overthrow governments he deemed sympathetic to the Soviet Union. President Ronald Reagan covertly supported Solidarity in Poland and the *mujahideen* rebels in Afghanistan in the 1980s as part of a larger program designed to bring down the Soviet Union without a shooting war. Daugherty does, however, criticize Eisenhower and Reagan for pursuing covert actions in Guatemala and Nicaragua, respectively, that proved to be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy.

A minor quibble concerns one item out of Daugherty's control: the fact that he had to submit his manuscript to the CIA for review in early 2003 prevented him from examining the *FRUS* Retrospective volume Guatemala 1951–1954, which DOS published in June 2003. Documents that DOS and CIA released in this volume show the genesis of, the plans for, and even the exact date when Eisenhower approved the use of covert action against the Arbenz government (on page 138 Daugherty laments the lack of available documentation). The manuscript has a few typographical errors, too. On page xix of the preface, paragraph two begins "In the 1990s, CIA covert action programs assisted in the capture of international terrorists such as Che Guevara." Since Che was captured in Bolivia with the CIA's assistance in 1967, perhaps Daugherty meant to write "By the 1990s." On page 42, Daugherty writes "there was no intervention in Italy in 1940." I assume he means 1948. On page 127 Daugherty is referring to Undersecretary David K. E. Bruce, not K. G. These aside, *Executive Secrets* is a crisply written introduction to the importance of covert action in presidential policymaking and a significant contribution to the literature of U.S. intelligence activities.

–Chris Tudda

Note: The views presented here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of State or the United States government. I would like to thank my colleague Douglas Kraft for his helpful comments and suggestions.

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INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami: *The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. ix, 302. $29.99, paper.)

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The "English School" and its American rivals in theorizing about international relations, as these authors rightly point out, have long since gone their separate

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ways. Even today, decades after Martin Wight and others began their investigations into the relationship among international rivalry, international society, and common humanity, many students of international relations in America are unlikely to be able to define just what the English School is, much less explain why scholars in the United States should pay attention to it.

This ignorance, then, provides all the more reason to welcome the appearance of this lucid and erudite explication of the English School and the kinds of inquiry to which it is predisposed. Its two authors begin from somewhat different perspectives, but their chapters are integrated well, and they have produced what may be the most complete and well-rounded survey of this school of thought published to date. Certainly, taken in conjunction with the pioneering study by Tim Dunne—*Inventing International Society: A History of the English School* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998)—it goes far to demonstrate what international theorists on this side of the Atlantic can learn from those on the other side.

Roughly the first half of the volume is devoted to a straightforward examination of the concerns of the English School, the major authors associated with it, and the methods of analysis most compatible with it. While avoiding repetition of the Dunne volume, the authors sketch out the foundational work done by figures such as Wight and C. A. W. Manning and bring the evolving contributions of their successors to the present day. They illuminate the differences within the School as well as acknowledging criticisms that have been made from beyond its bounds. The suggestion that English School authors have, by and large, not observed certain standards of social-science research currently dominant in the United States, for example, they grant is a fair one, and they suggest ways in which anyone writing on English School topics might clarify the assumptions underlying such research.

Although couched in the same open-minded and conversational tone as the initial section, the second half of the work is in substance more contentious. In the debate within the English School between those who see international society as largely and properly "pluralist" and those who advocate a view of international society that is more "solidarist," the book comes down squarely on the side of the solidarists. Pluralists are cognizant of the many views of the good life that characterize a diverse world and are reluctant to countenance any intellectual stance that could be used to legitimize the employment of power to eliminate contending ways of thought. On the other hand, the solidarists are concerned about threats to individual human dignity that can accompany too great a deference to communitarian ideals and are supportive of minimum standards established by reason and enforced by the united power of the international community. The book makes the argument that a "radicalized rationalism" is, in fact, inherent in the idea of international society itself. In seeking to harness the English School to progressive ends, the authors contend that they are making explicit what has been implicit in a properly conceived notion of international society all along.

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To accomplish this aim requires first a detour and second a pruning. The detour consists of an extended argument designed to prove that Kant's thought was, in fact, wrongly characterized by Wight as "revolutionist." Far from seeking the overthrow of the states-system, the authors insist, Kant was highly respectful of the independence of governments and wished only to promote "an international society built on sovereignty, yet holding states responsible for observing global moral principles," in which "*international harm conventions*—conventions which are designed to prevent harm in relations between states [—which may not] work to the advantage of the inhabitants of those states" are supplemented by "*cosmopolitan harm conventions* which protect individuals in and of themselves" (173, 179). Wight's argument that Kant sought ideological uniformity among states in the belief that perpetual peace could be secured only among law-governed republican states is dismissed as overdrawn and exaggerated. Linklater and Suganami hold that in Kant's view a closer inner ring of republican states could develop, with higher levels of cooperation and security among them, but intervention to install republican regimes in other states was not acceptable. By contrast, intervention to compel even the looser outer ring of states with nonrepublican forms of government not to harm the basic human rights of their inhabitants was desirable. Contrary to the expressed views of those great foundational figures of the English School, Wight and at least the earlier Hedley Bull, the authors endeavor to prove that the rationalist camp is open to humanitarian intervention, triggered by the internal practices of disparate regimes, carried out on a fairly regular basis.

Having returned from their detour, Linkater and Suganami are ready to undertake their pruning. What they wish to remove from the rationalist tradition within the English School is its association with pluralism—its aversion to mandating one view of the proper organization of domestic society and the enforcement of this orthodoxy by the larger international society. Building on the solidarism of such English-School scholars as Nicholas Wheeler in his *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) and taking issue with the pluralism of Robert Jackson, equally committed to the English School, in his *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Linkater and Suganami argue that pluralism certainly has represented a considerable advance over a purely amoral and cynical world. In such a world, states felt free to use their power to cripple or absorb other states without justification under any set of responsibilities to a society of states bound together by the normative and prudential principle of nonintervention. However, the solidarist approach of eradicating harm inflicted on individuals everywhere is now possible and, therefore, obligatory.

For all its path-breaking insights, then, the book follows a track already beaten by a number of contemporary scholars in its assumption that pluralism is only a way-station on the road to the better future and fuller revelation of the unity of humankind represented by solidarism. Pluralism's deep

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respect for sovereignty and its willingness to play the game of international politics within the confines of the states-system may have been useful and even necessary to move the world beyond the Hobbesian realist tradition. However, pluralism itself can now be set aside in order that the great common projects of the world, such as the advancement of human rights everywhere or environmental protection, may be realized. Pluralism defers to the surface reality of states; solidarism penetrates to the deeper reality of humanity. Without going so far as to enter into the revolutionist tradition and demand either the overthrow of the states-system or its conversion to doctrinal uniformity, the authors wish to open the rationalist tradition—and the English School as a whole—to a more progressive political orientation in the interest of global wellbeing. They raise "the question of whether the modern society of states is poised to make unusual progress in realizing the solidarist principles and practices, and whether the English School should give this process, which includes a central role for humanitarian intervention, explicit, moral support" (141). Their answer to both questions is in the affirmative.

It is, therefore, a fair test of *The English School of International Relations* to ask whether the current world does, indeed, give evidence of an unprecedented unity on a vision of the good life and a shared program of political and social reform. Sadly, a world in which representatives of Al Qaeda openly declare their intention to attack any American, whether combatant or non-combatant, seems closer to savagery than to solidarism. The regime in North Korea appears impervious to criticism of its record on human rights and moves forward in its declared intention of constructing a nuclear arsenal, and Russia and China do not seem inclined to allow the UN Security Council to go very far in any efforts to confront these evils; the similarly repressive regime in Iran is treated equally warily. The United States, chastened by a conflict in Iraq that has turned out to be far more difficult than it had expected, speaks less confidently about the capacity of the outside world to advance human rights and the rule of law in societies drawing on different traditions. In such a world, disfigured by ideological/religious conflicts of marked intensity that threaten to erupt into violence on many fronts, it might be a sufficient achievement to preserve the pluralist vision of tolerance and courteous distance between polities separated by deep disagreement over the way God or man has mandated societies should evolve. That the authors should take this as the propitious moment for an unprecedented global effort at defining harms to individuals and abolishing such universally agreed-on threats is a tribute to their confidence in the possibilities open to well-intentioned and forward-thinking advocates of international good citizenship.

The second test that the authors invite remains: whether the evolution of international society from a more pluralist into a more solidarist model is a development that should be encouraged. Here, Linklater and Suganami are properly attentive to the pluralism that exists within the community of

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scholars who identify themselves with the English School. They recognize that different points of view exist on this question, though their own stance is clear. Still, it is only in their conclusion that they allude at any length to the dangers that can accompany an effort to advance a Kantian destiny by seeking to act together today against what are generally agreed to be affronts to human dignity, even at the cost of respect for state sovereignty. The limits of the states-system do not impede only efforts to do good; they can act as barriers in the face of efforts to do harm—or, perhaps equally problematic, misguided attempts to do good that end in causing harm. In a world of considerable diversity, marshaling a united front against harm requires a high degree of confidence that one has, indeed, identified what is right in complex situations, and that those who disagree are mistaken. The pluralist tradition, with its modesty, sobriety, and tentativeness, can perhaps lay claim to a greater appreciation for the tragedy inherent in international life—an aspect of the world that is as important to understand as its hopeful aspirations.

–David Clinton

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