MY CHILD WILL BE A CITIZEN
Intergenerational Motives for Naturalization

By ALEX STREET*

SCHOLARS of citizenship laws emphasize the distinction between granting citizenship to newborn children by place of birth or by descent.[1] These two approaches are commonly referred to using the Latin terms *jus soli*, law of the soil, and *jus sanguinis*, law of blood. Countries with no provision for citizenship by birth on their territory are seen as having restrictive citizenship regimes. Hence, when Germany introduced a limited form of jus soli citizenship in 2000, it was considered a major liberalization.[2] Yet in spite of this provision and other changes that made naturalization easier, the number of foreign residents acquiring German citizenship actually fell after the reform and has remained low ever since. Motivated by this puzzle, this article aims to advance our understanding of the decision to naturalize. I show that foreign residents take account of the interests of their family members when deciding whether to apply for citizenship. In particular, parents may naturalize while their children are young, in order to ensure that their children grow up as citizens of the country of residence. By granting citizenship to many children born in Germany to immigrant parents, the introduction of jus soli removed this "intergenerational" incentive for parents to naturalize. This shift in parental incentives explains much of the recent fall in the naturalization rate in Germany.

Most existing research on immigration and citizenship focuses either on national citizenship laws or on individual incentives to naturalize.

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[1] Brubaker 1992; Howard 2009; Koopmans et al. 2005.

[2] Aktürk 2011; Brubaker 2001; Howard 2006; Goodman 2012.

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One argument advanced in this article is that these two literatures should speak to each other. Research on citizenship laws should be based on an understanding of the microfoundations of naturalization behavior. I also argue, however, that scholars have overlooked the family as a key site of decision making. Thus the appropriate microfoundations will have a social rather than merely an individualistic logic. This article demonstrates the analytic leverage that can be gained by taking the family as the unit of analysis in research on citizenship. This approach can also be extended to other domains of political behavior. When people make political choices that affect their family members, we should expect these effects to figure in the decision-making process.

The next section of the article introduces the puzzle of low naturalization rates in Germany. I then discuss existing research on citizenship laws and on naturalization and show that neither body of literature can explain recent developments in the number of foreign residents taking German citizenship. I explain one powerful way in which family ties can change the calculus of citizenship, by presenting a simple model of the decision to naturalize that takes account of the fact that when parents naturalize, their minor children typically also acquire citizenship. The predictions of the model are tested against qualitative and quantitative data. Interviews confirm the plausibility of the intergenerational mechanism. I then use household-level information in census data to show that parents whose first child was born before the reform of German citizenship law in 2000 are much more likely to have naturalized than similar parents who had their first child after the reform. In the final section of the article I describe the conditions under which intergenerational motives can be expected to have a large effect on naturalization rates. The conclusion discusses other contexts in which it might be beneficial to study political decision making in the family setting.

The Puzzle of Low Naturalization Rates in Germany

The political incorporation of immigrants and their descendants is a pressing and contentious issue in many contemporary democracies, nowhere more so than in Germany.[3] The country is home to nearly seven million foreign residents, around 9 percent of the total population. For the most part, they are *not* newcomers. The median length of residence is seventeen years, and 1.5 million "foreigners" were born in the country. Many speak fluent German and now consider the country to be

[3] On contention over citizenship, see Dancygier 2010; Koopmans et al. 2005.

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their home.[4] Yet, as foreign citizens, they lack full legal security and are excluded from the franchise.[5]

In Germany, as elsewhere, citizenship laws serve multiple purposes.[6] During the postwar partition of the country, residents of East Germany, as well as people of German descent in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, were automatically eligible for citizenship if they were able to reach the Federal Republic of Germany.[7] This provision served Cold War priorities and the goal of reunifying the country. By contrast, immigrants who had been recruited from Turkey, the Balkans, and Southern Europe to work in the booming postwar West German economy could naturalize only at state discretion, if it was seen to be in the public interest. This reflected the view that Germany was not a country of immigration and that migrant workers were only "guests." This stance was maintained even as the former migrant workers settled and had children in Germany. In the early 1990s, under pressure from the left, the Christian Democrat and Liberal government granted a right to citizenship to foreigners who had lived in the country for at least fifteen years (or eight years for those who had gone to school in the country) and who were able to demonstrate a "voluntary and lasting orientation to Germany."[8] Parents who satisfied the criteria could also include minor children in their applications.

The number of foreign residents taking German citizenship rose through the 1990s but remained too low to offset the growth in the foreign population as a result of ongoing immigration. A coalition government of the Social Democratic and Green parties, elected in 1998, promised to give the country a "modern" citizenship law that reflected the end of the Cold War and the rising priority of immigrant integration.[9] They proposed halving the required residence period, tolerating dual citizenship, and granting German citizenship to all children born in the country. The plan to allow dual citizenship was contentious, and opposition parties blocked the reform. A compromise was agreed upon, giving children of foreign parents born in Germany the right to German citizenship, provided that at least one parent had lived in the country for eight years and held long-term resident status at the time

[4] Wippermann and Flaig 2009, 5.
[5] Hansen 2009.
[6] Bauböck and Vink 2011.
[7] Brubaker and Kim 2011; Herbert 2001.
[8] Green 2004, 40.
[9] Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, speaking on November 10, 1998, in the German Bundestag. See *Deutscher Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 14/3, Stenographischer Bericht, 3. Sitzung*, p. 61.

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of the child's birth.[10] These children are allowed both German citizenship and that of their parents until adulthood, when they must choose which one to keep.[11] Because they have the option of remaining German, they are often referred to as "option-children" (*Optionskinder*). In another important change, the standard period of residence for naturalization was cut from fifteen years to eight, increasing the number of foreigners eligible from around 2.5 million to 4.5 million. The compromise also included a ban on dual citizenship, with exceptions for those who face significant obstacles to relinquishing their original citizenship.[12]

Despite the defeat of the original proposal, experts hailed the compromise reform as the biggest change to German citizenship law in decades.[13] The federal commissioner for immigrant affairs predicted as many as one million naturalizations in the year 2000 alone.[14] But far from rising, the numbers naturalizing actually fell and have remained low ever since the reform.[15] In 2000 nearly 190,000 foreign residents naturalized, though half had applied under the old rules.[16] A decade later, the number naturalizing each year was around 100,000. Even including all of the children granted the right to citizenship through the new jus soli provision, the numbers obtaining German citizenship are now lower than in the late 1990s. Germany has the largest noncitizen population of any European country but one of the lowest naturalization rates, similar to Italy (around 1 percent of the foreign population per year), but below France and the Netherlands (4 percent) or the UK and Sweden (5–6 percent).[17] Some commentators see the absence of

[10] A temporary clause allowed parents who had not themselves naturalized but who had met these conditions when their children were born in the 1990s to apply on the child's behalf for jus soli citizenship, but only within the first year that the new citizenship law was in force.

[11] The coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU and the Social Democrats, reached after the 2013 federal election, includes a commitment to change the law so that the children granted German citizenship by birth in the country will be allowed to retain dual citizenship.

[12] Some countries refuse to release their citizens from citizenship (for example, Iran), and others impose high fees (for example, Serbia).

[13] Green 2004; Hailbronner 2006. For recent, more skeptical accounts, see also Green 2012; and Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos 2012.

[14] Krupa 1999.

[15] German citizenship law saw further reforms after 2000. Since 2004 immigrants who complete an integration course have been eligible to naturalize after seven years. In 2007 a language test was introduced, formalizing a preexisting requirement to show familiarity with German that had been interpreted in different ways across the German *Länder*. In 2008 a civics test came into force. The fall in the numbers naturalizing was well established even before these reforms. On integration policies, see Goodman 2012; and Joppke 2007.

[16] Worbs 2008, 19. See Table A1 in the supplementary material (Street 2014) for the numbers naturalizing in recent years.

[17] OECD 2011, 421–22. In Germany the share of foreign residents naturalizing per year reached 2.8 percent 2000 but had fallen to 1.4 percent by 2011.

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basic political rights for the large population of foreign residents as a failure of German democracy.[18]

The Limitations of Existing Research

The view that the reform of 2000 marked a major liberalization of German citizenship law is due in no small part to the scholarship of Rogers Brubaker.[19] Writing before the reform, Brubaker argued that the German policy of jus sanguinis had deep historical roots. The German people, lacking a unified state until the nineteenth century, relied on an "ethnic" conception of membership by descent. By contrast, the French formed a "civic" identity based on their revolutionary history and granted citizenship by place of birth. Brubaker argued that the civic model was more open to residents with immigrant origins. However, Brubaker's prediction that German policymakers would continue to reject jus soli has proved incorrect.[20] The fall in the number of foreign residents naturalizing in Germany since the reform also belies the view that jus soli is a distinguishing feature of liberal citizenship regimes. Nonetheless, Brubaker's argument remains influential. Recent studies use typologies or indices to compare citizenship laws across a number of countries.[21] The distinction between jus soli and jus sanguinis remains central to these studies, which classify countries as liberal or restrictive based in part on the availability of citizenship by birth in the country.

It has proved difficult to link these measures of citizenship laws to variation in the numbers of foreign residents naturalizing, however. Existing typologies of citizenship laws cannot account for the recent fall in the naturalization rate in Germany, and they receive little support from cross-country comparisons. For example, Howard includes a "correction" to address the fact that his index of citizenship laws is not correlated with cross-country variation in naturalization rates.[22] Reichel finds no clear association between naturalization rates in fifteen West European countries and the Migrant Integration Policy In-

[18] Hansen 2009; see also Walzer 1983, 56–61.

[19] Brubaker 1992.

[20] Scholars have also observed that, historically, many countries, including France and Germany, have made use of both jus soli and jus sanguinis. See Waldrauch 2006; Weil 2008.

[21] Howard 2009; Janoski 2010; Koopmans et al. 2005; Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012; MPG 2011.

[22] Howard 2009, 24. Helbling 2011 criticizes Howard's approach as a case of conflating the independent and dependent variables. Janoski 2010 proposes his own index of "institutional barriers to naturalization," though the index is created using a "weighting scheme" (see p. 39) that is not explained, making it hard to replicate the analysis.

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dex (MIPEX) of citizenship laws.[23] One explanation for this disconnect is that scholars of citizenship laws have paid scant attention to the behavior of foreign residents or to the question of why they naturalize. Indeed, some commentators have criticized the exclusive focus on citizenship laws as an instance of "methodological nationalism."[24] Recent scholarship provides a wealth of information on citizenship laws, but this has not yet been matched by equally detailed research showing how these laws relate to the behavior of the people facing a decision over whether to naturalize.

If the literature on citizenship laws, much of it concentrating on Europe, can be accused of methodological nationalism, another body of research on the reasons why people naturalize, much of it conducted in North America, is clearly based on methodological individualism. The premise of much of the existing research on the decision to naturalize is that foreign residents weigh the costs and benefits of becoming citizens of their country of residence. Scholars explain variation between individuals by the greater value that some people place on the benefits of citizenship or the fact that some find the costs easier to bear.

The benefits to foreign residents of acquiring German citizenship include secure residence rights, access to all sectors of the labor market, the right to travel and work in the EU, and the right to participate in German (and EU) elections.[25] Two-thirds of foreigners living in Germany are permanent residents, but only citizens have the unconditional right to remain in the country. Senior jobs in the civil service—including much of the bureaucracy, the teaching profession, and the police—are reserved for German citizens. Costs of naturalization include the difficulty and expense of applying. The standard fee is €255 ($350) per person and €51 ($70) for minor children included with a parental application. The application process can take months or even years, and some people pay for legal assistance with the complex paperwork. Many applicants have to give up their prior citizenship, and some pay fees to the country of origin to be released.

Existing research shows that there are socioeconomic factors that make it easier for some people to manage the costs of becoming citizens of their country of residence. Those with higher incomes can bet-

[23] Reichel 2010, 7, finds a weakly significant association between liberal citizenship laws, as coded by MIPEX, and naturalization rates. But the pattern is driven by a single outlier, Sweden.

[24] Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002.

[25] It should be noted that, even as citizens, immigrant-origin residents of Europe can still suffer from unequal treatment. For example, Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2010 show that potential employers discriminate against Muslim citizens of France. Kaas and Manger 2010 show that German employers discriminate against applicants with non-Germanic names.

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ter afford the fees, and people with more education are less likely to be put off by the complex procedures.[26] In the economics literature, resources and skills are thought to boost the returns to citizenship, since it is expected that equal legal status will further enhance one's chances for upward mobility.[27] Scholars have shown that extra time in the country allows immigrants to learn the language, advance in the labor market, and form social ties. These factors make it easier to meet the requirements for citizenship and increase the value of fully secure residence rights. Net of time in the country, age is expected to reduce the returns to citizenship, since less time remains to reap any benefits.[28] The motivation to naturalize may also depend on the relative attractions of holding citizenship in the country of origin versus the country of destination: migrants from poor or war-torn countries have stronger incentives to become citizens of rich democracies.[29]

The cost-benefit model of the decision to naturalize can also incorporate contextual variables. For example, scholars have argued that immigrants responded to a hostile political climate in California in the 1990s—which made the legal security that comes with citizenship more attractive—by naturalizing in record numbers.[30] Bloemraad argues that multicultural policies provide information and symbolic resources that reduce the costs of naturalization.[31] But most existing research focuses on individual-level variables and pays little attention to the social or political context. For example, many studies use census data, with information on entire households, but assume that people living together reach independent decisions.[32]

This literature on the factors that make individuals more or less likely to naturalize cannot account for the recent decline in the German naturalization rate. The benefits of holding German citizenship did not suddenly decline starting in 2000. The number of foreign residents who meet the requirements for naturalization has risen, rather than fallen. Five million people now satisfy the length of residence requirement, up from 2.5 million immediately before the reform. Thus, it is not the case that the pool of people eligible to naturalize has emp-

[26] Bloemraad 2006; Jones-Correa 2001; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Yang 1994.
[27] Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir 2002; DeVoretz 2008.
[28] Kahanec and Tosun 2009; Portes and Curtis 1987; Zimmerman, Constant, and Gataullina 2009.
[29] Vink, Prokic-Breuer, and Dronkers 2012.
[30] Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001.
[31] Bloemraad 2006.
[32] Existing studies fail to account for household-level clustering in census data. See, for example, Bloemraad 2006; Jones-Correa 2001; Yang 1994. Only Liang 1994 makes explicit use of information on other household members.

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tied. Nor is there reason to think that the resources that help people naturalize became scarce after the reform of 2000. On average, to be sure, immigrant-origin residents are less educated and more likely to work in low-skill sectors of the economy than are native Germans. But many speak good German, and the (slow) trend is toward greater social and economic integration.[33]

My critique of the literature on naturalization is not that scholars have settled on the wrong list of costs and benefits but rather that most have assumed that only individual interests figure in this decision. Before elaborating on this point, however, it is important to discuss another alternative explanation for the low German naturalization rates. One cost of naturalization that has received particular attention in the German case is the requirement to give up one's prior citizenship.[34] Many foreign residents of Germany say they would prefer dual citizenship.[35] Yet establishing the effect of the ban on dual citizenship is difficult. Applicants are allowed to naturalize while retaining their prior citizenship if the country of origin makes it very hard to give it up, and migrants from some of these countries have high naturalization rates. But this is not the only factor differentiating these people from other immigrants. For example, immigrants from Iran are allowed dual citizenship, but many came to Germany as refugees, who are more prone to naturalize because they are less likely to return to the country of origin. A 2005 ruling by the German administrative court provides an opportunity to isolate the effects of the ban on dual citizenship, albeit only for a particular group of foreign residents. The court ruled that Germany must recognize EU treaties and allow naturalizing residents from other EU states (and Switzerland) to retain dual citizenship; this was incorporated into the citizenship law in 2007. There is no evidence that this externally imposed change caused any increase in the naturalization rate among foreign residents from the EU.[36]

Turkish-origin residents of Germany are sometimes considered especially likely to be deterred from naturalizing by the desire to remain Turkish citizens.[37] In the 1990s Turkey began allowing emigrants to

[33] On integration, see the evidence in BAMF 2012.

[34] Green 2004; Howard 2009; but see also Anil 2007; Diehl and Blohm 2001.

[35] Sauer 2009. See also responses to the 2006 German Social Survey (ALLBUS), question 102.

[36] Details on the effects of this change are available at Street 2014. Mazzolari 2009 finds that allowing dual citizenship increased the naturalization rate of migrants to the United States from a number of Latin American countries. In that case, however, the policy change was not exogenously imposed by the courts, but was due in part to the lobbying of people who wished to naturalize. Scott 2008, 109, notes no change in the naturalization rate when Sweden removed a ban on dual citizenship in 2001.

[37] See, for example, Howard 2008, 56; Green 2012, 181. But see also Anil 2007; Topçu 2007.

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give up and subsequently reacquire citizenship, enabling them to circumvent German policies intended to prevent dual citizenship. The German reform of 2000 included an explicit ban on dual citizenship that put an end to this practice.[38] The naturalization rate has since fallen faster among Turkish-origin residents than among immigrants from most other countries. One decade after the reform, the number of Turks taking German citizenship was around 65 percent lower than in 2000. However, the number taking German citizenship was also down nearly 30 percent among immigrants from other parts of the world. Thus, the reluctance of Turkish-origin residents to give up their citizenship of birth is not a sufficient explanation for the fall in the naturalization rate in Germany.[39] Finally, as I show below, the removal of an intergenerational motive to naturalize is a separate and powerful explanation for low naturalization rates, both for Turkish-origin residents and for those with roots in other parts of the world.

Intergenerational Motives to Naturalize

I argue that studying the family context of the decision to naturalize can help us understand the puzzling developments in the numbers taking German citizenship. When foreign residents become citizens of their new homeland, other family members are affected. One would expect people who are weighing the costs and benefits of naturalization to take the implications for their family members into account. In this article I focus on one of the ways in which the family setting shapes the logic of the decision. The fact that the minor children of those who naturalize are also eligible for citizenship implies that parents may be motivated to naturalize for the sake of their children. The idea that migrants are motivated by the hope of securing a better future for their children is a cliché, but it hints at an important truth about the social processes at work.[40]

An intuitive way to study the influence of the family context is to model the decision-making process under conditions of welfare in-

[38] Some see a double standard at work here, since children born to one German parent and one foreign resident are allowed dual citizenship. The ban on dual citizenship applies only to immigrants, and, since EU citizens are now exempted, most of those affected are immigrants from areas such as Turkey and the Balkans.

[39] It should also be noted that considerable numbers of Turkish-origin residents continue to naturalize, even without the option of dual citizenship. For example, in 2010, Turks made up 24 percent of the foreign population of Germany, and 26 percent of those naturalizing.

[40] Scholars of migration have argued that families constrained by poverty strategize over who should move abroad to provide an additional income stream. See Massey et al. 1987.

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terdependence among family members.[41] I present a simple case with two time periods and two people: a parent and her child. Suppose that these people derive utility from consumption, which must be paid for from earnings (we can also think of consumption as including nonmaterial sources of utility that may vary by citizenship status). In the first period the parent can transfer a share of income to her child, who has no earnings. In the second period, both parent and child finance their consumption from earnings. The parent decides whether to naturalize at the end of period 1, and if she does so the child also acquires citizenship of the country of residence. The parental decision over naturalization may affect the earnings of both parent and child in period 2. An altruistic parent transfers income to her child in period 1 and derives utility from the child's consumption in period 2. The parental decision is reached by comparing total utility over the two time periods. We can describe the utility function of the parent as

$$V^p = U^1(c^1,k^1) + bU^{2N}(c^{2N}, k^{2N}) + (1-b)U^{2F}(c^{2F},k^{2F}), \quad (1)$$

where c^1, c^{2j} and k^1, k^{2j}, $j = N, F$ are the consumption of the parent and child as naturalized citizens (N) or foreign residents (F) in periods 1 and 2. The variable b is chosen by the parent and takes the value one if she naturalizes, zero otherwise. The budget constraints of parent and child are, respectively,

$$c^1 + k^1 + bc^{2N} + (1-b)c^{2F} = y^1 + by^{2N} + (1-b)y^{2F}, \quad (2)$$

$$bk^{2N} + (1-b)k^{2F} = bz^{2N} + (1-b)z^{2F}, \quad (3)$$

where y^1 and y^{2j} are the income of the parent in the first and second periods. Similarly, z^{2j} represents the income of the child in the second period. Suppose that parental utility functions in the two periods take the following form:

$$U^1(c^1,k^1) = ln(c^1) + \gamma ln(k^1), \quad (4)$$

$$U^2(c^{2j},k^{2j}) = ln(c^{2j}) + \gamma ln(k^{2j}), \quad (5)$$

where $j = N, F$ and γ is an altruistic weight, which is assumed to be greater than or equal to zero. The parent makes the decision that maxi-

[41] I adapt a model presented in Dustmann 2003.

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mizes utility (equation 1) with respect to the budget constraints (equations 2 and 3), by comparing utility as a foreign resident with utility as a citizen.[42] We would expect the parent to naturalize if the following condition is met:

$$(2 + \gamma) ln \left(\frac{y^1 + y^{2N}}{y^1 + y^{2F}} \right) + \gamma ln \left(\frac{z^{2N}}{z^{2F}} \right) > 0. \quad (6)$$

If the parent is not altruistic ($\gamma = 0$), this reduces to a comparison between income as a foreign resident and as a naturalized citizen. But if the parent is altruistic, the cost-benefit calculus changes. Indeed, an altruistic parent may decide to naturalize even if her own expected returns from changing citizenship are negative.

The first benefit of formalizing the case for an intergenerational motive to naturalize is that it clarifies the logic of the argument. Second, the model reveals the conditions under which people are most likely to naturalize for the sake of their children. Most obviously, the argument applies only to people who are eligible to naturalize and are the parents of minor children. Parents must exhibit altruism toward their children (in the terms of the model, $\gamma > 0$). Another key condition is that parents must expect their children to benefit from becoming citizens of the country of residence (that is, $\left(\frac{z^{2N}}{z^{2F}} \right) > 1$). The final prediction is that the intergenerational motive is most likely to be decisive for parents who do not have strong reasons for or against naturalizing for their own sake (that is, $\left(\frac{y^1 + y^{2N}}{y^1 + y^{2F}} \right) \approx 1$).

The history of migration and citizenship law in Germany has ensured that many people satisfy these conditions. Low naturalization rates in the first decades of mass migration meant that, by the 1990s, Germany was home to many settled foreigners of childbearing age. The children of immigrants can be expected to benefit from going through the school system and then entering the labor market as German citizens.[43] Prior research also shows that permanent residents in Germany

[42] I substitute the budget constraints into (1) and solve for c^1, c^{2F}, k^1, and k^{2F}; the solution for c^1, c^{2N}, k^1, and k^{2N} is symmetrical. The parent naturalizes if $V^{PN} - V^{PF} > 0$, where V^{PN} is the utility of the parent who naturalizes and V^{PF} is the utility of the parent who remains a foreign resident.

[43] For example, according to recent data, of children born in Germany with a migrant background, the percentage qualified to attend university is 27 percent for those with German citizenship and 16 percent for those without citizenship. See Statistisches Bundesamt 2012, 40. The German educational system has been criticized for assigning many foreign children to less academic schools. See, for example, Kalter and Granato 2007.

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and other West European countries, though disadvantaged in various ways, do enjoy important civil and social rights, including the right to sponsor family members to join them in the country of residence and eligibility for social programs such as unemployment insurance or poverty assistance.[44] Hence, for many, the personal returns to naturalization may be limited, and the intergenerational motive is more likely to play a decisive role.

The model also clarifies how the argument can be tested, with implications for both the decision-making process and the citizenship status of immigrant-origin residents. Regarding the process, one would expect parents to take account of the intergenerational implications of the decision to naturalize. In this article, interviews provide evidence about the decision-making process and the social context in which this choice is made.[45] Regarding the outcome, one would expect those who are eligible for citizenship and whose children are growing up in Germany as foreign citizens to be more likely to naturalize. The model also implies that parents whose children have a right to German citizenship, as a result of the introduction of jus soli in 2000, are *less* likely to naturalize. I test these implications using representative statistical data.

Evidence about Naturalization Motives from Interviews

In this section of the article, I report on interviews I conducted with foreign residents, naturalized citizens, and the civil servants who administer applications for citizenship, in order to shed light on the motives for naturalization and the context in which the decision is made. If intergenerational motives figure in the decision, one would expect parents to cite the implications for their children when explaining their behavior. Hence the interviews provide what Mahoney refers to as "mechanism causal-process observations" that can be used to evaluate the plausibility of the argument.[46]

Thirty-six foreign residents and naturalized citizens were recruited for interview by snowball sampling. Initial contacts at research institutes and migrant organizations in three German regions were asked to suggest people who might be willing to talk. Additional interviews were conducted with nineteen civil servants who administer citizenship

[44] Soysal 1994; Joppke 2009.

[45] People who plan to have children might naturalize in advance—provided they are eligible to do so at that time—thereby ensuring that their children inherit citizenship. But one might also expect the intergenerational implications of the decision to become clearer after the birth of one's first child.

[46] Mahoney 2010, 128.

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law.[47] Snowball sampling is an efficient way to recruit uncommon and possibly reluctant interview subjects, but it is liable to result in a nonrepresentative sample. Compared with the immigrant-origin population, this sample included overly high shares of naturalized citizens (50 percent in the sample versus 22 percent in the immigrant-origin population) and people of Turkish origin (53 percent versus 27 percent). Because it is difficult to assess the uncertainty involved in drawing inferences from this nonrepresentative sample, interviews are used only to illustrate the mechanisms at work. Hence I do not report the frequency with which particular motives were reported. The following section of the article uses census data to provide representative evidence on the question of who naturalizes.

One interview subject explained how having a child changed the way she thought: "Until my son was born, I didn't think about naturalizing. But then I realized how valuable the German passport can be."[48] Another said that he became a German citizen "against my personal views," since he still felt Ghanaian. "But any time I went to a place, there was always the question of nationality [. . .] With the nationality, it is easier to enter. If I show you the ID you have to listen to me. I took this ID to stand firm myself and fight for the future of the next generations."[49] He went on to explain the benefits his children enjoy as German citizens: "If in the future our children fight for leading positions, the [German] passport can help. This is just one of the criteria but now it can't be used against them, it is one less disadvantage." Another interviewee who holds a position in the German bureaucracy that would not be open to a foreign citizen said his parents had naturalized while he was in school so that he would have the best chances at university and on the labor market. "Everything I have is because of my parents."[50]

Other parents explained that they see less reason to naturalize, because their children are already German citizens. One mother whose daughter holds German citizenship thanks to the jus soli provision introduced in the year 2000 said, in response to the question whether she would apply for German citizenship herself: "There is no need, because

[47] All interviews were conducted by the author, mostly in German but occasionally with some English. The main regions were Berlin (seven immigrant-origin interviews), Bavaria (nine immigrant-origin interviews), and North-Rhine-Westphalia (NRW; twenty immigrant-origin interviews). Berlin has a reputation for relatively liberal practice in the application of citizenship laws, Bavaria is reputed to be restrictive, and NRW is an intermediate case. See Bultmann 1998; Thränhardt 2008.

[48] Author interview with Leyla Özmal, Duisburg, June 1 2009.

[49] Author interview with Ernest Ampadu, Düsseldorf, April 6, 2009.

[50] Author interview with Hasan-Onur Kavak, Düsseldorf, May 6, 2009.

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my daughter is already a citizen."[51] Children who have one German parent also inherit German citizenship, as a young Spanish woman was well aware. She said she "would like citizenship, but it isn't urgent, because if I have children they will be Germans," since her partner is German.[52] A father who was advised by a lawyer that he is not eligible for German citizenship said he is "relieved" that at least his son inherited the citizenship of another EU country through the mother.[53] These interviews illustrate intergenerational motives and reveal that families are the social units that provide the context for the decision over citizenship. Indeed, interview subjects often appeared to take this context for granted, explaining why "we" decided to apply for citizenship, or listing "our" reasons against. This suggests that the family is viewed as the natural unit of behavior.

A number of interview subjects, especially those who had already lived in Germany for a long time, played down the stakes of naturalization in their own case but still thought that other migrants should become German citizens. As one Italian put it, naturalization makes more sense for those who still have their working lives in front of them. "It is too late for us, the guest workers, but it [citizenship] is crucial for the next generation."[54] His own children inherited citizenship from his German spouse. Interviewees generally favored higher naturalization rates, to give migrants greater political clout. One interview subject decried the fact that the geographic concentration of foreign residents means "there are whole areas, right in the heart of Europe, where there is no real democracy. If people were allowed to participate they would develop completely different feelings."[55]

The civil servants who administer applications for German citizenship commonly meet with hundreds of applicants each year. Interviews with these officials provide evidence of the effects of recent reforms of citizenship law. Civil servants said that most of those who come to their offices hoping to naturalize are able to do so, but that such people make up a small share of the eligible population. As one put it: "The key question is whether they ever come through my door."[56] He went on to note that the parents of children granted citizenship by jus soli very rarely come to his office to inquire about naturalizing. Another said that the system of sending a letter to parents to notify them that

[51] Author interview with Hamide Şen, Cologne, April 9, 2009.
[52] Author interview with Maria Entrialgo Castaño, Berlin, June 25, 2009.
[53] Author interview with Amir Nahum, Berlin, June 19, 2009.
[54] Author interview with Antonino Pecoraro, Nuremberg, May 22, 2009.
[55] Author interview with Rausch Özcelik, Essen, March 10, 2009.
[56] Author interview with Richard Tessarek, Bremen, May 8, 2009.

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their children qualify for jus soli means that "it is now very rare for the parents of the option-children to come to the office."[57] One civil servant who has worked in a citizenship office since the 1990s observed that in her experience "parents care most of all about the integration of their children, and that includes citizenship." Later, she said: "We don't see many of the parents of the option-children."[58]

Interviews with civil servants also provide evidence on the decision-making process. Interview subjects reported that the decision over citizenship often appears to be instrumental. One said, ruefully, that few immigrants seem to apply because they feel German. "The reasons are more rational [. . .] the decision comes from the head, not the heart."[59] Finally, the interviews with civil servants provide further evidence that families are seen as the natural context for decision making about citizenship. Civil servants confirmed that family members often come to the citizenship offices together. One official said the main source of information on how to go about applying for citizenship seems to be that "word gets around, from family to family."[60]

Evidence from Census Data on Childbirth and Naturalization

The interviews show how the decision to naturalize can be shaped by the family context; they also illustrate the power of intergenerational motives for becoming a citizen. In order to test the generality of these patterns, I now turn to representative statistical data. The source is the German microcensus, an annual survey of around 380,000 households. The microcensus collects demographic and labor-market data, and, since 2005, it has included questions that allow naturalized citizens to be identified.[61] Participation is obligatory, yielding a representative sample of immigrant-origin residents, even those who do not speak German.[62] A key advantage of these data for this research is that the household-level structure facilitates the study of the patterns of behavior within families. The people of interest, for my purposes, are foreign

[57] Author interview with Reinhard Entrup, Münster, May 4, 2009.
[58] Author interview with Anja Kügler, Berlin, July 23, 2009.
[59] Author interview with Olaf Kuch, Nuremberg, June 16, 2009.
[60] Author interview with Mike Häusgen, Solingen, May 19, 2009.
[61] Prior to 2005 the microcensus distinguished between Germans and foreign citizens but did not identify the German citizens who previously held another citizenship. I use data from 2007.
[62] Translations are available in eleven languages for residents who do not speak German. Access to microcensus data is administered by the Federal and State Statistical Offices (Statistische Ämter der Bund und Länder). For this reason it is not possible for the author to make replication data available. Details of coding procedures are available from the author.

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residents and naturalized German citizens. The census data reveal that in addition to nearly 7 million foreign residents, Germany is home to a further 2.5 million people who have naturalized.[63]

The census data confirm that many foreign residents acquire German citizenship as children. Of those who once lived in Germany as foreign residents but are now citizens, 40 percent acquired this status as children. Even excluding those covered by the new jus soli provision, 26 percent of the people who obtained German citizenship did so before the age of eighteen, along with one or both of their parents. Data on births registered in Germany show that around 900,000 children have been born to foreign parents since the 2000 reform of the citizenship law.[64] Only half of these children were granted German citizenship through jus soli, since many parents had not lived in the country for the required eight years or lacked permanent resident status when their children were born. The result is that, since the reform, half a million foreign parents have seen their German-born children granted citizenship under jus soli.[65] These are the people for whom the intergenerational motive to naturalize has been removed.

The census data also show that parents are relatively likely to hold German citizenship. Restricting the analysis to those between the ages of twenty and fifty, we see that 57 percent of the immigrant-origin population currently lives with one or more of their minor children.[66] Of people aged twenty to fifty, 19 percent of nonparents hold German citizenship, compared with 29 percent of parents. The difference is not entirely due to parental status; there are also other differences between parents and nonparents. However, the results of logistic models of citizenship status, reported in Table 1, show that parents are significantly more likely to have naturalized, even after accounting for factors that are related to both citizenship status and age at parenthood. The controls include demographic variables associated with social integration in Germany, such as marital status and length of residence, as well as education. I also account for variation by country or region of origin, reflecting the fact that migrants from some parts of the world have

[63] An additional three million "ethnic Germans" migrated to Germany from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Members of this group are excluded from my analysis, as they were automatically eligible for German citizenship upon reaching the country.

[64] Statistisches Bundesamt 2011b, 58.

[65] The first cohort of "option-children" had until the end of 2013 to decide whether to retain their German citizenship or that of their parents. Research conducted by the German government suggests that over 80 percent chose German citizenship; see Worbs, Scholz, and Blicke 2012, 302.

[66] I also exclude from the analysis people who acquired citizenship as children. This is because their parents were the ones who actually made the decision to naturalize.

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Table 1
Logistic Models of Citizenship Status, Comparing Parents and Nonparents[a]

	Model 1	*Model 2*
	Citizenship Status and Parenthood	*Citizenship Status and Timing of Parenthood*
Intercept	−4.123**	−4.022**
	(0.103)	(0.101)
Parent (Yes = 1)	0.188**	—
	(0.042)	
Parent, First Child before 2000	—	0.372**
		(0.044)
Parent, First Child after 2000	—	−1.336**
		(0.083)
Female (Yes = 1)	−0.04	−0.074**
	(0.027)	(0.027)
Married (Yes = 1)	0.136**	0.155**
	(0.042)	(0.042)
Age (Starting at 17)	0.067**	0.062**
	(0.01)	(0.009)
Age^2 (Starting at 17)	−0.001**	−0.001**
	(0)	(0)
Years of Residence	0.08**	0.079**
	(0.002)	(0.002)
$Years\ of\ Residence^2$	0.0001**	0.0001**
	(0)	(0)
Born in Germany (Yes = 1)	−0.573**	−0.534**
	(0.058)	(0.058)
Education: Finished Elementary School	0.345**	0.349**
	(0.056)	(0.057)
Education: Finished High School	0.637**	0.657**
	(0.057)	(0.056)
Education: University/Vocational	0.793**	0.821**
	(0.061)	(0.061)
Country of Origin Fixed Effects	yes	yes
Number of Observations	33,202	33,202
Log Likelihood	−14,579	−14,362

[a] The table reports logistic models, where the outcome value 1 indicates that the person holds German citizenship, 0 otherwise. Cells report estimated coefficients, with standard errors (robust to clustering by household) in parentheses. **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05. The analysis is restricted to people who did not acquire German citizenship as children, aged 20–50 when the data were collected. The baseline education category is "no qualifications." The data source is *Forschungsdatenzentrum der Statistischen Ämter des Bundes und der Länder*, Mikrozensus 2007. All calculations are by the author.

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more reason to naturalize.[67] Including income or occupational status does not improve model fit. Model 1 includes an indicator variable for parents, and model 2 distinguishes between parents whose first child was born before the reform of citizenship law in 2000 and those whose first child was born thereafter.[68] All results reported in this article use sample weights and standard errors clustered by household.

To facilitate interpretation of the results reported in Table 1, I calculate predicted values for a typical member of the immigrant-origin population. The predictions are for a married thirty-year-old woman, born in Turkey, who has lived in Germany for seventeen years and has the equivalent of a high school diploma. The predicted likelihood of holding German citizenship is 0.23 for a nonparent matching this description and 0.27 for a parent. Turning to the results from model 2, the predicted likelihood of having naturalized is 0.24 for a nonparent, 0.31 for an otherwise similar person who had her first child before 2000, but only 0.12 for someone whose first child was born after 2000. Although model 2 adjusts for average differences by age and length of residence, the low prediction for the most recent parents could be due, in part, to factors specific to immigrant-origin residents who reached childbearing age only recently. Not all of these people have lived in Germany long enough to be eligible for citizenship.[69]

To isolate the effect of removing the intergenerational motive to naturalize, I now turn to a focused comparison of immigrant-origin parents who had their first child shortly before or after the reform of German citizenship law in 2000. These parents allow a clean test of the argument presented in this article, since there is no reason to expect the timing of childbirth to coincide with a sudden change in other factors that influence the decision to naturalize, such as a preference for

[67] Regions are selected based on the recent history of migration to Germany. The full list of countries/regions used here is Asia, Central or South America, Eastern Europe/Former Yugoslavia, North Africa/Middle East, North America, Turkey, and Western Europe (plus "rest of world"). Similar results are obtained using fixed effects for individual countries.

[68] The negative coefficient on "born in Germany" is due to the restriction of the analysis to people who did not acquire German citizenship as children. Again, this restriction follows from the fact that their parents were the ones who actually decided to naturalize. Overall, those born in Germany are more likely to have German citizenship than those born abroad: 39 percent versus 30 percent. But because many children acquire citizenship along with their parents, people who were born in Germany but did *not* become German citizens before the age of eighteen are "negatively selected"; that is, they are unusual in ways that continue to make them less likely to naturalize as adults.

[69] It is not possible to establish with certainty from the census data who is eligible to naturalize. One important criterion is living in the country for at least eight years, but migrants married to a German citizen are eligible after just three years (and, in some cases, have since separated, making them impossible to identify). The census data contain no information on other requirements, such as language ability. However, substantively similar results are obtained in analyses that restrict the data to those who had lived in Germany for at least eight years.

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retaining one's original citizenship. If intergenerational motives are important, we would expect people whose first child was born after 2000 to be significantly less likely to naturalize, as compared with similar people who had their first child before the reform.

Figure 1 shows the percentage of immigrant-origin parents who had acquired German citizenship by the time the data were collected (in 2007), depending on the year in which their first child was born. Circles mark the percentage with German citizenship among parents whose first child was born before 2000, and triangles indicate the percentage among those whose first child was born thereafter. Vertical lines through each symbol show 95 percent confidence intervals. Smoothed (LOWESS) trend lines are fit to the data for the years before and after the reform of the citizenship law. We see a sharp break at the year 2000: immigrant-origin parents who had their first child before the introduction of jus soli citizenship are substantially more likely to have acquired German citizenship.




FIGURE 1
CITIZENSHIP OF PARENTS, BY YEAR OF BIRTH OF FIRST CHILD

SOURCE: *Forschungsdatenzentrum der Statistischen Ämter des Bundes und der Länder,* Mikrozensus 2007. All calculations are by the author.

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In order to confirm that the bivariate evidence on the effects of the reform, illustrated in Figure 1, is robust to the inclusion of other factors, I also report results from multivariate models of citizenship status. Again, I focus on people who had children around the time of the reform of the citizenship law. I identify a cohort of immigrant-origin parents, based on age, such that half had their first child before 2000 and half thereafter.[70] I further restrict the sample to people who had lived in Germany since at least 1990, ensuring that they were eligible to naturalize both before and after the reform of 2000.[71] Table 2 presents results from logistic models of citizenship status in this cohort of parents, controlling for variables associated with naturalization and age at parenthood. Model 3 shows that those who had their first child before 2000 are significantly more likely to have naturalized, as compared with those whose first child was born thereafter. The predicted probabilities, for people with typical scores on other variables, are 0.38 for those who became parents before 2000 and 0.21 for people who became parents afterward. This supports the claim that, prior to the reform of 2000, parents had an additional, intergenerational motive to naturalize. The naturalization rate in a reference cohort of nonparents was also stable over this period.[72] This implies that, at least for this cohort of young adults, the removal of an intergenerational motive to naturalize was the key effect of the 2000 reform of the German citizenship law.

Model 4 includes the same covariates as model 3, plus a variable designed to capture any overall trend in the likelihood of naturalization, depending on the timing of childbirth. This variable simply takes the value zero for parents whose first child was born in the earliest observed year, namely, 1990, and increases in equal increments for each subsequent year. If the difference that I have attributed to the reform of citizenship in the year 2000 were merely part of a broader trend, then this variable would be statistically significant and the coefficient on "first child born before 2000" would not. In fact, the trend variable is not significantly different from zero, and including it makes no differ-

[70] These parents were born between 1973 and 1982; 51 percent had their first child before 2000 and 49 percent thereafter. The analysis is once again restricted to people who did not become German citizens while children.

[71] Recall that, from 1990 onward, young people who had attended school in Germany were eligible to naturalize after just eight years of residence.

[72] The reference cohort is composed of immigrant-origin residents, born between 1973 and 1982, who had lived in Germany since at least 1990 but were not parents: 1.5 percent of this cohort of nonparents naturalized in 1999, 1.8 percent in the year 2000, 1.9 percent in the year 2001, and 1.8 percent in 2002.

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TABLE 2
LOGISTIC MODELS OF CITIZENSHIP STATUS, BY YEAR OF BIRTH OF FIRST CHILD[a]

	Model 3	*Model 4*
	Naturalization, before and after Reform	*Naturalization, with Linear Trend*
Intercept	−1.623**	−1.419*
	(0.484)	(0.722)
First Child Born before 2000	1.124**	1.039**
	(0.199)	(0.336)
Linear Trend in Year of Naturalization	—	−0.014
		(0.038)
Female (Yes = 1)	0.139	0.13
	(0.169)	(0.158)
Married (Yes = 1)	0.519*	0.522**
	(0.261)	(0.264)
Age (Starting at 24)	−0.303*	−0.305*
	(0.128)	(0.128)
Age^2 (Starting at 24)	0.023*	0.023*
	(0.01)	(0.011)
Born in Germany (Yes = 1)	−1.05**	−1.052**
	(0.18)	(0.18)
Education: Finished Elementary School	−0.301	−0.31
	(0.26)	(0.26)
Education: Finished High School	0.335	0.35
	(0.248)	(0.253)
Education: University/Vocational	−0.403	−0.385
	(0.442)	(0.448)
Number of Observations	1342	1342
Log Likelihood	−539	−539

[a] The table reports logistic models, where the outcome value 1 indicates that the individual holds German citizenship, 0 otherwise. Cells report estimated coefficients, with standard errors (robust to clustering by household) in parentheses. **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05. The analysis is restricted to parents who did not acquire German citizenship as children, aged 25–34 when the data were collected, such that half had their first child before the year 2000 and half thereafter. The baseline education category is "no qualifications." The data source is *Forschungsdatenzentrum der Statistischen Ämter des Bundes und der Länder*, Mikrozensus 2007. All calculations are by the author.

ence to model fit or to the coefficient of interest. I also tested whether the removal of the intergenerational incentive to naturalize had different effects for mothers or fathers, by interacting the dummy for "first child born before 2000" with a measure of the parental gender. There was no evidence of significant differences in behavior.

Finally, Table 3 presents separate analyses of people with roots in different parts of the world. This allows me to test whether intergenerational motives are observed only among migrants with a particular

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TABLE 3
LOGISTIC MODELS OF CITIZENSHIP STATUS, BY ORIGIN GROUP AND YEAR OF BIRTH OF FIRST CHILD[a]

	Model 5	*Model 6*	*Model 7*
	Turkish Origins	*Origins in E. Europe/ Former Yugoslavia*	*Origins in N. Africa/ Middle East*
Intercept	−1.511*	−4.715**	0.462
	(0.622)	(1.589)	(1.83)
First Child pre-2000	1.2**	0.975*	2.09**
	(0.28)	(0.5)	(0.8)
Female (Yes = 1)	0.2	0.227	−0.367
	(0.201)	(0.415)	(0.641)
Married (Yes = 1)	0.319	0.251	0.941
	(0.34)	(0.558)	(1.074)
Age (Starting at 24)	−0.384*	0.304	−0.641
	(0.161)	(0.41)	(0.451)
Age^2 (Starting at 24)	0.033*	−0.027	0.035
	(0.013)	(0.032)	(0.04)
Born in Germany (Yes = 1)	−0.581**	−1.111*	−2.067
	(0.216)	(0.442)	(1.781)
Education: Finished Elementary School	−0.466	1.159	0.007
	(0.3)	(1.16)	(0.775)
Education: Finished High School	0.348	1.889	1.316
	(0.29)	(1.145)	(0.817)
Education: University/Vocational	−0.167	1.406	0.685
	(0.556)	(1.389)	(1.422)
Number of Observations	792	259	170
Log Likelihood	−354	−85	−139

[a] The table reports logistic models, where the outcome value 1 indicates that the individual holds German citizenship, 0 otherwise. Cells report estimated coefficients, with standard errors (robust to clustering by household) in parentheses. **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05. The analysis is restricted to parents who did not acquire German citizenship as children, aged 25–34 when the data were collected, such that half had their first child before the year 2000 and half thereafter. The baseline education category is "no qualifications." The data source is *Forschungsdatenzentrum der Statistischen Ämter des Bundes und der Länder*, Mikrozensus 2007. All calculations are by the author.

cultural background. Further dividing the already restricted sample requires the use of wide categories. I present results for people from regions with broadly similar histories of migration to Germany. Turkish-origin residents are the largest minority group in Germany, by country of origin, and among the longest settled. Turkish-origin residents make up almost 60 percent of the cohort of parents who had their first child shortly before or after the reform of the citizenship law in 2000. This is because second-generation Turkish-origin residents were coming of

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age around this time, and this group has a comparatively high fertility rate. I also present results for migrants with origins in Eastern Europe or the former Yugoslavia—regions that sent many migrants to Germany in the 1980s and early 1990s. Third are those with origins in North Africa or the Middle East, a group that includes refugees in addition to labor and family migrants.[73] The key point to be taken from the results reported in Table 3 is that, in each of these groups, people who had their first child before the reform of German citizenship law in 2000 are significantly more likely to have naturalized than similar people whose eldest child was born thereafter.[74]

Conclusion

This article has argued that parents have an intergenerational motive to naturalize—in order to secure citizenship for their children—and tested the predictions of the argument in a key case. The reform of German citizenship law in 2000 was expected to greatly increase the numbers of foreign residents joining the citizenry, because the reform made naturalization easier for many foreign residents. To the contrary, however, the introduction of jus soli citizenship for large numbers of children born in the country to foreign parents removed a key motive for parents to naturalize. In this article, interviews provided support for the claim that foreign residents take account of the implications for their children of the decision to naturalize. Analysis of census data isolated the effect of removing the intergenerational motive to naturalize, by showing that new parents became much less likely to obtain German citizenship after the introduction of jus soli. The paper complements a large and growing literature on the ways in which immigrant-receiving countries define the terms of political membership. In order to understand the effects of citizenship laws and immigrant integration policies, we need to take account of the priorities of the people targeted by these laws. In addition to factors identified in other research, this article shows that citizenship is valued because it helps parents to pursue goals, such as upward mobility, that extend to the next generation.

Formalizing the case for an intergenerational motive to naturalize

[73] The other major region of origin is Western Europe, but the very low naturalization rate among migrants from that part of the world makes it impossible to obtain robust estimates for the relevant cohort of parents. Descriptive statistics on West Europeans show consistently low naturalization rates. For instance, the percentage of Italians living in Germany who acquired German citizenship, per year, from 1995 to 2007, ranged from 0.16 percent to 0.33 percent.

[74] Again, the results are similar when a variable is included to control for any secular trend in the numbers naturalizing, based on the year in which their children were born.

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helps to clarify the scope for extending the argument to other contexts. The intergenerational motive to naturalize will be most important where: (1) there are many foreign-resident parents, (2) these parents are themselves eligible to naturalize, (3) the parents do not have overwhelming reasons for or against applying for citizenship for their own sake, and (4) the parents expect their children to benefit from acquiring citizenship. These conditions were met as a result of Germany's history of immigration and citizenship law. One would expect the intergenerational motive for naturalization to be influential in other countries with parallel histories, such as Austria and Switzerland, and to gain importance in countries like Italy, which became a major immigrant destination in the 1990s. Indeed, there is evidence that high naturalization rates in Austria, from the late 1990s through the early 2000s, were due to large numbers of parents naturalizing with their children.[75] The intergenerational motive can be expected to play a smaller role in countries where many immigrant-origin children are already citizens, for example, as the result of the long history of unconditional jus soli in the United States or Canada. This motive will also be less important in countries where a large gap between the status of foreign residents and citizens provides strong incentives to naturalize, for those who are able. This is arguably the case in the United States, where reforms in the 1990s curtailed the social rights of noncitizens and where the practice of deporting foreign residents for minor crimes has also increased the value of citizenship.[76]

Another way to extend the argument presented here is to consider other ways in which the family context could shape the decision to naturalize. One possibility is that citizenship is "complementary" within the family. Foreign residents may place higher value on becoming citizens of the country of residence if their spouses are also able to naturalize. The costs of naturalization may be lower when family members apply for citizenship at the same time. Alternatively, families may opt to combine the benefits of holding citizenship of multiple countries, with some people acquiring citizenship of the country of residence, while others remain citizens of the country of origin, so that the family can maintain ties to both countries. Such behavior cannot be understood if we focus on individual incentives and ignore the social context of this decision. Another possibility that I have not been able to ad-

[75] See Çınar 2010, 8. A 2006 reform of the Austrian citizenship law made naturalization more difficult and prohibitively expensive, and the numbers naturalizing have since fallen.

[76] King and Valdez 2011.

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dress within the confines of this article is the potential for disagreement over the value of citizenship, among parents or between parents and children. These issues could be addressed in future research.

This article has shown one way in which the family, a social unit so prosaic that it is often taken for granted, can shape political decision making. Family-level dynamics could also produce distinctive patterns of behavior in other contexts where people face decisions that affect the people they care about. Some of these decisions have important aggregate effects, as in the case of the parental investments in education that help to produce a civic-minded electorate. The implications for one's family may also figure in decisions over whether to engage in risky forms of political activism, such as protest or insurrection. Political scientists have studied the family as a venue of political socialization, a site of attitudinal influence, and a source of inequalities in political participation.[77] The findings of this article suggest that there may still be much more to learn about the ways in which the family shapes political decision making.

Supplementary Material

Supplementary material for this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0043887114000033.

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[77] On socialization, see Jennings and Niemi 1981. On influence, see Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; and Stoker and Jennings 1995. On inequality, see Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 1997; and Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006.

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