surpass monolingualism. As a student, I found that almost all the multilingual classmates I met entered into postsecondary studies with a command of multiple systems of communication that they continued to develop at a university. Lifelong monolinguists, by contrast, found a way out by taking a minimum number of courses, passing a dictionary-assisted translation exam, attending an "intensive" summer session, or finding some other short-term solution that allowed them to dispense with language requirements and return to their monolingual existence. Even so, they subsequently considered themselves multilingual and, more harmfully, passed along this conception of multilingualism to their students. From there, it's easy to pass off the occasional insertion of foreign terms as translingual practice or the employment of social-networking slang as code-switching. As a remedy, the abolition of university language requirements might allow professors to stop fooling their students and themselves.

"If the teacher is a monolingual user of the dominant variety of English who does not normally code-mesh, asking linguistically diverse students to do so in the teacher's presence would not go over well," observes Matsuda. "The reverse is also true: imagine someone who grew up speaking the dominant variety of English trying to speak African American English; the result would likely be embarrassing, if not offensive" (483). In some ways, code-switching—or code-meshing, perhaps a more useful term—leads to more-insidious concerns. Even professors who have gotten past the language-exam hurdle generally have a sneaking suspicion that they do not really function in a second language. When it comes to African American speech, however, all sorts of people claim expertise after listening to a bit of hip-hop or watching movies or television programs featuring African Americans. As a musician traveling the "chitlin circuit," I heard a wide variety of African American speech around the United States and learned that these ever-evolving idioms can be hard to master and even more difficult to maintain in an environment where the meanings and pronunciations of terms hardly remain static. Thinking otherwise reveals an academic bias; countless episodes of *Treme* will not take the place of language learning, even if the language is merely considered a code performed by supposedly lower-class people.

The complications of classroom code-switching do not only involve African American speech. Bollywood movies, for example, have spawned a new school of professors who fancy themselves versed in mixtures of Hindi and English, often based on little, if any, viewing of actual films. One professor with whom I studied added Bollywood to his list of "specialties" and even taught a course that included this topic, solely on the basis of having seen *Slumdog Millionaire*. Clearly, the possibilities for academic mischief expand with each new successfully marketed exotic discovery. In an effort to forestall these affronts to academic integrity, we must ensure that the discussion initiated by Matsuda continues.

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Reply:

I am grateful to Marco Katz Montiel for sharing his thoughtful response. I agree about the need to extend this conversation and to raise the awareness of various perspectives and practices that have long existed outside the currently popular focus on translingual writing. I also agree that, to engage in pedagogical practices that involve language differences, scholars and teachers need to develop more than a superficial understanding of language, language learning, and language use. I have elaborated on these ideas in another recent piece ("It's the Wild West out There: A New Linguistic Frontier in U.S. College Composition"; *Literacy as Translingual*

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PMLA 130.1 (2015), published by the Modern Language Association of America

https://doi.org/10.1632/S0030812900195926 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Practice: Between Communities and Classrooms; ed. A. Suresh Canagarajah [Routledge, 2013] 128–38; print). I hope these discussions will stimulate the development of theoretical and pedagogical practices that are better informed and more sensitive to the lived experience of a wide variety of language users.

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Beauvoir, Colonialism, and Race

To the Editor:

In "Simone de Beauvoir and Practical Deliberation" (124.1 [2009]: 199–205), Emily Grosholz argues that "Beauvoir's work exhibits a methodological trajectory as Beauvoir sees more and more clearly that philosophical writing is performative as well as descriptive and that the enterprise she has undertaken is a form of rational persuasion rather than the construction of a 'correct' theory about people" (199). Following Claude Imbert ("Simone de Beauvoir: A Woman Philosopher in the Context of Her Generation"; *The Legacy of Simone de Beauvoir*; ed. Emily Grosholz [Clarendon, 2004] 3–21; print) and Michèle le Doeuff ("Towards a Friendly, Transatlantic Critique of *The Second Sex*"; *The Legacy of Simone de Beauvoir*; ed. Emily Grosholz [Clarendon, 2004] 22–29; print), Grosholz reconstructs the process of Beauvoir's developing analysis of women in the context of Beauvoir's generation. Most important in Beauvoir's work is how she persuaded us to acknowledge the *situation* of women, specifically those of her generation. Beginning with *The Ethics of Ambiguity* (1947) and ending with Beauvoir's active engagement with the feminist movement in France, which crystallized around the issue of reproductive rights in the 1970s, Grosholz traces an important tendency in Beauvoir's conception of philosophical method (200).

When Beauvoir led readers to see the untenable contradiction in the estate of women in *The Second Sex* (1949), the response brought her public acclaim and notoriety, which enabled her to frame and introduce legislation that at last galvanized feminism in France (203). Focusing on Beauvoir's later political involvement, during the 1970s, Grosholz explains Beauvoir's contribution to the legalization of abortion in France. On 5 April 1971, the "Manifesto of 343" was published

> in *Le nouvel observateur*, signed by a wide range of women who admitted to having had an abortion; Beauvoir was among them. By signing the manifesto, they all risked imprisonment since abortion was illegal; the movement Choisir was created by Gisèle Halimi, a Tunisian practicing as a lawyer in Paris, to defend those women in case they were prosecuted, and Beauvoir was elected its first president. (204)

In 1972 the movement Choisir gained more public acclaim when Halimi, backed by the Women's Liberation Movement in Paris, became involved in the "Bobigny affair." The affair concerned the legal case of a young woman who had been raped and had subsequently undergone an abortion. Through the case, Halimi attacked the 1920 law that criminalized abortion: "she argued that the law punished the poor disproportionately, because rich women had only to cross the English Channel to obtain a legal and safe abortion." The French parliament was influenced by supporters of Choisir—the public, the Women's Liberation Movement in Paris, Beauvoir, Halimi, and Simone Weil—and introduced "law 75-17 in 1975, which legalized the interruption of pregnancy under certain conditions. This law was at first provisional, but a definitive version, law 79-1204, was passed on New Year's Eve 1979" (204). From Grosholz's analysis, we acquire a new sense of the development of Beauvoir's philosophy. Beauvoir came to see that her ethical and political

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PMLA 130.1 (2015), published by the Modern Language Association of America

https://doi.org/10.1632/S0030812900195926 Published online by Cambridge University Press