us peculiarly well-qualified to sympathize with that ancient situation. 'Looking at Roman art with postmodern eyes' becomes a cheering experience. Once it is accepted that 'originality' is not the ultimate criterion of artistic excellence, once we learn to enjoy the modes of façade, collage and so on, then we can strip from 'emulation' all the queasiness of 'plagiarism'. So, in this volume, there is contented exploration of the cross-currents of connoisseurship, rhetoric, 'serial' copies, and the technical aspects of deriving marble statues from bronze originals. We may even learn to love struts.

NIGEL SPIVEY

Religion

This year, all but one of the books for review concern, entirely or mainly, Greek religion, so that no sub-headings are required. As a student, I was recommended by Moses Finley (of all people, one might think) to read two books that were already then half a century old, having been published in 1912: Cornford's *Thucydides Mythistoricus* and Murray's *Four Stages*. But he would never have dreamed of recommending a third book that appeared in the same year, Jane Harrison's *Themis* ('erratic, associative, intuitive') despite the fact that each of them had contributed a chapter or excursus to it; indeed in the Cambridge of those years, when no one had heard of the supposed 'Cambridge Ritualists', Harrison's work was regarded as an aberration, as an embarrassment – more so even than Frazer's. She suffered, as Renate Schlesier put it, from an effective *damnatio memoriae*. It is therefore ironic that her name is now widely known among the chattering classes, just as it was around 1903 (on one occasion in Dundee 1600 people attempted to attend one of her lectures), whereas theirs have almost faded from view. Not only did she herself publish a kind of autobiography in 1925, but many of her letters appeared in 1959; in the 1970s her work was contextualised by Ackerman and McGinty. The real breakthrough however came with Sandra Peacock's Freudian biography in 1988, which shifted Harrison's memory out of the classical niche. Annabel Robinson's *Life and Work*[1] is thus by no means the first; but it is certainly the fullest, most balanced, and most thoroughly-researched biography to date. It is also intensely readable. Unlike Mary Beard, Robinson is not interested in problematizing the biographer's task or worrying about the treachery of archives: she cites Leon Edel's notion of the 'inner myth' that a good biographer needs to be able to discern. Since Harrison lived for her work, and crafted her own fitting myth and persona, it is not in her case especially difficult to do so. Nor does she have much time for Beard's view of the place of Eugénie Strong in her life. But she builds up a convincing account of Harrison's intellectual and emotional 'Werdegang', and her sometimes difficult personality, and conveys well the intensity of her commitment to her work ('she approached [it] as if she were seeking for the key to the universe itself'), her debts to Germany and France, the importance of travel, the restless search for new ideas and approaches, her extraordinary success as a lecturer and teacher, and something of the mixed emotions she aroused among her colleagues. All the familiar stories are here, such as the forty German professors struggling to mount mules during one of Dörpfeld's Peloponnesian excursions, and Bertie Russell's offer to produce a bull, if Harrison would undertake to tear it

[1] *The Life and Work of Jane Ellen Harrison*. By Annabel Robinson. Oxford U.P., 2002. Pp. xvi +332, with 17 figs. Hardback £45.

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apart in a Bacchic frenzy during her lecture; but also many other less well-known documents and incidents, well reported and sensibly used. (There are though one or two minor blemishes – the Palaikastro 'hymn to the Kouros' for example is dated to the fourth century AD – she means that the text we have was inscribed in the third century AD, although that version was composed in the fourth century BC, on the basis of still older elements – and the grasp of German is a little shaky.) One of a biographer's trickiest decisions naturally concerns how much space to devote to the work. In Harrison's case, the sheer variety of her opinions, and the fact that they are now only of historical interest – who can now face totemism, bull-roarers, and cycles of reincarnation? (though I remember Marcel Detienne exclaiming with surprise, when *Prolegomena* had recently been reprinted, that there were one or two usable ideas in it) – makes the decision exceptionally difficult. Here Robinson is less successful: her accounts are workmanlike but a trifle staid, perhaps even dutiful, and emphases sometimes seem odd. One has sympathy: opening one of Harrison's books is like opening a bee-hive on a summer's day. More seriously, there is little sustained attempt to weigh different types of intellectual debts – there is some discussion of Bergson and Durkheim, but surprisingly, nothing about Maine, Robertson Smith, or Nietzsche, and it is not clear whether that is due to a judgement about their real lack of importance to her, or simply an oversight; of course there are no answers to such questions in the archives. Though there is certainly more to be said, the best brief account to my mind is still Renate Schlesier's in Calder's *The Cambridge Ritualists Reconsidered* (1991), for whom the keys to Harrison are her absorption of the lessons of the German historicists of the first half of the nineteenth century (at one point Harrison apparently confuses the two Müllers, K. O. and H. D., implying to me that she saw them not as individuals but as a tradition), and the vaguely Darwinian conviction that origins are both crucially important and in principle discoverable. Schlesier is also right to claim that Harrison's achievement was twofold, to value images as at least equipollent with texts, rather than as mere illustrations of what was already known from literary texts, and to find the key to Greek religion in the relation of ritual praxis to thinking and feeling. But I cannot help agreeing with Henk Versnel's observation that everything Harrison had intellectually to offer has long since been absorbed into the neo-historicism of Walter Burkert and those he has influenced. I see Harrison as a neo-Romantic who came to grief on what J. H. Elliott once called the 'quicksands of comparative history and comparative religion'; her restless eclecticism proved in the end a weakness not a strength. There remains the Harrison who inherited the £300 annuity under her mother's will which allowed her to survive as an intellectual woman, the first woman to give a lecture in the University of Cambridge, the Fellow of Newnham whose ideas and personality influenced a sheaf of Modernist writers. Robinson has served this Harrison well. One of Harrison's *idées fixes* was the contrast between the cult of the Olympians and that of heroes. She believed that heroes – mortals who have passed away – were worshipped by the Greeks in such a way as to stress their distinctiveness from the 'proper' gods and their closeness to the ordinary dead: whereas the symbolism of Olympian cult linked images of light, height, volatility, upward motion, and joyful collective celebration, that for heroes was characterized by the inverse, dark colours, low altars (*escharai*) or holes in the earth (*bothroi*), pushing the victim's head downwards, extensive use of blood, holocausts . . . On this view, the heroes' classificatory ambiguity between Olympian and human is satisfyingly reflected in the symbolism of actual cult. Given Harrison's intellectual debts, it comes as no

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surprise to find that this is in fact one of the oldest organizing ideas in modern scholarship, featuring already both in the Schlegelian comparativism of F. Creuzer's *Symbolik* (1st ed. 1810–11; 3rd 1842) and in the work of Creuzer's historicist opponents, for example Karl Otfried Müller's essay on Eleusis; Müller indeed aligned it with the further dichotomy he himself did much to establish (and which of course Harrison also believed in), between Olympian and chthonic/chthonian deities. Nor was it dreamed up by the Romantics: similar ideas could be found explicitly in the scholiasts, for example to Homer, *Od.* 1.291, Aesch., *Cho.* 484c, or Eur. *Phoen.* 274, and in the late-antique lexica, such as Hesychius and the Suda, which provided a reassuringly solid bridge between classical antiquity and modern times. Moreover, the evocation of Teiresias in the *Nekyia*, for all that its details did not quite fit the required scenario, as well as archaeological work on the association between early hero cults and graves, seemed to prove that it was legitimate to take the opposition as a constant of Greek religion. Like the dichotomy between Olympian and chthonian, the intermediate cultic status of heroes has, however, been under pressure for some while now. Its vulnerable point has always been that empirical evidence for cult-practice hardly supports it. Two generations ago, A. D. Nock pointed out how frequently heroes were offered ordinary 'Olympian' sacrifice, suggesting that exceptions were just that, and needed to be understood in terms of the mood or atmosphere of the rite in question. Since then, however, they have scarcely figured in the revival of academic interest in Greek sacrifice, though E. Vandiver showed in 1991 that, as far as Herodotus is concerned, there was no difference between the cult of gods and heroes; and in a series of articles over the past decade Annie Verbanck-Piérard has argued that the distinction makes little sense in relation to some of the most prominent examples, Herakles, healing cults, and the Attic demes. Gunnel Ekroth, a pupil of the late Brigitta Bergquist in Stockholm, has now in her *Sacrificial Rituals of Greek Hero-Cults* shown that, whatever the case may have been in later antiquity (which she does not discuss in any depth), the rule in the Archaic and Classical periods was that heroes receive the same type of sacrifice, which we are now to term *thysía*, as 'proper' gods, and, drawing upon Michael Jameson's fertile notion of 'powerful actions', made a strong case for seeing the exceptions, with Nock, as inflections of the rule to achieve special ends. 'Ritually speaking, ' she concludes, 'the heroes belonged with the gods'.[2] The issue is both methodological and empirical. The traditional view is largely based on late 'sources', which were all too explicit but whose own Tendenz was never thematized; this parti-pris was compounded by an interested reading of selected literary texts; and the evidence of the sacrificial calendars, largely Attic, which has of course only been available relatively recently, either interpreted in a consistent fashion or ignored when it did not fit. It is also true that the category 'hero' is in many ways unsatisfactory in that it covers a wide spectrum of cults evincing a wide variety of cult actions, from famous names transmitted from the Bronze Age to obscure Attic deme-heroes, from revered oikists to gallant generals, from figures in local sacred narratives to groups of war-dead. This looseness cannot easily be contained by classification. Ekroth's suggestion is that we should envisage a continuum between God and Deceased marked by the classes god/god, god/hero, hero/hero, hero/deceased, deceased/deceased (330). From that perspective, a hero can be defined as a locally prominent person who has lived and died,

[2] *The Sacrificial Rituals of Greek Hero-Cults in the Archaic to the early Hellenistic periods*. By Gunnel Ekroth. Kernos Supplément 12, 2002. Pp. 429, with 14 figs. Paperback.

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but has been released from the family's tendance of its dead into the public sphere of divine cult. The type might be the cult of Erechtheus, to whom, as the *Iliad* tells us (2.547–52), rams and bulls were sacrificed in the temple of Athena in Athens. Her main task being demolition, Ekroth sets to with a will, using the sacrificial calendars of the Classical period as her proof-stone (the Greek texts of those from Thorikos, Marathon, Erchia, and the Salaminioi are printed in an appendix). She shows that there is no reason to think that an *eschara* was, prior to the Hellenistic period, anything but a (small) brazier, and that the pre-300 BC texts in which the word occurs with *bômos*, such as Soph. *Ant.* 1016 and Eur. *Andr.* 1085–1165, suggest that they could be used interchangeably. The sole literary text prior to the Roman period to align gods with *bômoi* and heroes with *escharai* is Neanthes of Cyzicus, *FGrH* 84 F7, in turn the source of several scholia and lexical entries – but without a context it is useless; and we should note (though Ekroth does not), that Neanthes, who may have lived into the second century, shows a strong interest in Pythagorika – and it is in this period that we know Pythagoreans were concerned with the relation between the theory of metempsychosis and the rules for sacrifice. Insofar as *escharai* were especially connected with hero-shrines – and they are not markedly – it may be because such shrines tended to be smaller and less well-furnished than temples to the gods, so that they possessed just a simple brazier for sacrifices. She also shows that no texts earlier than the Roman period link *bothroi* to the cult of heroes, and that only tertiary texts (scholia, lexica) link these holes in the ground with a specific form of sacrifice, *enagizein*/*enagismos*. Most literary texts which mention *bothroi* consciously allude to the *Nekyia*; and they seem, with clear exceptions such as the large permanent *bothros* in the Anaktoron at Samothrace, to have been temporary, special-purpose sites. Half of all known literary uses of *enagis*-words occur in just four Roman-period authors, including Plutarch and Pausanias, who clearly imagined that they denoted an ancient, even primitive, form of destructive sacrifice to heroes; but it is virtually impossible to find authentic archaeological examples of holocaust sacrifice – the one known case relates to the cult of Palaimon at the Isthmus. Gifts of food to heroes (*theoxeniai*), which, being cheap, were probably very common, are to be linked not with the cult of the dead (Totenmahl) but with analogous offerings to the gods. On the positive side, the argument is, so to speak, for Harrisonian ritualism titrated with J.-L. Durand and Folkert van Straten. The tacit rule of the sacral calendars is that all sacrifices not specifically marked as holocaustic – that is, the great majority – are *thysíai*. The victims that are to be destroyed rather than eaten are invariably cheap, inconsiderable animals, mainly piglets. In the Greek view, to holocaust larger animals was a sheer waste of meat – and such actions are accordingly only performed by foreign despots. It is in fact impossible to over-estimate the power of this one model of sacral eating in Greek culture (which, for example, as G. Kuhn showed in 1985, created the stoa as a public building-type). Moreover, holocausting should be seen as only one among several techniques for marking an offering as 'special case' – one could alternatively, for specific symbolic ends, break the usual thysian rules relating to sacrificial blood (cutting the jugular; collection in a vessel, the *sphageion*; splashing a little blood on the face of the altar; whipping the blood for at least half an hour to prevent it from coagulating, then making blood-sausages in the gut) in different modes, by slashing the throat wide open – even severing the head -, 'wasting' the blood by pouring it into the ground or into running water, smearing it over surfaces to be 'cleansed', or drinking it. In hero-cults, blood-rituals of these kinds tend to occur in

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three contexts, war, purification, and contacting the dead. Ritual events are thus to be understood as governed by a shared grammar by means of which Greek sacrificers and the framers of sacral laws could compose different 'sentences', conveying different symbolic messages. Although she orients herself in this context primarily towards Jameson's idea of intensification, and J. van Baal's interesting article in *Numen* 25 (1976), 161–78, one can see a clear analogy here with the School of Rome's (Brelich, Sabatucci) fruitful distinction between the religion of everyday and the religion of the special case – only, here, the special case obtrudes, via sacral laws, into the religion of everyday. A pragmatic perspective such as this is much to be preferred over the crude dichotomy between Olympian and heroic cult – even if it cannot be quite excluded that such a contrast did not begin to impose itself in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. This question needs special discussion on its own; I should however be surprised if it turns out to be the case. This is a thoughtful book – exhaustive, careful, and fair-minded – which compellingly re-interprets the documentary and literary texts relating to hero-cult in the light of a pragmatic view of ritual. It also delivers a serious blow to Scott Scullion's recent defence (*ZPE* 121, 1998; 132, 2000) of the traditional distinction between Olympian and chthonian rituals (Ekroth shows, for example, that the injunction *ou phora* in the sacral calendars cannot be interpreted to mean that such flesh was usually in part destroyed: it just means what it says, the meat is to be eaten within the temenos). On its own ground, it is highly persuasive – one's reservations are minor and relate to details only. But it is not, and does not pretend to be, a complete account of the role of heroes in Greek religious praxis, of their supposed tomb cults, or of their frequently frightening and destructive aspects, such as sending plagues or driving people mad. It is a contribution solely to the question of the cult normally offered to heroes. This volume is to be complemented by another devoted to the specifically archaeological evidence relating to Archaic and Classical hero- and tomb-cult, which will underline the general message about the looseness of the category as a whole. Together, they will deservedly establish Ekroth as one of the most important members of the 'Swedish School' of pragmatic, eclectic, archaeologists of Greek religion, which, mainly through its conferences, has over the past few years stimulated an entire shelf-full of work, on the *Realien* of Greek cult practice, the role of religion in the early *polis*, the organization of sanctuaries, the varieties of hero-cult, the Olympian-chthonian dichotomy, to name only the most important.

Anyone who read Margaret Alexiou's *The Ritual Lament* when it first appeared in 1974 will register, first, astonishment that the Cambridge University Press at that time allowed it to go out of print, and then pleasure that it has been re-issued almost thirty years later by Rowman and Littlefield in a lightly-revised form which includes a thematically-organized selective bibliographical supplement up to 1998 mainly by D. Yatromanolakis (one is however mildly astonished not to find G. Holst-Warhaft, *Dangerous voices: Women's laments and Greek literature* [1992]).[3] At the time what seemed most novel about the book was its assertion of a continuous tradition of popular funerary lament from Antiquity through the Turkish occupation to modern practice in rural Greece, where Dr. Alexiou had done extensive fieldwork during the early-mid 1960s in Thessaly and western Macedonia. This was a striking

[3] *The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition*. By Margaret Alexiou, edited by Dimitrios Yatromanolakis and Panagiotis Roilos. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2002. Pp. xviii + 293. Paperback £22.95.

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justification of the rationale behind the then unique organization of the Department of Greek at Birmingham University, where her father, George Thomson, had been professor. With its Zorba-like photos of ageless peasant women at the grave, this was not a book that concerned itself with the usual academic boundaries: by chapter 2, one was already on to John Chrysostom's scathing rejection of this 'disease of females', to C. Bondelmontius' graphic description, in the early fifteenth century, of Cretan mourners' return to a sort of pre-civilized state for a year or more following a death, remaining indoors with the shutters up, eating while sitting on the floor, and attending no Church services; by chapter 5, on to the laments over the Fall of Constantinople, the scandalous sale of Parga by the British Government to the Turk in 1817, and the Vlachic *Lament for 1940* : '1940 was a very bad year, Lelé, lelé . . . Five aeroplanes came down and hid the sun, Lelé, lelé . . .'. This new edition owes its existence to the fact that the editors, both junior faculty-members at Harvard (where Alexiou ended her academic career in Modern Greek studies), had recently translated the book into Greek. One of its agendas, the tracing of the history of the popular lament back to antiquity, indeed to Homer, is thus evidently still actual: they report that rural practice has – surprisingly – not altered very greatly since the early seventies. From that point of view, the book was a contribution to folklore studies – the general thought can be traced at least as far back as J. T. Bent's account in *The Cyclades* (1885) of a Christianized 'swing festival' which supposedly goes back to the ritual for Erigone at the Attic Anthesteria, not to mention J. C. Lawson's *Modern Greek Folklore* (1910). And the stress on finding the legitimate comparandum in modern rural rather than literary laments has a whiff of Mannhardtian folk-fundamentalism about it: peasants preserve practice perfectly. Non-hellenes may perhaps find that agenda less convincing, particularly inasmuch as it involves playing down context and meaning, above all the influence of both Orthodox belief and the folk view that represents each individual as a microcosmic battle-ground between God and the Devil. And they will be suspicious of the hidden political implications of any such concession. Moreover, the range of modern *moirológi* seems much wider than what we know from the ancient world. But though Alexiou does sometimes seem to be suggesting continuity in a strong sense, as when, for example, she lays stress on the continued use into modern times of the stem *anakal-* in connection with the invocation of the dead at the tomb, her principle that the lament must be studied as part of the ritual to which it belongs actually implies a much looser notion of continuity, a notion which she tacitly accepts in the chapters on 'modern survivals' and on classification. It is partly this flexibility, the lack of dogma, that makes her book still enjoyable. What about its other aims? Alexiou rightly defended the popular lament on the charge of being derivative: it is of course conventional, and draws upon *topoi*, a range of stock themes and formulae, but within those constraints she shows that the compositional aim was to vary ideas, language and style as much as possible. The sections that have lasted best seem to me to be the explicitly literary discussions in the second half, the classification of the different types of (modern) lament, the analysis of antiphonal and antithetical structures (a characteristic device of quasi-formulaic composition, wittily parodied already by Lucian, *de luctu* 13, 'not having been a soldier, not having been a farmer . . .'), and the survey of themes whose deployment creates the strong sense of family resemblance between the laments she cites: the initial rhetorical hesitation; the oppositions between then and now, speaker and the defunct; wishing and cursing, praise and reproach; and the metaphors from nature which serve to locate a particular death within the grander

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scheme of things. Perhaps inevitably given the amount of recent interest in the matter, it is the first part of the first section, on Archaic and Classical defunctive practice, that has worn least well. There is a marked tendency towards the practice deplored by Ekroth, stitching together evidence from different – often widely different – periods in order to provide a synthetic picture. On occasion we find some delightful comparative stuff, derived from R. F. Willetts, who, at least in this context was evidently a faithful follower of George Thomson's unreconstructed Marxism, even including a reference to Engels' favourite anthropologist, Lewis H. Morgan. And Thomson's spirit – to say nothing of Gustave Glotz' – hovers indefinably over the speculations about the origin of the antiphonal structure of the funerary lament, for example in the thought that it might be a product of the supposedly different roles assigned to cognatic and agnatic kin; and in the analysis of the Solonian restrictions on defunctive extravagance. But taken as a literary account of the ritual lament, rather than as a book about the continuity of defunctive practice, Alexiou's book still evokes much of the pleasure one took in it thirty years ago.

Next, a book on Greek piety for the general reader. Jean Rudhardt began his classic analysis of Greek religious language, *Notions fondamentales* (1958, 1992) with a brief but penetrating analysis of the word *eusebeia*, pointing out that it denotes behaviour in accordance with a virtuous, pre-established, inner disposition, in respect of a whole series of central values: *ta hiera* in the narrow sense, the gods more generally, reverence for the dead, protection of suppliants, respect for one's parents and family, one's *polis* and its right of self-defence, even friendships, and that this wide meaning is supported by the Peripatetic definition of its inverse, *asebeia*, at the end of [Arist.] *de virt.* (1251a 30f.). Indeed Rudhardt's book as a whole is a kind of commentary on the Greek idea of 'piety'. This signal has not hitherto been followed up by the School of Paris, but Louise Bruit Zaidman of the Centre Louis-Gernet, well-known in the Anglo-Saxon world for her successful textbook on Greek religion, written with Pauline Schmitt-Pantel, has now returned to Rudhardt's problem in a series directed by P. Vidal-Naquet.[4] She begins with the question, What does 'piety' mean in a polytheistic religion, where it is impossible to develop a personal relation to a unique god? She locates the term at the interface between public action and subjective self-regard: it does have an emotional component, but the true quality of *eusebeia* is to be found in the way in which it is externalized or represented in action. 'Être pieux . . . c'est agir pieusement.' She thus avoids the false dichtomies between (true) internal and (false) external piety, and between the intimate/private and the social/collective. On the one hand, piety is represented 'vertically' as the behaviour that the gods expect of the individual, who must thereby show them that he respects their rights and dues, and the order of the world they sustain. On the other, it is represented 'horizontally', in the performance of an entire range of concrete actions, which enable one's fellow-citizens to judge one to be *eusebês*. Inversely, *asebeia* is likewise always expressed in terms of concrete actions, never simply as moral obloquy. She thus understands *eusebeia* as part of a projected cultural anthropology of the Greeks – her title is indeed taken from a chapter heading in Sissa & Detienne's *The Daily Life of the Greek Gods* (1989, Engl. 2000): its history is one aspect of the history of the *polis*. The book falls into three parts. The first depicts *eusebeia* in performance, expressed in specific behaviours and gestures, with

[4] *Le commerce des dieux:* Eusebeia. *Essai sur la piété en Grèce ancienne.* By Louise Bruit Zaidman. Éditions La Découverte & Syros, Paris, 2001. Pp. 240, with 17 figs. Paperback €20.58.

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Aristophanes' *Ploutos* used as a tacit reference-model of piety. It consists in an inevitably rapid sketch of the main features of *polis*-religion: festivals, which express the collective gratitude for blessings received and confidence in their future bestowal; prayer, which gives specific meaning to ritual action; the sacrificial system (considerable stress is laid here, for reasons that later become clear, on a feature of *thysía* which Bruit Zaidmann worked on twenty years ago but has been almost totally ignored otherwise by the School of Paris: *panspermia* and other types of bloodless offering, which do not involve division, and where, as it were, the gods are invited to the human table). There follow brief accounts of divination, understood as a dialogue with the gods involving negotiation between sign and interpretation (let me here signal an excellent introduction to this well-worn topic, V. Rosenberger, *Griechische Orakel: Eine Kulturgeschichte* [2001]); and mysteries, whose 'otherness' with respect to the major system is played down. The second section presents Bruit Zaidman's main analysis of the development of *eusebeia*, in a trajectory between Theognis (the word does not occur in Homer of course, which suits her stress on the connection between piety and *polis*), Attic tragedy (mainly Aeschylus), and a group of 'portraits' from the late fifth/early fourth century – Nicias, Xenophon, Agesilaos, Socrates, Euthyphro. The argument here is that piety, as a cultural concept, is always a counter in social relations, and subject to argument and negotiation, claim and counter-claim. By the fourth century this leads to specific reflection about the concept itself, both in Xenophon's defence of Socrates and in the *Euthyphro*. The third section discusses the emergence of principled opposition to *thysía*, particularly Theophrastus' 'archaeology' of sacrifice and his insistence that human beings are naturally vegetarian, and ending with Porphyry's appeal to the notions of a hierarchy of sacrifices, and mankind's 'true' food. Even the philosophical redefinition of *eusebeia* as a moral, indeed spiritual, attitude depends upon the visible behaviour of refusing to eat meat. Much of this is well-taken. It is valuable to find *eusebeia* problematized and discussed not so much as a mere given, which everyone agreed on, as a judgement and a claim, which could be deployed and fragmented. That is one clear gain of the cultural approach. The contextualization of Theophrastus and Dicaearchus by means of the issues raised by the 'portraits' is another, as is the extension of the Archaic subversion of the sacrificial system to some of the philosophical responses to the decline of the *polis*, above all the reworking of socio-political values into ethico-religious ones. But Bruit Zaidman has not really solved the problem of how to represent *eusebeia* in action – what we get in the first part is a rechauffé of the familiar Paris-School idealization of *polis*-religion. The chapters on divination and mysteries are too short to get much of an argument going specifically relating to piety. Nor, given the insistence on *eusebeia* as a concept of the *polis*, is it clear how she would deal with the piety of foreigners: the *theosebeia* of Croesus, for example, is nowhere examined. In the second section, the discussion of *eusebeia* in tragedy is strangely truncated, being limited to rather cursory discussion of a handful of passages, and, although one important issue, whether and how far the piety of women is comparable to that of men, is alluded to there, it is not thematized. Here, once again, the School of Paris pays the price of its Durkheimian origins. Finally, particularly in view of George Boys-Stones' recent powerful account of the pre-occupations of Middle Platonism in *Post-Hellenistic Philosophy* (2001), it is perhaps unfortunate that she chose to continue the argument on to Porphyry himself without having the space to do justice to the religio-philosophical changes of the intervening period. A stimulating Parisian account, then, raising more issues than its brevity can properly address. It has

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long been recognized that magic, or perhaps 'magic', provides a good, perhaps even the best, insight into popular understanding of religious systems and their daily uses. Two books, both partly or wholly written at the Center for Hellenic Studies in Washington, represent the first monographic treatments of their subjects; Classics missed out on the entire first generation of historical work on this topic from Walker, Mandrou, and Ginzburg onwards. One is the paperback version of Christopher Faraone's well-received *Love Magic*, originally published in 1999, which does indeed, as one reviewer observed, pack more interest into its few pages than many a larger work.[5] Faraone's distinctive contribution to the study of Greek magic in the Archaic and Classical period (apart from calling attention to numerous particles of 'buried' evidence) has been twofold: to see how to use comparative material to amplify the wretchedly lacunate surviving evidence; and to situate what does survive in its social context. Here he argues that some features of Greek love magic, for example, the use of belts and amulets, most famously Aphrodite's *kestos himas* in *Iliad* 14, recall the use of knotted threads in neo-Assyrian texts, especially the *egalkura* series, to restrain anger and enhance attractiveness, and that aspects of the *agogai* or *agogima*, the erotic compulsion spells among the Graeco-Egyptian magical papyri, which are mainly of (late) imperial date, are directly relevant to an understanding of Classical Greek erotic magic. The book's central argument is that there are two quite different types of Greek love magic, (aggressive) erotic magic, which is designed to compel a person, normally a woman, to experience passion for a named client, and (defensive) reconciliatory magic, used by wives to recover errant husbands. (This is why anthropologists, insofar as they interest themselves in this question, have generally dropped the expression 'love magic' in favour of 'magic concerned with intimate personal relationships'). The literary type of erotic magic is Pindar's allusion in *Pyth.* 4 to Aphrodite teaching Jason how to cause Medea to fall in love with him by means of a *iynx* (which F. understands as primarily a form of torture-wheel, used for breaking criminals' bodies), but the same intention is clearly present in the Graeco-Egyptian *agogai*. This genre raises interesting questions concerning the implied sexual nature of women/girls, the role of magic in negotiating between suitors, girls, and parents in a society in which access to women's sexual favours was carefully policed, and remoter practices, such as abductive marriage, which may provide a context for the language of violent subjugation so characteristic of these texts. The conclusion is that the *agogai* operate against a background in which the social fact of girls' erotic madness in a context of negotiated marriage-settlements was a means of easing their passage from one household to another on their own terms. The literary type of defensive magic is Deianeira in Soph. *Trachiniae*, who gives Herakles a philtre not to revenge herself upon him for his faithlessness – what Greek wife realistically expected fidelity? – nor because she was infatuated with him, but precisely because she was his wife and feared being ignored or abandoned if he married Iole, as he evidently intended to do. This type of magic is closely related to Near-Eastern spells for reducing anger; and was further associated in Greece with a male fear of being neutered by potions. A kind of fusion of these two types can be found among courtesans and prostitutes, who lived in a highly competitive world where the highest, and very scarce, good was the long-term affection of a wealthy young man; which leads Faraone to

[5] *Ancient Greek Love Magic*. By Christopher Faraone. Harvard U.P., 2001. Pp. xii + 223. Paperback.

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suggest that Simaetha in Theocr. *Idyll* 2 is precisely in this situation. The final point is that we can see at least two different models of gender in this material, misogynist versus 'misandrist' (surely 'athliogynist'?), women as dangerous, women as victims, but that we do not have to choose between them: such images are not 'true' models but pragmatic ones, which tell us more about where people happen to be standing than about their culture's deep beliefs. The distinction between aggressive and defensive magic is a fundamental insight into the implicit rules of love magic, which makes sense of many of its features that one had noticed but never consciously allocated. It links 'belief' with social interest. It also reproduces basic role-models in Greek culture, according to which men are supposed to be active in obtaining their ends, women reticent and/or devious. But the book's main achievement, I think, is to vindicate the claim that the study of magic is not an insignificant minor avocation, but mainstream, inasmuch as magical activity is associated with many of the critical points of social conflict and ambiguity, in this case those concerned with gender roles, power, rights, and identities. Magic is not 'irrational' but an aspect of social history; yet how much has been written on gender lately without ever taking it into consideration! One would however have liked to see more discussion of the issue of social power: who exactly has recourse to magic of this kind, and under what circumstances? Sophocles' Deianeira and Euripides' Medea are both unrealistic figures in that both are supposed to be high-status women who yet have recourse to magic: that is why stress is laid upon the fact that they have no family to protect their interests. If recourse to defensive magic is a mark of powerlessness, what about erotic or aggressive magic? Moreover, how are we to understand the role of aggressive magic for the client? Faraone suggests his benefit is a psychological boost; but how does that relate to the argument about the girl's erotic mania? The sharp distinction between defensive and aggressive makes it difficult to place an entire area of magical discourse (related to the issue of the witch-bawd): its use by men to excuse sexual failure, the risk of which is believed to be high in aggressively promiscuous social situations where 'performance' is at a premium, and their beliefs about women's tricks to turn men's heads (analogous to the famous *Tehuana* of Mexico). What is a man to say when he loses face by acting 'stupidly' under the influence of a pair of bewitching eyes? Inversely, magic is central to the rationalization by *hetairai* and prostitutes of the carrousel of loss and gain. The distinction also blunts the force of the point that in this area the interests of husbands and wives are often violently discrepant. In all these areas, just as in the case of the evil eye, love magic is 'good to think'. But such questions do not at all reduce the value of Faraone's genuine achievement: they pay homage to the fertility of his analysis. Faraone's book is partly based on earlier articles, and part of its interest is the manner in which these have been put together to form the elements in a larger argument. Daniel Ogden's book on necromancy, on the other hand, was entirely written within an academic year: with a bibliography of over 900 items and hundreds of footnotes, this is indeed an astonishing achievement.[6] It evidently emerged out of his earlier work on curse-tablets, which likewise take for granted the power and knowledge of the dead. Ogden's book is immensely informative: it lists and discusses virtually every passage from ancient literature that mentions necromancy, and indeed any practice connected with ghosts,

[6] *Greek and Roman Necromancy*. By Daniel Ogden. Princeton U.P., 2001. Pp. xxxii + 313. Hardback £35.

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the dead, soul-journeys, and the like (though it unfortunately lacks an index locorum). In fact, it almost amounts to an account of ancient magical practice tout court. It is organized in four sections, three concerned with Realien: the sites where oracles of the dead were located in antiquity (Thesprotia, Tainaron, Avernus near Cumae, Herakleia in Pontus), the individuals who performed necromantic consultations, and the methods they employed; the fourth section deals with more subjective issues, the experience of the consultants, and discussion of how consultations may have worked. He rightly argues that it is impossible to write a meaningful history of ancient necromancy, so that any treatment has to be synthetic and in a sense idealizing. In the absence of documents (there is no 'necromantic epigraphy' for example), one can only try to take account of the contexts and Tendenz of the literary texts which constitute the evidence. And he makes a serious effort to group and organize the very considerable material, from the *Nekyia* to the *pseudo-Clementines*, from Akanthis to Zatchlas, from Acheron to Ocean, into meaningful categories: the dead at the tomb, shamanic figures, reports of reanimating the dead, the kinds of knowledge assigned to the dead, and so on. All of this industry is impressive, learned, and useful. Necromancy is defined as any revelation provided to the living by the dead. Ogden refuses to ask the question, Why did the ancients practice necromancy?, preferring to turn the issue round, and ask, Why don't we? – and will not stay for an answer. If this is not a history of necromancy, what is it? A history of the ideas, beliefs, and prejudices about it. A contribution to the history of ideas then? Not exactly, it turns out, because, as becomes clear in the case of the necromantic oracle in Thesprotia, which is explored with the aid of Homer's *Nekyia* and Pausanias, we are to suppose the existence of an actual *nekyomanteion* somewhere by the lake, used in the Archaic and Classical period, and possibly still active at the time of Clement of Alexandria, if not into the early fourth century (Ogden rightly accepts the recent demonstration that the building at Mesopotamos nr. Igoumenitsa, which Sotirios Dakaris identified as the oracle, and which is today presented in guidebooks as the Nekromanteion, was a Hellenistic fort). We can moreover read dozens of sentences of the type 'We are not told the ages of the people Nero killed for divination under the guidance of Tiridates . . . but they may well have been boys too' (197). Yet at the same time Ogden agrees that we cannot identify a single authentic or even plausible account of an actual necromantic session; and though one may well have sympathy with his argument that most necromantic experiences were incubatory, that is, involved dreams of the dead, that does not correspond with the great bulk of the literary evidence, of which he claims to be writing the history. The speed at which Ogden evidently works has demanded its price: he has had no time to distance himself from the material, and ask himself what he wants to do with it, so that he is constantly moving unmediatedly between ancient reports and his own judgements about what is plausible and what not. But of what value are such judgements in relation to the type of literary texts that are involved here? He cannot even manage the distance implied by the notion of a discourse. It is obvious to the neutral outsider that, at least as a project, necromancy must be located at the interface between two major praxeis, that relating to the dead, and divination; and that it needs to be situated theoretically in relation to both before one can begin to decide what evidence is to be selected in answer to what questions. For on reflection the apparently concrete questions to which Ogden produces the answers: Where? Who? How? only make sense if we are dealing with an actual institution. But it is precisely the institutional status of necromancy which is most doubtful, a doubt which

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apparently justified Ogden in his original statement of intent, to write a history of ideas. But at least anyone who wants now to attempt that task, and treat necromancy, say, as the constantly-reinvented margin between intuitive and inductive divination, which tests the limits of each, can be grateful that there now exists a massive collection of organized material at his or her disposal. The final book this year concerns the much-debated issue of the experience of the Jews in the Diaspora. Erich Gruen, a distinguished historian of the later Republic and Rome's entry into the Hellenistic world, has been working on the cultural history of Hellenistic and Roman Judaism for well over a decade now. His earlier book on this theme, *Heritage and Hellenism* (1998), argued that the Jews engaged actively with many of the genres of Hellenistic literary culture, rewriting their own traditions within a Hellenistic idiom, a rewriting which necessitated at the same time a reinvention of the Jewish past. In this second book, *Diaspora*,[7] he complements this argument with another, that it is quite wrong to read the situation of the Jewish diaspora back from the fate of Palestine in AD 70, and impose a sharp alternative between ghettoization and total assimilation. He offers an up-beat account of Diaspora experience, concluding that most such Jews (who by the first century AD were also the great majority of all Jews) managed without too much difficulty to combine accommodation to the fact of living outside Palestine with an acceptance of their Jewish identity. To do this, he uses four strategies. The first is to re-assess the evidence for the position of Jews in the Diaspora – limited in fact to Rome, Alexandria, and the cities of Asia Minor, nominally from Alexander but mainly in practice between Pompey and Nero – and show that what has generally been taken to be evidence for generalized hostility to the Jews need not be so understood. He then argues that the Jews were integrated institutionally into the Hellenistic cities: the synagogue fulfilled many representative and organizational functions for the Jewish communities, and is in no sense to be assimilated to the *synodos*/*collegium* model. The Jews also had no hesitation in participating in the civic life of these cities. The second pair of arguments is cultural, designed to show that the Jews did have a concept of the Diaspora, even though they never developed a 'philosophy' of it, and certainly never longed to return. One prong is an analysis of a number of books in the Apocrypha (e.g. *Tobit, Judith, II Maccabees*), and the pseudepigrapha (esp. *Testament of Abraham*), attempting to show that they are suffused with a comic playfulness, which he interprets as a mark of relaxation within the wider culture. The other (the final two chapters, which have already been published elsewhere) is devoted to Jewish representations of Hellenic and Roman culture, which were more or less subtly refashioned to demonstrate the moral and intellectual superiority of Jewish institutions and assumptions. A brave book, therefore, fully aware of the challenges it offers to numerous camps in this contentious field. The two more convincing sections are the second and the fourth. The Jews may not have enjoyed citizen rights in Greek cities (whatever the case in Rome), but they were at least, in different degrees in different cities, assimilated into city life – as far as we can tell, there were no ghettoes, and Jewish tombstones regularly appear alongside Hellenic ones. And there is little question that the Jews borrowed Hellenic institutions and habits of thought while at the same time seeking to delimit themselves in a multitude of ways, major and minor, from the host communities. Gruen is also

[7] *Diaspora: Jews amidst Greeks and Romans*. By Erich S. Gruen. Harvard U.P., 2002. Pp. ix + 386. Hardback £27.50.

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justified in claiming that there cannot have been constant high friction between the Jewish communities and the host populations. Nevertheless, the first three chapters, which try to argue away the evidence for intermittent tensions, do so in a thoroughly suspicious manner, by taking each item separately, and arguing its significance away, when it is only as a sequence, as a group, that they acquire their potential force. Thus the expulsions of Jews from Rome are dismissed one after the other as at best 'symbolic' or 'enhancement of the image of the régime'; the Alexandrian pogrom of AD 38 ('a brief episode') made – *incredibile dictu* - the responsibility of the Egyptians, and Josephus' reports of tensions in Asia cut down to minor disputes over the protectionist intentions of the Greeks. Moreover, the decision not to pursue the Diaspora beyond AD 70 allows Gruen to avoid discussing the effects of the Bar Kochba revolt, and the Cyrenaic War. Gruen himself allows that the third section is risky ('the allusions are less than explicit, requiring interpretation and imagination'), and I admit that I failed in most cases to grasp the point he was making. If anything, the implication of the Apocryphal and pseudepigraphical texts (which are anyway mostly earlier than the texts he deals with in other sections) seems to me the very opposite of what he claims: *Tobit*, for example, may show Tobit recovering his sight and enjoying a ripe old age in Ecbatana, but before that, despite all his virtue and his burying of the executed Jew, he loses everything; the irony of *Judith* is simply dramatic irony, to build up the story until she murders Holofernes – the situation is such that it requires a woman to become a man. Such themes surely imply an element of compensation for a daily life that is less than comfortable, where the status of the Jew is contested rather than taken for granted. And one might draw the same implication from some of Gruen's own evidence in the fourth section. All in all, a much less convincing, and more ragged, book than *Heritage and Hellenism*, and one which is bound to evoke a considerable degree of disagreement. And one rather wishes that Gruen would stick to one register: is it really appropriate in an academic book, even one by a Californian, to write phrases such as 'stir up too much of ruckus', or 'make a peep'? Just as irony is not necessarily humour, facetiousness is not necessarily wit.

RICHARD GORDON

Sexuality and Gender

The appearance of a new volume, *Sexuality and Gender in the Classical World: Readings and Sources*, edited by Laura K. McClure, which brings together some of the most influential articles previously published in the field, presents a timely opportunity to review newer scholarship on the same topic.[1] As the volume is well-designed for use in a teaching context, it will be informative to survey potentially complementary materials. McClure chooses to divide the subject geographically between Greece and Rome with four articles dedicated to each. The articles are supported by appropriate extracts from classical texts in translation. On Greek sexuality, McClure selected Dover's 'Classical Greek Attitudes to Sexuality', pairing it with Aristophanes' speech from

[1] *Sexuality and Gender in the Classical World.* Readings and Sources. Edited by Laura K. McClure. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2002. Pp. xiii + 318, with 9 black and white illustrations. Paper £15.99.

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