Europe as an Idea: An Intellectual History of European Unity and Cooperation," in *Europe: The Return of History*, ed. Sven Tägil (Lund, Sweden, 2001), 68–71.

[123]Katiana Orluc, "Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after the First World War," in *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, ed. Bo Straeth (Frankfurt, 2000), 124.

[124]Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 83.

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nation-states could begin the process of political unification.[125] This line of reasoning did not follow seamlessly from Fried's thinking. Fried had argued that because Pan-Europe was to be nonpolitical, it could represent the interests of different kinds of polities.[126] However, the implication was not that political heterogeneity was the only impediment to federalization. Rather, the major stumbling block was the pervasive mindset among Europeans that held national sovereignty (regardless of the form of polity) as sacred. Nevertheless, though Coudenhove inverted the order of Fried's steps toward the realization of Pan-Europe, he retained Fried's cautious, measured approach. Political integration would be a slow, step-by-step process.

Coudenhove elaborated the initial steps that were to be taken as follows. First, European governments would summon pan-European conferences that would meet periodically to discuss any relevant political matters except territorial disputes. The second step would be the signing of arbitration agreements between democratic states. The third step would be the establishment of a European customs union, and the final step would be the establishment of a United States of Europe. Like Fried, he did not provide much detail about the nature of this culminating European polity. Coudenhove even failed to specify whether the United States of Europe would be federal or confederal.[127] In short, he saw his inversion of the pan-European trajectory—from Fried's economy followed by politics to the reverse—as an adaptation to interwar circumstances. However, the implication of his reversal of the order of Fried's steps is fascinating in hindsight. Fried's prewar program was strikingly like the functionalist path that the first steps toward integration followed in the 1950s. In putting political integration first, Coudenhove was in step with interwar thinking about integration, but he was out of step with what turned out to be Fried's more accurate estimation of the most realistic path to achieve European unification.

Coudenhove's second change to Fried's Pan-Europe was the addition of a European military alliance and common European Air Force.[128] This was less of a departure than one might think. Most prewar continental pacifists, Fried included, condoned defensive military force.[129] Fried likely left military infrastructure out of his pan-European proposal for the same reason he did not include a political apparatus: he believed it to be too ambitious for the time. Thus, in incorporating military capability, Coudenhove was adapting Fried's Pan-Europe to meet what he considered to be interwar realities that were more conducive than prewar circumstances. Coudenhove's interest in creating a pan-European military does not imply that his conception of Pan-Europe was less rooted in pacifism. Coudenhove envisioned a purely defensive European military alliance. It would ensure Europe's right to its own

[125]Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Die Europäische Frage." *Die Friedens-Warte* 23, no. 1/2 (Jan.–Feb. 1923): 9–11, at 9.

[126]Fried, *Restoration,* 136.

[127]Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, "Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi," 99.

[128]According to the program of the Pan-European Union, published in 1936, the movement was to promote "a European league of states with the mutual guarantee of equal rights, security, and independence of all states of Europe; a European court of justice for the settling of all conflicts between European states; a Military alliance with a common air force to safeguard peace and symmetrical disarmament; the step-by-step creation of a European customs union; the common development of European economies; a common European currency; the fostering of the national cultures of all European peoples as the basis for the European cultural community; the protection of all the national minorities of Europe against denationalization and repression; and the cooperation of Europe with other groups of peoples within the framework of a world league of nations." See: Michael Gehler, "A Visionary Proved Himself to Be a Realist: Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergie, Austria, and the 'United States of Europe,' 1923–2003," *Human Security* 9 (2004/2005): 171–86, at 177.

[129]See: Cooper, *Patriotic Pacifism,* 162.

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Monroe Doctrine, which, for Coudenhove, meant that foreign powers would not be able to meddle in European domestic affairs. The military alliance would enable Europe to protect itself, but, Coudenhove argued, Europe's multilingual nature would act as a check on offensive, imperialist aggression.[130] In other words, Coudenhove's advocacy of a military component in Pan-Europe was compatible with his vision of Pan-Europe as leading the world "from world anarchy to world peace."[131]

Indeed, just as Fried's countenance of defensive military force was typical of prewar pacifism, Coudenhove's advocacy of a pan-European army did not single him out among interwar pacifists. As Ofer Ashkenazi has shown, Einstein—a supporter of Coudenhove's Pan-European Union—also supported the idea of a world army. Antiwar thinkers in the interwar period embraced a variety of ideas and proposals that, he argues, scholars have sometimes regarded as incoherent or contradictory, but were in fact all in service of "a central ideological thrust within ... networks of activists, which sought to establish mechanisms to overcome the inherent threat posed by unlimited national sovereignty."[132] Thus, as with his introduction of political unification into Fried's pan-European proposal, Coudenhove's addition of a military dimension was an adaption to the interwar context. In this case, however, it is worth noting with hindsight that given the failed European Defense Community, Fried's plan was more accurately predictive of post-1945 developments.

Coudenhove's third change to Fried's proposal was the greater emphasis he placed on Europe's spiritual and cultural dimensions. Coudenhove saw nations as outgrowths of "the actions and reactions between gifted peoples and their great men" as expressed "through the medium of language, religion, art, and politics."[133] His definition of nationhood is important. Like his prewar pacifist predecessors, Coudenhove did not oppose the national idea as such. He opposed national chauvinism and, in particular, the "race myth" that asserted nations were racial communities.[134] He understood chauvinism—the fear and hatred of other nations—as the primary obstacle for Pan-Europe to overcome because it prevented Europeans from recognizing their membership in an international moral and cultural community.[135] Thus, cultivating a supranational Pan-Europe did not, for Coudenhove, mean the end of national identities. Rather, the nature of such identities would be revealed by a proper cultivation of heterogeneous pan-European culture, which would lead to the eventual separation of nation and state, an erroneous linkage that actually stifled national cultures.[136] Coudenhove said more than Fried about nations as spiritual communities—Fried mostly restricted his proposal to material conditions.[137] But what he did write on the subject anticipated Coudenhove's arguments. In *Europäische Wiederherstellung*, Fried had written that nationalism undermined the "inner life of nations," that it oppressed rather than liberated them, and that each nation would only "attain its full freedom and become an active agent of human progress" through "the political organization of all mankind."[138]

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[130]Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Die Europäische Frage," 11.

[131]Ibid.

[132]Ofer Ashkenazi, "Reframing the Interwar Peace Movement: The Curious Case of Albert Einstein," *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, no. 4 (2011): 741–66, at 761.

[133]Coudenhove, *Pan-Europe*, 154–55.

[134]Ibid.

[135]Ibid., 159–61.

[136]Ibid., 161–71.

[137]On Coudenhove's description of Europe as a spiritual community, see: Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, *Botschafter Europas,* 329–68.

[138]Fried, *Restoration,* 32–35.

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Taken together, the changes that Coudenhove made to Fried's proposal amounted to a reformulation of the pan-European idea in bolder terms that reflected the urgency and priorities of the interwar period. Fried's slogan—"organize the world!"—and Coudenhove's —"integration or collapse!"—encapsulate the difference. The threat of American economic competition, which Fried had dismissed as alarmist, became compounded by shock at the devastation of World War I and fear that Europe would destroy itself through future wars or fall victim to Soviet military aggression.[139] Thus, a principal purpose of Pan-Europe for Coudenhove was to defend Europe from these threats. Moreover, because Europe was now a politically homogeneous community of nation-states, he believed it was feasible to undertake the political unification that Fried had (accurately, as it happens) thought premature.

Historical hindsight aside, in the interwar years, Coudenhove gained far more traction among politicians, leaders in industry, and high-profile public intellectuals than Fried ever did, though his Pan-European Union never produced the mass movement he envisioned. Coudenhove's greater success is, in part, explained by the more conducive interwar context, but that context does not provide a full explanation—the interwar period in Central Europe was itself, after all, hardly hospitable to cosmopolitan and internationalist initiatives. Coudenhove succeeded in bringing Pan-Europe out of the political margins because he had access to resources and connections that had eluded Fried.

The first supporters for Coudenhove's Pan-European Union were Viennese freemasons, most of them progressive social reformers like Fried himself. However, Coudenhove soon realized that wider support would require that he appeal to more conservative ideologies that would alienate his original audience.[140] To this end, he used the resources with which his aristocratic background furnished him. Coudenhove was a member of the Bohemian aristocracy, a group whose status shifted dramatically in the immediate aftermath of the war from that of a political and economic elite to that of a marginal, pariah class. Many nobles adapted to the new national climate by attempting to shed their image as symbols of Habsburg German domination and privilege. Some became Czech nationalists, others pan-German nationalists, and still others, Coudenhove among them, embraced pan-European cosmopolitanism.[141] Eagle Glassheim has noted of Coudenhove and Otto von Habsburg that "[t]he triple curse of being noble, German, and a Habsburg in a new world of nation-states and minorities was an essential impetus to these men's pan-European dreams."[142]

Their sudden marginal status notwithstanding, nobles throughout Central Europe still commanded tremendous, if reduced, wealth and maintained influential political and economic networks.[143] It was these networks that Coudenhove marshaled to launch his Pan-European Union into prominent, international circles. Baron Louis Rothschild, for example, recruited supporters for Coudenhove in the German banking industry. The Warburg family and others consequently provided the bulk of the Pan-European Union's funding, and the

[139]Fried's pan-European proposal had addressed these very concerns about European decline. He had also addressed the "American threat," but his stance was more optimistic than defensive. He agreed with the popular sentiment that Europe had fallen behind the United States in economic and geopolitical status and that international organization would restore European standing, but he believed that a unified Europe would build a mutually beneficial relationship with the United States. See: Fried, "Die amerikanische Gefahr."

[140]See: Historisches Museum der Stadt Wien, *Zirkel Und Winkelmass*; Eugen Lennhof and Oskar Posner, *Internationales Freimaurer-Lexikon*.

[141]Eagle Glasshiem, *Noble Nationalists: The Transformation of the Bohemian Aristocracy* (Cambridge: MA, 2005), 4–5.

[142]Ibid., 121.

[143]Ibid., 5.

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union only went into decline when that funding decreased in 1929 with the Great Depression and then dried up completely in 1933 when the Nazis banned the Pan-European Union in Germany.[144] In short, although Coudenhove formulated his pan-European proposal in the progressive and pacifist circles that he and Fried both moved in as freemasons, he soon realized that this network could offer more by way of inspiration than influence, and used his considerable resources to widen the movement's reach.[145]

Furthermore, having rejected pan-German nationalism, Coudenhove was also able to recruit supporters among that movement's strongest opponents—Christian Socialists—who shared his Habsburg nostalgia and respected his aristocratic credentials. Christian Socialism offered influence among clerical and conservative members of the German Right, and though Coudenhove himself was not anti-Semitic—his wife was partly of Jewish heritage and he and his father had both published critiques of anti-Semitism—he was able to turn a blind eye to the anti-Semitic conflation of Jews with liberalism that was a fundamental element of Christian Social ideology.[146] For Fried, Catholic conservatives, even those who supported federalization of the Habsburg monarchy and of Europe, were not a source of support, but rather constituted the opposition. In a 1910 letter to Suttner, he argued that no patriotic, progressive-minded Austrian could countenance rule by such figures as Francis Ferdinand, pastor Clemens von Galen, Karl Lueger, and Alois von Aehrenthal.[147] Fried, a secular progressive, did not support the worldview of such figures, but regardless, he did not have the option of their support. Coudenhove did.

In short, Coudenhove made major inroads into powerful circles thanks to his background. Consequently, the central office of the Pan-European Union was established with governmental support at Vienna's Hofburg in 1925. Chancellor Ignaz Seipel served as honorary president until his death in 1932 and was followed by subsequent Christian Social chancellors, Engelbert Dollfuss and Kurt Schuschnigg. Outside Austria, Coudenhove's supporters included Aristide Briand, Konrad Adenauer, Winston Churchill, and a score of prominent intellectuals, among them Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Albert Einstein, Thomas Mann, and Sigmund Freud. The result was that, in spite of the fact that they both operated in climates hostile to internationalism, Coudenhove fared far better than Fried.

Recent scholarship has shed light on the dilemma that Jews and Catholic aristocrats shared in the decades bracketing World War I. As Malachi Hacohen has noted, neither group had anything to gain from the disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy; indeed, its disintegration was traumatic for both.[148] Among the wide variety of responses to this dilemma was a series of cosmopolitan initiatives offering an alternative to the ethnic

[144]Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, "Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi," 98–99.

[145]On the supporters Fried and Coudenhove shared among Viennese masons, see: Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, *Botschafter Europas,* 54.

[146]See Coudenhove's introduction to a 1929 edition of his father's 1901 work on anti-Semitism. Heinrich Johann Maria Coudenhove, *Das Wesen des Antisemitismus: Eingeleitet durch Antisemitismus nach dem Weltkrieg* (Vienna, 1929).

[147]Alfred H. Fried to Bertha von Suttner, 30 Mar. 1910, LoN, Bertha von Suttner Collection, Box 19, folder 220. Clemens von Galen was a German Catholic priest educated in Austria who became an outspoken critic of Hitler, in particular of Nazi racial science. Alois von Aehrenthal was an Austrian diplomat who was instrumental in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. A conservative, Catholic Austrian monarchist, Aehrenthal was a strong critic of nationalism in the late 1890s, claiming about German nationalists that: "The Germans degrade themselves, when they follow the example of the Czechs and anti-Semites." See: Glassheim, *Noble Nationalists,* 36. Although unlike Lueger, not all of Fried's Catholic conservative examples were anti-Semitic, they still represented clerical power, which Fried opposed.

[148]See: Hacohen, "Kosmopoliten in einer ethnonationalen Zeit?"

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belonging dictated by the radicalized nationalism ultimately deployed in Central Europe's interwar nationalizing states.[149] But Catholic aristocrats had more options than Jews—at stake was their *relevance* in a Europe of nation-states, not their very *membership* therein. Nobles could adapt the language of aristocratic entitlement to a language of national entitlement, and some, like Karl Anton Rohan, embraced pan-German nationalism, racial anti-Semitism, and ultimately Nazism.[150] Coudenhove attempted instead to breathe new life into the liberal cosmopolitanism cultivated among early-twentieth-century progressives and pacifists, many of whom were Jews. He was well aware of the intellectual genealogy to which he contributed. In fact, in a rather bizarre proposal, he offered a means for its perpetuation. He advocated a process of "social eugenics," by which the old, landed "blood nobility" *(Blutadel)* would merge with the urban, Jewish "nobility of the mind" *(Geistesadel)* and form a new moral rather than political "aristocracy of the future."[151]

Conclusion

Fried's conception of Europe and its formative Austrian Jewish context, the intellectual roots of the pan-European idea in Fried's work, and the relevance of his proposals for the Jewish predicament in fin-de-siècle Central Europe have remained largely unexamined. Given that the ideal of international organization, particularly in Europe, was at the core of Fried's pacifism, the absence of an in-depth study of his ideas in the literature on movements for European unity begs explanation.

From a presentist perspective, his formulation of pacifism in evolutionary terms may appear pseudoscientific, but at the time it was not incompatible with a progressive and cosmopolitan worldview.[152] Fried only had limited success in his goals for the peace movement. He was successful in establishing peace studies as an academic discipline in Germany and Austria, but not, as he had hoped, as a branch of sociology and not linked to a program for the

[149]Ibid. It should be noted that by "cosmopolitan initiatives," I mean something looser than the rare, uncompromisingly cosmopolitan view held by Karl Popper, among others. On Popper's cosmopolitanism, see: Malachi Haim Hacohen, *Karl Popper: The Formative Years, 1902–1945* (Cambridge: UK, 2000). For a contemporary discussion of proposals for limiting national sovereignty in the early twentieth century, which emphasizes the scarcity of strictly cosmopolitan proposals, see: Krehbiel, *Nationalism, War, and Society*.

[150]See: Glassheim, *Noble Nationalists*, and Guido Müller, *Europäische Gesellschaftsbeziehungen*.

[151]Glassheim, *Noble Nationalists*, 120.

[152]Historians have not always recognized this. Daniel Gasman's damning introduction to Fried's *Handbuch der Friedensbewegung*, for example, accuses Fried of being a naive German nationalist and social Darwinist (used as a pejorative) who took at face value the pacifist utterances of European statesmen, most importantly those of the German Kaiser. See: Daniel Gasman, "Introduction," in Alfred H. Fried, *Handbuch Der Friedensbewegung*, 2 vols. (New York, 1972), 1:5–19. Similarly, in a dissertation on Jews and Weimar German pacifism, Virginia Iris Holmes describes Fried as sexist and speciesist. See: Virginia Iris Holmes, "'The Inviolability of Human Life:' Pacifism and the Jews in Weimar Germany" (PhD diss., SUNY Binghamton, 2001). If he stood out from his contemporaries in these areas, it was likely as a progressive, so it is unclear whether we learn something distinctive about Fried, or rather about early-twentieth-century gender norms and attitudes toward animals in his rhetoric. Fried was indeed a critic of the brand of moral pacifism embraced by the women's movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, Fried supported woman suffrage, chose a female role model in Bertha von Suttner (despite her moral pacifism), published in at least one feminist journal, and fought for women's inclusion in the German Peace Society (women were excluded from the preexisting Prussian society). For an example of Fried's publications on feminism, see: Alfred H. Fried, *Internationalismus und Patriotismus* (Leipzig, 1908). For Fried's views on pacifism in the women's movement, see: Alfred H. Fried, "Die Deutsche Frau in Der Friedensbewegung," *Friedens-Warte* 1, no. 2 (1899).

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organization of Europe, but rather oriented toward human rights. However, neither Fried's brand of pacifism nor the apparent vagueness of his pan-European proposal can explain his position in the literature on European unification.

I have argued that this absence reflects his Jewish marginality. Pan-Europe had the implication of being far more than a variation on a long-standing internationalist theme; in its ultimate goal of transcending European nationalisms, it offered a solution to a deeply personal problem. Pan-Europe would have made it possible for cosmopolitan Jewish intellectuals like Fried to live as Austrian Europeans of Jewish descent free from the ethnic membership required by the nation-state, something that, as Jews, they could not acquire. As a Jew, Fried could not appeal to wider support among Christian conservatives or pan-German nationalists. Coudenhove, though his mother was Japanese, was at least Catholic, and was a member of the Habsburg aristocracy.

Historiography has reinforced the contemporary judgment of scientific pacifism and the defeat of Jewish social reformism. However, Fried's ideas were foundational to thinking about European integration in the interwar period and during the Cold War. Their social scientific foundations went out of fashion, and World War I undermined the school of pacifism in which they were rooted, but elements of Fried's ideas are now institutionalized in contemporary assumptions about the purpose of European unity, the character of shared European culture, and the methods that guide the integration process.

The history of integration tends to focus on the Cold War context and to take the point of departure as post-World War II French-German rapprochement. This tendency privileges successful movements. That might seem perfectly legitimate, but it posits a story of a persistent, if gradual, march forward. This story is imposed on a history that has, in fact, been dominated by fits and starts, failures, and contestation. The ongoing Eurozone crisis is but a contemporary example. One of the first examples was Fried's spirited, though unsuccessful, attempt to organize Europe on the pan-American model, the culmination of which was to be a supranational European federation that could accommodate Habsburg multiethnicity. Ideas like Fried's Pan-Europe cannot be left out of the historiography because the problems they sought to address were marginal. Fried's proposals for the organization of Europe, along with the *reasons* that most Europeans were not ready to take them up until after World War II, are a crucial chapter in the history of European integration. When considering the center of the integration process, we need to think beyond Brussels to include Jewish Vienna.

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